From f59393bd0d10c33c27c98a39c57aba22fdd00a62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: zhouwenpei Date: Thu, 26 Oct 2023 02:31:41 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] fix CVE-2023-5367,CVE-2023-5380,CVE-2023-5574 --- backport-0001-CVE-2023-5574.patch | 109 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ backport-0002-CVE-2023-5574.patch | 39 +++++++++++ backport-0003-CVE-2023-5574.patch | 50 ++++++++++++++ backport-CVE-2023-5367.patch | 80 ++++++++++++++++++++++ backport-CVE-2023-5380.patch | 98 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ xorg-x11-server.spec | 10 ++- 6 files changed, 385 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 backport-0001-CVE-2023-5574.patch create mode 100644 backport-0002-CVE-2023-5574.patch create mode 100644 backport-0003-CVE-2023-5574.patch create mode 100644 backport-CVE-2023-5367.patch create mode 100644 backport-CVE-2023-5380.patch diff --git a/backport-0001-CVE-2023-5574.patch b/backport-0001-CVE-2023-5574.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a3631c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0001-CVE-2023-5574.patch @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +From 1953f460b9ad1a9cdf0fcce70f6ad3310b713d5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2023 12:44:13 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] fb: properly wrap/unwrap CloseScreen + +fbCloseScreen assumes that it overrides miCloseScreen (which just +calls FreePixmap(screen->devPrivates)) and emulates that instead of +wrapping it. + +This is a wrong assumption, we may have ShmCloseScreen in the mix too, +resulting in leaks (see below). Fix this by properly setting up the +CloseScreen wrapper. + +This means we no longer need the manual DestroyPixmap call in +vfbCloseScreen, reverting d348ab06aae21c153ecbc3511aeafc8ab66d8303 + +CVE-2023-5574, ZDI-CAN-21213 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Sri working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer +Reviewed-by: Adam Jackson +--- + fb/fb.h | 1 + + fb/fbscreen.c | 14 ++++++++++---- + hw/vfb/InitOutput.c | 7 ------- + 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/fb/fb.h b/fb/fb.h +index d157b6956d..cd7bd05d21 100644 +--- a/fb/fb.h ++++ b/fb/fb.h +@@ -410,6 +410,7 @@ typedef struct { + #endif + DevPrivateKeyRec gcPrivateKeyRec; + DevPrivateKeyRec winPrivateKeyRec; ++ CloseScreenProcPtr CloseScreen; + } FbScreenPrivRec, *FbScreenPrivPtr; + + #define fbGetScreenPrivate(pScreen) ((FbScreenPrivPtr) \ +diff --git a/fb/fbscreen.c b/fb/fbscreen.c +index 4ab807ab50..c481033f98 100644 +--- a/fb/fbscreen.c ++++ b/fb/fbscreen.c +@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ + Bool + fbCloseScreen(ScreenPtr pScreen) + { ++ FbScreenPrivPtr screen_priv = fbGetScreenPrivate(pScreen); + int d; + DepthPtr depths = pScreen->allowedDepths; + +@@ -37,9 +38,10 @@ fbCloseScreen(ScreenPtr pScreen) + free(depths[d].vids); + free(depths); + free(pScreen->visuals); +- if (pScreen->devPrivate) +- FreePixmap((PixmapPtr)pScreen->devPrivate); +- return TRUE; ++ ++ pScreen->CloseScreen = screen_priv->CloseScreen; ++ ++ return pScreen->CloseScreen(pScreen); + } + + Bool +@@ -144,6 +146,7 @@ fbFinishScreenInit(ScreenPtr pScreen, void *pbits, int xsize, int ysize, + int dpix, int dpiy, int width, int bpp) + #endif + { ++ FbScreenPrivPtr screen_priv; + VisualPtr visuals; + DepthPtr depths; + int nvisuals; +@@ -177,8 +180,11 @@ fbFinishScreenInit(ScreenPtr pScreen, void *pbits, int xsize, int ysize, + rootdepth, ndepths, depths, + defaultVisual, nvisuals, visuals)) + return FALSE; +- /* overwrite miCloseScreen with our own */ ++ ++ screen_priv = fbGetScreenPrivate(pScreen); ++ screen_priv->CloseScreen = pScreen->CloseScreen; + pScreen->CloseScreen = fbCloseScreen; ++ + return TRUE; + } + +diff --git a/hw/vfb/InitOutput.c b/hw/vfb/InitOutput.c +index 48efb61b2f..076fb7defa 100644 +--- a/hw/vfb/InitOutput.c ++++ b/hw/vfb/InitOutput.c +@@ -720,13 +720,6 @@ vfbCloseScreen(ScreenPtr pScreen) + + pScreen->CloseScreen = pvfb->closeScreen; + +- /* +- * fb overwrites miCloseScreen, so do this here +- */ +- if (pScreen->devPrivate) +- (*pScreen->DestroyPixmap) (pScreen->devPrivate); +- pScreen->devPrivate = NULL; +- + return pScreen->CloseScreen(pScreen); + } + +-- +GitLab + diff --git a/backport-0002-CVE-2023-5574.patch b/backport-0002-CVE-2023-5574.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..50ed818 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0002-CVE-2023-5574.patch @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From b6fe3f924aecac6d6e311673511ce61aa2f7a81f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2023 12:42:06 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] mi: fix CloseScreen initialization order + +If SHM is enabled it will set the CloseScreen pointer, only to be +overridden by the hardcoded miCloseScreen pointer. Do this the other way +round, miCloseScreen is the bottom of our stack. + +Direct leak of 48 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: + #0 0x7f5ea3ad8cc7 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xd8cc7) (BuildId: d8f3addefe29e892d775c30eb364afd3c2484ca5)) + #1 0x70adfb in ShmInitScreenPriv ../Xext/shm.c:213 + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer +Reviewed-by: Adam Jackson + +--- + mi/miscrinit.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/mi/miscrinit.c b/mi/miscrinit.c +index 264622d..907e46a 100644 +--- a/mi/miscrinit.c ++++ b/mi/miscrinit.c +@@ -242,10 +242,10 @@ miScreenInit(ScreenPtr pScreen, void *pbits, /* pointer to screen bits */ + pScreen->numVisuals = numVisuals; + pScreen->visuals = visuals; + if (width) { ++ pScreen->CloseScreen = miCloseScreen; + #ifdef MITSHM + ShmRegisterFbFuncs(pScreen); + #endif +- pScreen->CloseScreen = miCloseScreen; + } + /* else CloseScreen */ + /* QueryBestSize, SaveScreen, GetImage, GetSpans */ +-- +2.27.0 + diff --git a/backport-0003-CVE-2023-5574.patch b/backport-0003-CVE-2023-5574.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5b2fa9a --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0003-CVE-2023-5574.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From ab2c58ba4719fc31c19c7829b06bdba8a88bd586 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Tue, 24 Oct 2023 12:09:36 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] dix: always initialize pScreen->CloseScreen + +CloseScreen is wrapped by the various modules, many of which do not +check if they're the last ones unwrapping. This is fine if the order of +those modules never changes but when it does we might get a NULL-pointer +dereference by some naive code doing a + + pScreen->CloseScreen = priv->CloseScreen; + free(priv); + return (*pScreen->CloseScreen)(pScreen); + +To avoid this set it to a default function that just returns TRUE that's +guaranteed to be the last one. +--- + dix/dispatch.c | 9 +++++++++ + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/dix/dispatch.c b/dix/dispatch.c +index eaac39b7c9..cd092fd409 100644 +--- a/dix/dispatch.c ++++ b/dix/dispatch.c +@@ -3890,6 +3890,12 @@ static int indexForScanlinePad[65] = { + 3 /* 64 bits per scanline pad unit */ + }; + ++static Bool ++DefaultCloseScreen(ScreenPtr screen) ++{ ++ return TRUE; ++} ++ + /* + grow the array of screenRecs if necessary. + call the device-supplied initialization procedure +@@ -3949,6 +3955,9 @@ static int init_screen(ScreenPtr pScreen, int i, Bool gpu) + PixmapWidthPaddingInfo[depth].notPower2 = 0; + } + } ++ ++ pScreen->CloseScreen = DefaultCloseScreen; ++ + return 0; + } + +-- +GitLab + diff --git a/backport-CVE-2023-5367.patch b/backport-CVE-2023-5367.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dfd7c6e --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-CVE-2023-5367.patch @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +From 541ab2ecd41d4d8689e71855d93e492bc554719a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Tue, 3 Oct 2023 11:53:05 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] Xi/randr: fix handling of PropModeAppend/Prepend + +The handling of appending/prepending properties was incorrect, with at +least two bugs: the property length was set to the length of the new +part only, i.e. appending or prepending N elements to a property with P +existing elements always resulted in the property having N elements +instead of N + P. + +Second, when pre-pending a value to a property, the offset for the old +values was incorrect, leaving the new property with potentially +uninitalized values and/or resulting in OOB memory writes. +For example, prepending a 3 element value to a 5 element property would +result in this 8 value array: + [N, N, N, ?, ?, P, P, P ] P, P + ^OOB write + +The XI2 code is a copy/paste of the RandR code, so the bug exists in +both. + +CVE-2023-5367, ZDI-CAN-22153 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer +--- + Xi/xiproperty.c | 4 ++-- + randr/rrproperty.c | 4 ++-- + 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c +index 066ba21fba..d315f04d0e 100644 +--- a/Xi/xiproperty.c ++++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c +@@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ XIChangeDeviceProperty(DeviceIntPtr dev, Atom property, Atom type, + XIDestroyDeviceProperty(prop); + return BadAlloc; + } +- new_value.size = len; ++ new_value.size = total_len; + new_value.type = type; + new_value.format = format; + +@@ -747,7 +747,7 @@ XIChangeDeviceProperty(DeviceIntPtr dev, Atom property, Atom type, + case PropModePrepend: + new_data = new_value.data; + old_data = (void *) (((char *) new_value.data) + +- (prop_value->size * size_in_bytes)); ++ (len * size_in_bytes)); + break; + } + if (new_data) +diff --git a/randr/rrproperty.c b/randr/rrproperty.c +index c2fb9585c6..25469f57b2 100644 +--- a/randr/rrproperty.c ++++ b/randr/rrproperty.c +@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ RRChangeOutputProperty(RROutputPtr output, Atom property, Atom type, + RRDestroyOutputProperty(prop); + return BadAlloc; + } +- new_value.size = len; ++ new_value.size = total_len; + new_value.type = type; + new_value.format = format; + +@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ RRChangeOutputProperty(RROutputPtr output, Atom property, Atom type, + case PropModePrepend: + new_data = new_value.data; + old_data = (void *) (((char *) new_value.data) + +- (prop_value->size * size_in_bytes)); ++ (len * size_in_bytes)); + break; + } + if (new_data) +-- +GitLab + diff --git a/backport-CVE-2023-5380.patch b/backport-CVE-2023-5380.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1865185 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-CVE-2023-5380.patch @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +From 564ccf2ce9616620456102727acb8b0256b7bbd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Thu, 5 Oct 2023 12:19:45 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] mi: reset the PointerWindows reference on screen switch + +PointerWindows[] keeps a reference to the last window our sprite +entered - changes are usually handled by CheckMotion(). + +If we switch between screens via XWarpPointer our +dev->spriteInfo->sprite->win is set to the new screen's root window. +If there's another window at the cursor location CheckMotion() will +trigger the right enter/leave events later. If there is not, it skips +that process and we never trigger LeaveWindow() - PointerWindows[] for +the device still refers to the previous window. + +If that window is destroyed we have a dangling reference that will +eventually cause a use-after-free bug when checking the window hierarchy +later. + +To trigger this, we require: +- two protocol screens +- XWarpPointer to the other screen's root window +- XDestroyWindow before entering any other window + +This is a niche bug so we hack around it by making sure we reset the +PointerWindows[] entry so we cannot have a dangling pointer. This +doesn't handle Enter/Leave events correctly but the previous code didn't +either. + +CVE-2023-5380, ZDI-CAN-21608 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Sri working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer +Reviewed-by: Adam Jackson +--- + dix/enterleave.h | 2 -- + include/eventstr.h | 3 +++ + mi/mipointer.c | 17 +++++++++++++++-- + 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/dix/enterleave.h b/dix/enterleave.h +index 4b833d8..e8af924 100644 +--- a/dix/enterleave.h ++++ b/dix/enterleave.h +@@ -58,8 +58,6 @@ extern void DeviceFocusEvent(DeviceIntPtr dev, + + extern void EnterWindow(DeviceIntPtr dev, WindowPtr win, int mode); + +-extern void LeaveWindow(DeviceIntPtr dev); +- + extern void CoreFocusEvent(DeviceIntPtr kbd, + int type, int mode, int detail, WindowPtr pWin); + +diff --git a/include/eventstr.h b/include/eventstr.h +index bf3b95f..2bae3b0 100644 +--- a/include/eventstr.h ++++ b/include/eventstr.h +@@ -296,4 +296,7 @@ union _InternalEvent { + #endif + }; + ++extern void ++LeaveWindow(DeviceIntPtr dev); ++ + #endif +diff --git a/mi/mipointer.c b/mi/mipointer.c +index 75be1ae..b12ae9b 100644 +--- a/mi/mipointer.c ++++ b/mi/mipointer.c +@@ -397,8 +397,21 @@ miPointerWarpCursor(DeviceIntPtr pDev, ScreenPtr pScreen, int x, int y) + #ifdef PANORAMIX + && noPanoramiXExtension + #endif +- ) +- UpdateSpriteForScreen(pDev, pScreen); ++ ) { ++ DeviceIntPtr master = GetMaster(pDev, MASTER_POINTER); ++ /* Hack for CVE-2023-5380: if we're moving ++ * screens PointerWindows[] keeps referring to the ++ * old window. If that gets destroyed we have a UAF ++ * bug later. Only happens when jumping from a window ++ * to the root window on the other screen. ++ * Enter/Leave events are incorrect for that case but ++ * too niche to fix. ++ */ ++ LeaveWindow(pDev); ++ if (master) ++ LeaveWindow(master); ++ UpdateSpriteForScreen(pDev, pScreen); ++ } + } + + /** +-- +2.27.0 + diff --git a/xorg-x11-server.spec b/xorg-x11-server.spec index 0c0eab8..aeba449 100644 --- a/xorg-x11-server.spec +++ b/xorg-x11-server.spec @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Name: xorg-x11-server Version: 1.20.11 -Release: 21 +Release: 22 Summary: X.Org X11 X server License: MIT and GPLv2 URL: https://www.x.org @@ -107,6 +107,11 @@ Patch6020: backport-CVE-2023-1393.patch Patch6021: backport-CVE-2022-3550.patch # Fix build with gcc 12 Patch6022: render-fix-build-with-gcc12.patch +Patch6023: backport-CVE-2023-5367.patch +Patch6024: backport-CVE-2023-5380.patch +Patch6025: backport-0001-CVE-2023-5574.patch +Patch6026: backport-0002-CVE-2023-5574.patch +Patch6027: backport-0003-CVE-2023-5574.patch BuildRequires: audit-libs-devel autoconf automake bison dbus-devel flex git gcc BuildRequires: systemtap-sdt-devel libtool pkgconfig @@ -448,6 +453,9 @@ find %{inst_srcdir}/hw/xfree86 -name \*.c -delete %{_mandir}/man*/* %changelog +* Thu Oct 26 2023 zhouwenpei -1.20.11-22 +- fix CVE-2023-5367,CVE-2023-5380,CVE-2023-5574 + * Thu Sep 07 2023 zhouwenpei -1.20.11-21 - enable unit test