!119 fix CVE-2022-4283,CVE-2022-46340,CVE-2022-46341,CVE-2022-46342,CVE-2022-46343,CVE-2022-46344
From: @zhouwenpei Reviewed-by: @t_feng Signed-off-by: @t_feng
This commit is contained in:
openeuler-ci-bot
Gitee
commit
79bd9b96d4
34
backport-CVE-2022-4283.patch
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34
backport-CVE-2022-4283.patch
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From ccdd431cd8f1cabae9d744f0514b6533c438908c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Date: Mon, 5 Dec 2022 15:55:54 +1000
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Subject: [PATCH] xkb: reset the radio_groups pointer to NULL after freeing it
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Unlike other elements of the keymap, this pointer was freed but not
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reset. On a subsequent XkbGetKbdByName request, the server may access
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already freed memory.
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CVE-2022-4283, ZDI-CAN-19530
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This vulnerability was discovered by:
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Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
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Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
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---
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xkb/xkbUtils.c | 1 +
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1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
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diff --git a/xkb/xkbUtils.c b/xkb/xkbUtils.c
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index dd089c204..3f5791a18 100644
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--- a/xkb/xkbUtils.c
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+++ b/xkb/xkbUtils.c
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@@ -1326,6 +1326,7 @@ _XkbCopyNames(XkbDescPtr src, XkbDescPtr dst)
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}
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else {
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free(dst->names->radio_groups);
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+ dst->names->radio_groups = NULL;
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}
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dst->names->num_rg = src->names->num_rg;
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--
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GitLab
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50
backport-CVE-2022-46340.patch
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50
backport-CVE-2022-46340.patch
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From b320ca0ffe4c0c872eeb3a93d9bde21f765c7c63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 12:55:45 +1000
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Subject: [PATCH] Xtest: disallow GenericEvents in XTestSwapFakeInput
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XTestSwapFakeInput assumes all events in this request are
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sizeof(xEvent) and iterates through these in 32-byte increments.
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However, a GenericEvent may be of arbitrary length longer than 32 bytes,
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so any GenericEvent in this list would result in subsequent events to be
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misparsed.
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Additional, the swapped event is written into a stack-allocated struct
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xEvent (size 32 bytes). For any GenericEvent longer than 32 bytes,
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swapping the event may thus smash the stack like an avocado on toast.
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Catch this case early and return BadValue for any GenericEvent.
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Which is what would happen in unswapped setups anyway since XTest
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doesn't support GenericEvent.
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CVE-2022-46340, ZDI-CAN 19265
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This vulnerability was discovered by:
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Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
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Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
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---
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Xext/xtest.c | 5 +++--
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1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/Xext/xtest.c b/Xext/xtest.c
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index bf27eb590..2985a4ce6 100644
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--- a/Xext/xtest.c
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+++ b/Xext/xtest.c
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@@ -502,10 +502,11 @@ XTestSwapFakeInput(ClientPtr client, xReq * req)
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nev = ((req->length << 2) - sizeof(xReq)) / sizeof(xEvent);
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for (ev = (xEvent *) &req[1]; --nev >= 0; ev++) {
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+ int evtype = ev->u.u.type & 0x177;
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/* Swap event */
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- proc = EventSwapVector[ev->u.u.type & 0177];
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+ proc = EventSwapVector[evtype];
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/* no swapping proc; invalid event type? */
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- if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented) {
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+ if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented || evtype == GenericEvent) {
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client->errorValue = ev->u.u.type;
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return BadValue;
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}
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--
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GitLab
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81
backport-CVE-2022-46341.patch
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81
backport-CVE-2022-46341.patch
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From 51eb63b0ee1509c6c6b8922b0e4aa037faa6f78b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:55:32 +1000
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Subject: [PATCH] Xi: disallow passive grabs with a detail > 255
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The XKB protocol effectively prevents us from ever using keycodes above
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255. For buttons it's theoretically possible but realistically too niche
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to worry about. For all other passive grabs, the detail must be zero
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anyway.
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This fixes an OOB write:
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ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice() calls DeletePassiveGrabFromList with a
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temporary grab struct which contains tempGrab->detail.exact = stuff->detail.
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For matching existing grabs, DeleteDetailFromMask is called with the
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stuff->detail value. This function creates a new mask with the one bit
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representing stuff->detail cleared.
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However, the array size for the new mask is 8 * sizeof(CARD32) bits,
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thus any detail above 255 results in an OOB array write.
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CVE-2022-46341, ZDI-CAN 19381
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This vulnerability was discovered by:
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Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
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Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
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---
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Xi/xipassivegrab.c | 22 ++++++++++++++--------
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1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
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index 2769fb7c9..c9ac2f855 100644
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--- a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
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+++ b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
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@@ -137,6 +137,12 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
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return BadValue;
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}
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+ /* XI2 allows 32-bit keycodes but thanks to XKB we can never
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+ * implement this. Just return an error for all keycodes that
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+ * cannot work anyway, same for buttons > 255. */
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+ if (stuff->detail > 255)
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+ return XIAlreadyGrabbed;
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+
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if (XICheckInvalidMaskBits(client, (unsigned char *) &stuff[1],
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stuff->mask_len * 4) != Success)
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return BadValue;
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@@ -207,14 +213,8 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
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¶m, XI2, &mask);
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break;
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case XIGrabtypeKeycode:
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- /* XI2 allows 32-bit keycodes but thanks to XKB we can never
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- * implement this. Just return an error for all keycodes that
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- * cannot work anyway */
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- if (stuff->detail > 255)
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- status = XIAlreadyGrabbed;
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- else
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- status = GrabKey(client, dev, mod_dev, stuff->detail,
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- ¶m, XI2, &mask);
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+ status = GrabKey(client, dev, mod_dev, stuff->detail,
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+ ¶m, XI2, &mask);
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break;
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case XIGrabtypeEnter:
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case XIGrabtypeFocusIn:
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@@ -334,6 +334,12 @@ ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
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return BadValue;
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}
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+ /* We don't allow passive grabs for details > 255 anyway */
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+ if (stuff->detail > 255) {
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+ client->errorValue = stuff->detail;
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+ return BadValue;
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+ }
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+
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rc = dixLookupWindow(&win, stuff->grab_window, client, DixSetAttrAccess);
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if (rc != Success)
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return rc;
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--
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GitLab
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73
backport-CVE-2022-46342.patch
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73
backport-CVE-2022-46342.patch
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From b79f32b57cc0c1186b2899bce7cf89f7b325161b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2022 11:20:40 +1000
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Subject: [PATCH] Xext: free the XvRTVideoNotify when turning off from the same
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client
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This fixes a use-after-free bug:
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When a client first calls XvdiSelectVideoNotify() on a drawable with a
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TRUE onoff argument, a struct XvVideoNotifyRec is allocated. This struct
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is added twice to the resources:
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- as the drawable's XvRTVideoNotifyList. This happens only once per
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drawable, subsequent calls append to this list.
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- as the client's XvRTVideoNotify. This happens for every client.
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The struct keeps the ClientPtr around once it has been added for a
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client. The idea, presumably, is that if the client disconnects we can remove
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all structs from the drawable's list that match the client (by resetting
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the ClientPtr to NULL), but if the drawable is destroyed we can remove
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and free the whole list.
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However, if the same client then calls XvdiSelectVideoNotify() on the
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same drawable with a FALSE onoff argument, only the ClientPtr on the
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existing struct was set to NULL. The struct itself remained in the
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client's resources.
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If the drawable is now destroyed, the resource system invokes
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XvdiDestroyVideoNotifyList which frees the whole list for this drawable
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- including our struct. This function however does not free the resource
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for the client since our ClientPtr is NULL.
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Later, when the client is destroyed and the resource system invokes
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XvdiDestroyVideoNotify, we unconditionally set the ClientPtr to NULL. On
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a struct that has been freed previously. This is generally frowned upon.
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Fix this by calling FreeResource() on the second call instead of merely
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setting the ClientPtr to NULL. This removes the struct from the client
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resources (but not from the list), ensuring that it won't be accessed
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again when the client quits.
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Note that the assignment tpn->client = NULL; is superfluous since the
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XvdiDestroyVideoNotify function will do this anyway. But it's left for
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|
clarity and to match a similar invocation in XvdiSelectPortNotify.
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CVE-2022-46342, ZDI-CAN 19400
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|
This vulnerability was discovered by:
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Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
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Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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|
Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
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---
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|
Xext/xvmain.c | 4 +++-
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|
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/Xext/xvmain.c b/Xext/xvmain.c
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|
index f62747193..2a08f8744 100644
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|
--- a/Xext/xvmain.c
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|
+++ b/Xext/xvmain.c
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|
@@ -811,8 +811,10 @@ XvdiSelectVideoNotify(ClientPtr client, DrawablePtr pDraw, BOOL onoff)
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|
tpn = pn;
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|
while (tpn) {
|
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|
if (tpn->client == client) {
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|
- if (!onoff)
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|
+ if (!onoff) {
|
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|
tpn->client = NULL;
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+ FreeResource(tpn->id, XvRTVideoNotify);
|
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|
+ }
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|
return Success;
|
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|
}
|
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|
if (!tpn->client)
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|
--
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GitLab
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46
backport-CVE-2022-46343.patch
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46
backport-CVE-2022-46343.patch
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From 842ca3ccef100ce010d1d8f5f6d6cc1915055900 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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|
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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|
Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 14:53:07 +1000
|
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|
Subject: [PATCH] Xext: free the screen saver resource when replacing it
|
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|
|
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|
This fixes a use-after-free bug:
|
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|
|
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|
When a client first calls ScreenSaverSetAttributes(), a struct
|
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|
ScreenSaverAttrRec is allocated and added to the client's
|
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|
resources.
|
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|
|
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|
When the same client calls ScreenSaverSetAttributes() again, a new
|
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|
struct ScreenSaverAttrRec is allocated, replacing the old struct. The
|
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|
old struct was freed but not removed from the clients resources.
|
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|
|
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|
Later, when the client is destroyed the resource system invokes
|
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|
ScreenSaverFreeAttr and attempts to clean up the already freed struct.
|
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|
|
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|
Fix this by letting the resource system free the old attrs instead.
|
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|
|
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|
CVE-2022-46343, ZDI-CAN 19404
|
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|
|
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|
This vulnerability was discovered by:
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|
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
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|
|
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|
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
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|
Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
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|
---
|
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|
Xext/saver.c | 2 +-
|
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|
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
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|
|
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|
diff --git a/Xext/saver.c b/Xext/saver.c
|
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|
index f813ba08d..fd6153c31 100644
|
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|
--- a/Xext/saver.c
|
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|
+++ b/Xext/saver.c
|
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|
@@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@ ScreenSaverSetAttributes(ClientPtr client)
|
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|
pVlist++;
|
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|
}
|
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|
if (pPriv->attr)
|
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|
- FreeScreenAttr(pPriv->attr);
|
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|
+ FreeResource(pPriv->attr->resource, AttrType);
|
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|
pPriv->attr = pAttr;
|
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|
pAttr->resource = FakeClientID(client->index);
|
||||||
|
if (!AddResource(pAttr->resource, AttrType, (void *) pAttr))
|
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|
--
|
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GitLab
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70
backport-CVE-2022-46344.patch
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70
backport-CVE-2022-46344.patch
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From 8f454b793e1f13c99872c15f0eed1d7f3b823fe8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||||
|
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
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|
Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:26:57 +1000
|
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|
Subject: [PATCH] Xi: avoid integer truncation in length check of
|
||||||
|
ProcXIChangeProperty
|
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|
|
||||||
|
This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With
|
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|
the correct stuff->num_items value the expected request size was
|
||||||
|
truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes
|
||||||
|
(depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it
|
||||||
|
finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least
|
||||||
|
stuff->num_items bytes, i.e. 4GB.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The same bug exists in ProcChangeProperty and ProcXChangeDeviceProperty,
|
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|
so let's fix that too.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CVE-2022-46344, ZDI-CAN 19405
|
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|
|
||||||
|
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
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|
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||||
|
Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
Xi/xiproperty.c | 4 ++--
|
||||||
|
dix/property.c | 3 ++-
|
||||||
|
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c
|
||||||
|
index 68c362c62..066ba21fb 100644
|
||||||
|
--- a/Xi/xiproperty.c
|
||||||
|
+++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c
|
||||||
|
@@ -890,7 +890,7 @@ ProcXChangeDeviceProperty(ClientPtr client)
|
||||||
|
REQUEST(xChangeDevicePropertyReq);
|
||||||
|
DeviceIntPtr dev;
|
||||||
|
unsigned long len;
|
||||||
|
- int totalSize;
|
||||||
|
+ uint64_t totalSize;
|
||||||
|
int rc;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xChangeDevicePropertyReq);
|
||||||
|
@@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@ ProcXIChangeProperty(ClientPtr client)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
int rc;
|
||||||
|
DeviceIntPtr dev;
|
||||||
|
- int totalSize;
|
||||||
|
+ uint64_t totalSize;
|
||||||
|
unsigned long len;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
REQUEST(xXIChangePropertyReq);
|
||||||
|
diff --git a/dix/property.c b/dix/property.c
|
||||||
|
index 94ef5a0ec..acce94b2c 100644
|
||||||
|
--- a/dix/property.c
|
||||||
|
+++ b/dix/property.c
|
||||||
|
@@ -205,7 +205,8 @@ ProcChangeProperty(ClientPtr client)
|
||||||
|
WindowPtr pWin;
|
||||||
|
char format, mode;
|
||||||
|
unsigned long len;
|
||||||
|
- int sizeInBytes, totalSize, err;
|
||||||
|
+ int sizeInBytes, err;
|
||||||
|
+ uint64_t totalSize;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
REQUEST(xChangePropertyReq);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
--
|
||||||
|
GitLab
|
||||||
@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
Name: xorg-x11-server
|
Name: xorg-x11-server
|
||||||
Version: 1.20.11
|
Version: 1.20.11
|
||||||
Release: 12
|
Release: 13
|
||||||
Summary: X.Org X11 X server
|
Summary: X.Org X11 X server
|
||||||
License: MIT and GPLv2
|
License: MIT and GPLv2
|
||||||
URL: https://www.x.org
|
URL: https://www.x.org
|
||||||
@ -94,6 +94,12 @@ Patch6008: backport-CVE-2022-3551.patch
|
|||||||
Patch6009: xorg-server-1.20.11-sw.patch
|
Patch6009: xorg-server-1.20.11-sw.patch
|
||||||
%endif
|
%endif
|
||||||
Patch6010: backport-CVE-2022-3553.patch
|
Patch6010: backport-CVE-2022-3553.patch
|
||||||
|
Patch6011: backport-CVE-2022-4283.patch
|
||||||
|
Patch6012: backport-CVE-2022-46340.patch
|
||||||
|
Patch6013: backport-CVE-2022-46341.patch
|
||||||
|
Patch6014: backport-CVE-2022-46342.patch
|
||||||
|
Patch6015: backport-CVE-2022-46343.patch
|
||||||
|
Patch6016: backport-CVE-2022-46344.patch
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
BuildRequires: audit-libs-devel autoconf automake bison dbus-devel flex git gcc
|
BuildRequires: audit-libs-devel autoconf automake bison dbus-devel flex git gcc
|
||||||
BuildRequires: systemtap-sdt-devel libtool pkgconfig
|
BuildRequires: systemtap-sdt-devel libtool pkgconfig
|
||||||
@ -437,6 +443,9 @@ find %{inst_srcdir}/hw/xfree86 -name \*.c -delete
|
|||||||
%{_mandir}/man*/*
|
%{_mandir}/man*/*
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
%changelog
|
%changelog
|
||||||
|
* Wed Dec 21 2022 zhouwenpei <zhouwenpei1@h-partners.com> -1.20.11-13
|
||||||
|
- fix CVE-2022-4283,CVE-2022-46340,CVE-2022-46341,CVE-2022-46342,CVE-2022-46343,CVE-2022-46344
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
* Fri Nov 18 2022 wangkerong <wangkerong@h-partners.com> -1.20.11-12
|
* Fri Nov 18 2022 wangkerong <wangkerong@h-partners.com> -1.20.11-12
|
||||||
- fix CVE-2022-3551,CVE-2022-3553
|
- fix CVE-2022-3551,CVE-2022-3553
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|||||||
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user