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dogsheng 2019-12-25 16:10:18 +08:00
parent 75995c1a74
commit c42829d90a
6 changed files with 488 additions and 2 deletions
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47
CVE-2019-11555-1.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
From d2d1a324ce937628e4d9d9999fe113819b7d4478 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 02:21:20 +0300
Subject: EAP-pwd peer: Fix reassembly buffer handling
Unexpected fragment might result in data->inbuf not being allocated
before processing and that could have resulted in NULL pointer
dereference. Fix that by explicitly checking for data->inbuf to be
available before using it.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
backport addr https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/patch/?id=d2d1a324ce937628e4d9d9999fe113819b7d4478
---
src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
index bbe9b40..f8e1afe 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
@@ -888,6 +888,13 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
* buffer and ACK the fragment
*/
if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) {
+ if (!data->inbuf) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "EAP-pwd: No buffer for reassembly");
+ ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE;
+ ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
+ return NULL;
+ }
data->in_frag_pos += len;
if (data->in_frag_pos > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow attack "
@@ -914,7 +921,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
/*
* we're buffering and this is the last fragment
*/
- if (data->in_frag_pos) {
+ if (data->in_frag_pos && data->inbuf) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes",
(int) len);
pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf);
--
2.19.1

47
CVE-2019-11555-2.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
From fe76f487e28bdc61940f304f153a954cf36935ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 01:55:32 +0300
Subject: EAP-pwd server: Fix reassembly buffer handling
data->inbuf allocation might fail and if that were to happen, the next
fragment in the exchange could have resulted in NULL pointer
dereference. Unexpected fragment with more bit might also be able to
trigger this. Fix that by explicitly checking for data->inbuf to be
available before using it.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
backport addr https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/patch/?id=fe76f487e28bdc61940f304f153a954cf36935ea
---
src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
index 275bdf8..afad505 100644
--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
@@ -968,6 +968,12 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
* the first and all intermediate fragments have the M bit set
*/
if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) {
+ if (!data->inbuf) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "EAP-pwd: No buffer for reassembly");
+ eap_pwd_state(data, FAILURE);
+ return;
+ }
if ((data->in_frag_pos + len) > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow "
"attack detected! (%d+%d > %d)",
@@ -988,7 +994,7 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
* last fragment won't have the M bit set (but we're obviously
* buffering fragments so that's how we know it's the last)
*/
- if (data->in_frag_pos) {
+ if (data->in_frag_pos && data->inbuf) {
pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf);
len = data->in_frag_pos;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes",
--
2.19.1

73
CVE-2019-16275.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
From 8c07fa9eda13e835f3f968b2e1c9a8be3a851ff9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2019 11:52:04 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] AP: Silently ignore management frame from unexpected source
address
Do not process any received Management frames with unexpected/invalid SA
so that we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end up
sending out frames to unexpected destination. This prevents unexpected
sequences where an unprotected frame might end up causing the AP to send
out a response to another device and that other device processing the
unexpected response.
In particular, this prevents some potential denial of service cases
where the unexpected response frame from the AP might result in a
connected station dropping its association.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
src/ap/drv_callbacks.c | 13 +++++++++++++
src/ap/ieee802_11.c | 12 ++++++++++++
2 files changed, 25 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c b/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c
index 31587685fe3b..34ca379edc3d 100644
--- a/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c
+++ b/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c
@@ -131,6 +131,19 @@ int hostapd_notif_assoc(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *addr,
"hostapd_notif_assoc: Skip event with no address");
return -1;
}
+
+ if (is_multicast_ether_addr(addr) ||
+ is_zero_ether_addr(addr) ||
+ os_memcmp(addr, hapd->own_addr, ETH_ALEN) == 0) {
+ /* Do not process any frames with unexpected/invalid SA so that
+ * we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end
+ * up sending out frames to unexpected destination. */
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Invalid SA=" MACSTR
+ " in received indication - ignore this indication silently",
+ __func__, MAC2STR(addr));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
random_add_randomness(addr, ETH_ALEN);
hostapd_logger(hapd, addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211,
diff --git a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
index c85a28db44b7..e7065372e158 100644
--- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
+++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
@@ -4626,6 +4626,18 @@ int ieee802_11_mgmt(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *buf, size_t len,
fc = le_to_host16(mgmt->frame_control);
stype = WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(fc);
+ if (is_multicast_ether_addr(mgmt->sa) ||
+ is_zero_ether_addr(mgmt->sa) ||
+ os_memcmp(mgmt->sa, hapd->own_addr, ETH_ALEN) == 0) {
+ /* Do not process any frames with unexpected/invalid SA so that
+ * we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end
+ * up sending out frames to unexpected destination. */
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "MGMT: Invalid SA=" MACSTR
+ " in received frame - ignore this frame silently",
+ MAC2STR(mgmt->sa));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (stype == WLAN_FC_STYPE_BEACON) {
handle_beacon(hapd, mgmt, len, fi);
return 1;
--
2.20.1

47
CVE-2019-9497.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
From d63edfa90243e9a7de6ae5c275032f2cc79fef95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mathy Vanhoef <mathy.vanhoef@nyu.edu>
Date: Sun, 31 Mar 2019 17:26:01 +0200
Subject: EAP-pwd server: Detect reflection attacks
When processing an EAP-pwd Commit frame, verify that the peer's scalar
and elliptic curve element differ from the one sent by the server. This
prevents reflection attacks where the adversary reflects the scalar and
element sent by the server. (CVE-2019-9497)
The vulnerability allows an adversary to complete the EAP-pwd handshake
as any user. However, the adversary does not learn the negotiated
session key, meaning the subsequent 4-way handshake would fail. As a
result, this cannot be abused to bypass authentication unless EAP-pwd is
used in non-WLAN cases without any following key exchange that would
require the attacker to learn the MSK.
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <mathy.vanhoef@nyu.edu>
backport addr https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/patch/?id=d63edfa90243e9a7de6ae5c275032f2cc79fef95
---
src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 9 +++++++++
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
index 64bf708..cb5f682 100644
--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
@@ -725,6 +725,15 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
}
}
+ /* detect reflection attacks */
+ if (crypto_bignum_cmp(data->my_scalar, data->peer_scalar) == 0 ||
+ crypto_ec_point_cmp(data->grp->group, data->my_element,
+ data->peer_element) == 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "EAP-PWD (server): detected reflection attack!");
+ goto fin;
+ }
+
/* compute the shared key, k */
if ((!EC_POINT_mul(data->grp->group, K, NULL, data->grp->pwe,
data->peer_scalar, data->bnctx)) ||
--
2.19.1

258
CVE-2019-9498-and-CVE-2019-9499.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
From 16d4f1069118aa19bfce013493e1ac5783f92f1d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2019 02:12:50 +0300
Subject: EAP-pwd: Check element x,y coordinates explicitly
This adds an explicit check for 0 < x,y < prime based on RFC 5931,
2.8.5.2.2 requirement. The earlier checks might have covered this
implicitly, but it is safer to avoid any dependency on implicit checks
and specific crypto library behavior. (CVE-2019-9498 and CVE-2019-9499)
Furthermore, this moves the EAP-pwd element and scalar parsing and
validation steps into shared helper functions so that there is no need
to maintain two separate copies of this common functionality between the
server and peer implementations.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
backport addr https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/patch/?id=16d4f1069118aa19bfce013493e1ac5783f92f1d
https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/patch/?id=70ff850e89fbc8bc7da515321b4d15b5eef70581
https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/patch/?id=8ad8585f91823ddcc3728155e288e0f9f872e31a
---
src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.h | 3 +
src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 19 +-----
src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 19 +-----
4 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
index 67f8f70..ef47db1 100644
--- a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
+++ b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
@@ -365,3 +365,109 @@ int compute_keys(EAP_PWD_group *grp, BN_CTX *bnctx, const BIGNUM *k,
return 1;
}
+
+
+static int eap_pwd_element_coord_ok(const struct crypto_bignum *prime,
+ const u8 *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ struct crypto_bignum *val;
+ int ok = 1;
+
+ val = crypto_bignum_init_set(buf, len);
+ if (!val || crypto_bignum_is_zero(val) ||
+ crypto_bignum_cmp(val, prime) >= 0)
+ ok = 0;
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(val, 0);
+ return ok;
+}
+
+
+struct crypto_ec_point * eap_pwd_get_element(EAP_PWD_group *group,
+ const u8 *buf)
+{
+ struct crypto_ec_point *element;
+ const struct crypto_bignum *prime;
+ size_t prime_len;
+ struct crypto_bignum *cofactor = NULL;
+
+ prime = crypto_ec_get_prime(group->group);
+ prime_len = crypto_ec_prime_len(group->group);
+
+ /* RFC 5931, 2.8.5.2.2: 0 < x,y < p */
+ if (!eap_pwd_element_coord_ok(prime, buf, prime_len) ||
+ !eap_pwd_element_coord_ok(prime, buf + prime_len, prime_len)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Invalid coordinate in element");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ element = crypto_ec_point_from_bin(group->group, buf);
+ if (!element) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: EC point from element failed");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* RFC 5931, 2.8.5.2.2: on curve and not the point at infinity */
+ if (!crypto_ec_point_is_on_curve(group->group, element) ||
+ crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(group->group, element)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Invalid element");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ cofactor = crypto_bignum_init();
+ if (!cofactor || crypto_ec_cofactor(group->group, cofactor) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "EAP-pwd: Unable to get cofactor for curve");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (!crypto_bignum_is_one(cofactor)) {
+ struct crypto_ec_point *point;
+ int ok = 1;
+
+ /* check to ensure peer's element is not in a small sub-group */
+ point = crypto_ec_point_init(group->group);
+ if (!point ||
+ crypto_ec_point_mul(group->group, element,
+ cofactor, point) != 0 ||
+ crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(group->group, point))
+ ok = 0;
+ crypto_ec_point_deinit(point, 0);
+
+ if (!ok) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "EAP-pwd: Small sub-group check on peer element failed");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(cofactor, 0);
+ return element;
+fail:
+ crypto_ec_point_deinit(element, 0);
+ element = NULL;
+ goto out;
+}
+
+
+struct crypto_bignum * eap_pwd_get_scalar(EAP_PWD_group *group, const u8 *buf)
+{
+ struct crypto_bignum *scalar;
+ const struct crypto_bignum *order;
+ size_t order_len;
+
+ order = crypto_ec_get_order(group->group);
+ order_len = crypto_ec_order_len(group->group);
+
+ /* RFC 5931, 2.8.5.2: 1 < scalar < r */
+ scalar = crypto_bignum_init_set(buf, order_len);
+ if (!scalar || crypto_bignum_is_zero(scalar) ||
+ crypto_bignum_is_one(scalar) ||
+ crypto_bignum_cmp(scalar, order) >= 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: received scalar is invalid");
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(scalar, 0);
+ scalar = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return scalar;
+}
diff --git a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.h b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.h
index a0d717e..01f43eb 100644
--- a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.h
+++ b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.h
@@ -68,5 +68,8 @@ int compute_keys(EAP_PWD_group *grp, BN_CTX *bnctx, const BIGNUM *k,
struct crypto_hash * eap_pwd_h_init(void);
void eap_pwd_h_update(struct crypto_hash *hash, const u8 *data, size_t len);
void eap_pwd_h_final(struct crypto_hash *hash, u8 *digest);
+struct crypto_ec_point * eap_pwd_get_element(EAP_PWD_group *group,
+ const u8 *buf);
+struct crypto_bignum * eap_pwd_get_scalar(EAP_PWD_group *group, const u8 *buf);
#endif /* EAP_PWD_COMMON_H */
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
index d2bc981..bbe9b40 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
const struct wpabuf *reqData,
const u8 *payload, size_t payload_len)
{
- EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *K = NULL;
BIGNUM *mask = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
u16 offset;
u8 *ptr, *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL;
@@ -429,7 +429,6 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
if (((data->server_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
((K = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) ||
- ((point = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) ||
((data->server_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL))
{
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): peer data allocation "
@@ -452,21 +451,6 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
goto fin;
}
- /* check to ensure server's element is not in a small sub-group */
- if (BN_cmp(cofactor, BN_value_one())) {
- if (!EC_POINT_mul(data->grp->group, point, NULL,
- data->server_element, cofactor, NULL)) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): cannot multiply "
- "server element by order!\n");
- goto fin;
- }
- if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(data->grp->group, point)) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): server element "
- "is at infinity!\n");
- goto fin;
- }
- }
-
/* compute the shared key, k */
if ((!EC_POINT_mul(data->grp->group, K, NULL, data->grp->pwe,
data->server_scalar, data->bnctx)) ||
@@ -557,7 +541,6 @@ fin:
BN_clear_free(mask);
BN_clear_free(cofactor);
EC_POINT_clear_free(K);
- EC_POINT_clear_free(point);
if (data->outbuf == NULL)
eap_pwd_state(data, FAILURE);
else
diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
index cb5f682..275bdf8 100644
--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
@@ -659,7 +659,7 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
{
u8 *ptr;
BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
- EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *K = NULL;
int res = 0;
size_t prime_len, order_len;
@@ -681,7 +681,6 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
((x = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
((y = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
- ((point = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) ||
((K = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) ||
((data->peer_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (server): peer data allocation "
@@ -710,21 +709,6 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
goto fin;
}
- /* check to ensure peer's element is not in a small sub-group */
- if (BN_cmp(cofactor, BN_value_one())) {
- if (!EC_POINT_mul(data->grp->group, point, NULL,
- data->peer_element, cofactor, NULL)) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (server): cannot "
- "multiply peer element by order");
- goto fin;
- }
- if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(data->grp->group, point)) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (server): peer element "
- "is at infinity!\n");
- goto fin;
- }
- }
-
/* detect reflection attacks */
if (crypto_bignum_cmp(data->my_scalar, data->peer_scalar) == 0 ||
crypto_ec_point_cmp(data->grp->group, data->my_element,
@@ -777,7 +761,6 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
fin:
EC_POINT_clear_free(K);
- EC_POINT_clear_free(point);
BN_clear_free(cofactor);
BN_clear_free(x);
BN_clear_free(y);
--
2.19.1

18
wpa_supplicant.spec
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
Name: wpa_supplicant
Epoch: 1
Version: 2.6
Release: 19
Release: 21
Summary: A WPA Supplicant with support for WPA and WPA2 (IEEE 802.11i / RSN)
License: BSD
Url: https://w1.fi/wpa_supplicant/
@ -87,9 +87,17 @@ Patch6059: CVE-2019-9494-5.patch
Patch6060: CVE-2019-9494-6.patch
Patch6061: CVE-2019-9494-7.patch
Patch6062: CVE-2019-9494-8.patch
Patch6063: CVE-2019-16275.patch
Patch6064: CVE-2019-9497.patch
Patch6065: CVE-2019-9498-and-CVE-2019-9499.patch
Patch6066: CVE-2019-11555-1.patch
Patch6067: CVE-2019-11555-2.patch
BuildRequires: qt-devel >= 4.0 openssl-devel readline-devel dbus-devel libnl3-devel systemd-units docbook-utils
Requires: systemd-sysv systemd
Requires(post): systemd-sysv
Requires(post): systemd
Requires(preun): systemd
Requires(postun): systemd
Obsoletes: libeap < %{epoch}:%{version}-%{release} libeap-devel < %{epoch}:%{version}-%{release}
%description
@ -179,6 +187,12 @@ install -m644 %{name}/doc/docbook/*.5 %{buildroot}%{_mandir}/man5
%{_mandir}/man5/*
%changelog
* Sat Dec 21 2019 openEuler Buildteam <buildteam@openeuler.org> - 1:2.6-21
- Modify requires
* Mon Dec 16 2019 openEuler Buildteam <buildteam@openeuler.org> - 1:2.6-20
- fix CVE-2019-16275, CVE-2019-9497, CVE-2019-9498, CVE-2019-9499, CVE-2019-11555
* Wed Sep 25 2019 huzhiyu <huzhiyu1@huawei.com> - 1:2.6-19
- change patch names legal