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update version to 2.10

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weiwei_tiantian 2022-03-31 16:55:58 +08:00
parent 4e0a909235
commit 850b66697c
96 changed files with 20 additions and 19660 deletions
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47
CVE-2019-11555-1.patch
View File

@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
From d2d1a324ce937628e4d9d9999fe113819b7d4478 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 02:21:20 +0300
Subject: EAP-pwd peer: Fix reassembly buffer handling
Unexpected fragment might result in data->inbuf not being allocated
before processing and that could have resulted in NULL pointer
dereference. Fix that by explicitly checking for data->inbuf to be
available before using it.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
backport addr https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/patch/?id=d2d1a324ce937628e4d9d9999fe113819b7d4478
---
src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
index bbe9b40..f8e1afe 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
@@ -888,6 +888,13 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
* buffer and ACK the fragment
*/
if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) {
+ if (!data->inbuf) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "EAP-pwd: No buffer for reassembly");
+ ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE;
+ ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
+ return NULL;
+ }
data->in_frag_pos += len;
if (data->in_frag_pos > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow attack "
@@ -914,7 +921,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
/*
* we're buffering and this is the last fragment
*/
- if (data->in_frag_pos) {
+ if (data->in_frag_pos && data->inbuf) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes",
(int) len);
pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf);
--
2.19.1

47
CVE-2019-11555-2.patch
View File

@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
From fe76f487e28bdc61940f304f153a954cf36935ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 01:55:32 +0300
Subject: EAP-pwd server: Fix reassembly buffer handling
data->inbuf allocation might fail and if that were to happen, the next
fragment in the exchange could have resulted in NULL pointer
dereference. Unexpected fragment with more bit might also be able to
trigger this. Fix that by explicitly checking for data->inbuf to be
available before using it.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
backport addr https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/patch/?id=fe76f487e28bdc61940f304f153a954cf36935ea
---
src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
index 275bdf8..afad505 100644
--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
@@ -968,6 +968,12 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
* the first and all intermediate fragments have the M bit set
*/
if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) {
+ if (!data->inbuf) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "EAP-pwd: No buffer for reassembly");
+ eap_pwd_state(data, FAILURE);
+ return;
+ }
if ((data->in_frag_pos + len) > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow "
"attack detected! (%d+%d > %d)",
@@ -988,7 +994,7 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
* last fragment won't have the M bit set (but we're obviously
* buffering fragments so that's how we know it's the last)
*/
- if (data->in_frag_pos) {
+ if (data->in_frag_pos && data->inbuf) {
pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf);
len = data->in_frag_pos;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes",
--
2.19.1

28
CVE-2019-13377-1.patch
View File

@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
From e43f08991f00820c1f711ca254021d5f83b5cd7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2019 18:52:34 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 1/6] SAE: Use const_time_memcmp() for pwd_value >= prime
comparison
This reduces timing and memory access pattern differences for an
operation that could depend on the used password.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8e14b030e558d23f65d761895c07089404e61cf1)
diff --git a/src/common/sae.c b/src/common/sae.c
index 72b7954..4741753 100644
--- a/src/common/sae.c
+++ b/src/common/sae.c
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-value",
pwd_value, sae->tmp->prime_len);
- if (os_memcmp(pwd_value, prime, sae->tmp->prime_len) >= 0)
+ if (const_time_memcmp(pwd_value, prime, sae->tmp->prime_len) >= 0)
return 0;
x_cand = crypto_bignum_init_set(pwd_value, sae->tmp->prime_len);
--
2.23.0

246
CVE-2019-13377-2-pre.patch
View File

@ -1,246 +0,0 @@
From 8b093db2c3f489a74b67f687becf750d24fcf626 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Sat, 13 Apr 2019 17:30:22 +0300
Subject: EAP-pwd: Remove unused checks for cofactor > 1 cases
None of the ECC groups supported in the implementation had a cofactor
greater than 1, so these checks are unreachable and for all cases, the
cofactor is known to be 1. Furthermore, RFC 5931 explicitly disallow use
of ECC groups with cofactor larger than 1, so this checks cannot be
needed for any curve that is compliant with the RFC.
Remove the unneeded group cofactor checks to simplify the
implementation.
---
src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c | 53 ++---------------------------------------
src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 23 +++---------------
src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 23 ++----------------
3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 92 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
index ccd3627..cd7cd0f 100644
--- a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
+++ b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
u8 found = 0; /* 0 (false) or 0xff (true) to be used as const_time_*
* mask */
size_t primebytelen = 0, primebitlen;
- struct crypto_bignum *x_candidate = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
+ struct crypto_bignum *x_candidate = NULL;
const struct crypto_bignum *prime;
u8 mask, found_ctr = 0, is_odd = 0;
@@ -159,21 +159,15 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
os_memset(x_bin, 0, sizeof(x_bin));
prime = crypto_ec_get_prime(grp->group);
- cofactor = crypto_bignum_init();
grp->pwe = crypto_ec_point_init(grp->group);
tmp1 = crypto_bignum_init();
pm1 = crypto_bignum_init();
one = crypto_bignum_init_set((const u8 *) "\x01", 1);
- if (!cofactor || !grp->pwe || !tmp1 || !pm1 || !one) {
+ if ( !grp->pwe || !tmp1 || !pm1 || !one) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to create bignums");
goto fail;
}
- if (crypto_ec_cofactor(grp->group, cofactor) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to get cofactor for "
- "curve");
- goto fail;
- }
primebitlen = crypto_ec_prime_len_bits(grp->group);
primebytelen = crypto_ec_prime_len(grp->group);
if ((prfbuf = os_malloc(primebytelen)) == NULL) {
@@ -342,19 +336,6 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
goto fail;
}
- if (!crypto_bignum_is_one(cofactor)) {
- /* make sure the point is not in a small sub-group */
- if (crypto_ec_point_mul(grp->group, grp->pwe, cofactor,
- grp->pwe) != 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
- "EAP-pwd: cannot multiply generator by order");
- goto fail;
- }
- if (crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(grp->group, grp->pwe)) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: point is at infinity");
- goto fail;
- }
- }
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: found a PWE in %02d tries", found_ctr);
if (0) {
@@ -364,7 +345,6 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
ret = 1;
}
/* cleanliness and order.... */
- crypto_bignum_deinit(cofactor, 1);
crypto_bignum_deinit(x_candidate, 1);
crypto_bignum_deinit(pm1, 0);
crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp1, 1);
@@ -491,35 +471,7 @@ struct crypto_ec_point * eap_pwd_get_element(EAP_PWD_group *group,
goto fail;
}
- cofactor = crypto_bignum_init();
- if (!cofactor || crypto_ec_cofactor(group->group, cofactor) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
- "EAP-pwd: Unable to get cofactor for curve");
- goto fail;
- }
-
- if (!crypto_bignum_is_one(cofactor)) {
- struct crypto_ec_point *point;
- int ok = 1;
-
- /* check to ensure peer's element is not in a small sub-group */
- point = crypto_ec_point_init(group->group);
- if (!point ||
- crypto_ec_point_mul(group->group, element,
- cofactor, point) != 0 ||
- crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(group->group, point))
- ok = 0;
- crypto_ec_point_deinit(point, 0);
-
- if (!ok) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
- "EAP-pwd: Small sub-group check on peer element failed");
- goto fail;
- }
- }
-
out:
- crypto_bignum_deinit(cofactor, 0);
return element;
fail:
crypto_ec_point_deinit(element, 0);
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
index 8064f3f..1ed00e2 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
const u8 *payload, size_t payload_len)
{
struct crypto_ec_point *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
- struct crypto_bignum *mask = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
+ struct crypto_bignum *mask = NULL;
const u8 *ptr;
u8 *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL;
size_t prime_len, order_len;
@@ -370,20 +370,14 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
data->private_value = crypto_bignum_init();
data->my_element = crypto_ec_point_init(data->grp->group);
- cofactor = crypto_bignum_init();
data->my_scalar = crypto_bignum_init();
mask = crypto_bignum_init();
- if (!data->private_value || !data->my_element || !cofactor ||
+ if (!data->private_value || !data->my_element ||
!data->my_scalar || !mask) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): scalar allocation fail");
goto fin;
}
- if (crypto_ec_cofactor(data->grp->group, cofactor) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd (peer): unable to get cofactor "
- "for curve");
- goto fin;
- }
if (crypto_bignum_rand(data->private_value,
crypto_ec_get_order(data->grp->group)) < 0 ||
@@ -470,17 +464,9 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
goto fin;
}
- /* ensure that the shared key isn't in a small sub-group */
- if (!crypto_bignum_is_one(cofactor)) {
- if (crypto_ec_point_mul(data->grp->group, K, cofactor, K) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): cannot multiply "
- "shared key point by order");
- goto fin;
- }
- }
/*
- * This check is strictly speaking just for the case above where
+ * This check is strictly speaking just for the case where
* co-factor > 1 but it was suggested that even though this is probably
* never going to happen it is a simple and safe check "just to be
* sure" so let's be safe.
@@ -529,7 +515,6 @@ fin:
os_free(scalar);
os_free(element);
crypto_bignum_deinit(mask, 1);
- crypto_bignum_deinit(cofactor, 1);
crypto_ec_point_deinit(K, 1);
crypto_ec_point_deinit(point, 1);
if (data->outbuf == NULL)
diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
index b952b67..aa0f0d8 100644
--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
@@ -602,7 +602,6 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
const u8 *payload, size_t payload_len)
{
const u8 *ptr;
- struct crypto_bignum *cofactor = NULL;
struct crypto_ec_point *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
int res = 0;
size_t prime_len, order_len;
@@ -621,20 +620,14 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
}
data->k = crypto_bignum_init();
- cofactor = crypto_bignum_init();
point = crypto_ec_point_init(data->grp->group);
K = crypto_ec_point_init(data->grp->group);
- if (!data->k || !cofactor || !point || !K) {
+ if (!data->k || !point || !K) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (server): peer data allocation "
"fail");
goto fin;
}
- if (crypto_ec_cofactor(data->grp->group, cofactor) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (server): unable to get "
- "cofactor for curve");
- goto fin;
- }
/* element, x then y, followed by scalar */
ptr = payload;
@@ -666,18 +659,9 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
goto fin;
}
- /* ensure that the shared key isn't in a small sub-group */
- if (!crypto_bignum_is_one(cofactor)) {
- if (crypto_ec_point_mul(data->grp->group, K, cofactor,
- K) != 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (server): cannot "
- "multiply shared key point by order!\n");
- goto fin;
- }
- }
/*
- * This check is strictly speaking just for the case above where
+ * This check is strictly speaking just for the case where
* co-factor > 1 but it was suggested that even though this is probably
* never going to happen it is a simple and safe check "just to be
* sure" so let's be safe.
@@ -697,7 +681,6 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
fin:
crypto_ec_point_deinit(K, 1);
crypto_ec_point_deinit(point, 1);
- crypto_bignum_deinit(cofactor, 1);
if (res)
eap_pwd_state(data, PWD_Confirm_Req);
--
2.23.0

43
CVE-2019-13377-2-pre1.patch
View File

@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
From 92e1b96c26a84e503847bdd22ebadf697c4031ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Sat, 13 Apr 2019 17:20:57 +0300
Subject: EAP-pwd: Disallow ECC groups with a prime under 256 bits
Based on the SAE implementation guidance update to not allow ECC groups
with a prime that is under 256 bits, reject groups 25, 26, and 27 in
EAP-pwd.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
diff --git a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
index a2dd386..ccd3627 100644
--- a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
+++ b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
@@ -84,11 +84,23 @@ static int eap_pwd_kdf(const u8 *key, size_t keylen, const u8 *label,
return 0;
}
+static int eap_pwd_suitable_group(u16 num)
+{
+ /* Do not allow ECC groups with prime under 256 bits based on guidance
+ * for the similar design in SAE. */
+ return num == 19 || num == 20 || num == 21 ||
+ num == 28 || num == 29 || num == 30;
+}
EAP_PWD_group * get_eap_pwd_group(u16 num)
{
EAP_PWD_group *grp;
grp = os_zalloc(sizeof(EAP_PWD_group));
+ if (!eap_pwd_suitable_group(num)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unsuitable group %u", num);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
if (!grp)
return NULL;
grp->group = crypto_ec_init(num);
--
2.23.0

70
CVE-2019-13377-2.patch
View File

@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
From 20d7bd83c43fb24c4cf84d3045254d3ee1957166 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2019 19:07:05 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 2/6] EAP-pwd: Use const_time_memcmp() for pwd_value >= prime
comparison
This reduces timing and memory access pattern differences for an
operation that could depend on the used password.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7958223fdcfe82479e6ed71019a84f6d4cbf799c)
---
src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c | 13 ++++++++-----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
index cd7cd0f..a2aaafe 100644
--- a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
+++ b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
u8 qnr_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
u8 qr_or_qnr_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
u8 x_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
+ u8 prime_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
struct crypto_bignum *tmp1 = NULL, *tmp2 = NULL, *pm1 = NULL;
struct crypto_hash *hash;
unsigned char pwe_digest[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *prfbuf = NULL, ctr;
@@ -159,6 +160,11 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
os_memset(x_bin, 0, sizeof(x_bin));
prime = crypto_ec_get_prime(grp->group);
+ primebitlen = crypto_ec_prime_len_bits(grp->group);
+ primebytelen = crypto_ec_prime_len(grp->group);
+ if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(prime, prime_bin, sizeof(prime_bin),
+ primebytelen) < 0)
+ return -1;
grp->pwe = crypto_ec_point_init(grp->group);
tmp1 = crypto_bignum_init();
pm1 = crypto_bignum_init();
@@ -168,8 +174,6 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
goto fail;
}
- primebitlen = crypto_ec_prime_len_bits(grp->group);
- primebytelen = crypto_ec_prime_len(grp->group);
if ((prfbuf = os_malloc(primebytelen)) == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to malloc space for prf "
"buffer");
@@ -235,6 +239,8 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
if (primebitlen % 8)
buf_shift_right(prfbuf, primebytelen,
8 - primebitlen % 8);
+ if (const_time_memcmp(prfbuf, prime_bin, primebytelen) >= 0)
+ continue;
crypto_bignum_deinit(x_candidate, 1);
x_candidate = crypto_bignum_init_set(prfbuf, primebytelen);
@@ -244,9 +250,6 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
goto fail;
}
- if (crypto_bignum_cmp(x_candidate, prime) >= 0)
- continue;
-
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: x_candidate",
prfbuf, primebytelen);
const_time_select_bin(found, x_bin, prfbuf, primebytelen,
--
2.23.0

66
CVE-2019-13377-3.patch
View File

@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
From ee34d8cfbd0fbf7ba7429531d4bee1c43b074d8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2019 19:23:05 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 3/6] OpenSSL: Use BN_bn2binpad() or BN_bn2bin_padded() if
available
This converts crypto_bignum_to_bin() to use the OpenSSL/BoringSSL
functions BN_bn2binpad()/BN_bn2bin_padded(), when available, to avoid
differences in runtime and memory access patterns depending on the
leading bytes of the BIGNUM value.
OpenSSL 1.0.2 and LibreSSL do not include such functions, so those cases
are still using the previous implementation where the BN_num_bytes()
call may result in different memory access pattern.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1e237903f5b5d3117342daf006c5878cdb45e3d3)
---
src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c b/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
index 748a7ad..00b61b9 100644
--- a/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
+++ b/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
@@ -1129,14 +1129,27 @@ void crypto_bignum_deinit(struct crypto_bignum *n, int clear)
int crypto_bignum_to_bin(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
u8 *buf, size_t buflen, size_t padlen)
{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+#else /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+#else
int num_bytes, offset;
+#endif
+#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
if (TEST_FAIL())
return -1;
if (padlen > buflen)
return -1;
-
+#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+ if (BN_bn2bin_padded(buf, padlen, (const BIGNUM *) a) == 0)
+ return -1;
+ return padlen;
+#else /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ return BN_bn2binpad((const BIGNUM *) a, buf, padlen);
+#else
num_bytes = BN_num_bytes((const BIGNUM *) a);
if ((size_t) num_bytes > buflen)
return -1;
@@ -1149,6 +1162,8 @@ int crypto_bignum_to_bin(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
BN_bn2bin((const BIGNUM *) a, buf + offset);
return num_bytes + offset;
+#endif
+#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
}
--
2.23.0

59
CVE-2019-13377-4.patch
View File

@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
From a25b48118d75f3c2d7cb1b2c3b4cffb13091a34c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 23:01:06 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 4/6] SAE: Run through prf result processing even if it >=
prime
This reduces differences in timing and memory access within the
hunting-and-pecking loop for ECC groups that have a prime that is not
close to a power of two (e.g., Brainpool curves).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
(cherry picked from commit 147bf7b88a9c231322b5b574263071ca6dbb0503)
---
src/common/sae.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/common/sae.c b/src/common/sae.c
index 4741753..e155a71 100644
--- a/src/common/sae.c
+++ b/src/common/sae.c
@@ -274,6 +274,8 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
struct crypto_bignum *y_sqr, *x_cand;
int res;
size_t bits;
+ int cmp_prime;
+ unsigned int in_range;
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-seed", pwd_seed, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
@@ -287,8 +289,13 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-value",
pwd_value, sae->tmp->prime_len);
- if (const_time_memcmp(pwd_value, prime, sae->tmp->prime_len) >= 0)
- return 0;
+ cmp_prime = const_time_memcmp(pwd_value, prime, sae->tmp->prime_len);
+ /* Create a const_time mask for selection based on prf result
+ * being smaller than prime. */
+ in_range = const_time_fill_msb((unsigned int) cmp_prime);
+ /* The algorithm description would skip the next steps if
+ * cmp_prime >= 0 (reutnr 0 here), but go through them regardless to
+ * minimize externally observable differences in behavior. */
x_cand = crypto_bignum_init_set(pwd_value, sae->tmp->prime_len);
if (!x_cand)
@@ -300,7 +307,9 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
res = is_quadratic_residue_blind(sae, prime, bits, qr, qnr, y_sqr);
crypto_bignum_deinit(y_sqr, 1);
- return res;
+ if (res < 0)
+ return res;
+ return const_time_select_int(in_range, res, 0);
}
--
2.23.0

58
CVE-2019-13377-5.patch
View File

@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
From 00a6cc73da61b03c146b6c341d0d1e572bcef432 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 23:02:51 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 5/6] EAP-pwd: Run through prf result processing even if it >=
prime
This reduces differences in timing and memory access within the
hunting-and-pecking loop for ECC groups that have a prime that is not
close to a power of two (e.g., Brainpool curves).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
(cherry picked from commit cd803299ca485eb857e37c88f973fccfbb8600e5)
---
src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c | 13 ++++++++++---
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
index a2aaafe..8e7966e 100644
--- a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
+++ b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
@@ -153,6 +153,8 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
struct crypto_bignum *x_candidate = NULL;
const struct crypto_bignum *prime;
u8 mask, found_ctr = 0, is_odd = 0;
+ int cmp_prime;
+ unsigned int in_range;
if (grp->pwe)
return -1;
@@ -239,8 +241,13 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
if (primebitlen % 8)
buf_shift_right(prfbuf, primebytelen,
8 - primebitlen % 8);
- if (const_time_memcmp(prfbuf, prime_bin, primebytelen) >= 0)
- continue;
+ cmp_prime = const_time_memcmp(prfbuf, prime_bin, primebytelen);
+ /* Create a const_time mask for selection based on prf result
+ * being smaller than prime. */
+ in_range = const_time_fill_msb((unsigned int) cmp_prime);
+ /* The algorithm description would skip the next steps if
+ * cmp_prime >= 0, but go through them regardless to minimize
+ * externally observable differences in behavior. */
crypto_bignum_deinit(x_candidate, 1);
x_candidate = crypto_bignum_init_set(prfbuf, primebytelen);
@@ -308,7 +315,7 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
goto fail;
mask = const_time_eq(res, check);
found_ctr = const_time_select_u8(found, found_ctr, ctr);
- found |= mask;
+ found |= mask & in_range;
}
if (found == 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
--
2.23.0

59
CVE-2019-13377-6-pre.patch
View File

@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
From db54db11aec763b6fc74715c36e0f9de0d65e206 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2019 18:01:07 +0300
Subject: SAE: Reject unsuitable groups based on REVmd changes
The rules defining which DH groups are suitable for SAE use were
accepted into IEEE 802.11 REVmd based on this document:
https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/19/11-19-0387-02-000m-addressing-some-sae-comments.docx
Enforce those rules in production builds of wpa_supplicant and hostapd.
CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS=y builds can still be used to select any o the
implemented groups to maintain testing coverage.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
---
src/common/sae.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/common/sae.c b/src/common/sae.c
index e155a71..91b6b41 100644
--- a/src/common/sae.c
+++ b/src/common/sae.c
@@ -17,11 +17,32 @@
#include "ieee802_11_defs.h"
#include "sae.h"
+static int sae_suitable_group(int group)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
+ /* Allow all groups for testing purposes in non-production builds. */
+ return 1;
+#else /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
+ /* Enforce REVmd rules on which SAE groups are suitable for production
+ * purposes: FFC groups whose prime is >= 3072 bits and ECC groups
+ * defined over a prime field whose prime is >= 256 bits. Furthermore,
+ * ECC groups defined over a characteristic 2 finite field and ECC
+ * groups with a co-factor greater than 1 are not suitable. */
+ return group == 19 || group == 20 || group == 21 ||
+ group == 28 || group == 29 || group == 30 ||
+ group == 15 || group == 16 || group == 17 || group == 18;
+#endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
+}
int sae_set_group(struct sae_data *sae, int group)
{
struct sae_temporary_data *tmp;
+ if (!sae_suitable_group(group)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Reject unsuitable group %d", group);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
sae_clear_data(sae);
tmp = sae->tmp = os_zalloc(sizeof(*tmp));
if (tmp == NULL)
--
2.23.0

53
CVE-2019-13377-6.patch
View File

@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
From 558518ed63202e5358116ab7e0afd5e85490f2ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Sat, 27 Jul 2019 23:19:17 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 6/6] dragonfly: Disable use of groups using Brainpool curves
Disable groups that use Brainpool curves for now since they leak more
timing information due to the prime not being close to a power of two.
This removes use of groups 28, 29, and 30 from SAE and EAP-pwd.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
(cherry picked from commit 876c5eaa6dae1a87a17603fc489a44c29eedc2e3)
---
src/common/sae.c | 7 +++++--
src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c | 3 +--
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/common/sae.c b/src/common/sae.c
index 91b6b41..5ef6c4c 100644
--- a/src/common/sae.c
+++ b/src/common/sae.c
@@ -27,9 +27,12 @@ static int sae_suitable_group(int group)
* purposes: FFC groups whose prime is >= 3072 bits and ECC groups
* defined over a prime field whose prime is >= 256 bits. Furthermore,
* ECC groups defined over a characteristic 2 finite field and ECC
- * groups with a co-factor greater than 1 are not suitable. */
+ * groups with a co-factor greater than 1 are not suitable. Disable
+ * groups that use Brainpool curves as well for now since they leak more
+ * timing information due to the prime not being close to a power of
+ * two. */
+
return group == 19 || group == 20 || group == 21 ||
- group == 28 || group == 29 || group == 30 ||
group == 15 || group == 16 || group == 17 || group == 18;
#endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
}
diff --git a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
index 8e7966e..bac2796 100644
--- a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
+++ b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
@@ -88,8 +88,7 @@ static int eap_pwd_suitable_group(u16 num)
{
/* Do not allow ECC groups with prime under 256 bits based on guidance
* for the similar design in SAE. */
- return num == 19 || num == 20 || num == 21 ||
- num == 28 || num == 29 || num == 30;
+ return num == 19 || num == 20 || num == 21;
}
EAP_PWD_group * get_eap_pwd_group(u16 num)
{
--
2.23.0

73
CVE-2019-16275.patch
View File

@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
From 8c07fa9eda13e835f3f968b2e1c9a8be3a851ff9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2019 11:52:04 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] AP: Silently ignore management frame from unexpected source
address
Do not process any received Management frames with unexpected/invalid SA
so that we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end up
sending out frames to unexpected destination. This prevents unexpected
sequences where an unprotected frame might end up causing the AP to send
out a response to another device and that other device processing the
unexpected response.
In particular, this prevents some potential denial of service cases
where the unexpected response frame from the AP might result in a
connected station dropping its association.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
src/ap/drv_callbacks.c | 13 +++++++++++++
src/ap/ieee802_11.c | 12 ++++++++++++
2 files changed, 25 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c b/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c
index 31587685fe3b..34ca379edc3d 100644
--- a/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c
+++ b/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c
@@ -131,6 +131,19 @@ int hostapd_notif_assoc(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *addr,
"hostapd_notif_assoc: Skip event with no address");
return -1;
}
+
+ if (is_multicast_ether_addr(addr) ||
+ is_zero_ether_addr(addr) ||
+ os_memcmp(addr, hapd->own_addr, ETH_ALEN) == 0) {
+ /* Do not process any frames with unexpected/invalid SA so that
+ * we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end
+ * up sending out frames to unexpected destination. */
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Invalid SA=" MACSTR
+ " in received indication - ignore this indication silently",
+ __func__, MAC2STR(addr));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
random_add_randomness(addr, ETH_ALEN);
hostapd_logger(hapd, addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211,
diff --git a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
index c85a28db44b7..e7065372e158 100644
--- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
+++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
@@ -4626,6 +4626,18 @@ int ieee802_11_mgmt(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *buf, size_t len,
fc = le_to_host16(mgmt->frame_control);
stype = WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(fc);
+ if (is_multicast_ether_addr(mgmt->sa) ||
+ is_zero_ether_addr(mgmt->sa) ||
+ os_memcmp(mgmt->sa, hapd->own_addr, ETH_ALEN) == 0) {
+ /* Do not process any frames with unexpected/invalid SA so that
+ * we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end
+ * up sending out frames to unexpected destination. */
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "MGMT: Invalid SA=" MACSTR
+ " in received frame - ignore this frame silently",
+ MAC2STR(mgmt->sa));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (stype == WLAN_FC_STYPE_BEACON) {
handle_beacon(hapd, mgmt, len, fi);
return 1;
--
2.20.1

218
CVE-2019-9494-1.patch
View File

@ -1,218 +0,0 @@
From 6e34f618d37ddbb5854c42e2ad4fca83492fa7b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2019 18:38:30 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 02/14] Add helper functions for constant time operations
These functions can be used to help implement constant time operations
for various cryptographic operations that must minimize externally
observable differences in processing (both in timing and also in
internal cache use, etc.).
This is related to CVE-2019-9494 and CVE-2019-9495.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
---
src/utils/const_time.h | 191 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 191 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 src/utils/const_time.h
diff --git a/src/utils/const_time.h b/src/utils/const_time.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ab8f611
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/utils/const_time.h
@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+/*
+ * Helper functions for constant time operations
+ * Copyright (c) 2019, The Linux Foundation
+ *
+ * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
+ * See README for more details.
+ *
+ * These helper functions can be used to implement logic that needs to minimize
+ * externally visible differences in execution path by avoiding use of branches,
+ * avoiding early termination or other time differences, and forcing same memory
+ * access pattern regardless of values.
+ */
+
+#ifndef CONST_TIME_H
+#define CONST_TIME_H
+
+
+#if defined(__clang__)
+#define NO_UBSAN_UINT_OVERFLOW \
+ __attribute__((no_sanitize("unsigned-integer-overflow")))
+#else
+#define NO_UBSAN_UINT_OVERFLOW
+#endif
+
+
+/**
+ * const_time_fill_msb - Fill all bits with MSB value
+ * @val: Input value
+ * Returns: Value with all the bits set to the MSB of the input val
+ */
+static inline unsigned int const_time_fill_msb(unsigned int val)
+{
+ /* Move the MSB to LSB and multiple by -1 to fill in all bits. */
+ return (val >> (sizeof(val) * 8 - 1)) * ~0U;
+}
+
+
+/* Returns: -1 if val is zero; 0 if val is not zero */
+static inline unsigned int const_time_is_zero(unsigned int val)
+ NO_UBSAN_UINT_OVERFLOW
+{
+ /* Set MSB to 1 for 0 and fill rest of bits with the MSB value */
+ return const_time_fill_msb(~val & (val - 1));
+}
+
+
+/* Returns: -1 if a == b; 0 if a != b */
+static inline unsigned int const_time_eq(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
+{
+ return const_time_is_zero(a ^ b);
+}
+
+
+/* Returns: -1 if a == b; 0 if a != b */
+static inline u8 const_time_eq_u8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
+{
+ return (u8) const_time_eq(a, b);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * const_time_eq_bin - Constant time memory comparison
+ * @a: First buffer to compare
+ * @b: Second buffer to compare
+ * @len: Number of octets to compare
+ * Returns: -1 if buffers are equal, 0 if not
+ *
+ * This function is meant for comparing passwords or hash values where
+ * difference in execution time or memory access pattern could provide external
+ * observer information about the location of the difference in the memory
+ * buffers. The return value does not behave like memcmp(), i.e.,
+ * const_time_eq_bin() cannot be used to sort items into a defined order. Unlike
+ * memcmp(), the execution time of const_time_eq_bin() does not depend on the
+ * contents of the compared memory buffers, but only on the total compared
+ * length.
+ */
+static inline unsigned int const_time_eq_bin(const void *a, const void *b,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ const u8 *aa = a;
+ const u8 *bb = b;
+ size_t i;
+ u8 res = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+ res |= aa[i] ^ bb[i];
+
+ return const_time_is_zero(res);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * const_time_select - Constant time unsigned int selection
+ * @mask: 0 (false) or -1 (true) to identify which value to select
+ * @true_val: Value to select for the true case
+ * @false_val: Value to select for the false case
+ * Returns: true_val if mask == -1, false_val if mask == 0
+ */
+static inline unsigned int const_time_select(unsigned int mask,
+ unsigned int true_val,
+ unsigned int false_val)
+{
+ return (mask & true_val) | (~mask & false_val);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * const_time_select_int - Constant time int selection
+ * @mask: 0 (false) or -1 (true) to identify which value to select
+ * @true_val: Value to select for the true case
+ * @false_val: Value to select for the false case
+ * Returns: true_val if mask == -1, false_val if mask == 0
+ */
+static inline int const_time_select_int(unsigned int mask, int true_val,
+ int false_val)
+{
+ return (int) const_time_select(mask, (unsigned int) true_val,
+ (unsigned int) false_val);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * const_time_select_u8 - Constant time u8 selection
+ * @mask: 0 (false) or -1 (true) to identify which value to select
+ * @true_val: Value to select for the true case
+ * @false_val: Value to select for the false case
+ * Returns: true_val if mask == -1, false_val if mask == 0
+ */
+static inline u8 const_time_select_u8(u8 mask, u8 true_val, u8 false_val)
+{
+ return (u8) const_time_select(mask, true_val, false_val);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * const_time_select_s8 - Constant time s8 selection
+ * @mask: 0 (false) or -1 (true) to identify which value to select
+ * @true_val: Value to select for the true case
+ * @false_val: Value to select for the false case
+ * Returns: true_val if mask == -1, false_val if mask == 0
+ */
+static inline s8 const_time_select_s8(u8 mask, s8 true_val, s8 false_val)
+{
+ return (s8) const_time_select(mask, (unsigned int) true_val,
+ (unsigned int) false_val);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * const_time_select_bin - Constant time binary buffer selection copy
+ * @mask: 0 (false) or -1 (true) to identify which value to copy
+ * @true_val: Buffer to copy for the true case
+ * @false_val: Buffer to copy for the false case
+ * @len: Number of octets to copy
+ * @dst: Destination buffer for the copy
+ *
+ * This function copies the specified buffer into the destination buffer using
+ * operations with identical memory access pattern regardless of which buffer
+ * is being copied.
+ */
+static inline void const_time_select_bin(u8 mask, const u8 *true_val,
+ const u8 *false_val, size_t len,
+ u8 *dst)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+ dst[i] = const_time_select_u8(mask, true_val[i], false_val[i]);
+}
+
+
+static inline int const_time_memcmp(const void *a, const void *b, size_t len)
+{
+ const u8 *aa = a;
+ const u8 *bb = b;
+ int diff, res = 0;
+ unsigned int mask;
+
+ if (len == 0)
+ return 0;
+ do {
+ len--;
+ diff = (int) aa[len] - (int) bb[len];
+ mask = const_time_is_zero((unsigned int) diff);
+ res = const_time_select_int(mask, res, diff);
+ } while (len);
+
+ return res;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONST_TIME_H */
--
2.7.4

38
CVE-2019-9494-2.patch
View File

@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
--- wpa_supplicant-2.6-bak/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c 2019-06-30 21:39:30.605000000 -0400
+++ wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c 2019-07-01 02:49:34.765000000 -0400
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#endif /* CONFIG_ECC */
#include "common.h"
+#include "utils/const_time.h"
#include "wpabuf.h"
#include "dh_group5.h"
#include "sha1.h"
@@ -1306,6 +1307,7 @@ int crypto_bignum_legendre(const struct
BN_CTX *bnctx;
BIGNUM *exp = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
int res = -2;
+ unsigned int mask;
if (TEST_FAIL())
return -2;
@@ -1324,12 +1326,13 @@ int crypto_bignum_legendre(const struct
bnctx))
goto fail;
- if (BN_is_word(tmp, 1))
- res = 1;
- else if (BN_is_zero(tmp))
- res = 0;
- else
- res = -1;
+ /* Return 1 if tmp == 1, 0 if tmp == 0, or -1 otherwise. Need to use
+ * constant time selection to avoid branches here. */
+ res = -1;
+ mask = const_time_eq(BN_is_word(tmp, 1), 1);
+ res = const_time_select_int(mask, 1, res);
+ mask = const_time_eq(BN_is_zero(tmp), 1);
+ res = const_time_select_int(mask, 0, res);
fail:
BN_clear_free(tmp);

218
CVE-2019-9494-3.patch
View File

@ -1,218 +0,0 @@
--- wpa_supplicant-2.6-bak/src/common/sae.c 2019-06-30 21:39:30.592000000 -0400
+++ wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/common/sae.c 2019-07-01 04:08:21.023000000 -0400
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include "includes.h"
#include "common.h"
+#include "utils/const_time.h"
#include "crypto/crypto.h"
#include "crypto/sha256.h"
#include "crypto/random.h"
@@ -262,15 +263,12 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(struct
const u8 *prime,
const struct crypto_bignum *qr,
const struct crypto_bignum *qnr,
- struct crypto_bignum **ret_x_cand)
+ u8 *pwd_value)
{
- u8 pwd_value[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
struct crypto_bignum *y_sqr, *x_cand;
int res;
size_t bits;
- *ret_x_cand = NULL;
-
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-seed", pwd_seed, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
/* pwd-value = KDF-z(pwd-seed, "SAE Hunting and Pecking", p) */
@@ -279,7 +277,7 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(struct
prime, sae->tmp->prime_len, pwd_value, bits) < 0)
return -1;
if (bits % 8)
- buf_shift_right(pwd_value, sizeof(pwd_value), 8 - bits % 8);
+ buf_shift_right(pwd_value, sae->tmp->prime_len, 8 - bits % 8);
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-value",
pwd_value, sae->tmp->prime_len);
@@ -290,20 +288,13 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(struct
if (!x_cand)
return -1;
y_sqr = crypto_ec_point_compute_y_sqr(sae->tmp->ec, x_cand);
- if (!y_sqr) {
- crypto_bignum_deinit(x_cand, 1);
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(x_cand, 1);
+ if (!y_sqr)
return -1;
- }
res = is_quadratic_residue_blind(sae, prime, bits, qr, qnr, y_sqr);
crypto_bignum_deinit(y_sqr, 1);
- if (res <= 0) {
- crypto_bignum_deinit(x_cand, 1);
- return res;
- }
-
- *ret_x_cand = x_cand;
- return 1;
+ return res;
}
@@ -423,25 +414,30 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae
u8 addrs[2 * ETH_ALEN];
const u8 *addr[2];
size_t len[2];
- u8 dummy_password[32];
- size_t dummy_password_len;
+ u8 *dummy_password, *tmp_password;
int pwd_seed_odd = 0;
u8 prime[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
size_t prime_len;
- struct crypto_bignum *x = NULL, *qr, *qnr;
+ struct crypto_bignum *x = NULL, *qr = NULL, *qnr = NULL;
+ u8 x_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
+ u8 x_cand_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
size_t bits;
- int res;
-
- dummy_password_len = password_len;
- if (dummy_password_len > sizeof(dummy_password))
- dummy_password_len = sizeof(dummy_password);
- if (random_get_bytes(dummy_password, dummy_password_len) < 0)
- return -1;
+ int res = -1;
+ u8 found = 0; /* 0 (false) or 0xff (true) to be used as const_time_*
+ * mask */
+
+ os_memset(x_bin, 0, sizeof(x_bin));
+
+ dummy_password = os_malloc(password_len);
+ tmp_password = os_malloc(password_len);
+ if (!dummy_password || !tmp_password ||
+ random_get_bytes(dummy_password, password_len) < 0)
+ goto fail;
prime_len = sae->tmp->prime_len;
if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(sae->tmp->prime, prime, sizeof(prime),
prime_len) < 0)
- return -1;
+ goto fail;
bits = crypto_ec_prime_len_bits(sae->tmp->ec);
/*
@@ -450,7 +446,7 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae
*/
if (get_random_qr_qnr(prime, prime_len, sae->tmp->prime, bits,
&qr, &qnr) < 0)
- return -1;
+ goto fail;
wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: password",
password, password_len);
@@ -463,7 +459,7 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae
*/
sae_pwd_seed_key(addr1, addr2, addrs);
- addr[0] = password;
+ addr[0] = tmp_password;
len[0] = password_len;
addr[1] = &counter;
len[1] = sizeof(counter);
@@ -473,9 +469,8 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae
* attacks that attempt to determine the number of iterations required
* in the loop.
*/
- for (counter = 1; counter <= k || !x; counter++) {
+ for (counter = 1; counter <= k || !found; counter++) {
u8 pwd_seed[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
- struct crypto_bignum *x_cand;
if (counter > 200) {
/* This should not happen in practice */
@@ -483,36 +478,46 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae
break;
}
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: counter = %u", counter);
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: counter = %03u", counter);
+ const_time_select_bin(found, dummy_password, password,
+ password_len, tmp_password);
+
if (hmac_sha256_vector(addrs, sizeof(addrs), 2, addr, len,
pwd_seed) < 0)
break;
res = sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(sae, pwd_seed,
- prime, qr, qnr, &x_cand);
+ prime, qr, qnr, x_cand_bin);
+ const_time_select_bin(found, x_bin, x_cand_bin, prime_len,
+ x_bin);
+ pwd_seed_odd = const_time_select_u8(
+ found, pwd_seed_odd,
+ pwd_seed[SHA256_MAC_LEN - 1] & 0x01);
+ os_memset(pwd_seed, 0, sizeof(pwd_seed));
if (res < 0)
goto fail;
- if (res > 0 && !x) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
- "SAE: Selected pwd-seed with counter %u",
- counter);
- x = x_cand;
- pwd_seed_odd = pwd_seed[SHA256_MAC_LEN - 1] & 0x01;
- os_memset(pwd_seed, 0, sizeof(pwd_seed));
-
- /*
- * Use a dummy password for the following rounds, if
- * any.
- */
- addr[0] = dummy_password;
- len[0] = dummy_password_len;
- } else if (res > 0) {
- crypto_bignum_deinit(x_cand, 1);
- }
+ /* Need to minimize differences in handling res == 0 and 1 here
+ * to avoid differences in timing and instruction cache access,
+ * so use const_time_select_*() to make local copies of the
+ * values based on whether this loop iteration was the one that
+ * found the pwd-seed/x. */
+
+ /* found is 0 or 0xff here and res is 0 or 1. Bitwise OR of them
+ * (with res converted to 0/0xff) handles this in constant time.
+ */
+ found |= res * 0xff;
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-seed result %d found=0x%02x",
+ res, found);
+ }
+
+ if (!found) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Could not generate PWE");
+ res = -1;
+ goto fail;
}
+ x = crypto_bignum_init_set(x_bin, prime_len);
if (!x) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Could not generate PWE");
res = -1;
goto fail;
}
@@ -525,7 +530,6 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae
res = crypto_ec_point_solve_y_coord(sae->tmp->ec,
sae->tmp->pwe_ecc, x,
pwd_seed_odd);
- crypto_bignum_deinit(x, 1);
if (res < 0) {
/*
* This should not happen since we already checked that there
@@ -537,6 +541,11 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae
fail:
crypto_bignum_deinit(qr, 0);
crypto_bignum_deinit(qnr, 0);
+ os_free(dummy_password);
+ bin_clear_free(tmp_password, password_len);
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(x, 1);
+ os_memset(x_bin, 0, sizeof(x_bin));
+ os_memset(x_cand_bin, 0, sizeof(x_cand_bin));
return res;
}

125
CVE-2019-9494-4.patch
View File

@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
--- wpa_supplicant-2.6-bak2/src/common/sae.c 2019-07-01 04:54:10.185000000 -0400
+++ wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/common/sae.c 2019-07-01 04:58:09.913000000 -0400
@@ -202,12 +202,14 @@ get_rand_1_to_p_1(const u8 *prime, size_
static int is_quadratic_residue_blind(struct sae_data *sae,
const u8 *prime, size_t bits,
- const struct crypto_bignum *qr,
- const struct crypto_bignum *qnr,
+ const u8 *qr, const u8 *qnr,
const struct crypto_bignum *y_sqr)
{
- struct crypto_bignum *r, *num;
+ struct crypto_bignum *r, *num, *qr_or_qnr = NULL;
int r_odd, check, res = -1;
+ u8 qr_or_qnr_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
+ size_t prime_len = sae->tmp->prime_len;
+ unsigned int mask;
/*
* Use the blinding technique to mask y_sqr while determining
@@ -218,7 +220,7 @@ static int is_quadratic_residue_blind(st
* r = a random number between 1 and p-1, inclusive
* num = (v * r * r) modulo p
*/
- r = get_rand_1_to_p_1(prime, sae->tmp->prime_len, bits, &r_odd);
+ r = get_rand_1_to_p_1(prime, prime_len, bits, &r_odd);
if (!r)
return -1;
@@ -228,41 +230,45 @@ static int is_quadratic_residue_blind(st
crypto_bignum_mulmod(num, r, sae->tmp->prime, num) < 0)
goto fail;
- if (r_odd) {
- /*
- * num = (num * qr) module p
- * LGR(num, p) = 1 ==> quadratic residue
- */
- if (crypto_bignum_mulmod(num, qr, sae->tmp->prime, num) < 0)
- goto fail;
- check = 1;
- } else {
- /*
- * num = (num * qnr) module p
- * LGR(num, p) = -1 ==> quadratic residue
- */
- if (crypto_bignum_mulmod(num, qnr, sae->tmp->prime, num) < 0)
- goto fail;
- check = -1;
- }
+ /*
+ * Need to minimize differences in handling different cases, so try to
+ * avoid branches and timing differences.
+ *
+ * If r_odd:
+ * num = (num * qr) module p
+ * LGR(num, p) = 1 ==> quadratic residue
+ * else:
+ * num = (num * qnr) module p
+ * LGR(num, p) = -1 ==> quadratic residue
+ */
+ mask = const_time_is_zero(r_odd);
+ const_time_select_bin(mask, qnr, qr, prime_len, qr_or_qnr_bin);
+ qr_or_qnr = crypto_bignum_init_set(qr_or_qnr_bin, prime_len);
+ if (!qr_or_qnr ||
+ crypto_bignum_mulmod(num, qr_or_qnr, sae->tmp->prime, num) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+ /* r_odd is 0 or 1; branchless version of check = r_odd ? 1 : -1, */
+ check = const_time_select_int(mask, -1, 1);
res = crypto_bignum_legendre(num, sae->tmp->prime);
if (res == -2) {
res = -1;
goto fail;
}
- res = res == check;
+ /* branchless version of res = res == check
+ * (res is -1, 0, or 1; check is -1 or 1) */
+ mask = const_time_eq(res, check);
+ res = const_time_select_int(mask, 1, 0);
fail:
crypto_bignum_deinit(num, 1);
crypto_bignum_deinit(r, 1);
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(qr_or_qnr, 1);
return res;
}
static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
- const u8 *prime,
- const struct crypto_bignum *qr,
- const struct crypto_bignum *qnr,
+ const u8 *prime, const u8 *qr, const u8 *qnr,
u8 *pwd_value)
{
struct crypto_bignum *y_sqr, *x_cand;
@@ -421,6 +427,8 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae
struct crypto_bignum *x = NULL, *qr = NULL, *qnr = NULL;
u8 x_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
u8 x_cand_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
+ u8 qr_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
+ u8 qnr_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
size_t bits;
int res = -1;
u8 found = 0; /* 0 (false) or 0xff (true) to be used as const_time_*
@@ -445,7 +453,9 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae
* (qnr) modulo p for blinding purposes during the loop.
*/
if (get_random_qr_qnr(prime, prime_len, sae->tmp->prime, bits,
- &qr, &qnr) < 0)
+ &qr, &qnr) < 0 ||
+ crypto_bignum_to_bin(qr, qr_bin, sizeof(qr_bin), prime_len) < 0 ||
+ crypto_bignum_to_bin(qnr, qnr_bin, sizeof(qnr_bin), prime_len) < 0)
goto fail;
wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: password",
@@ -487,7 +497,7 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae
break;
res = sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(sae, pwd_seed,
- prime, qr, qnr, x_cand_bin);
+ prime, qr_bin, qnr_bin, x_cand_bin);
const_time_select_bin(found, x_bin, x_cand_bin, prime_len,
x_bin);
pwd_seed_odd = const_time_select_u8(

80
CVE-2019-9494-5.patch
View File

@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
--- wpa_supplicant-2.6-bak2/src/common/sae.c 2019-07-01 05:05:26.086000000 -0400
+++ wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/common/sae.c 2019-07-01 05:22:08.799000000 -0400
@@ -561,21 +561,26 @@ fail:
}
+static int sae_modp_group_require_masking(int group)
+{
+ /* Groups for which pwd-value is likely to be >= p frequently */
+ return group == 22 || group == 23 || group == 24;
+}
+
+
static int sae_derive_pwe_ffc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *addr1,
const u8 *addr2, const u8 *password,
size_t password_len)
{
- u8 counter;
+ u8 counter, k;
u8 addrs[2 * ETH_ALEN];
const u8 *addr[2];
size_t len[2];
int found = 0;
+ struct crypto_bignum *pwe = NULL;
- if (sae->tmp->pwe_ffc == NULL) {
- sae->tmp->pwe_ffc = crypto_bignum_init();
- if (sae->tmp->pwe_ffc == NULL)
- return -1;
- }
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(sae->tmp->pwe_ffc, 1);
+ sae->tmp->pwe_ffc = NULL;
wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: password",
password, password_len);
@@ -592,7 +597,9 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ffc(struct sae
addr[1] = &counter;
len[1] = sizeof(counter);
- for (counter = 1; !found; counter++) {
+ k = sae_modp_group_require_masking(sae->group) ? 40 : 1;
+
+ for (counter = 1; counter <= k || !found; counter++) {
u8 pwd_seed[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
int res;
@@ -602,19 +609,30 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ffc(struct sae
break;
}
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: counter = %u", counter);
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: counter = %02u", counter);
if (hmac_sha256_vector(addrs, sizeof(addrs), 2, addr, len,
pwd_seed) < 0)
break;
- res = sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc(sae, pwd_seed, sae->tmp->pwe_ffc);
+ if (!pwe) {
+ pwe = crypto_bignum_init();
+ if (!pwe)
+ break;
+ }
+ res = sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc(sae, pwd_seed, pwe);
if (res < 0)
break;
if (res > 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Use this PWE");
found = 1;
+ if (!sae->tmp->pwe_ffc) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Use this PWE");
+ sae->tmp->pwe_ffc = pwe;
+ pwe = NULL;
+ }
}
}
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(pwe, 1);
+
return found ? 0 : -1;
}

82
CVE-2019-9494-6.patch
View File

@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
--- wpa_supplicant-2.6-bak/src/common/sae.c 2019-07-01 05:44:06.962000000 -0400
+++ wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/common/sae.c 2019-07-01 06:04:52.798000000 -0400
@@ -572,16 +572,27 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ffc(struct sae
const u8 *addr2, const u8 *password,
size_t password_len)
{
- u8 counter, k;
+ u8 counter, k, sel_counter = 0;
u8 addrs[2 * ETH_ALEN];
const u8 *addr[2];
size_t len[2];
- int found = 0;
- struct crypto_bignum *pwe = NULL;
+ u8 found = 0; /* 0 (false) or 0xff (true) to be used as const_time_*
+ * mask */
+ u8 mask;
+ struct crypto_bignum *pwe;
+ size_t prime_len = sae->tmp->prime_len * 8;
+ u8 *pwe_buf;
crypto_bignum_deinit(sae->tmp->pwe_ffc, 1);
sae->tmp->pwe_ffc = NULL;
+ /* Allocate a buffer to maintain selected and candidate PWE for constant
+ * time selection. */
+ pwe_buf = os_zalloc(prime_len * 2);
+ pwe = crypto_bignum_init();
+ if (!pwe_buf || !pwe)
+ goto fail;
+
wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: password",
password, password_len);
@@ -613,27 +624,33 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ffc(struct sae
if (hmac_sha256_vector(addrs, sizeof(addrs), 2, addr, len,
pwd_seed) < 0)
break;
- if (!pwe) {
- pwe = crypto_bignum_init();
- if (!pwe)
- break;
- }
res = sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc(sae, pwd_seed, pwe);
+ /* res is -1 for fatal failure, 0 if a valid PWE was not found,
+ * or 1 if a valid PWE was found. */
if (res < 0)
break;
- if (res > 0) {
- found = 1;
- if (!sae->tmp->pwe_ffc) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Use this PWE");
- sae->tmp->pwe_ffc = pwe;
- pwe = NULL;
- }
- }
+ /* Store the candidate PWE into the second half of pwe_buf and
+ * the selected PWE in the beginning of pwe_buf using constant
+ * time selection. */
+ if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(pwe, pwe_buf + prime_len, prime_len,
+ prime_len) < 0)
+ break;
+ const_time_select_bin(found, pwe_buf, pwe_buf + prime_len,
+ prime_len, pwe_buf);
+ sel_counter = const_time_select_u8(found, sel_counter, counter);
+ mask = const_time_eq_u8(res, 1);
+ found = const_time_select_u8(found, found, mask);
}
- crypto_bignum_deinit(pwe, 1);
+ if (!found)
+ goto fail;
- return found ? 0 : -1;
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Use PWE from counter = %02u", sel_counter);
+ sae->tmp->pwe_ffc = crypto_bignum_init_set(pwe_buf, prime_len);
+fail:
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(pwe, 1);
+ bin_clear_free(pwe_buf, prime_len * 2);
+ return sae->tmp->pwe_ffc ? 0 : -1;
}

137
CVE-2019-9494-7.patch
View File

@ -1,137 +0,0 @@
m cff138b0747fa39765cbc641b66cfa5d7f1735d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Date: Sat, 2 Mar 2019 16:05:56 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 09/14] SAE: Use constant time operations in
sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc()
Try to avoid showing externally visible timing or memory access
differences regardless of whether the derived pwd-value is smaller than
the group prime.
This is related to CVE-2019-9494.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
---
src/common/sae.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/common/sae.c b/src/common/sae.c
index fa9a145..eaf825d 100644
--- a/src/common/sae.c
+++ b/src/common/sae.c
@@ -334,14 +334,17 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
}
+/* Returns -1 on fatal failure, 0 if PWE cannot be derived from the provided
+ * pwd-seed, or 1 if a valid PWE was derived from pwd-seed. */
static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
struct crypto_bignum *pwe)
{
u8 pwd_value[SAE_MAX_PRIME_LEN];
size_t bits = sae->tmp->prime_len * 8;
u8 exp[1];
- struct crypto_bignum *a, *b;
- int res;
+ struct crypto_bignum *a, *b = NULL;
+ int res, is_val;
+ u8 pwd_value_valid;
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-seed", pwd_seed, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
@@ -353,16 +356,29 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-value", pwd_value,
sae->tmp->prime_len);
- if (os_memcmp(pwd_value, sae->tmp->dh->prime, sae->tmp->prime_len) >= 0)
- {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-value >= p");
- return 0;
- }
+ /* Check whether pwd-value < p */
+ res = const_time_memcmp(pwd_value, sae->tmp->dh->prime,
+ sae->tmp->prime_len);
+ /* pwd-value >= p is invalid, so res is < 0 for the valid cases and
+ * the negative sign can be used to fill the mask for constant time
+ * selection */
+ pwd_value_valid = const_time_fill_msb(res);
+
+ /* If pwd-value >= p, force pwd-value to be < p and perform the
+ * calculations anyway to hide timing difference. The derived PWE will
+ * be ignored in that case. */
+ pwd_value[0] = const_time_select_u8(pwd_value_valid, pwd_value[0], 0);
/* PWE = pwd-value^((p-1)/r) modulo p */
+ res = -1;
a = crypto_bignum_init_set(pwd_value, sae->tmp->prime_len);
+ if (!a)
+ goto fail;
+ /* This is an optimization based on the used group that does not depend
+ * on the password in any way, so it is fine to use separate branches
+ * for this step without constant time operations. */
if (sae->tmp->dh->safe_prime) {
/*
* r = (p-1)/2 for the group used here, so this becomes:
@@ -376,33 +392,34 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
b = crypto_bignum_init_set(exp, sizeof(exp));
if (b == NULL ||
crypto_bignum_sub(sae->tmp->prime, b, b) < 0 ||
- crypto_bignum_div(b, sae->tmp->order, b) < 0) {
- crypto_bignum_deinit(b, 0);
- b = NULL;
- }
+ crypto_bignum_div(b, sae->tmp->order, b) < 0)
+ goto fail;
}
- if (a == NULL || b == NULL)
- res = -1;
- else
- res = crypto_bignum_exptmod(a, b, sae->tmp->prime, pwe);
-
- crypto_bignum_deinit(a, 0);
- crypto_bignum_deinit(b, 0);
+ if (!b)
+ goto fail;
- if (res < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Failed to calculate PWE");
- return -1;
- }
+ res = crypto_bignum_exptmod(a, b, sae->tmp->prime, pwe);
+ if (res < 0)
+ goto fail;
- /* if (PWE > 1) --> found */
- if (crypto_bignum_is_zero(pwe) || crypto_bignum_is_one(pwe)) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PWE <= 1");
- return 0;
- }
+ /* There were no fatal errors in calculations, so determine the return
+ * value using constant time operations. We get here for number of
+ * invalid cases which are cleared here after having performed all the
+ * computation. PWE is valid if pwd-value was less than prime and
+ * PWE > 1. Start with pwd-value check first and then use constant time
+ * operations to clear res to 0 if PWE is 0 or 1.
+ */
+ res = const_time_select_u8(pwd_value_valid, 1, 0);
+ is_val = crypto_bignum_is_zero(pwe);
+ res = const_time_select_u8(const_time_is_zero(is_val), res, 0);
+ is_val = crypto_bignum_is_one(pwe);
+ res = const_time_select_u8(const_time_is_zero(is_val), res, 0);
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PWE found");
- return 1;
+fail:
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(a, 1);
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(b, 1);
+ return res;
}
--
2.7.4

57
CVE-2019-9494-8.patch
View File

@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
--- wpa_supplicant-2.6-bak/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c 2019-07-01 06:22:50.648000000 -0400
+++ wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c 2019-07-01 07:23:31.462000000 -0400
@@ -475,7 +475,8 @@ int crypto_mod_exp(const u8 *base, size_
bn_result == NULL)
goto error;
- if (BN_mod_exp(bn_result, bn_base, bn_exp, bn_modulus, ctx) != 1)
+ if (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(bn_result, bn_base, bn_exp, bn_modulus,
+ ctx, NULL) != 1)
goto error;
*result_len = BN_bn2bin(bn_result, result);
@@ -1192,8 +1193,9 @@ int crypto_bignum_exptmod(const struct c
bnctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (bnctx == NULL)
return -1;
- res = BN_mod_exp((BIGNUM *) d, (const BIGNUM *) a, (const BIGNUM *) b,
- (const BIGNUM *) c, bnctx);
+ res = BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime((BIGNUM *) d, (const BIGNUM *) a,
+ (const BIGNUM *) b, (const BIGNUM *) c,
+ bnctx, NULL);
BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
return res ? 0 : -1;
@@ -1212,6 +1214,11 @@ int crypto_bignum_inverse(const struct c
bnctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (bnctx == NULL)
return -1;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+ /* TODO: use BN_mod_inverse_blinded() ? */
+#else /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
+ BN_set_flags((BIGNUM *) a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
res = BN_mod_inverse((BIGNUM *) c, (const BIGNUM *) a,
(const BIGNUM *) b, bnctx);
BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
@@ -1245,6 +1252,9 @@ int crypto_bignum_div(const struct crypt
bnctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (bnctx == NULL)
return -1;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+ BN_set_flags((BIGNUM *) a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
res = BN_div((BIGNUM *) c, NULL, (const BIGNUM *) a,
(const BIGNUM *) b, bnctx);
BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
@@ -1322,8 +1332,8 @@ int crypto_bignum_legendre(const struct
/* exp = (p-1) / 2 */
!BN_sub(exp, (const BIGNUM *) p, BN_value_one()) ||
!BN_rshift1(exp, exp) ||
- !BN_mod_exp(tmp, (const BIGNUM *) a, exp, (const BIGNUM *) p,
- bnctx))
+ !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(tmp, (const BIGNUM *) a, exp,
+ (const BIGNUM *) p, bnctx, NULL))
goto fail;
/* Return 1 if tmp == 1, 0 if tmp == 0, or -1 otherwise. Need to use

1501
CVE-2019-9495-pre1.patch
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

92
CVE-2019-9495-pre2.patch
View File

@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
diff -Nur orig-wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
--- orig-wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c 2020-02-04 00:21:51.805643103 +0800
+++ wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c 2020-02-04 00:30:16.612332185 +0800
@@ -80,6 +80,26 @@
return 0;
}
+EAP_PWD_group * get_eap_pwd_group(u16 num)
+{
+ EAP_PWD_group *grp;
+
+ grp = os_zalloc(sizeof(EAP_PWD_group));
+ if (!grp)
+ return NULL;
+ grp->group = crypto_ec_init(num);
+ if (!grp->group) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to create EC group");
+ os_free(grp);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ grp->group_num = num;
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: provisioned group %d", num);
+
+ return grp;
+}
++
/*
* compute a "random" secret point on an elliptic curve based
@@ -97,12 +117,8 @@
size_t primebytelen, primebitlen;
struct crypto_bignum *x_candidate = NULL, *rnd = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
- grp->pwe = NULL;
- grp->group = crypto_ec_init(num);
- if (!grp->group) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to create EC group");
- goto fail;
- }
+ if (grp->pwe)
+ return -1;
cofactor = crypto_bignum_init();
grp->pwe = crypto_ec_point_init(grp->group);
@@ -234,11 +250,8 @@
break;
}
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: found a PWE in %d tries", ctr);
- grp->group_num = num;
if (0) {
fail:
- crypto_ec_deinit(grp->group);
- grp->group = NULL;
crypto_ec_point_deinit(grp->pwe, 1);
grp->pwe = NULL;
ret = 1;
diff -Nur orig-wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.h wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.h
--- orig-wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.h 2020-02-04 00:21:51.805643103 +0800
+++ wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.h 2020-02-04 00:31:51.873594123 +0800
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
} STRUCT_PACKED;
/* common routines */
+EAP_PWD_group * get_eap_pwd_group(u16 num);
int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
const u8 *password, size_t password_len,
const u8 *id_server, size_t id_server_len,
diff -Nur orig-wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
--- orig-wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c 2020-02-04 00:21:51.805643103 +0800
+++ wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c 2020-02-04 00:33:35.694969340 +0800
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@
wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): server sent id of",
data->id_server, data->id_server_len);
- data->grp = os_zalloc(sizeof(EAP_PWD_group));
+ data->grp = get_eap_pwd_group(data->group_num);
if (data->grp == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD: failed to allocate memory for "
"group");
diff -Nur orig-wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
--- orig-wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c 2020-02-04 00:21:51.805643103 +0800
+++ wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c 2020-02-04 00:34:34.975754518 +0800
@@ -561,7 +561,7 @@
wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PWD (server): peer sent id of",
data->id_peer, data->id_peer_len);
- data->grp = os_zalloc(sizeof(EAP_PWD_group));
+ data->grp = get_eap_pwd_group(data->group_num);
if (data->grp == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD: failed to allocate memory for "
"group");

236
CVE-2019-9495-pre3.patch
View File

@ -1,236 +0,0 @@
diff -Nur orig-wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
--- orig-wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c 2020-02-04 00:39:56.190008362 +0800
+++ wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c 2020-02-04 01:06:55.651509904 +0800
@@ -111,18 +111,25 @@
const u8 *id_peer, size_t id_peer_len,
const u8 *token)
{
+ struct crypto_bignum *qr = NULL, *qnr = NULL, *one = NULL;
+ struct crypto_bignum *tmp1 = NULL, *tmp2 = NULL, *pm1 = NULL;
struct crypto_hash *hash;
unsigned char pwe_digest[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *prfbuf = NULL, ctr;
- int is_odd, ret = 0;
+ int is_odd, ret = 0, check, found = 0;
size_t primebytelen, primebitlen;
struct crypto_bignum *x_candidate = NULL, *rnd = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
+ const struct crypto_bignum *prime;
if (grp->pwe)
return -1;
+ prime = crypto_ec_get_prime(grp->group);
cofactor = crypto_bignum_init();
grp->pwe = crypto_ec_point_init(grp->group);
- if (!cofactor || !grp->pwe) {
+ tmp1 = crypto_bignum_init();
+ pm1 = crypto_bignum_init();
+ one = crypto_bignum_init_set((const u8 *) "\x01", 1);
+ if (!cofactor || !grp->pwe || !tmp1 || !pm1 || !one) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to create bignums");
goto fail;
}
@@ -139,15 +146,36 @@
"buffer");
goto fail;
}
- os_memset(prfbuf, 0, primebytelen);
- ctr = 0;
- while (1) {
- if (ctr > 30) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to find random "
- "point on curve for group %d, something's "
- "fishy", num);
+ if (crypto_bignum_sub(prime, one, pm1) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ /* get a random quadratic residue and nonresidue */
+ while (!qr || !qnr) {
+ int res;
+
+ if (crypto_bignum_rand(tmp1, prime) < 0)
goto fail;
+ res = crypto_bignum_legendre(tmp1, prime);
+ if (!qr && res == 1) {
+ qr = tmp1;
+ tmp1 = crypto_bignum_init();
+ } else if (!qnr && res == -1) {
+ qnr = tmp1;
+ tmp1 = crypto_bignum_init();
}
+ if (!tmp1)
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ os_memset(prfbuf, 0, primebytelen);
+ ctr = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Run through the hunting-and-pecking loop 40 times to mask the time
+ * necessary to find PWE. The odds of PWE not being found in 40 loops is
+ * roughly 1 in 1 trillion.
+ */
+ while (ctr < 40) {
ctr++;
/*
@@ -198,58 +226,118 @@
x_candidate) < 0)
goto fail;
- if (crypto_bignum_cmp(x_candidate,
- crypto_ec_get_prime(grp->group)) >= 0)
+ if (crypto_bignum_cmp(x_candidate, prime) >= 0)
continue;
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: x_candidate",
prfbuf, primebytelen);
/*
- * need to unambiguously identify the solution, if there is
- * one...
+ * compute y^2 using the equation of the curve
+ *
+ * y^2 = x^3 + ax + b
+ */
+ tmp2 = crypto_ec_point_compute_y_sqr(grp->group, x_candidate);
+ if (!tmp2)
+ goto fail;
+
+ /*
+ * mask tmp2 so doing legendre won't leak timing info
+ *
+ * tmp1 is a random number between 1 and p-1
*/
- is_odd = crypto_bignum_is_odd(rnd);
+ if (crypto_bignum_rand(tmp1, pm1) < 0 ||
+ crypto_bignum_mulmod(tmp2, tmp1, prime, tmp2) < 0 ||
+ crypto_bignum_mulmod(tmp2, tmp1, prime, tmp2) < 0)
+ goto fail;
/*
- * solve the quadratic equation, if it's not solvable then we
- * don't have a point
+ * Now tmp2 (y^2) is masked, all values between 1 and p-1
+ * are equally probable. Multiplying by r^2 does not change
+ * whether or not tmp2 is a quadratic residue, just masks it.
+ *
+ * Flip a coin, multiply by the random quadratic residue or the
+ * random quadratic nonresidue and record heads or tails.
*/
if (crypto_ec_point_solve_y_coord(grp->group, grp->pwe,
x_candidate, is_odd) != 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Could not solve for y");
continue;
}
+ if (crypto_bignum_is_odd(tmp1)) {
+ crypto_bignum_mulmod(tmp2, qr, prime, tmp2);
+ check = 1;
+ } else {
+ crypto_bignum_mulmod(tmp2, qnr, prime, tmp2);
+ check = -1;
+ }
+
/*
- * If there's a solution to the equation then the point must be
- * on the curve so why check again explicitly? OpenSSL code
- * says this is required by X9.62. We're not X9.62 but it can't
- * hurt just to be sure.
+ * Now it's safe to do legendre, if check is 1 then it's
+ * a straightforward test (multiplying by qr does not
+ * change result), if check is -1 then it's the opposite test
+ * (multiplying a qr by qnr would make a qnr).
*/
- if (!crypto_ec_point_is_on_curve(grp->group, grp->pwe)) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: point is not on curve");
- continue;
- }
-
- if (!crypto_bignum_is_one(cofactor)) {
- /* make sure the point is not in a small sub-group */
- if (crypto_ec_point_mul(grp->group, grp->pwe,
- cofactor, grp->pwe) != 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: cannot "
- "multiply generator by order");
+ if (crypto_bignum_legendre(tmp2, prime) == check) {
+ if (found == 1)
+ continue;
+
+ /* need to unambiguously identify the solution */
+ is_odd = crypto_bignum_is_odd(rnd);
+
+ /*
+ * We know x_candidate is a quadratic residue so set
+ * it here.
+ */
+ if (crypto_ec_point_solve_y_coord(grp->group, grp->pwe,
+ x_candidate,
+ is_odd) != 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "EAP-pwd: Could not solve for y");
continue;
}
- if (crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(grp->group,
- grp->pwe)) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: point is at "
- "infinity");
+
+ /*
+ * If there's a solution to the equation then the point
+ * must be on the curve so why check again explicitly?
+ * OpenSSL code says this is required by X9.62. We're
+ * not X9.62 but it can't hurt just to be sure.
+ */
+ if (!crypto_ec_point_is_on_curve(grp->group,
+ grp->pwe)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "EAP-pwd: point is not on curve");
continue;
}
+
+ if (!crypto_bignum_is_one(cofactor)) {
+ /* make sure the point is not in a small
+ * sub-group */
+ if (crypto_ec_point_mul(grp->group, grp->pwe,
+ cofactor,
+ grp->pwe) != 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "EAP-pwd: cannot multiply generator by order");
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(grp->group,
+ grp->pwe)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "EAP-pwd: point is at infinity");
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "EAP-pwd: found a PWE in %d tries", ctr);
+ found = 1;
}
- /* if we got here then we have a new generator. */
- break;
}
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: found a PWE in %d tries", ctr);
+ if (found == 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "EAP-pwd: unable to find random point on curve for group %d, something's fishy",
+ num);
+ goto fail;
+ }
if (0) {
fail:
crypto_ec_point_deinit(grp->pwe, 1);
@@ -260,6 +348,12 @@
crypto_bignum_deinit(cofactor, 1);
crypto_bignum_deinit(x_candidate, 1);
crypto_bignum_deinit(rnd, 1);
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(pm1, 0);
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp1, 1);
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp2, 1);
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(qr, 1);
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(qnr, 1);
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(one, 0);
os_free(prfbuf);
return ret;

296
CVE-2019-9495.patch
View File

@ -1,296 +0,0 @@
diff -Nur orig-wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
--- orig-wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c 2020-02-04 01:25:30.586304407 +0800
+++ wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c 2020-02-04 01:58:33.502654599 +0800
@@ -8,11 +8,15 @@
#include "includes.h"
#include "common.h"
+#include "utils/const_time.h"
#include "crypto/sha256.h"
#include "crypto/crypto.h"
#include "eap_defs.h"
#include "eap_pwd_common.h"
+#define MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN 66
+
+
/* The random function H(x) = HMAC-SHA256(0^32, x) */
struct crypto_hash * eap_pwd_h_init(void)
{
@@ -99,7 +103,16 @@
return grp;
}
-+
+
+
+static void buf_shift_right(u8 *buf, size_t len, size_t bits)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ for (i = len - 1; i > 0; i--)
+ buf[i] = (buf[i - 1] << (8 - bits)) | (buf[i] >> bits);
+ buf[0] >>= bits;
+}
+
/*
* compute a "random" secret point on an elliptic curve based
@@ -112,17 +125,27 @@
const u8 *token)
{
struct crypto_bignum *qr = NULL, *qnr = NULL, *one = NULL;
+ struct crypto_bignum *qr_or_qnr = NULL;
+ u8 qr_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
+ u8 qnr_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
+ u8 qr_or_qnr_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
+ u8 x_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
struct crypto_bignum *tmp1 = NULL, *tmp2 = NULL, *pm1 = NULL;
struct crypto_hash *hash;
unsigned char pwe_digest[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *prfbuf = NULL, ctr;
- int is_odd, ret = 0, check, found = 0;
- size_t primebytelen, primebitlen;
- struct crypto_bignum *x_candidate = NULL, *rnd = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
+ int ret = 0, check, res;
+ u8 found = 0; /* 0 (false) or 0xff (true) to be used as const_time_*
+ * mask */
+ size_t primebytelen = 0, primebitlen;
+ struct crypto_bignum *x_candidate = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
const struct crypto_bignum *prime;
+ u8 mask, found_ctr = 0, is_odd = 0;
if (grp->pwe)
return -1;
+ os_memset(x_bin, 0, sizeof(x_bin));
+
prime = crypto_ec_get_prime(grp->group);
cofactor = crypto_bignum_init();
grp->pwe = crypto_ec_point_init(grp->group);
@@ -151,8 +174,6 @@
/* get a random quadratic residue and nonresidue */
while (!qr || !qnr) {
- int res;
-
if (crypto_bignum_rand(tmp1, prime) < 0)
goto fail;
res = crypto_bignum_legendre(tmp1, prime);
@@ -166,6 +187,11 @@
if (!tmp1)
goto fail;
}
+ if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(qr, qr_bin, sizeof(qr_bin),
+ primebytelen) < 0 ||
+ crypto_bignum_to_bin(qnr, qnr_bin, sizeof(qnr_bin),
+ primebytelen) < 0)
+ goto fail;
os_memset(prfbuf, 0, primebytelen);
ctr = 0;
@@ -193,17 +219,16 @@
eap_pwd_h_update(hash, &ctr, sizeof(ctr));
eap_pwd_h_final(hash, pwe_digest);
- crypto_bignum_deinit(rnd, 1);
- rnd = crypto_bignum_init_set(pwe_digest, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
- if (!rnd) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to create rnd");
- goto fail;
- }
+ is_odd = const_time_select_u8(
+ found, is_odd, pwe_digest[SHA256_MAC_LEN - 1] & 0x01);
if (eap_pwd_kdf(pwe_digest, SHA256_MAC_LEN,
(u8 *) "EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking",
os_strlen("EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking"),
prfbuf, primebitlen) < 0)
goto fail;
+ if (primebitlen % 8)
+ buf_shift_right(prfbuf, primebytelen,
+ 8 - primebitlen % 8);
crypto_bignum_deinit(x_candidate, 1);
x_candidate = crypto_bignum_init_set(prfbuf, primebytelen);
@@ -213,24 +238,13 @@
goto fail;
}
- /*
- * eap_pwd_kdf() returns a string of bits 0..primebitlen but
- * BN_bin2bn will treat that string of bits as a big endian
- * number. If the primebitlen is not an even multiple of 8
- * then excessive bits-- those _after_ primebitlen-- so now
- * we have to shift right the amount we masked off.
- */
- if ((primebitlen % 8) &&
- crypto_bignum_rshift(x_candidate,
- (8 - (primebitlen % 8)),
- x_candidate) < 0)
- goto fail;
-
if (crypto_bignum_cmp(x_candidate, prime) >= 0)
continue;
- wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: x_candidate",
- prfbuf, primebytelen);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: x_candidate",
+ prfbuf, primebytelen);
+ const_time_select_bin(found, x_bin, prfbuf, primebytelen,
+ x_bin);
/*
* compute y^2 using the equation of the curve
@@ -264,13 +278,15 @@
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Could not solve for y");
continue;
}
- if (crypto_bignum_is_odd(tmp1)) {
- crypto_bignum_mulmod(tmp2, qr, prime, tmp2);
- check = 1;
- } else {
- crypto_bignum_mulmod(tmp2, qnr, prime, tmp2);
- check = -1;
- }
+ mask = const_time_eq_u8(crypto_bignum_is_odd(tmp1), 1);
+ check = const_time_select_s8(mask, 1, -1);
+ const_time_select_bin(mask, qr_bin, qnr_bin, primebytelen,
+ qr_or_qnr_bin);
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(qr_or_qnr, 1);
+ qr_or_qnr = crypto_bignum_init_set(qr_or_qnr_bin, primebytelen);
+ if (!qr_or_qnr ||
+ crypto_bignum_mulmod(tmp2, qr_or_qnr, prime, tmp2) < 0)
+ goto fail;
/*
* Now it's safe to do legendre, if check is 1 then it's
@@ -278,59 +294,12 @@
* change result), if check is -1 then it's the opposite test
* (multiplying a qr by qnr would make a qnr).
*/
- if (crypto_bignum_legendre(tmp2, prime) == check) {
- if (found == 1)
- continue;
-
- /* need to unambiguously identify the solution */
- is_odd = crypto_bignum_is_odd(rnd);
-
- /*
- * We know x_candidate is a quadratic residue so set
- * it here.
- */
- if (crypto_ec_point_solve_y_coord(grp->group, grp->pwe,
- x_candidate,
- is_odd) != 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
- "EAP-pwd: Could not solve for y");
- continue;
- }
-
- /*
- * If there's a solution to the equation then the point
- * must be on the curve so why check again explicitly?
- * OpenSSL code says this is required by X9.62. We're
- * not X9.62 but it can't hurt just to be sure.
- */
- if (!crypto_ec_point_is_on_curve(grp->group,
- grp->pwe)) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
- "EAP-pwd: point is not on curve");
- continue;
- }
-
- if (!crypto_bignum_is_one(cofactor)) {
- /* make sure the point is not in a small
- * sub-group */
- if (crypto_ec_point_mul(grp->group, grp->pwe,
- cofactor,
- grp->pwe) != 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
- "EAP-pwd: cannot multiply generator by order");
- continue;
- }
- if (crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(grp->group,
- grp->pwe)) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
- "EAP-pwd: point is at infinity");
- continue;
- }
- }
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
- "EAP-pwd: found a PWE in %d tries", ctr);
- found = 1;
- }
+ res = crypto_bignum_legendre(tmp2, prime);
+ if (res == -2)
+ goto fail;
+ mask = const_time_eq(res, check);
+ found_ctr = const_time_select_u8(found, found_ctr, ctr);
+ found |= mask;
}
if (found == 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
@@ -338,6 +307,44 @@
num);
goto fail;
}
+
+ /*
+ * We know x_candidate is a quadratic residue so set it here.
+ */
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(x_candidate, 1);
+ x_candidate = crypto_bignum_init_set(x_bin, primebytelen);
+ if (!x_candidate ||
+ crypto_ec_point_solve_y_coord(grp->group, grp->pwe, x_candidate,
+ is_odd) != 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Could not solve for y");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If there's a solution to the equation then the point must be on the
+ * curve so why check again explicitly? OpenSSL code says this is
+ * required by X9.62. We're not X9.62 but it can't hurt just to be sure.
+ */
+ if (!crypto_ec_point_is_on_curve(grp->group, grp->pwe)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: point is not on curve");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (!crypto_bignum_is_one(cofactor)) {
+ /* make sure the point is not in a small sub-group */
+ if (crypto_ec_point_mul(grp->group, grp->pwe, cofactor,
+ grp->pwe) != 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "EAP-pwd: cannot multiply generator by order");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(grp->group, grp->pwe)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: point is at infinity");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: found a PWE in %02d tries", found_ctr);
+
if (0) {
fail:
crypto_ec_point_deinit(grp->pwe, 1);
@@ -347,14 +354,18 @@
/* cleanliness and order.... */
crypto_bignum_deinit(cofactor, 1);
crypto_bignum_deinit(x_candidate, 1);
- crypto_bignum_deinit(rnd, 1);
crypto_bignum_deinit(pm1, 0);
crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp1, 1);
crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp2, 1);
crypto_bignum_deinit(qr, 1);
crypto_bignum_deinit(qnr, 1);
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(qr_or_qnr, 1);
crypto_bignum_deinit(one, 0);
- os_free(prfbuf);
+ bin_clear_free(prfbuf, primebytelen);
+ os_memset(qr_bin, 0, sizeof(qr_bin));
+ os_memset(qnr_bin, 0, sizeof(qnr_bin));
+ os_memset(qr_or_qnr_bin, 0, sizeof(qr_or_qnr_bin));
+ os_memset(pwe_digest, 0, sizeof(pwe_digest));
return ret;
}

57
CVE-2019-9496-SAE-Fix-confirm-message-validation-in-error-cases.patch
View File

@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
From ac8fa9ef198640086cf2ce7c94673be2b6a018a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2019 23:43:25 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 10/14] SAE: Fix confirm message validation in error cases
Explicitly verify that own and peer commit scalar/element are available
when trying to check SAE confirm message. It could have been possible to
hit a NULL pointer dereference if the peer element could not have been
parsed. (CVE-2019-9496)
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
---
src/common/sae.c | 14 +++++++++++---
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/common/sae.c b/src/common/sae.c
index eaf825d..5a50294 100644
--- a/src/common/sae.c
+++ b/src/common/sae.c
@@ -1487,23 +1487,31 @@ int sae_check_confirm(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *data, size_t len)
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: peer-send-confirm %u", WPA_GET_LE16(data));
- if (sae->tmp == NULL) {
+ if (!sae->tmp || !sae->peer_commit_scalar ||
+ !sae->tmp->own_commit_scalar) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Temporary data not yet available");
return -1;
}
- if (sae->tmp->ec)
+ if (sae->tmp->ec) {
+ if (!sae->tmp->peer_commit_element_ecc ||
+ !sae->tmp->own_commit_element_ecc)
+ return -1;
sae_cn_confirm_ecc(sae, data, sae->peer_commit_scalar,
sae->tmp->peer_commit_element_ecc,
sae->tmp->own_commit_scalar,
sae->tmp->own_commit_element_ecc,
verifier);
- else
+ } else {
+ if (!sae->tmp->peer_commit_element_ffc ||
+ !sae->tmp->own_commit_element_ffc)
+ return -1;
sae_cn_confirm_ffc(sae, data, sae->peer_commit_scalar,
sae->tmp->peer_commit_element_ffc,
sae->tmp->own_commit_scalar,
sae->tmp->own_commit_element_ffc,
verifier);
+ }
if (os_memcmp_const(verifier, data + 2, SHA256_MAC_LEN) != 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Confirm mismatch");
--
2.7.4

47
CVE-2019-9497.patch
View File

@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
From d63edfa90243e9a7de6ae5c275032f2cc79fef95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mathy Vanhoef <mathy.vanhoef@nyu.edu>
Date: Sun, 31 Mar 2019 17:26:01 +0200
Subject: EAP-pwd server: Detect reflection attacks
When processing an EAP-pwd Commit frame, verify that the peer's scalar
and elliptic curve element differ from the one sent by the server. This
prevents reflection attacks where the adversary reflects the scalar and
element sent by the server. (CVE-2019-9497)
The vulnerability allows an adversary to complete the EAP-pwd handshake
as any user. However, the adversary does not learn the negotiated
session key, meaning the subsequent 4-way handshake would fail. As a
result, this cannot be abused to bypass authentication unless EAP-pwd is
used in non-WLAN cases without any following key exchange that would
require the attacker to learn the MSK.
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <mathy.vanhoef@nyu.edu>
backport addr https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/patch/?id=d63edfa90243e9a7de6ae5c275032f2cc79fef95
---
src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 9 +++++++++
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
index 64bf708..cb5f682 100644
--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
@@ -725,6 +725,15 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
}
}
+ /* detect reflection attacks */
+ if (crypto_bignum_cmp(data->my_scalar, data->peer_scalar) == 0 ||
+ crypto_ec_point_cmp(data->grp->group, data->my_element,
+ data->peer_element) == 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "EAP-PWD (server): detected reflection attack!");
+ goto fin;
+ }
+
/* compute the shared key, k */
if ((!EC_POINT_mul(data->grp->group, K, NULL, data->grp->pwe,
data->peer_scalar, data->bnctx)) ||
--
2.19.1

258
CVE-2019-9498-and-CVE-2019-9499.patch
View File

@ -1,258 +0,0 @@
From 16d4f1069118aa19bfce013493e1ac5783f92f1d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2019 02:12:50 +0300
Subject: EAP-pwd: Check element x,y coordinates explicitly
This adds an explicit check for 0 < x,y < prime based on RFC 5931,
2.8.5.2.2 requirement. The earlier checks might have covered this
implicitly, but it is safer to avoid any dependency on implicit checks
and specific crypto library behavior. (CVE-2019-9498 and CVE-2019-9499)
Furthermore, this moves the EAP-pwd element and scalar parsing and
validation steps into shared helper functions so that there is no need
to maintain two separate copies of this common functionality between the
server and peer implementations.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
backport addr https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/patch/?id=16d4f1069118aa19bfce013493e1ac5783f92f1d
https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/patch/?id=70ff850e89fbc8bc7da515321b4d15b5eef70581
https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/patch/?id=8ad8585f91823ddcc3728155e288e0f9f872e31a
---
src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.h | 3 +
src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 19 +-----
src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 19 +-----
4 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
index 67f8f70..ef47db1 100644
--- a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
+++ b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
@@ -365,3 +365,109 @@ int compute_keys(EAP_PWD_group *grp, BN_CTX *bnctx, const BIGNUM *k,
return 1;
}
+
+
+static int eap_pwd_element_coord_ok(const struct crypto_bignum *prime,
+ const u8 *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ struct crypto_bignum *val;
+ int ok = 1;
+
+ val = crypto_bignum_init_set(buf, len);
+ if (!val || crypto_bignum_is_zero(val) ||
+ crypto_bignum_cmp(val, prime) >= 0)
+ ok = 0;
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(val, 0);
+ return ok;
+}
+
+
+struct crypto_ec_point * eap_pwd_get_element(EAP_PWD_group *group,
+ const u8 *buf)
+{
+ struct crypto_ec_point *element;
+ const struct crypto_bignum *prime;
+ size_t prime_len;
+ struct crypto_bignum *cofactor = NULL;
+
+ prime = crypto_ec_get_prime(group->group);
+ prime_len = crypto_ec_prime_len(group->group);
+
+ /* RFC 5931, 2.8.5.2.2: 0 < x,y < p */
+ if (!eap_pwd_element_coord_ok(prime, buf, prime_len) ||
+ !eap_pwd_element_coord_ok(prime, buf + prime_len, prime_len)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Invalid coordinate in element");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ element = crypto_ec_point_from_bin(group->group, buf);
+ if (!element) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: EC point from element failed");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* RFC 5931, 2.8.5.2.2: on curve and not the point at infinity */
+ if (!crypto_ec_point_is_on_curve(group->group, element) ||
+ crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(group->group, element)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Invalid element");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ cofactor = crypto_bignum_init();
+ if (!cofactor || crypto_ec_cofactor(group->group, cofactor) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "EAP-pwd: Unable to get cofactor for curve");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (!crypto_bignum_is_one(cofactor)) {
+ struct crypto_ec_point *point;
+ int ok = 1;
+
+ /* check to ensure peer's element is not in a small sub-group */
+ point = crypto_ec_point_init(group->group);
+ if (!point ||
+ crypto_ec_point_mul(group->group, element,
+ cofactor, point) != 0 ||
+ crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(group->group, point))
+ ok = 0;
+ crypto_ec_point_deinit(point, 0);
+
+ if (!ok) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "EAP-pwd: Small sub-group check on peer element failed");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(cofactor, 0);
+ return element;
+fail:
+ crypto_ec_point_deinit(element, 0);
+ element = NULL;
+ goto out;
+}
+
+
+struct crypto_bignum * eap_pwd_get_scalar(EAP_PWD_group *group, const u8 *buf)
+{
+ struct crypto_bignum *scalar;
+ const struct crypto_bignum *order;
+ size_t order_len;
+
+ order = crypto_ec_get_order(group->group);
+ order_len = crypto_ec_order_len(group->group);
+
+ /* RFC 5931, 2.8.5.2: 1 < scalar < r */
+ scalar = crypto_bignum_init_set(buf, order_len);
+ if (!scalar || crypto_bignum_is_zero(scalar) ||
+ crypto_bignum_is_one(scalar) ||
+ crypto_bignum_cmp(scalar, order) >= 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: received scalar is invalid");
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(scalar, 0);
+ scalar = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return scalar;
+}
diff --git a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.h b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.h
index a0d717e..01f43eb 100644
--- a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.h
+++ b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.h
@@ -68,5 +68,8 @@ int compute_keys(EAP_PWD_group *grp, BN_CTX *bnctx, const BIGNUM *k,
struct crypto_hash * eap_pwd_h_init(void);
void eap_pwd_h_update(struct crypto_hash *hash, const u8 *data, size_t len);
void eap_pwd_h_final(struct crypto_hash *hash, u8 *digest);
+struct crypto_ec_point * eap_pwd_get_element(EAP_PWD_group *group,
+ const u8 *buf);
+struct crypto_bignum * eap_pwd_get_scalar(EAP_PWD_group *group, const u8 *buf);
#endif /* EAP_PWD_COMMON_H */
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
index d2bc981..bbe9b40 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
const struct wpabuf *reqData,
const u8 *payload, size_t payload_len)
{
- EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *K = NULL;
BIGNUM *mask = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
u16 offset;
u8 *ptr, *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL;
@@ -429,7 +429,6 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
if (((data->server_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
((K = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) ||
- ((point = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) ||
((data->server_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL))
{
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): peer data allocation "
@@ -452,21 +451,6 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
goto fin;
}
- /* check to ensure server's element is not in a small sub-group */
- if (BN_cmp(cofactor, BN_value_one())) {
- if (!EC_POINT_mul(data->grp->group, point, NULL,
- data->server_element, cofactor, NULL)) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): cannot multiply "
- "server element by order!\n");
- goto fin;
- }
- if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(data->grp->group, point)) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): server element "
- "is at infinity!\n");
- goto fin;
- }
- }
-
/* compute the shared key, k */
if ((!EC_POINT_mul(data->grp->group, K, NULL, data->grp->pwe,
data->server_scalar, data->bnctx)) ||
@@ -557,7 +541,6 @@ fin:
BN_clear_free(mask);
BN_clear_free(cofactor);
EC_POINT_clear_free(K);
- EC_POINT_clear_free(point);
if (data->outbuf == NULL)
eap_pwd_state(data, FAILURE);
else
diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
index cb5f682..275bdf8 100644
--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
@@ -659,7 +659,7 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
{
u8 *ptr;
BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
- EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *K = NULL;
int res = 0;
size_t prime_len, order_len;
@@ -681,7 +681,6 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
((x = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
((y = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
- ((point = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) ||
((K = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) ||
((data->peer_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (server): peer data allocation "
@@ -710,21 +709,6 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
goto fin;
}
- /* check to ensure peer's element is not in a small sub-group */
- if (BN_cmp(cofactor, BN_value_one())) {
- if (!EC_POINT_mul(data->grp->group, point, NULL,
- data->peer_element, cofactor, NULL)) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (server): cannot "
- "multiply peer element by order");
- goto fin;
- }
- if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(data->grp->group, point)) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (server): peer element "
- "is at infinity!\n");
- goto fin;
- }
- }
-
/* detect reflection attacks */
if (crypto_bignum_cmp(data->my_scalar, data->peer_scalar) == 0 ||
crypto_ec_point_cmp(data->grp->group, data->my_element,
@@ -777,7 +761,6 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
fin:
EC_POINT_clear_free(K);
- EC_POINT_clear_free(point);
BN_clear_free(cofactor);
BN_clear_free(x);
BN_clear_free(y);
--
2.19.1

30
CVE-2019-9499.patch
View File

@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
diff -Nur orig-wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
--- orig-wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c 2020-02-03 19:32:18.847432926 +0800
+++ wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c 2020-02-03 19:33:32.688400551 +0800
@@ -451,6 +451,26 @@
goto fin;
}
+ /* verify received scalar */
+ if (crypto_bignum_is_zero(data->server_scalar) ||
+ crypto_bignum_is_one(data->server_scalar) ||
+ crypto_bignum_cmp(data->server_scalar,
+ crypto_ec_get_order(data->grp->group)) >= 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "EAP-PWD (peer): received scalar is invalid");
+ goto fin;
+ }
+
+ /* verify received element */
+ if (!crypto_ec_point_is_on_curve(data->grp->group,
+ data->server_element) ||
+ crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(data->grp->group,
+ data->server_element)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "EAP-PWD (peer): received element is invalid");
+ goto fin;
+ }
+
/* compute the shared key, k */
if ((!EC_POINT_mul(data->grp->group, K, NULL, data->grp->pwe,
data->server_scalar, data->bnctx)) ||

38
CVE-2021-0326.patch
View File

@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
From 947272febe24a8f0ea828b5b2f35f13c3821901e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2020 11:43:12 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] P2P: Fix copying of secondary device types for P2P group
client
Parsing and copying of WPS secondary device types list was verifying
that the contents is not too long for the internal maximum in the case
of WPS messages, but similar validation was missing from the case of P2P
group information which encodes this information in a different
attribute. This could result in writing beyond the memory area assigned
for these entries and corrupting memory within an instance of struct
p2p_device. This could result in invalid operations and unexpected
behavior when trying to free pointers from that corrupted memory.
Credit to OSS-Fuzz: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=27269
Fixes: e57ae6e19edf ("P2P: Keep track of secondary device types for peers")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
---
src/p2p/p2p.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/p2p/p2p.c b/src/p2p/p2p.c
index 74b7b52..5cbfc21 100644
--- a/src/p2p/p2p.c
+++ b/src/p2p/p2p.c
@@ -453,6 +453,8 @@ static void p2p_copy_client_info(struct p2p_device *dev,
dev->info.config_methods = cli->config_methods;
os_memcpy(dev->info.pri_dev_type, cli->pri_dev_type, 8);
dev->info.wps_sec_dev_type_list_len = 8 * cli->num_sec_dev_types;
+ if (dev->info.wps_sec_dev_type_list_len > WPS_SEC_DEV_TYPE_MAX_LEN)
+ dev->info.wps_sec_dev_type_list_len = WPS_SEC_DEV_TYPE_MAX_LEN;
os_memcpy(dev->info.wps_sec_dev_type_list, cli->sec_dev_types,
dev->info.wps_sec_dev_type_list_len);
}
--
1.8.3.1

50
CVE-2021-27803.patch
View File

@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
From 8460e3230988ef2ec13ce6b69b687e941f6cdb32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2020 23:52:50 +0200
Subject: P2P: Fix a corner case in peer addition based on PD Request
p2p_add_device() may remove the oldest entry if there is no room in the
peer table for a new peer. This would result in any pointer to that
removed entry becoming stale. A corner case with an invalid PD Request
frame could result in such a case ending up using (read+write) freed
memory. This could only by triggered when the peer table has reached its
maximum size and the PD Request frame is received from the P2P Device
Address of the oldest remaining entry and the frame has incorrect P2P
Device Address in the payload.
Fix this by fetching the dev pointer again after having called
p2p_add_device() so that the stale pointer cannot be used.
Fixes: 17bef1e97a50 ("P2P: Add peer entry based on Provision Discovery Request")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
---
src/p2p/p2p_pd.c | 12 +++++-------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/p2p/p2p_pd.c b/src/p2p/p2p_pd.c
index 3994ec0..05fd593 100644
--- a/src/p2p/p2p_pd.c
+++ b/src/p2p/p2p_pd.c
@@ -595,14 +595,12 @@ void p2p_process_prov_disc_req(struct p2p_data *p2p, const u8 *sa,
goto out;
}
+ dev = p2p_get_device(p2p, sa);
if (!dev) {
- dev = p2p_get_device(p2p, sa);
- if (!dev) {
- p2p_dbg(p2p,
- "Provision Discovery device not found "
- MACSTR, MAC2STR(sa));
- goto out;
- }
+ p2p_dbg(p2p,
+ "Provision Discovery device not found "
+ MACSTR, MAC2STR(sa));
+ goto out;
}
} else if (msg.wfd_subelems) {
wpabuf_free(dev->info.wfd_subelems);
--
cgit v0.12

42
add-options-of-wpa_supplicant-service.patch
View File

@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
From edb7c242b5177f13ff4f57f61257838e80fb48ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: guoxiaoqi <guoxiaoqi2@huawei.com>
Date: Tue, 31 Dec 2019 15:52:23 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] add options of wpa_supplicant.service
Signed-off-by: guoxiaoqi <guoxiaoqi2@huawei.com>
---
wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant.service.in | 5 ++++-
wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1.service.in | 5 ++++-
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant.service.in b/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant.service.in
index a75918f..19b4d79 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant.service.in
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant.service.in
@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
[D-BUS Service]
Name=fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant
-Exec=@BINDIR@/wpa_supplicant -u
+Environment=DEBUG_LOGGER=/var/log/wpa_supplicant.log
+Environment=DEBUG_CONF=/etc/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
+Environment=PID_FILE=/var/run/wpa_supplicant.pid
+Exec=@BINDIR@/wpa_supplicant -u -f ${DEBUG_LOGGER} -c ${DEBUG_CONF} -P ${PID_FILE}
User=root
SystemdService=wpa_supplicant.service
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1.service.in b/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1.service.in
index d97ff39..fd1e10b 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1.service.in
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/dbus/fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1.service.in
@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
[D-BUS Service]
Name=fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1
-Exec=@BINDIR@/wpa_supplicant -u
+Environment=DEBUG_LOGGER=/var/log/wpa_supplicant.log
+Environment=DEBUG_CONF=/etc/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
+Environment=PID_FILE=/var/run/wpa_supplicant.pid
+Exec=@BINDIR@/wpa_supplicant -u -f ${DEBUG_LOGGER} -c ${DEBUG_CONF} -P ${PID_FILE}
User=root
SystemdService=wpa_supplicant.service
--
1.8.3.1

318
backport-0001-CVE-2022-23303-CVE-2022-23304.patch
View File

@ -1,318 +0,0 @@
From 208e5687ff2e48622e28d8888ce5444a54353bbd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2019 16:33:15 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] crypto: Add more bignum/EC helper functions
These are needed for implementing SAE hash-to-element.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
---
src/crypto/crypto.h | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++
src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/crypto/crypto_wolfssl.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 205 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/crypto/crypto.h b/src/crypto/crypto.h
index bdc3ba6..0bc9df4 100644
--- a/src/crypto/crypto.h
+++ b/src/crypto/crypto.h
@@ -508,6 +508,13 @@ struct crypto_bignum * crypto_bignum_init(void);
struct crypto_bignum * crypto_bignum_init_set(const u8 *buf, size_t len);
/**
+ * crypto_bignum_init_set - Allocate memory for bignum and set the value (uint)
+ * @val: Value to set
+ * Returns: Pointer to allocated bignum or %NULL on failure
+ */
+struct crypto_bignum * crypto_bignum_init_uint(unsigned int val);
+
+/**
* crypto_bignum_deinit - Free bignum
* @n: Bignum from crypto_bignum_init() or crypto_bignum_init_set()
* @clear: Whether to clear the value from memory
@@ -594,6 +601,19 @@ int crypto_bignum_div(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
struct crypto_bignum *c);
/**
+ * crypto_bignum_addmod - d = a + b (mod c)
+ * @a: Bignum
+ * @b: Bignum
+ * @c: Bignum
+ * @d: Bignum; used to store the result of (a + b) % c
+ * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure
+ */
+int crypto_bignum_addmod(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
+ const struct crypto_bignum *b,
+ const struct crypto_bignum *c,
+ struct crypto_bignum *d);
+
+/**
* crypto_bignum_mulmod - d = a * b (mod c)
* @a: Bignum
* @b: Bignum
@@ -607,6 +627,28 @@ int crypto_bignum_mulmod(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
struct crypto_bignum *d);
/**
+ * crypto_bignum_sqrmod - c = a^2 (mod b)
+ * @a: Bignum
+ * @b: Bignum
+ * @c: Bignum; used to store the result of a^2 % b
+ * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure
+ */
+int crypto_bignum_sqrmod(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
+ const struct crypto_bignum *b,
+ struct crypto_bignum *c);
+
+/**
+ * crypto_bignum_sqrtmod - returns sqrt(a) (mod b)
+ * @a: Bignum
+ * @b: Bignum
+ * @c: Bignum; used to store the result
+ * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure
+ */
+int crypto_bignum_sqrtmod(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
+ const struct crypto_bignum *b,
+ struct crypto_bignum *c);
+
+/**
* crypto_bignum_cmp - Compare two bignums
* @a: Bignum
* @b: Bignum
@@ -695,6 +737,9 @@ const struct crypto_bignum * crypto_ec_get_prime(struct crypto_ec *e);
*/
const struct crypto_bignum * crypto_ec_get_order(struct crypto_ec *e);
+const struct crypto_bignum * crypto_ec_get_a(struct crypto_ec *e);
+const struct crypto_bignum * crypto_ec_get_b(struct crypto_ec *e);
+
/**
* struct crypto_ec_point - Elliptic curve point
*
diff --git a/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c b/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
index 00b61b9..80867b6 100644
--- a/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
+++ b/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
@@ -1117,6 +1117,24 @@ struct crypto_bignum * crypto_bignum_init_set(const u8 *buf, size_t len)
}
+struct crypto_bignum * crypto_bignum_init_uint(unsigned int val)
+{
+ BIGNUM *bn;
+
+ if (TEST_FAIL())
+ return NULL;
+
+ bn = BN_new();
+ if (!bn)
+ return NULL;
+ if (BN_set_word(bn, val) != 1) {
+ BN_free(bn);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return (struct crypto_bignum *) bn;
+}
+
+
void crypto_bignum_deinit(struct crypto_bignum *n, int clear)
{
if (clear)
@@ -1278,6 +1296,28 @@ int crypto_bignum_div(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
}
+int crypto_bignum_addmod(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
+ const struct crypto_bignum *b,
+ const struct crypto_bignum *c,
+ struct crypto_bignum *d)
+{
+ int res;
+ BN_CTX *bnctx;
+
+ if (TEST_FAIL())
+ return -1;
+
+ bnctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if (!bnctx)
+ return -1;
+ res = BN_mod_add((BIGNUM *) d, (const BIGNUM *) a, (const BIGNUM *) b,
+ (const BIGNUM *) c, bnctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+
+ return res ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+
int crypto_bignum_mulmod(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
const struct crypto_bignum *b,
const struct crypto_bignum *c,
@@ -1301,6 +1341,48 @@ int crypto_bignum_mulmod(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
}
+int crypto_bignum_sqrmod(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
+ const struct crypto_bignum *b,
+ struct crypto_bignum *c)
+{
+ int res;
+ BN_CTX *bnctx;
+
+ if (TEST_FAIL())
+ return -1;
+
+ bnctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if (!bnctx)
+ return -1;
+ res = BN_mod_sqr((BIGNUM *) c, (const BIGNUM *) a, (const BIGNUM *) b,
+ bnctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+
+ return res ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+
+int crypto_bignum_sqrtmod(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
+ const struct crypto_bignum *b,
+ struct crypto_bignum *c)
+{
+ BN_CTX *bnctx;
+ BIGNUM *res;
+
+ if (TEST_FAIL())
+ return -1;
+
+ bnctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if (!bnctx)
+ return -1;
+ res = BN_mod_sqrt((BIGNUM *) c, (const BIGNUM *) a, (const BIGNUM *) b,
+ bnctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+
+ return res ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+
int crypto_bignum_cmp(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
const struct crypto_bignum *b)
{
@@ -1494,6 +1576,18 @@ const struct crypto_bignum * crypto_ec_get_order(struct crypto_ec *e)
}
+const struct crypto_bignum * crypto_ec_get_a(struct crypto_ec *e)
+{
+ return (const struct crypto_bignum *) e->a;
+}
+
+
+const struct crypto_bignum * crypto_ec_get_b(struct crypto_ec *e)
+{
+ return (const struct crypto_bignum *) e->b;
+}
+
+
void crypto_ec_point_deinit(struct crypto_ec_point *p, int clear)
{
if (clear)
diff --git a/src/crypto/crypto_wolfssl.c b/src/crypto/crypto_wolfssl.c
index 90163c4..683c553 100644
--- a/src/crypto/crypto_wolfssl.c
+++ b/src/crypto/crypto_wolfssl.c
@@ -1043,6 +1043,26 @@ struct crypto_bignum * crypto_bignum_init_set(const u8 *buf, size_t len)
}
+struct crypto_bignum * crypto_bignum_init_uint(unsigned int val)
+{
+ mp_int *a;
+
+ if (TEST_FAIL())
+ return NULL;
+
+ a = (mp_int *) crypto_bignum_init();
+ if (!a)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (mp_set_int(a, val) != MP_OKAY) {
+ os_free(a);
+ a = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return (struct crypto_bignum *) a;
+}
+
+
void crypto_bignum_deinit(struct crypto_bignum *n, int clear)
{
if (!n)
@@ -1167,6 +1187,19 @@ int crypto_bignum_div(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
}
+int crypto_bignum_addmod(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
+ const struct crypto_bignum *b,
+ const struct crypto_bignum *c,
+ struct crypto_bignum *d)
+{
+ if (TEST_FAIL())
+ return -1;
+
+ return mp_addmod((mp_int *) a, (mp_int *) b, (mp_int *) c,
+ (mp_int *) d) == MP_OKAY ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+
int crypto_bignum_mulmod(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
const struct crypto_bignum *b,
const struct crypto_bignum *m,
@@ -1180,6 +1213,27 @@ int crypto_bignum_mulmod(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
}
+int crypto_bignum_sqrmod(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
+ const struct crypto_bignum *b,
+ struct crypto_bignum *c)
+{
+ if (TEST_FAIL())
+ return -1;
+
+ return mp_sqrmod((mp_int *) a, (mp_int *) b,
+ (mp_int *) c) == MP_OKAY ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+
+int crypto_bignum_sqrtmod(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
+ const struct crypto_bignum *b,
+ struct crypto_bignum *c)
+{
+ /* TODO */
+ return -1;
+}
+
+
int crypto_bignum_rshift(const struct crypto_bignum *a, int n,
struct crypto_bignum *r)
{
@@ -1401,6 +1455,18 @@ const struct crypto_bignum * crypto_ec_get_order(struct crypto_ec *e)
}
+const struct crypto_bignum * crypto_ec_get_a(struct crypto_ec *e)
+{
+ return (const struct crypto_bignum *) &e->a;
+}
+
+
+const struct crypto_bignum * crypto_ec_get_b(struct crypto_ec *e)
+{
+ return (const struct crypto_bignum *) &e->b;
+}
+
+
void crypto_ec_point_deinit(struct crypto_ec_point *p, int clear)
{
ecc_point *point = (ecc_point *) p;
--
1.8.3.1

72
backport-0002-CVE-2022-23303-CVE-2022-23304.patch
View File

@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
From 2232d3d5f188b65dbb6c823ac62175412739eb16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Fri, 7 Jan 2022 13:47:16 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] dragonfly: Add sqrt() helper function
This is a backport of "SAE: Move sqrt() implementation into a helper
function" to introduce the helper function needed for the following
patches.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
src/common/dragonfly.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/common/dragonfly.h | 3 +++
2 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/common/dragonfly.c b/src/common/dragonfly.c
index 1e80404..7dcc6de 100644
--- a/src/common/dragonfly.c
+++ b/src/common/dragonfly.c
@@ -25,3 +25,37 @@ int dragonfly_suitable_group(int group, int ecc_only)
(!ecc_only &&
(group == 15 || group == 16 || group == 17 || group == 18));
}
+
+
+/* res = sqrt(val) */
+int dragonfly_sqrt(struct crypto_ec *ec, const struct crypto_bignum *val,
+ struct crypto_bignum *res)
+{
+ const struct crypto_bignum *prime;
+ struct crypto_bignum *tmp, *one;
+ int ret = 0;
+ u8 prime_bin[DRAGONFLY_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
+ size_t prime_len;
+
+ /* For prime p such that p = 3 mod 4, sqrt(w) = w^((p+1)/4) mod p */
+
+ prime = crypto_ec_get_prime(ec);
+ prime_len = crypto_ec_prime_len(ec);
+ tmp = crypto_bignum_init();
+ one = crypto_bignum_init_uint(1);
+
+ if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(prime, prime_bin, sizeof(prime_bin),
+ prime_len) < 0 ||
+ (prime_bin[prime_len - 1] & 0x03) != 3 ||
+ !tmp || !one ||
+ /* tmp = (p+1)/4 */
+ crypto_bignum_add(prime, one, tmp) < 0 ||
+ crypto_bignum_rshift(tmp, 2, tmp) < 0 ||
+ /* res = sqrt(val) */
+ crypto_bignum_exptmod(val, tmp, prime, res) < 0)
+ ret = -1;
+
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp, 0);
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(one, 0);
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/src/common/dragonfly.h b/src/common/dragonfly.h
index 9f3c428..f0f49d0 100644
--- a/src/common/dragonfly.h
+++ b/src/common/dragonfly.h
@@ -12,4 +12,7 @@
int dragonfly_suitable_group(int group, int ecc_only);
+int dragonfly_sqrt(struct crypto_ec *ec, const struct crypto_bignum *val,
+ struct crypto_bignum *res);
+
#endif /* DRAGONFLY_H */
--
1.8.3.1

100
backport-0003-CVE-2022-23303-CVE-2022-23304.patch
View File

@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
From fe534b0baaa8c0e6ddeb24cf529d6e50e33dc501 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Fri, 7 Jan 2022 13:47:16 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] SAE: Derive the y coordinate for PWE with own
implementation
The crypto_ec_point_solve_y_coord() wrapper function might not use
constant time operations in the crypto library and as such, could leak
side channel information about the password that is used to generate the
PWE in the hunting and pecking loop. As such, calculate the two possible
y coordinate values and pick the correct one to use with constant time
selection.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
src/common/sae.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/common/sae.c b/src/common/sae.c
index b35821d..c168bf1 100644
--- a/src/common/sae.c
+++ b/src/common/sae.c
@@ -459,15 +459,17 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *addr1,
int pwd_seed_odd = 0;
u8 prime[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
size_t prime_len;
- struct crypto_bignum *x = NULL, *qr = NULL, *qnr = NULL;
+ struct crypto_bignum *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *qr = NULL, *qnr = NULL;
u8 x_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
u8 x_cand_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
u8 qr_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
u8 qnr_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
+ u8 x_y[2 * SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
size_t bits;
int res = -1;
u8 found = 0; /* 0 (false) or 0xff (true) to be used as const_time_*
* mask */
+ unsigned int is_eq;
os_memset(x_bin, 0, sizeof(x_bin));
@@ -567,25 +569,42 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *addr1,
goto fail;
}
- if (!sae->tmp->pwe_ecc)
- sae->tmp->pwe_ecc = crypto_ec_point_init(sae->tmp->ec);
- if (!sae->tmp->pwe_ecc)
- res = -1;
- else
- res = crypto_ec_point_solve_y_coord(sae->tmp->ec,
- sae->tmp->pwe_ecc, x,
- pwd_seed_odd);
- if (res < 0) {
- /*
- * This should not happen since we already checked that there
- * is a result.
- */
+ /* y = sqrt(x^3 + ax + b) mod p
+ * if LSB(save) == LSB(y): PWE = (x, y)
+ * else: PWE = (x, p - y)
+ *
+ * Calculate y and the two possible values for PWE and after that,
+ * use constant time selection to copy the correct alternative.
+ */
+ y = crypto_ec_point_compute_y_sqr(sae->tmp->ec, x);
+ if (!y ||
+ dragonfly_sqrt(sae->tmp->ec, y, y) < 0 ||
+ crypto_bignum_to_bin(y, x_y, SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN,
+ prime_len) < 0 ||
+ crypto_bignum_sub(sae->tmp->prime, y, y) < 0 ||
+ crypto_bignum_to_bin(y, x_y + SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN,
+ SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN, prime_len) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Could not solve y");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ is_eq = const_time_eq(pwd_seed_odd, x_y[prime_len - 1] & 0x01);
+ const_time_select_bin(is_eq, x_y, x_y + SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN,
+ prime_len, x_y + prime_len);
+ os_memcpy(x_y, x_bin, prime_len);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PWE", x_y, 2 * prime_len);
+ crypto_ec_point_deinit(sae->tmp->pwe_ecc, 1);
+ sae->tmp->pwe_ecc = crypto_ec_point_from_bin(sae->tmp->ec, x_y);
+ if (!sae->tmp->pwe_ecc) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Could not generate PWE");
+ res = -1;
}
fail:
+ forced_memzero(x_y, sizeof(x_y));
crypto_bignum_deinit(qr, 0);
crypto_bignum_deinit(qnr, 0);
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(y, 1);
os_free(dummy_password);
bin_clear_free(tmp_password, password_len);
crypto_bignum_deinit(x, 1);
--
1.8.3.1

109
backport-0004-CVE-2022-23303-CVE-2022-23304.patch
View File

@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
From 603cd880e7f90595482658a7136fa6a7be5cb485 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Fri, 7 Jan 2022 18:52:27 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] EAP-pwd: Derive the y coordinate for PWE with own
implementation
The crypto_ec_point_solve_y_coord() wrapper function might not use
constant time operations in the crypto library and as such, could leak
side channel information about the password that is used to generate the
PWE in the hunting and pecking loop. As such, calculate the two possible
y coordinate values and pick the correct one to use with constant time
selection.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
index 755aafb..ab8eb92 100644
--- a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
+++ b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
@@ -137,7 +137,8 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
u8 qr_or_qnr_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
u8 x_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
u8 prime_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
- struct crypto_bignum *tmp1 = NULL, *tmp2 = NULL, *pm1 = NULL;
+ u8 x_y[2 * MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
+ struct crypto_bignum *tmp1 = NULL, *tmp2 = NULL, *pm1 = NULL, *y = NULL;
struct crypto_hash *hash;
unsigned char pwe_digest[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *prfbuf = NULL, ctr;
int ret = 0, check, res;
@@ -149,6 +150,7 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
u8 mask, found_ctr = 0, is_odd = 0;
int cmp_prime;
unsigned int in_range;
+ unsigned int is_eq;
if (grp->pwe)
return -1;
@@ -161,7 +163,6 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(prime, prime_bin, sizeof(prime_bin),
primebytelen) < 0)
return -1;
- grp->pwe = crypto_ec_point_init(grp->group);
tmp1 = crypto_bignum_init();
pm1 = crypto_bignum_init();
one = crypto_bignum_init_set((const u8 *) "\x01", 1);
@@ -323,10 +324,37 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
*/
crypto_bignum_deinit(x_candidate, 1);
x_candidate = crypto_bignum_init_set(x_bin, primebytelen);
- if (!x_candidate ||
- crypto_ec_point_solve_y_coord(grp->group, grp->pwe, x_candidate,
- is_odd) != 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Could not solve for y");
+ if (!x_candidate)
+ goto fail;
+
+ /* y = sqrt(x^3 + ax + b) mod p
+ * if LSB(y) == LSB(pwd-seed): PWE = (x, y)
+ * else: PWE = (x, p - y)
+ *
+ * Calculate y and the two possible values for PWE and after that,
+ * use constant time selection to copy the correct alternative.
+ */
+ y = crypto_ec_point_compute_y_sqr(grp->group, x_candidate);
+ if (!y ||
+ dragonfly_sqrt(grp->group, y, y) < 0 ||
+ crypto_bignum_to_bin(y, x_y, MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN, primebytelen) < 0 ||
+ crypto_bignum_sub(prime, y, y) < 0 ||
+ crypto_bignum_to_bin(y, x_y + MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN,
+ MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN, primebytelen) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Could not solve y");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /* Constant time selection of the y coordinate from the two
+ * options */
+ is_eq = const_time_eq(is_odd, x_y[primebytelen - 1] & 0x01);
+ const_time_select_bin(is_eq, x_y, x_y + MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN,
+ primebytelen, x_y + primebytelen);
+ os_memcpy(x_y, x_bin, primebytelen);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: PWE", x_y, 2 * primebytelen);
+ grp->pwe = crypto_ec_point_from_bin(grp->group, x_y);
+ if (!grp->pwe) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Could not generate PWE");
goto fail;
}
@@ -353,6 +381,7 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
crypto_bignum_deinit(pm1, 0);
crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp1, 1);
crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp2, 1);
+ crypto_bignum_deinit(y, 1);
crypto_bignum_deinit(qr, 1);
crypto_bignum_deinit(qnr, 1);
crypto_bignum_deinit(qr_or_qnr, 1);
@@ -362,6 +391,7 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
os_memset(qnr_bin, 0, sizeof(qnr_bin));
os_memset(qr_or_qnr_bin, 0, sizeof(qr_or_qnr_bin));
os_memset(pwe_digest, 0, sizeof(pwe_digest));
+ forced_memzero(x_y, sizeof(x_y));
return ret;
}
--
1.8.3.1

4084
backport-Add-support-for-wolfSSL-cryptographic-library.patch
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

219
backport-Share-common-SAE-and-EAP-pwd-functionality-suitable-.patch
View File

@ -1,219 +0,0 @@
From 2b84ca4dd96459b661b0ebaf40ec43074fc9f42c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2019 19:45:27 +0300
Subject: Share common SAE and EAP-pwd functionality: suitable groups
Start sharing common SAE and EAP-pwd functionality by adding a new
source code file that can be included into both. This first step is
bringing in a shared function to check whether a group is suitable.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
---
src/common/dragonfly.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/common/dragonfly.h | 15 +++++++++++++++
src/common/sae.c | 27 ++++++---------------------
src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c | 9 ++-------
wpa_supplicant/Android.mk | 6 ++++++
wpa_supplicant/Makefile | 6 ++++++
6 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/common/dragonfly.c
create mode 100644 src/common/dragonfly.h
diff --git a/src/common/dragonfly.c b/src/common/dragonfly.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1e80404
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/common/dragonfly.c
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/*
+ * Shared Dragonfly functionality
+ * Copyright (c) 2012-2016, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 2019, The Linux Foundation
+ *
+ * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
+ * See README for more details.
+ */
+
+#include "utils/includes.h"
+
+#include "utils/common.h"
+#include "dragonfly.h"
+
+
+int dragonfly_suitable_group(int group, int ecc_only)
+{
+ /* Enforce REVmd rules on which SAE groups are suitable for production
+ * purposes: FFC groups whose prime is >= 3072 bits and ECC groups
+ * defined over a prime field whose prime is >= 256 bits. Furthermore,
+ * ECC groups defined over a characteristic 2 finite field and ECC
+ * groups with a co-factor greater than 1 are not suitable. */
+ return group == 19 || group == 20 || group == 21 ||
+ group == 28 || group == 29 || group == 30 ||
+ (!ecc_only &&
+ (group == 15 || group == 16 || group == 17 || group == 18));
+}
diff --git a/src/common/dragonfly.h b/src/common/dragonfly.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f3c428
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/common/dragonfly.h
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+/*
+ * Shared Dragonfly functionality
+ * Copyright (c) 2012-2016, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 2019, The Linux Foundation
+ *
+ * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
+ * See README for more details.
+ */
+
+#ifndef DRAGONFLY_H
+#define DRAGONFLY_H
+
+int dragonfly_suitable_group(int group, int ecc_only);
+
+#endif /* DRAGONFLY_H */
diff --git a/src/common/sae.c b/src/common/sae.c
index 5ef6c4c..b35821d 100644
--- a/src/common/sae.c
+++ b/src/common/sae.c
@@ -15,36 +15,21 @@
#include "crypto/random.h"
#include "crypto/dh_groups.h"
#include "ieee802_11_defs.h"
+#include "dragonfly.h"
#include "sae.h"
-static int sae_suitable_group(int group)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
- /* Allow all groups for testing purposes in non-production builds. */
- return 1;
-#else /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
- /* Enforce REVmd rules on which SAE groups are suitable for production
- * purposes: FFC groups whose prime is >= 3072 bits and ECC groups
- * defined over a prime field whose prime is >= 256 bits. Furthermore,
- * ECC groups defined over a characteristic 2 finite field and ECC
- * groups with a co-factor greater than 1 are not suitable. Disable
- * groups that use Brainpool curves as well for now since they leak more
- * timing information due to the prime not being close to a power of
- * two. */
-
- return group == 19 || group == 20 || group == 21 ||
- group == 15 || group == 16 || group == 17 || group == 18;
-#endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
-}
-
int sae_set_group(struct sae_data *sae, int group)
{
struct sae_temporary_data *tmp;
- if (!sae_suitable_group(group)) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
+ /* Allow all groups for testing purposes in non-production builds. */
+#else /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
+ if (!dragonfly_suitable_group(group, 0)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Reject unsuitable group %d", group);
return -1;
}
+#endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
sae_clear_data(sae);
tmp = sae->tmp = os_zalloc(sizeof(*tmp));
diff --git a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
index bac2796..755aafb 100644
--- a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
+++ b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include "includes.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "utils/const_time.h"
+#include "common/dragonfly.h"
#include "crypto/sha256.h"
#include "crypto/crypto.h"
#include "eap_defs.h"
@@ -84,18 +85,12 @@ static int eap_pwd_kdf(const u8 *key, size_t keylen, const u8 *label,
return 0;
}
-static int eap_pwd_suitable_group(u16 num)
-{
- /* Do not allow ECC groups with prime under 256 bits based on guidance
- * for the similar design in SAE. */
- return num == 19 || num == 20 || num == 21;
-}
EAP_PWD_group * get_eap_pwd_group(u16 num)
{
EAP_PWD_group *grp;
grp = os_zalloc(sizeof(EAP_PWD_group));
- if (!eap_pwd_suitable_group(num)) {
+ if (!dragonfly_suitable_group(num, 1)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unsuitable group %u", num);
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/Android.mk b/wpa_supplicant/Android.mk
index 924ac07..aa5ac8c 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/Android.mk
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/Android.mk
@@ -236,6 +236,7 @@ L_CFLAGS += -DCONFIG_SAE
OBJS += src/common/sae.c
NEED_ECC=y
NEED_DH_GROUPS=y
+NEED_DRAGONFLY=y
endif
ifdef CONFIG_WNM
@@ -641,6 +642,7 @@ OBJS += src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
CONFIG_IEEE8021X_EAPOL=y
NEED_SHA256=y
NEED_ECC=y
+NEED_DRAGONFLY=y
endif
ifdef CONFIG_EAP_EKE
@@ -918,6 +920,10 @@ ifdef CONFIG_SMARTCARD
L_CFLAGS += -DCONFIG_SMARTCARD
endif
+ifdef NEED_DRAGONFLY
+OBJS += src/common/dragonfly.c
+endif
+
ifdef MS_FUNCS
OBJS += src/crypto/ms_funcs.c
NEED_DES=y
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
index d70189b..8fce344 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
@@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ CFLAGS += -DCONFIG_SAE
OBJS += ../src/common/sae.o
NEED_ECC=y
NEED_DH_GROUPS=y
+NEED_DRAGONFLY=y
endif
ifdef CONFIG_WNM
@@ -673,6 +674,7 @@ OBJS += ../src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.o ../src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.o
CONFIG_IEEE8021X_EAPOL=y
NEED_SHA256=y
NEED_ECC=y
+NEED_DRAGONFLY=y
endif
ifdef CONFIG_EAP_EKE
@@ -967,6 +969,10 @@ ifdef CONFIG_SMARTCARD
CFLAGS += -DCONFIG_SMARTCARD
endif
+ifdef NEED_DRAGONFLY
+OBJS += ../src/common/dragonfly.o
+endif
+
ifdef MS_FUNCS
OBJS += ../src/crypto/ms_funcs.o
NEED_DES=y
--
1.8.3.1

237
macsec-0001-mka-Move-structs-transmit-receive-_-sa-sc-to-a-commo.patch
View File

@ -1,237 +0,0 @@
From f75f6e2b03fa5e807142a37039b0b613565eafa7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <f75f6e2b03fa5e807142a37039b0b613565eafa7.1488376601.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Tue, 20 Sep 2016 09:43:04 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] mka: Move structs {transmit,receive}_{sa,sc} to a common
header
These structs will be passed down to macsec drivers in a coming patch to
make the driver interface cleaner, so they need to be shared between the
core MKA implementation and the drivers.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
---
src/drivers/driver.h | 3 ++
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h | 82 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay_i.h | 82 -------------------------------------------
src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.h | 4 ---
4 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver.h b/src/drivers/driver.h
index a449cc9..073219e 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver.h
+++ b/src/drivers/driver.h
@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@
#include "common/defs.h"
#include "common/ieee802_11_defs.h"
+#ifdef CONFIG_MACSEC
+#include "pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h"
+#endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */
#include "utils/list.h"
#define HOSTAPD_CHAN_DISABLED 0x00000001
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
index afbaa33..0361e1a 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
@@ -49,6 +49,88 @@ enum mka_created_mode {
EAP_EXCHANGE,
};
+struct data_key {
+ u8 *key;
+ int key_len;
+ struct ieee802_1x_mka_ki key_identifier;
+ enum confidentiality_offset confidentiality_offset;
+ u8 an;
+ Boolean transmits;
+ Boolean receives;
+ struct os_time created_time;
+ u32 next_pn;
+
+ /* not defined data */
+ Boolean rx_latest;
+ Boolean tx_latest;
+
+ int user; /* FIXME: to indicate if it can be delete safely */
+
+ struct dl_list list;
+};
+
+/* TransmitSC in IEEE Std 802.1AE-2006, Figure 10-6 */
+struct transmit_sc {
+ struct ieee802_1x_mka_sci sci; /* const SCI sci */
+ Boolean transmitting; /* bool transmitting (read only) */
+
+ struct os_time created_time; /* Time createdTime */
+
+ u8 encoding_sa; /* AN encodingSA (read only) */
+ u8 enciphering_sa; /* AN encipheringSA (read only) */
+
+ /* not defined data */
+ unsigned int channel;
+
+ struct dl_list list;
+ struct dl_list sa_list;
+};
+
+/* TransmitSA in IEEE Std 802.1AE-2006, Figure 10-6 */
+struct transmit_sa {
+ Boolean in_use; /* bool inUse (read only) */
+ u32 next_pn; /* PN nextPN (read only) */
+ struct os_time created_time; /* Time createdTime */
+
+ Boolean enable_transmit; /* bool EnableTransmit */
+
+ u8 an;
+ Boolean confidentiality;
+ struct data_key *pkey;
+
+ struct transmit_sc *sc;
+ struct dl_list list; /* list entry in struct transmit_sc::sa_list */
+};
+
+/* ReceiveSC in IEEE Std 802.1AE-2006, Figure 10-6 */
+struct receive_sc {
+ struct ieee802_1x_mka_sci sci; /* const SCI sci */
+ Boolean receiving; /* bool receiving (read only) */
+
+ struct os_time created_time; /* Time createdTime */
+
+ unsigned int channel;
+
+ struct dl_list list;
+ struct dl_list sa_list;
+};
+
+/* ReceiveSA in IEEE Std 802.1AE-2006, Figure 10-6 */
+struct receive_sa {
+ Boolean enable_receive; /* bool enableReceive */
+ Boolean in_use; /* bool inUse (read only) */
+
+ u32 next_pn; /* PN nextPN (read only) */
+ u32 lowest_pn; /* PN lowestPN (read only) */
+ u8 an;
+ struct os_time created_time;
+
+ struct data_key *pkey;
+ struct receive_sc *sc; /* list entry in struct receive_sc::sa_list */
+
+ struct dl_list list;
+};
+
struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx {
/* pointer to arbitrary upper level context */
void *ctx;
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay_i.h b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay_i.h
index 622282e..e3d7db4 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay_i.h
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay_i.h
@@ -54,88 +54,6 @@ struct ieee802_1x_kay_peer {
struct dl_list list;
};
-struct data_key {
- u8 *key;
- int key_len;
- struct ieee802_1x_mka_ki key_identifier;
- enum confidentiality_offset confidentiality_offset;
- u8 an;
- Boolean transmits;
- Boolean receives;
- struct os_time created_time;
- u32 next_pn;
-
- /* not defined data */
- Boolean rx_latest;
- Boolean tx_latest;
-
- int user; /* FIXME: to indicate if it can be delete safely */
-
- struct dl_list list;
-};
-
-/* TransmitSC in IEEE Std 802.1AE-2006, Figure 10-6 */
-struct transmit_sc {
- struct ieee802_1x_mka_sci sci; /* const SCI sci */
- Boolean transmitting; /* bool transmitting (read only) */
-
- struct os_time created_time; /* Time createdTime */
-
- u8 encoding_sa; /* AN encodingSA (read only) */
- u8 enciphering_sa; /* AN encipheringSA (read only) */
-
- /* not defined data */
- unsigned int channel;
-
- struct dl_list list;
- struct dl_list sa_list;
-};
-
-/* TransmitSA in IEEE Std 802.1AE-2006, Figure 10-6 */
-struct transmit_sa {
- Boolean in_use; /* bool inUse (read only) */
- u32 next_pn; /* PN nextPN (read only) */
- struct os_time created_time; /* Time createdTime */
-
- Boolean enable_transmit; /* bool EnableTransmit */
-
- u8 an;
- Boolean confidentiality;
- struct data_key *pkey;
-
- struct transmit_sc *sc;
- struct dl_list list; /* list entry in struct transmit_sc::sa_list */
-};
-
-/* ReceiveSC in IEEE Std 802.1AE-2006, Figure 10-6 */
-struct receive_sc {
- struct ieee802_1x_mka_sci sci; /* const SCI sci */
- Boolean receiving; /* bool receiving (read only) */
-
- struct os_time created_time; /* Time createdTime */
-
- unsigned int channel;
-
- struct dl_list list;
- struct dl_list sa_list;
-};
-
-/* ReceiveSA in IEEE Std 802.1AE-2006, Figure 10-6 */
-struct receive_sa {
- Boolean enable_receive; /* bool enableReceive */
- Boolean in_use; /* bool inUse (read only) */
-
- u32 next_pn; /* PN nextPN (read only) */
- u32 lowest_pn; /* PN lowestPN (read only) */
- u8 an;
- struct os_time created_time;
-
- struct data_key *pkey;
- struct receive_sc *sc; /* list entry in struct receive_sc::sa_list */
-
- struct dl_list list;
-};
-
struct macsec_ciphersuite {
u64 id;
char name[32];
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.h b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.h
index f5057ee..120ca3c 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.h
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.h
@@ -13,10 +13,6 @@
#include "common/ieee802_1x_defs.h"
struct ieee802_1x_kay_conf;
-struct receive_sa;
-struct transmit_sa;
-struct receive_sc;
-struct transmit_sc;
int secy_init_macsec(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay);
int secy_deinit_macsec(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay);
--
2.7.4

296
macsec-0002-mka-Pass-full-structures-down-to-macsec-drivers-pack.patch
View File

@ -1,296 +0,0 @@
From 7fa5eff8abbbff4f3385932175b080aad40bf211 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <7fa5eff8abbbff4f3385932175b080aad40bf211.1488376601.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Tue, 20 Sep 2016 09:43:05 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] mka: Pass full structures down to macsec drivers' packet
number ops
Clean up the driver interface by passing pointers to structs transmit_sa
and receive_sa down the stack to get_receive_lowest_pn(),
get_transmit_next_pn(), and set_transmit_next_pn() ops, instead of
passing the individual arguments.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
---
src/drivers/driver.h | 21 ++++++---------------
src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++---------------
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h | 8 +++-----
src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c | 15 +++------------
wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h | 18 ++++++------------
wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c | 15 ++++++---------
6 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver.h b/src/drivers/driver.h
index 073219e..2c7ce6c 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver.h
+++ b/src/drivers/driver.h
@@ -3336,35 +3336,26 @@ struct wpa_driver_ops {
/**
* get_receive_lowest_pn - Get receive lowest pn
* @priv: Private driver interface data
- * @channel: secure channel
- * @an: association number
- * @lowest_pn: lowest accept pn
+ * @sa: secure association
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure (or if not supported)
*/
- int (*get_receive_lowest_pn)(void *priv, u32 channel, u8 an,
- u32 *lowest_pn);
+ int (*get_receive_lowest_pn)(void *priv, struct receive_sa *sa);
/**
* get_transmit_next_pn - Get transmit next pn
* @priv: Private driver interface data
- * @channel: secure channel
- * @an: association number
- * @next_pn: next pn
+ * @sa: secure association
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure (or if not supported)
*/
- int (*get_transmit_next_pn)(void *priv, u32 channel, u8 an,
- u32 *next_pn);
+ int (*get_transmit_next_pn)(void *priv, struct transmit_sa *sa);
/**
* set_transmit_next_pn - Set transmit next pn
* @priv: Private driver interface data
- * @channel: secure channel
- * @an: association number
- * @next_pn: next pn
+ * @sa: secure association
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure (or if not supported)
*/
- int (*set_transmit_next_pn)(void *priv, u32 channel, u8 an,
- u32 next_pn);
+ int (*set_transmit_next_pn)(void *priv, struct transmit_sa *sa);
/**
* get_available_receive_sc - get available receive channel
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
index 826d3cc..95f1e27 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include "utils/eloop.h"
#include "common/defs.h"
#include "common/ieee802_1x_defs.h"
+#include "pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h"
#include "driver.h"
#include "nss_macsec_secy.h"
@@ -515,16 +516,16 @@ static int macsec_qca_enable_controlled_port(void *priv, Boolean enabled)
}
-static int macsec_qca_get_receive_lowest_pn(void *priv, u32 channel, u8 an,
- u32 *lowest_pn)
+static int macsec_qca_get_receive_lowest_pn(void *priv, struct receive_sa *sa)
{
struct macsec_qca_data *drv = priv;
int ret = 0;
u32 next_pn = 0;
bool enabled = FALSE;
u32 win;
+ u32 channel = sa->sc->channel;
- ret += nss_macsec_secy_rx_sa_next_pn_get(drv->secy_id, channel, an,
+ ret += nss_macsec_secy_rx_sa_next_pn_get(drv->secy_id, channel, sa->an,
&next_pn);
ret += nss_macsec_secy_rx_sc_replay_protect_get(drv->secy_id, channel,
&enabled);
@@ -532,40 +533,42 @@ static int macsec_qca_get_receive_lowest_pn(void *priv, u32 channel, u8 an,
channel, &win);
if (enabled)
- *lowest_pn = (next_pn > win) ? (next_pn - win) : 1;
+ sa->lowest_pn = (next_pn > win) ? (next_pn - win) : 1;
else
- *lowest_pn = next_pn;
+ sa->lowest_pn = next_pn;
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: lpn=0x%x", __func__, *lowest_pn);
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: lpn=0x%x", __func__, sa->lowest_pn);
return ret;
}
-static int macsec_qca_get_transmit_next_pn(void *priv, u32 channel, u8 an,
- u32 *next_pn)
+static int macsec_qca_get_transmit_next_pn(void *priv, struct transmit_sa *sa)
{
struct macsec_qca_data *drv = priv;
int ret = 0;
+ u32 channel = sa->sc->channel;
- ret += nss_macsec_secy_tx_sa_next_pn_get(drv->secy_id, channel, an,
- next_pn);
+ ret += nss_macsec_secy_tx_sa_next_pn_get(drv->secy_id, channel, sa->an,
+ &sa->next_pn);
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: npn=0x%x", __func__, *next_pn);
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: npn=0x%x", __func__, sa->next_pn);
return ret;
}
-int macsec_qca_set_transmit_next_pn(void *priv, u32 channel, u8 an, u32 next_pn)
+int macsec_qca_set_transmit_next_pn(void *priv, struct transmit_sa *sa)
{
struct macsec_qca_data *drv = priv;
int ret = 0;
+ u32 channel = sa->sc->channel;
- ret += nss_macsec_secy_tx_sa_next_pn_set(drv->secy_id, channel, an,
- next_pn);
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "%s: npn=0x%x", __func__, next_pn);
+ ret += nss_macsec_secy_tx_sa_next_pn_set(drv->secy_id, channel, sa->an,
+ sa->next_pn);
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "%s: npn=0x%x", __func__, sa->next_pn);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
index 0361e1a..a747b11 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
@@ -142,11 +142,9 @@ struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx {
int (*set_replay_protect)(void *ctx, Boolean enabled, u32 window);
int (*set_current_cipher_suite)(void *ctx, u64 cs);
int (*enable_controlled_port)(void *ctx, Boolean enabled);
- int (*get_receive_lowest_pn)(void *ctx, u32 channel, u8 an,
- u32 *lowest_pn);
- int (*get_transmit_next_pn)(void *ctx, u32 channel, u8 an,
- u32 *next_pn);
- int (*set_transmit_next_pn)(void *ctx, u32 channel, u8 an, u32 next_pn);
+ int (*get_receive_lowest_pn)(void *ctx, struct receive_sa *sa);
+ int (*get_transmit_next_pn)(void *ctx, struct transmit_sa *sa);
+ int (*set_transmit_next_pn)(void *ctx, struct transmit_sa *sa);
int (*get_available_receive_sc)(void *ctx, u32 *channel);
int (*create_receive_sc)(void *ctx, u32 channel,
struct ieee802_1x_mka_sci *sci,
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c
index 2d12911..d05e00f 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c
@@ -130,10 +130,7 @@ int secy_get_receive_lowest_pn(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
return -1;
}
- return ops->get_receive_lowest_pn(ops->ctx,
- rxsa->sc->channel,
- rxsa->an,
- &rxsa->lowest_pn);
+ return ops->get_receive_lowest_pn(ops->ctx, rxsa);
}
@@ -154,10 +151,7 @@ int secy_get_transmit_next_pn(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
return -1;
}
- return ops->get_transmit_next_pn(ops->ctx,
- txsa->sc->channel,
- txsa->an,
- &txsa->next_pn);
+ return ops->get_transmit_next_pn(ops->ctx, txsa);
}
@@ -178,10 +172,7 @@ int secy_set_transmit_next_pn(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
return -1;
}
- return ops->set_transmit_next_pn(ops->ctx,
- txsa->sc->channel,
- txsa->an,
- txsa->next_pn);
+ return ops->set_transmit_next_pn(ops->ctx, txsa);
}
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h b/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h
index 220b7ba..639bb83 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h
@@ -749,33 +749,27 @@ static inline int wpa_drv_enable_controlled_port(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
}
static inline int wpa_drv_get_receive_lowest_pn(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
- u32 channel, u8 an,
- u32 *lowest_pn)
+ struct receive_sa *sa)
{
if (!wpa_s->driver->get_receive_lowest_pn)
return -1;
- return wpa_s->driver->get_receive_lowest_pn(wpa_s->drv_priv, channel,
- an, lowest_pn);
+ return wpa_s->driver->get_receive_lowest_pn(wpa_s->drv_priv, sa);
}
static inline int wpa_drv_get_transmit_next_pn(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
- u32 channel, u8 an,
- u32 *next_pn)
+ struct transmit_sa *sa)
{
if (!wpa_s->driver->get_transmit_next_pn)
return -1;
- return wpa_s->driver->get_transmit_next_pn(wpa_s->drv_priv, channel,
- an, next_pn);
+ return wpa_s->driver->get_transmit_next_pn(wpa_s->drv_priv, sa);
}
static inline int wpa_drv_set_transmit_next_pn(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
- u32 channel, u8 an,
- u32 next_pn)
+ struct transmit_sa *sa)
{
if (!wpa_s->driver->set_transmit_next_pn)
return -1;
- return wpa_s->driver->set_transmit_next_pn(wpa_s->drv_priv, channel,
- an, next_pn);
+ return wpa_s->driver->set_transmit_next_pn(wpa_s->drv_priv, sa);
}
static inline int wpa_drv_get_available_receive_sc(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
index d6ec8c5..306d9f1 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
@@ -62,24 +62,21 @@ static int wpas_enable_controlled_port(void *wpa_s, Boolean enabled)
}
-static int wpas_get_receive_lowest_pn(void *wpa_s, u32 channel,
- u8 an, u32 *lowest_pn)
+static int wpas_get_receive_lowest_pn(void *wpa_s, struct receive_sa *sa)
{
- return wpa_drv_get_receive_lowest_pn(wpa_s, channel, an, lowest_pn);
+ return wpa_drv_get_receive_lowest_pn(wpa_s, sa);
}
-static int wpas_get_transmit_next_pn(void *wpa_s, u32 channel,
- u8 an, u32 *next_pn)
+static int wpas_get_transmit_next_pn(void *wpa_s, struct transmit_sa *sa)
{
- return wpa_drv_get_transmit_next_pn(wpa_s, channel, an, next_pn);
+ return wpa_drv_get_transmit_next_pn(wpa_s, sa);
}
-static int wpas_set_transmit_next_pn(void *wpa_s, u32 channel,
- u8 an, u32 next_pn)
+static int wpas_set_transmit_next_pn(void *wpa_s, struct transmit_sa *sa)
{
- return wpa_drv_set_transmit_next_pn(wpa_s, channel, an, next_pn);
+ return wpa_drv_set_transmit_next_pn(wpa_s, sa);
}
--
2.7.4

290
macsec-0003-mka-Pass-full-structures-down-to-macsec-drivers-tran.patch
View File

@ -1,290 +0,0 @@
From 909c1b9835ecc9c115980e9827a9313c17dab22b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <909c1b9835ecc9c115980e9827a9313c17dab22b.1488376601.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Tue, 20 Sep 2016 09:43:07 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] mka: Pass full structures down to macsec drivers' transmit SA
ops
Clean up the driver interface by passing pointers to struct transmit_sa
down the stack to the {create,enable,disable}_transmit_sa ops, instead
of passing the individual properties of the SA.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
---
src/drivers/driver.h | 20 ++++++--------------
src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h | 7 +++----
src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c | 8 +++-----
wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h | 16 ++++++----------
wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c | 15 ++++++---------
6 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver.h b/src/drivers/driver.h
index 2c7ce6c..bb2d1d2 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver.h
+++ b/src/drivers/driver.h
@@ -3448,34 +3448,26 @@ struct wpa_driver_ops {
/**
* create_transmit_sa - create secure association for transmit
* @priv: private driver interface data from init()
- * @channel: secure channel index
- * @an: association number
- * @next_pn: the packet number used as next transmit packet
- * @confidentiality: True if the SA is to provide confidentiality
- * as well as integrity
- * @sak: the secure association key
+ * @sa: secure association
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure
*/
- int (*create_transmit_sa)(void *priv, u32 channel, u8 an, u32 next_pn,
- Boolean confidentiality, const u8 *sak);
+ int (*create_transmit_sa)(void *priv, struct transmit_sa *sa);
/**
* enable_transmit_sa - enable SA for transmit
* @priv: private driver interface data from init()
- * @channel: secure channel
- * @an: association number
+ * @sa: secure association
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure
*/
- int (*enable_transmit_sa)(void *priv, u32 channel, u8 an);
+ int (*enable_transmit_sa)(void *priv, struct transmit_sa *sa);
/**
* disable_transmit_sa - disable SA for transmit
* @priv: private driver interface data from init()
- * @channel: secure channel
- * @an: association number
+ * @sa: secure association
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure
*/
- int (*disable_transmit_sa)(void *priv, u32 channel, u8 an);
+ int (*disable_transmit_sa)(void *priv, struct transmit_sa *sa);
#endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */
/**
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
index 95f1e27..9bfc9a4 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
@@ -794,19 +794,18 @@ static int macsec_qca_delete_transmit_sc(void *priv, u32 channel)
}
-static int macsec_qca_create_transmit_sa(void *priv, u32 channel, u8 an,
- u32 next_pn, Boolean confidentiality,
- const u8 *sak)
+static int macsec_qca_create_transmit_sa(void *priv, struct transmit_sa *sa)
{
struct macsec_qca_data *drv = priv;
int ret = 0;
u8 tci = 0;
fal_tx_sak_t tx_sak;
int i;
+ u32 channel = sa->sc->channel;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"%s: channel=%d, an=%d, next_pn=0x%x, confidentiality=%d",
- __func__, channel, an, next_pn, confidentiality);
+ __func__, channel, sa->an, sa->next_pn, sa->confidentiality);
if (drv->always_include_sci)
tci |= TCI_SC;
@@ -815,45 +814,53 @@ static int macsec_qca_create_transmit_sa(void *priv, u32 channel, u8 an,
else if (drv->use_scb)
tci |= TCI_SCB;
- if (confidentiality)
+ if (sa->confidentiality)
tci |= TCI_E | TCI_C;
os_memset(&tx_sak, 0, sizeof(tx_sak));
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- tx_sak.sak[i] = sak[15 - i];
+ tx_sak.sak[i] = sa->pkey->key[15 - i];
- ret += nss_macsec_secy_tx_sa_next_pn_set(drv->secy_id, channel, an,
- next_pn);
- ret += nss_macsec_secy_tx_sak_set(drv->secy_id, channel, an, &tx_sak);
+ ret += nss_macsec_secy_tx_sa_next_pn_set(drv->secy_id, channel, sa->an,
+ sa->next_pn);
+ ret += nss_macsec_secy_tx_sak_set(drv->secy_id, channel, sa->an,
+ &tx_sak);
ret += nss_macsec_secy_tx_sc_tci_7_2_set(drv->secy_id, channel,
(tci >> 2));
- ret += nss_macsec_secy_tx_sc_an_set(drv->secy_id, channel, an);
+ ret += nss_macsec_secy_tx_sc_an_set(drv->secy_id, channel, sa->an);
return ret;
}
-static int macsec_qca_enable_transmit_sa(void *priv, u32 channel, u8 an)
+static int macsec_qca_enable_transmit_sa(void *priv, struct transmit_sa *sa)
{
struct macsec_qca_data *drv = priv;
int ret = 0;
+ u32 channel = sa->sc->channel;
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: channel=%d, an=%d", __func__, channel, an);
- ret += nss_macsec_secy_tx_sa_en_set(drv->secy_id, channel, an, TRUE);
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: channel=%d, an=%d", __func__, channel,
+ sa->an);
+
+ ret += nss_macsec_secy_tx_sa_en_set(drv->secy_id, channel, sa->an,
+ TRUE);
return ret;
}
-static int macsec_qca_disable_transmit_sa(void *priv, u32 channel, u8 an)
+static int macsec_qca_disable_transmit_sa(void *priv, struct transmit_sa *sa)
{
struct macsec_qca_data *drv = priv;
int ret = 0;
+ u32 channel = sa->sc->channel;
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: channel=%d, an=%d", __func__, channel, an);
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: channel=%d, an=%d", __func__, channel,
+ sa->an);
- ret += nss_macsec_secy_tx_sa_en_set(drv->secy_id, channel, an, FALSE);
+ ret += nss_macsec_secy_tx_sa_en_set(drv->secy_id, channel, sa->an,
+ FALSE);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
index a747b11..36a7bd6 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
@@ -160,10 +160,9 @@ struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx {
const struct ieee802_1x_mka_sci *sci,
enum confidentiality_offset co);
int (*delete_transmit_sc)(void *ctx, u32 channel);
- int (*create_transmit_sa)(void *ctx, u32 channel, u8 an, u32 next_pn,
- Boolean confidentiality, const u8 *sak);
- int (*enable_transmit_sa)(void *ctx, u32 channel, u8 an);
- int (*disable_transmit_sa)(void *ctx, u32 channel, u8 an);
+ int (*create_transmit_sa)(void *ctx, struct transmit_sa *sa);
+ int (*enable_transmit_sa)(void *ctx, struct transmit_sa *sa);
+ int (*disable_transmit_sa)(void *ctx, struct transmit_sa *sa);
};
struct ieee802_1x_kay {
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c
index d05e00f..8c31ca9 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c
@@ -382,9 +382,7 @@ int secy_create_transmit_sa(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
return -1;
}
- return ops->create_transmit_sa(ops->ctx, txsa->sc->channel, txsa->an,
- txsa->next_pn, txsa->confidentiality,
- txsa->pkey->key);
+ return ops->create_transmit_sa(ops->ctx, txsa);
}
@@ -407,7 +405,7 @@ int secy_enable_transmit_sa(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
txsa->enable_transmit = TRUE;
- return ops->enable_transmit_sa(ops->ctx, txsa->sc->channel, txsa->an);
+ return ops->enable_transmit_sa(ops->ctx, txsa);
}
@@ -430,7 +428,7 @@ int secy_disable_transmit_sa(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
txsa->enable_transmit = FALSE;
- return ops->disable_transmit_sa(ops->ctx, txsa->sc->channel, txsa->an);
+ return ops->disable_transmit_sa(ops->ctx, txsa);
}
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h b/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h
index 639bb83..e2c2bd7 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h
@@ -857,31 +857,27 @@ static inline int wpa_drv_delete_transmit_sc(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
}
static inline int wpa_drv_create_transmit_sa(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
- u32 channel, u8 an,
- u32 next_pn,
- Boolean confidentiality,
- const u8 *sak)
+ struct transmit_sa *sa)
{
if (!wpa_s->driver->create_transmit_sa)
return -1;
- return wpa_s->driver->create_transmit_sa(wpa_s->drv_priv, channel, an,
- next_pn, confidentiality, sak);
+ return wpa_s->driver->create_transmit_sa(wpa_s->drv_priv, sa);
}
static inline int wpa_drv_enable_transmit_sa(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
- u32 channel, u8 an)
+ struct transmit_sa *sa)
{
if (!wpa_s->driver->enable_transmit_sa)
return -1;
- return wpa_s->driver->enable_transmit_sa(wpa_s->drv_priv, channel, an);
+ return wpa_s->driver->enable_transmit_sa(wpa_s->drv_priv, sa);
}
static inline int wpa_drv_disable_transmit_sa(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
- u32 channel, u8 an)
+ struct transmit_sa *sa)
{
if (!wpa_s->driver->disable_transmit_sa)
return -1;
- return wpa_s->driver->disable_transmit_sa(wpa_s->drv_priv, channel, an);
+ return wpa_s->driver->disable_transmit_sa(wpa_s->drv_priv, sa);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
index 306d9f1..4b74112 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
@@ -159,24 +159,21 @@ static int wpas_delete_transmit_sc(void *wpa_s, u32 channel)
}
-static int wpas_create_transmit_sa(void *wpa_s, u32 channel, u8 an,
- u32 next_pn, Boolean confidentiality,
- const u8 *sak)
+static int wpas_create_transmit_sa(void *wpa_s, struct transmit_sa *sa)
{
- return wpa_drv_create_transmit_sa(wpa_s, channel, an, next_pn,
- confidentiality, sak);
+ return wpa_drv_create_transmit_sa(wpa_s, sa);
}
-static int wpas_enable_transmit_sa(void *wpa_s, u32 channel, u8 an)
+static int wpas_enable_transmit_sa(void *wpa_s, struct transmit_sa *sa)
{
- return wpa_drv_enable_transmit_sa(wpa_s, channel, an);
+ return wpa_drv_enable_transmit_sa(wpa_s, sa);
}
-static int wpas_disable_transmit_sa(void *wpa_s, u32 channel, u8 an)
+static int wpas_disable_transmit_sa(void *wpa_s, struct transmit_sa *sa)
{
- return wpa_drv_disable_transmit_sa(wpa_s, channel, an);
+ return wpa_drv_disable_transmit_sa(wpa_s, sa);
}
--
2.7.4

264
macsec-0004-mka-Pass-full-structures-down-to-macsec-drivers-rece.patch
View File

@ -1,264 +0,0 @@
From cecdecdbe81c9ca86127413c6559be2d3ffcabd3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <cecdecdbe81c9ca86127413c6559be2d3ffcabd3.1488376601.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Tue, 20 Sep 2016 09:43:09 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] mka: Pass full structures down to macsec drivers' receive SA
ops
Clean up the driver interface by passing pointers to struct receive_sa
down the stack to the {create,enable,disable}_receive_sa() ops, instead
of passing the individual properties of the SA.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
---
src/drivers/driver.h | 18 ++++++------------
src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++------------
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h | 7 +++----
src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c | 7 +++----
wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h | 14 ++++++--------
wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c | 13 ++++++-------
6 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver.h b/src/drivers/driver.h
index bb2d1d2..f1915fc 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver.h
+++ b/src/drivers/driver.h
@@ -3391,32 +3391,26 @@ struct wpa_driver_ops {
/**
* create_receive_sa - create secure association for receive
* @priv: private driver interface data from init()
- * @channel: secure channel
- * @an: association number
- * @lowest_pn: the lowest packet number can be received
- * @sak: the secure association key
+ * @sa: secure association
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure
*/
- int (*create_receive_sa)(void *priv, u32 channel, u8 an,
- u32 lowest_pn, const u8 *sak);
+ int (*create_receive_sa)(void *priv, struct receive_sa *sa);
/**
* enable_receive_sa - enable the SA for receive
* @priv: private driver interface data from init()
- * @channel: secure channel
- * @an: association number
+ * @sa: secure association
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure
*/
- int (*enable_receive_sa)(void *priv, u32 channel, u8 an);
+ int (*enable_receive_sa)(void *priv, struct receive_sa *sa);
/**
* disable_receive_sa - disable SA for receive
* @priv: private driver interface data from init()
- * @channel: secure channel index
- * @an: association number
+ * @sa: secure association
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure
*/
- int (*disable_receive_sa)(void *priv, u32 channel, u8 an);
+ int (*disable_receive_sa)(void *priv, struct receive_sa *sa);
/**
* get_available_transmit_sc - get available transmit channel
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
index 9bfc9a4..2867c31 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
@@ -667,49 +667,57 @@ static int macsec_qca_delete_receive_sc(void *priv, u32 channel)
}
-static int macsec_qca_create_receive_sa(void *priv, u32 channel, u8 an,
- u32 lowest_pn, const u8 *sak)
+static int macsec_qca_create_receive_sa(void *priv, struct receive_sa *sa)
{
struct macsec_qca_data *drv = priv;
int ret = 0;
fal_rx_sak_t rx_sak;
int i = 0;
+ u32 channel = sa->sc->channel;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s, channel=%d, an=%d, lpn=0x%x",
- __func__, channel, an, lowest_pn);
+ __func__, channel, sa->an, sa->lowest_pn);
os_memset(&rx_sak, 0, sizeof(rx_sak));
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- rx_sak.sak[i] = sak[15 - i];
+ rx_sak.sak[i] = sa->pkey->key[15 - i];
- ret += nss_macsec_secy_rx_sa_create(drv->secy_id, channel, an);
- ret += nss_macsec_secy_rx_sak_set(drv->secy_id, channel, an, &rx_sak);
+ ret += nss_macsec_secy_rx_sa_create(drv->secy_id, channel, sa->an);
+ ret += nss_macsec_secy_rx_sak_set(drv->secy_id, channel, sa->an,
+ &rx_sak);
return ret;
}
-static int macsec_qca_enable_receive_sa(void *priv, u32 channel, u8 an)
+static int macsec_qca_enable_receive_sa(void *priv, struct receive_sa *sa)
{
struct macsec_qca_data *drv = priv;
int ret = 0;
+ u32 channel = sa->sc->channel;
+
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: channel=%d, an=%d", __func__, channel, an);
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: channel=%d, an=%d", __func__, channel,
+ sa->an);
- ret += nss_macsec_secy_rx_sa_en_set(drv->secy_id, channel, an, TRUE);
+ ret += nss_macsec_secy_rx_sa_en_set(drv->secy_id, channel, sa->an,
+ TRUE);
return ret;
}
-static int macsec_qca_disable_receive_sa(void *priv, u32 channel, u8 an)
+static int macsec_qca_disable_receive_sa(void *priv, struct receive_sa *sa)
{
struct macsec_qca_data *drv = priv;
int ret = 0;
+ u32 channel = sa->sc->channel;
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: channel=%d, an=%d", __func__, channel, an);
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: channel=%d, an=%d", __func__, channel,
+ sa->an);
- ret += nss_macsec_secy_rx_sa_en_set(drv->secy_id, channel, an, FALSE);
+ ret += nss_macsec_secy_rx_sa_en_set(drv->secy_id, channel, sa->an,
+ FALSE);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
index 36a7bd6..8ee5860 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
@@ -151,10 +151,9 @@ struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx {
enum validate_frames vf,
enum confidentiality_offset co);
int (*delete_receive_sc)(void *ctx, u32 channel);
- int (*create_receive_sa)(void *ctx, u32 channel, u8 an, u32 lowest_pn,
- const u8 *sak);
- int (*enable_receive_sa)(void *ctx, u32 channel, u8 an);
- int (*disable_receive_sa)(void *ctx, u32 channel, u8 an);
+ int (*create_receive_sa)(void *ctx, struct receive_sa *sa);
+ int (*enable_receive_sa)(void *ctx, struct receive_sa *sa);
+ int (*disable_receive_sa)(void *ctx, struct receive_sa *sa);
int (*get_available_transmit_sc)(void *ctx, u32 *channel);
int (*create_transmit_sc)(void *ctx, u32 channel,
const struct ieee802_1x_mka_sci *sci,
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c
index 8c31ca9..fb376df 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c
@@ -253,8 +253,7 @@ int secy_create_receive_sa(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, struct receive_sa *rxsa)
return -1;
}
- return ops->create_receive_sa(ops->ctx, rxsa->sc->channel, rxsa->an,
- rxsa->lowest_pn, rxsa->pkey->key);
+ return ops->create_receive_sa(ops->ctx, rxsa);
}
@@ -276,7 +275,7 @@ int secy_enable_receive_sa(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, struct receive_sa *rxsa)
rxsa->enable_receive = TRUE;
- return ops->enable_receive_sa(ops->ctx, rxsa->sc->channel, rxsa->an);
+ return ops->enable_receive_sa(ops->ctx, rxsa);
}
@@ -298,7 +297,7 @@ int secy_disable_receive_sa(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, struct receive_sa *rxsa)
rxsa->enable_receive = FALSE;
- return ops->disable_receive_sa(ops->ctx, rxsa->sc->channel, rxsa->an);
+ return ops->disable_receive_sa(ops->ctx, rxsa);
}
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h b/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h
index e2c2bd7..666798b 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h
@@ -802,29 +802,27 @@ static inline int wpa_drv_delete_receive_sc(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
}
static inline int wpa_drv_create_receive_sa(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
- u32 channel, u8 an,
- u32 lowest_pn, const u8 *sak)
+ struct receive_sa *sa)
{
if (!wpa_s->driver->create_receive_sa)
return -1;
- return wpa_s->driver->create_receive_sa(wpa_s->drv_priv, channel, an,
- lowest_pn, sak);
+ return wpa_s->driver->create_receive_sa(wpa_s->drv_priv, sa);
}
static inline int wpa_drv_enable_receive_sa(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
- u32 channel, u8 an)
+ struct receive_sa *sa)
{
if (!wpa_s->driver->enable_receive_sa)
return -1;
- return wpa_s->driver->enable_receive_sa(wpa_s->drv_priv, channel, an);
+ return wpa_s->driver->enable_receive_sa(wpa_s->drv_priv, sa);
}
static inline int wpa_drv_disable_receive_sa(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
- u32 channel, u8 an)
+ struct receive_sa *sa)
{
if (!wpa_s->driver->disable_receive_sa)
return -1;
- return wpa_s->driver->disable_receive_sa(wpa_s->drv_priv, channel, an);
+ return wpa_s->driver->disable_receive_sa(wpa_s->drv_priv, sa);
}
static inline int
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
index 4b74112..344c59e 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
@@ -117,22 +117,21 @@ static int wpas_delete_receive_sc(void *wpa_s, u32 channel)
}
-static int wpas_create_receive_sa(void *wpa_s, u32 channel, u8 an,
- u32 lowest_pn, const u8 *sak)
+static int wpas_create_receive_sa(void *wpa_s, struct receive_sa *sa)
{
- return wpa_drv_create_receive_sa(wpa_s, channel, an, lowest_pn, sak);
+ return wpa_drv_create_receive_sa(wpa_s, sa);
}
-static int wpas_enable_receive_sa(void *wpa_s, u32 channel, u8 an)
+static int wpas_enable_receive_sa(void *wpa_s, struct receive_sa *sa)
{
- return wpa_drv_enable_receive_sa(wpa_s, channel, an);
+ return wpa_drv_enable_receive_sa(wpa_s, sa);
}
-static int wpas_disable_receive_sa(void *wpa_s, u32 channel, u8 an)
+static int wpas_disable_receive_sa(void *wpa_s, struct receive_sa *sa)
{
- return wpa_drv_disable_receive_sa(wpa_s, channel, an);
+ return wpa_drv_disable_receive_sa(wpa_s, sa);
}
--
2.7.4

204
macsec-0005-mka-Pass-full-structures-down-to-macsec-drivers-tran.patch
View File

@ -1,204 +0,0 @@
From 8ebfc7c2ba77ac1f71577b3ddc46a050d9fb1103 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <8ebfc7c2ba77ac1f71577b3ddc46a050d9fb1103.1488376601.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Fri, 7 Oct 2016 12:08:09 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] mka: Pass full structures down to macsec drivers' transmit SC
ops
Clean up the driver interface by passing pointers to struct transmit_sc
down the stack to the {create,delete}_transmit_sc() ops, instead of
passing the individual arguments.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
---
src/drivers/driver.h | 13 ++++++-------
src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c | 13 +++++++------
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h | 5 ++---
src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c | 5 ++---
wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h | 10 ++++------
wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c | 11 ++++-------
6 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver.h b/src/drivers/driver.h
index f1915fc..1e2d623 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver.h
+++ b/src/drivers/driver.h
@@ -3423,21 +3423,20 @@ struct wpa_driver_ops {
/**
* create_transmit_sc - create secure connection for transmit
* @priv: private driver interface data from init()
- * @channel: secure channel
- * @sci_addr: secure channel identifier - address
- * @sci_port: secure channel identifier - port
+ * @sc: secure channel
+ * @conf_offset: confidentiality offset (0, 30, or 50)
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure
*/
- int (*create_transmit_sc)(void *priv, u32 channel, const u8 *sci_addr,
- u16 sci_port, unsigned int conf_offset);
+ int (*create_transmit_sc)(void *priv, struct transmit_sc *sc,
+ unsigned int conf_offset);
/**
* delete_transmit_sc - delete secure connection for transmit
* @priv: private driver interface data from init()
- * @channel: secure channel
+ * @sc: secure channel
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure
*/
- int (*delete_transmit_sc)(void *priv, u32 channel);
+ int (*delete_transmit_sc)(void *priv, struct transmit_sc *sc);
/**
* create_transmit_sa - create secure association for transmit
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
index 2867c31..fef93df 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
@@ -750,14 +750,14 @@ static int macsec_qca_get_available_transmit_sc(void *priv, u32 *channel)
}
-static int macsec_qca_create_transmit_sc(void *priv, u32 channel,
- const u8 *sci_addr, u16 sci_port,
+static int macsec_qca_create_transmit_sc(void *priv, struct transmit_sc *sc,
unsigned int conf_offset)
{
struct macsec_qca_data *drv = priv;
int ret = 0;
fal_tx_class_lut_t entry;
u8 psci[ETH_ALEN + 2];
+ u32 channel = sc->channel;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: channel=%d", __func__, channel);
@@ -768,9 +768,9 @@ static int macsec_qca_create_transmit_sc(void *priv, u32 channel,
entry.action = FAL_TX_CLASS_ACTION_FORWARD;
entry.channel = channel;
- os_memcpy(psci, sci_addr, ETH_ALEN);
- psci[6] = (sci_port >> 8) & 0xf;
- psci[7] = sci_port & 0xf;
+ os_memcpy(psci, sc->sci.addr, ETH_ALEN);
+ psci[6] = (sc->sci.port >> 8) & 0xf;
+ psci[7] = sc->sci.port & 0xf;
ret += nss_macsec_secy_tx_class_lut_set(drv->secy_id, channel, &entry);
ret += nss_macsec_secy_tx_sc_create(drv->secy_id, channel, psci, 8);
@@ -784,11 +784,12 @@ static int macsec_qca_create_transmit_sc(void *priv, u32 channel,
}
-static int macsec_qca_delete_transmit_sc(void *priv, u32 channel)
+static int macsec_qca_delete_transmit_sc(void *priv, struct transmit_sc *sc)
{
struct macsec_qca_data *drv = priv;
int ret = 0;
fal_tx_class_lut_t entry;
+ u32 channel = sc->channel;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: channel=%d", __func__, channel);
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
index 8ee5860..8cd5fa6 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
@@ -155,10 +155,9 @@ struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx {
int (*enable_receive_sa)(void *ctx, struct receive_sa *sa);
int (*disable_receive_sa)(void *ctx, struct receive_sa *sa);
int (*get_available_transmit_sc)(void *ctx, u32 *channel);
- int (*create_transmit_sc)(void *ctx, u32 channel,
- const struct ieee802_1x_mka_sci *sci,
+ int (*create_transmit_sc)(void *ctx, struct transmit_sc *sc,
enum confidentiality_offset co);
- int (*delete_transmit_sc)(void *ctx, u32 channel);
+ int (*delete_transmit_sc)(void *ctx, struct transmit_sc *sc);
int (*create_transmit_sa)(void *ctx, struct transmit_sa *sa);
int (*enable_transmit_sa)(void *ctx, struct transmit_sa *sa);
int (*disable_transmit_sa)(void *ctx, struct transmit_sa *sa);
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c
index fb376df..669dc98 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c
@@ -338,8 +338,7 @@ int secy_create_transmit_sc(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
return -1;
}
- return ops->create_transmit_sc(ops->ctx, txsc->channel, &txsc->sci,
- kay->co);
+ return ops->create_transmit_sc(ops->ctx, txsc, kay->co);
}
@@ -360,7 +359,7 @@ int secy_delete_transmit_sc(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
return -1;
}
- return ops->delete_transmit_sc(ops->ctx, txsc->channel);
+ return ops->delete_transmit_sc(ops->ctx, txsc);
}
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h b/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h
index 666798b..2dc74bf 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h
@@ -835,23 +835,21 @@ wpa_drv_get_available_transmit_sc(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, u32 *channel)
}
static inline int
-wpa_drv_create_transmit_sc(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, u32 channel,
- const u8 *sci_addr, u16 sci_port,
+wpa_drv_create_transmit_sc(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, struct transmit_sc *sc,
unsigned int conf_offset)
{
if (!wpa_s->driver->create_transmit_sc)
return -1;
- return wpa_s->driver->create_transmit_sc(wpa_s->drv_priv, channel,
- sci_addr, sci_port,
+ return wpa_s->driver->create_transmit_sc(wpa_s->drv_priv, sc,
conf_offset);
}
static inline int wpa_drv_delete_transmit_sc(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
- u32 channel)
+ struct transmit_sc *sc)
{
if (!wpa_s->driver->delete_transmit_sc)
return -1;
- return wpa_s->driver->delete_transmit_sc(wpa_s->drv_priv, channel);
+ return wpa_s->driver->delete_transmit_sc(wpa_s->drv_priv, sc);
}
static inline int wpa_drv_create_transmit_sa(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
index 344c59e..e0f8e28 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
@@ -142,19 +142,16 @@ static int wpas_get_available_transmit_sc(void *wpa_s, u32 *channel)
static int
-wpas_create_transmit_sc(void *wpa_s, u32 channel,
- const struct ieee802_1x_mka_sci *sci,
+wpas_create_transmit_sc(void *wpa_s, struct transmit_sc *sc,
enum confidentiality_offset co)
{
- return wpa_drv_create_transmit_sc(wpa_s, channel, sci->addr,
- be_to_host16(sci->port),
- conf_offset_val(co));
+ return wpa_drv_create_transmit_sc(wpa_s, sc, conf_offset_val(co));
}
-static int wpas_delete_transmit_sc(void *wpa_s, u32 channel)
+static int wpas_delete_transmit_sc(void *wpa_s, struct transmit_sc *sc)
{
- return wpa_drv_delete_transmit_sc(wpa_s, channel);
+ return wpa_drv_delete_transmit_sc(wpa_s, sc);
}
--
2.7.4

200
macsec-0006-mka-Pass-full-structures-down-to-macsec-drivers-rece.patch
View File

@ -1,200 +0,0 @@
From 5f5ca28414de7ae0b86d4c2aa09c3e67b697dd56 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <5f5ca28414de7ae0b86d4c2aa09c3e67b697dd56.1488376601.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Fri, 7 Oct 2016 12:08:10 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] mka: Pass full structures down to macsec drivers' receive SC
ops
Clean up the driver interface by passing pointers to struct receive_sc
down the stack to the {create,delete}_recevie_sc() ops, instead of
passing the individual properties of the SC.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
---
src/drivers/driver.h | 12 +++++-------
src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c | 9 ++++++---
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h | 5 ++---
src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c | 5 ++---
wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h | 12 +++++-------
wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c | 11 ++++-------
6 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver.h b/src/drivers/driver.h
index 1e2d623..a57aa53 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver.h
+++ b/src/drivers/driver.h
@@ -3368,25 +3368,23 @@ struct wpa_driver_ops {
/**
* create_receive_sc - create secure channel for receiving
* @priv: Private driver interface data
- * @channel: secure channel
- * @sci_addr: secure channel identifier - address
- * @sci_port: secure channel identifier - port
+ * @sc: secure channel
* @conf_offset: confidentiality offset (0, 30, or 50)
* @validation: frame validation policy (0 = Disabled, 1 = Checked,
* 2 = Strict)
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure (or if not supported)
*/
- int (*create_receive_sc)(void *priv, u32 channel, const u8 *sci_addr,
- u16 sci_port, unsigned int conf_offset,
+ int (*create_receive_sc)(void *priv, struct receive_sc *sc,
+ unsigned int conf_offset,
int validation);
/**
* delete_receive_sc - delete secure connection for receiving
* @priv: private driver interface data from init()
- * @channel: secure channel
+ * @sc: secure channel
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure
*/
- int (*delete_receive_sc)(void *priv, u32 channel);
+ int (*delete_receive_sc)(void *priv, struct receive_sc *sc);
/**
* create_receive_sa - create secure association for receive
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
index fef93df..385f7c5 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
@@ -601,8 +601,7 @@ static int macsec_qca_get_available_receive_sc(void *priv, u32 *channel)
}
-static int macsec_qca_create_receive_sc(void *priv, u32 channel,
- const u8 *sci_addr, u16 sci_port,
+static int macsec_qca_create_receive_sc(void *priv, struct receive_sc *sc,
unsigned int conf_offset,
int validation)
{
@@ -611,6 +610,9 @@ static int macsec_qca_create_receive_sc(void *priv, u32 channel,
fal_rx_prc_lut_t entry;
fal_rx_sc_validate_frame_e vf;
enum validate_frames validate_frames = validation;
+ u32 channel = sc->channel;
+ const u8 *sci_addr = sc->sci.addr;
+ u16 sci_port = be_to_host16(sc->sci.port);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: channel=%d", __func__, channel);
@@ -649,11 +651,12 @@ static int macsec_qca_create_receive_sc(void *priv, u32 channel,
}
-static int macsec_qca_delete_receive_sc(void *priv, u32 channel)
+static int macsec_qca_delete_receive_sc(void *priv, struct receive_sc *sc)
{
struct macsec_qca_data *drv = priv;
int ret = 0;
fal_rx_prc_lut_t entry;
+ u32 channel = sc->channel;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: channel=%d", __func__, channel);
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
index 8cd5fa6..144ee90 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
@@ -146,11 +146,10 @@ struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx {
int (*get_transmit_next_pn)(void *ctx, struct transmit_sa *sa);
int (*set_transmit_next_pn)(void *ctx, struct transmit_sa *sa);
int (*get_available_receive_sc)(void *ctx, u32 *channel);
- int (*create_receive_sc)(void *ctx, u32 channel,
- struct ieee802_1x_mka_sci *sci,
+ int (*create_receive_sc)(void *ctx, struct receive_sc *sc,
enum validate_frames vf,
enum confidentiality_offset co);
- int (*delete_receive_sc)(void *ctx, u32 channel);
+ int (*delete_receive_sc)(void *ctx, struct receive_sc *sc);
int (*create_receive_sa)(void *ctx, struct receive_sa *sa);
int (*enable_receive_sa)(void *ctx, struct receive_sa *sa);
int (*disable_receive_sa)(void *ctx, struct receive_sa *sa);
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c
index 669dc98..b8fcf05 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c
@@ -212,8 +212,7 @@ int secy_create_receive_sc(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, struct receive_sc *rxsc)
return -1;
}
- return ops->create_receive_sc(ops->ctx, rxsc->channel, &rxsc->sci,
- kay->vf, kay->co);
+ return ops->create_receive_sc(ops->ctx, rxsc, kay->vf, kay->co);
}
@@ -233,7 +232,7 @@ int secy_delete_receive_sc(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, struct receive_sc *rxsc)
return -1;
}
- return ops->delete_receive_sc(ops->ctx, rxsc->channel);
+ return ops->delete_receive_sc(ops->ctx, rxsc);
}
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h b/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h
index 2dc74bf..d47395c 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h
@@ -782,23 +782,21 @@ static inline int wpa_drv_get_available_receive_sc(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
}
static inline int
-wpa_drv_create_receive_sc(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, u32 channel,
- const u8 *sci_addr, u16 sci_port,
+wpa_drv_create_receive_sc(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, struct receive_sc *sc,
unsigned int conf_offset, int validation)
{
if (!wpa_s->driver->create_receive_sc)
return -1;
- return wpa_s->driver->create_receive_sc(wpa_s->drv_priv, channel,
- sci_addr, sci_port, conf_offset,
- validation);
+ return wpa_s->driver->create_receive_sc(wpa_s->drv_priv, sc,
+ conf_offset, validation);
}
static inline int wpa_drv_delete_receive_sc(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
- u32 channel)
+ struct receive_sc *sc)
{
if (!wpa_s->driver->delete_receive_sc)
return -1;
- return wpa_s->driver->delete_receive_sc(wpa_s->drv_priv, channel);
+ return wpa_s->driver->delete_receive_sc(wpa_s->drv_priv, sc);
}
static inline int wpa_drv_create_receive_sa(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
index e0f8e28..4163b61 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
@@ -100,20 +100,17 @@ static unsigned int conf_offset_val(enum confidentiality_offset co)
}
-static int wpas_create_receive_sc(void *wpa_s, u32 channel,
- struct ieee802_1x_mka_sci *sci,
+static int wpas_create_receive_sc(void *wpa_s, struct receive_sc *sc,
enum validate_frames vf,
enum confidentiality_offset co)
{
- return wpa_drv_create_receive_sc(wpa_s, channel, sci->addr,
- be_to_host16(sci->port),
- conf_offset_val(co), vf);
+ return wpa_drv_create_receive_sc(wpa_s, sc, conf_offset_val(co), vf);
}
-static int wpas_delete_receive_sc(void *wpa_s, u32 channel)
+static int wpas_delete_receive_sc(void *wpa_s, struct receive_sc *sc)
{
- return wpa_drv_delete_receive_sc(wpa_s, channel);
+ return wpa_drv_delete_receive_sc(wpa_s, sc);
}
--
2.7.4

219
macsec-0007-mka-Add-driver-op-to-get-macsec-capabilities.patch
View File

@ -1,219 +0,0 @@
From a25e4efc9e428d968e83398bd8c9c94698ba5851 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <a25e4efc9e428d968e83398bd8c9c94698ba5851.1488376601.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Fri, 7 Oct 2016 12:08:12 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] mka: Add driver op to get macsec capabilities
This also implements the macsec_get_capability for the macsec_qca
driver to maintain the existing behavior.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
---
src/drivers/driver.h | 8 ++++++++
src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c | 11 +++++++++++
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h | 1 +
src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.h | 1 +
wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h | 8 ++++++++
wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c | 7 +++++++
8 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver.h b/src/drivers/driver.h
index a57aa53..ea4a41f 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver.h
+++ b/src/drivers/driver.h
@@ -3298,6 +3298,14 @@ struct wpa_driver_ops {
int (*macsec_deinit)(void *priv);
/**
+ * macsec_get_capability - Inform MKA of this driver's capability
+ * @priv: Private driver interface data
+ * @cap: Driver's capability
+ * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure
+ */
+ int (*macsec_get_capability)(void *priv, enum macsec_cap *cap);
+
+ /**
* enable_protect_frames - Set protect frames status
* @priv: Private driver interface data
* @enabled: TRUE = protect frames enabled
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
index 385f7c5..041bcf5 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
@@ -458,6 +458,16 @@ static int macsec_qca_macsec_deinit(void *priv)
}
+static int macsec_qca_get_capability(void *priv, enum macsec_cap *cap)
+{
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s", __func__);
+
+ *cap = MACSEC_CAP_INTEG_AND_CONF_0_30_50;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
static int macsec_qca_enable_protect_frames(void *priv, Boolean enabled)
{
struct macsec_qca_data *drv = priv;
@@ -889,6 +899,7 @@ const struct wpa_driver_ops wpa_driver_macsec_qca_ops = {
.macsec_init = macsec_qca_macsec_init,
.macsec_deinit = macsec_qca_macsec_deinit,
+ .macsec_get_capability = macsec_qca_get_capability,
.enable_protect_frames = macsec_qca_enable_protect_frames,
.set_replay_protect = macsec_qca_set_replay_protect,
.set_current_cipher_suite = macsec_qca_set_current_cipher_suite,
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
index a8e7efc..52eeeff 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
@@ -3069,13 +3069,20 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_init(struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ctx, enum macsec_policy policy,
kay->macsec_replay_window = 0;
kay->macsec_confidentiality = CONFIDENTIALITY_NONE;
} else {
- kay->macsec_capable = MACSEC_CAP_INTEG_AND_CONF_0_30_50;
+ if (secy_get_capability(kay, &kay->macsec_capable) < 0) {
+ os_free(kay);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
kay->macsec_desired = TRUE;
kay->macsec_protect = TRUE;
kay->macsec_validate = Strict;
kay->macsec_replay_protect = FALSE;
kay->macsec_replay_window = 0;
- kay->macsec_confidentiality = CONFIDENTIALITY_OFFSET_0;
+ if (kay->macsec_capable >= MACSEC_CAP_INTEG_AND_CONF)
+ kay->macsec_confidentiality = CONFIDENTIALITY_OFFSET_0;
+ else
+ kay->macsec_confidentiality = MACSEC_CAP_INTEGRITY;
}
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "KaY: state machine created");
@@ -3409,6 +3416,7 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_change_cipher_suite(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
unsigned int cs_index)
{
struct ieee802_1x_mka_participant *participant;
+ enum macsec_cap secy_cap;
if (!kay)
return -1;
@@ -3427,6 +3435,12 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_change_cipher_suite(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
kay->macsec_csindex = cs_index;
kay->macsec_capable = cipher_suite_tbl[kay->macsec_csindex].capable;
+ if (secy_get_capability(kay, &secy_cap) < 0)
+ return -3;
+
+ if (kay->macsec_capable > secy_cap)
+ kay->macsec_capable = secy_cap;
+
participant = ieee802_1x_kay_get_principal_participant(kay);
if (participant) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "KaY: Cipher Suite changed");
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
index 144ee90..bf6fbe5 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx {
/* abstract wpa driver interface */
int (*macsec_init)(void *ctx, struct macsec_init_params *params);
int (*macsec_deinit)(void *ctx);
+ int (*macsec_get_capability)(void *priv, enum macsec_cap *cap);
int (*enable_protect_frames)(void *ctx, Boolean enabled);
int (*set_replay_protect)(void *ctx, Boolean enabled, u32 window);
int (*set_current_cipher_suite)(void *ctx, u64 cs);
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c
index b8fcf05..32ee816 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c
@@ -113,6 +113,26 @@ int secy_cp_control_enable_port(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, Boolean enabled)
}
+int secy_get_capability(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, enum macsec_cap *cap)
+{
+ struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ops;
+
+ if (!kay) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "KaY: %s params invalid", __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ops = kay->ctx;
+ if (!ops || !ops->macsec_get_capability) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
+ "KaY: secy macsec_get_capability operation not supported");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return ops->macsec_get_capability(ops->ctx, cap);
+}
+
+
int secy_get_receive_lowest_pn(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
struct receive_sa *rxsa)
{
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.h b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.h
index 120ca3c..bfd5737 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.h
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.h
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ int secy_cp_control_confidentiality_offset(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
int secy_cp_control_enable_port(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, Boolean flag);
/****** KaY -> SecY *******/
+int secy_get_capability(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, enum macsec_cap *cap);
int secy_get_receive_lowest_pn(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
struct receive_sa *rxsa);
int secy_get_transmit_next_pn(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h b/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h
index d47395c..5d5dcf0 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h
@@ -715,6 +715,14 @@ static inline int wpa_drv_macsec_deinit(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s)
return wpa_s->driver->macsec_deinit(wpa_s->drv_priv);
}
+static inline int wpa_drv_macsec_get_capability(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
+ enum macsec_cap *cap)
+{
+ if (!wpa_s->driver->macsec_get_capability)
+ return -1;
+ return wpa_s->driver->macsec_get_capability(wpa_s->drv_priv, cap);
+}
+
static inline int wpa_drv_enable_protect_frames(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
Boolean enabled)
{
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
index 4163b61..29b7b56 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
@@ -38,6 +38,12 @@ static int wpas_macsec_deinit(void *priv)
}
+static int wpas_macsec_get_capability(void *priv, enum macsec_cap *cap)
+{
+ return wpa_drv_macsec_get_capability(priv, cap);
+}
+
+
static int wpas_enable_protect_frames(void *wpa_s, Boolean enabled)
{
return wpa_drv_enable_protect_frames(wpa_s, enabled);
@@ -191,6 +197,7 @@ int ieee802_1x_alloc_kay_sm(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, struct wpa_ssid *ssid)
kay_ctx->macsec_init = wpas_macsec_init;
kay_ctx->macsec_deinit = wpas_macsec_deinit;
+ kay_ctx->macsec_get_capability = wpas_macsec_get_capability;
kay_ctx->enable_protect_frames = wpas_enable_protect_frames;
kay_ctx->set_replay_protect = wpas_set_replay_protect;
kay_ctx->set_current_cipher_suite = wpas_set_current_cipher_suite;
--
2.7.4

774
macsec-0008-mka-Remove-channel-hacks-from-the-stack-and-the-macs.patch
View File

@ -1,774 +0,0 @@
From 6f551abdfca16021e7cd9d4ac891e3eb27010a90 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <6f551abdfca16021e7cd9d4ac891e3eb27010a90.1488376601.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Fri, 21 Oct 2016 14:45:26 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] mka: Remove "channel" hacks from the stack and the macsec_qca
driver
This is specific to the macsec_qca driver. The core implementation
shouldn't care about this, and only deal with the complete secure
channel, and pass this down to the driver.
Drivers that have such limitations should take care of these in their
->create functions and throw an error.
Since the core MKA no longer saves the channel number, the macsec_qca
driver must be able to recover it. Add a map (which is just an array
since it's quite short) to match SCIs to channel numbers, and lookup
functions that will be called in every place where functions would get
the channel from the core code. Getting an available channel should be
part of channel creation, instead of being a preparation step.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
---
src/drivers/driver.h | 16 ----
src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c | 174 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c | 41 +++-------
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h | 7 --
src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c | 40 ---------
src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.h | 2 -
wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h | 18 -----
wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c | 14 ----
8 files changed, 159 insertions(+), 153 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver.h b/src/drivers/driver.h
index aeb9694..54ae6b7 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver.h
+++ b/src/drivers/driver.h
@@ -3390,14 +3390,6 @@ struct wpa_driver_ops {
int (*set_transmit_next_pn)(void *priv, struct transmit_sa *sa);
/**
- * get_available_receive_sc - get available receive channel
- * @priv: Private driver interface data
- * @channel: secure channel
- * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure (or if not supported)
- */
- int (*get_available_receive_sc)(void *priv, u32 *channel);
-
- /**
* create_receive_sc - create secure channel for receiving
* @priv: Private driver interface data
* @sc: secure channel
@@ -3443,14 +3435,6 @@ struct wpa_driver_ops {
int (*disable_receive_sa)(void *priv, struct receive_sa *sa);
/**
- * get_available_transmit_sc - get available transmit channel
- * @priv: Private driver interface data
- * @channel: secure channel
- * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure (or if not supported)
- */
- int (*get_available_transmit_sc)(void *priv, u32 *channel);
-
- /**
* create_transmit_sc - create secure connection for transmit
* @priv: private driver interface data from init()
* @sc: secure channel
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
index 041bcf5..22d414c 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
@@ -56,6 +56,10 @@
static const u8 pae_group_addr[ETH_ALEN] =
{ 0x01, 0x80, 0xc2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03 };
+struct channel_map {
+ struct ieee802_1x_mka_sci sci;
+};
+
struct macsec_qca_data {
char ifname[IFNAMSIZ + 1];
u32 secy_id;
@@ -72,6 +76,9 @@ struct macsec_qca_data {
Boolean protect_frames;
Boolean replay_protect;
u32 replay_window;
+
+ struct channel_map receive_channel_map[MAXSC];
+ struct channel_map transmit_channel_map[MAXSC];
};
@@ -526,6 +533,68 @@ static int macsec_qca_enable_controlled_port(void *priv, Boolean enabled)
}
+static int macsec_qca_lookup_channel(struct channel_map *map,
+ struct ieee802_1x_mka_sci *sci,
+ u32 *channel)
+{
+ u32 i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < MAXSC; i++) {
+ if (os_memcmp(&map[i].sci, sci,
+ sizeof(struct ieee802_1x_mka_sci)) == 0) {
+ *channel = i;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+
+static void macsec_qca_register_channel(struct channel_map *map,
+ struct ieee802_1x_mka_sci *sci,
+ u32 channel)
+{
+ os_memcpy(&map[channel].sci, sci, sizeof(struct ieee802_1x_mka_sci));
+}
+
+
+static int macsec_qca_lookup_receive_channel(struct macsec_qca_data *drv,
+ struct receive_sc *sc,
+ u32 *channel)
+{
+ return macsec_qca_lookup_channel(drv->receive_channel_map, &sc->sci,
+ channel);
+}
+
+
+static void macsec_qca_register_receive_channel(struct macsec_qca_data *drv,
+ struct receive_sc *sc,
+ u32 channel)
+{
+ macsec_qca_register_channel(drv->receive_channel_map, &sc->sci,
+ channel);
+}
+
+
+static int macsec_qca_lookup_transmit_channel(struct macsec_qca_data *drv,
+ struct transmit_sc *sc,
+ u32 *channel)
+{
+ return macsec_qca_lookup_channel(drv->transmit_channel_map, &sc->sci,
+ channel);
+}
+
+
+static void macsec_qca_register_transmit_channel(struct macsec_qca_data *drv,
+ struct transmit_sc *sc,
+ u32 channel)
+{
+ macsec_qca_register_channel(drv->transmit_channel_map, &sc->sci,
+ channel);
+}
+
+
static int macsec_qca_get_receive_lowest_pn(void *priv, struct receive_sa *sa)
{
struct macsec_qca_data *drv = priv;
@@ -533,7 +602,11 @@ static int macsec_qca_get_receive_lowest_pn(void *priv, struct receive_sa *sa)
u32 next_pn = 0;
bool enabled = FALSE;
u32 win;
- u32 channel = sa->sc->channel;
+ u32 channel;
+
+ ret = macsec_qca_lookup_receive_channel(priv, sa->sc, &channel);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
ret += nss_macsec_secy_rx_sa_next_pn_get(drv->secy_id, channel, sa->an,
&next_pn);
@@ -557,7 +630,11 @@ static int macsec_qca_get_transmit_next_pn(void *priv, struct transmit_sa *sa)
{
struct macsec_qca_data *drv = priv;
int ret = 0;
- u32 channel = sa->sc->channel;
+ u32 channel;
+
+ ret = macsec_qca_lookup_transmit_channel(priv, sa->sc, &channel);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
ret += nss_macsec_secy_tx_sa_next_pn_get(drv->secy_id, channel, sa->an,
&sa->next_pn);
@@ -572,8 +649,11 @@ int macsec_qca_set_transmit_next_pn(void *priv, struct transmit_sa *sa)
{
struct macsec_qca_data *drv = priv;
int ret = 0;
- u32 channel = sa->sc->channel;
+ u32 channel;
+ ret = macsec_qca_lookup_transmit_channel(priv, sa->sc, &channel);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
ret += nss_macsec_secy_tx_sa_next_pn_set(drv->secy_id, channel, sa->an,
sa->next_pn);
@@ -620,10 +700,14 @@ static int macsec_qca_create_receive_sc(void *priv, struct receive_sc *sc,
fal_rx_prc_lut_t entry;
fal_rx_sc_validate_frame_e vf;
enum validate_frames validate_frames = validation;
- u32 channel = sc->channel;
+ u32 channel;
const u8 *sci_addr = sc->sci.addr;
u16 sci_port = be_to_host16(sc->sci.port);
+ ret = macsec_qca_get_available_receive_sc(priv, &channel);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
+
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: channel=%d", __func__, channel);
/* rx prc lut */
@@ -657,6 +741,8 @@ static int macsec_qca_create_receive_sc(void *priv, struct receive_sc *sc,
channel,
drv->replay_window);
+ macsec_qca_register_receive_channel(drv, sc, channel);
+
return ret;
}
@@ -664,9 +750,13 @@ static int macsec_qca_create_receive_sc(void *priv, struct receive_sc *sc,
static int macsec_qca_delete_receive_sc(void *priv, struct receive_sc *sc)
{
struct macsec_qca_data *drv = priv;
- int ret = 0;
+ int ret;
fal_rx_prc_lut_t entry;
- u32 channel = sc->channel;
+ u32 channel;
+
+ ret = macsec_qca_lookup_receive_channel(priv, sc, &channel);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: channel=%d", __func__, channel);
@@ -683,10 +773,14 @@ static int macsec_qca_delete_receive_sc(void *priv, struct receive_sc *sc)
static int macsec_qca_create_receive_sa(void *priv, struct receive_sa *sa)
{
struct macsec_qca_data *drv = priv;
- int ret = 0;
+ int ret;
fal_rx_sak_t rx_sak;
int i = 0;
- u32 channel = sa->sc->channel;
+ u32 channel;
+
+ ret = macsec_qca_lookup_receive_channel(priv, sa->sc, &channel);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s, channel=%d, an=%d, lpn=0x%x",
__func__, channel, sa->an, sa->lowest_pn);
@@ -706,9 +800,12 @@ static int macsec_qca_create_receive_sa(void *priv, struct receive_sa *sa)
static int macsec_qca_enable_receive_sa(void *priv, struct receive_sa *sa)
{
struct macsec_qca_data *drv = priv;
- int ret = 0;
- u32 channel = sa->sc->channel;
+ int ret;
+ u32 channel;
+ ret = macsec_qca_lookup_receive_channel(priv, sa->sc, &channel);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: channel=%d, an=%d", __func__, channel,
sa->an);
@@ -723,8 +820,12 @@ static int macsec_qca_enable_receive_sa(void *priv, struct receive_sa *sa)
static int macsec_qca_disable_receive_sa(void *priv, struct receive_sa *sa)
{
struct macsec_qca_data *drv = priv;
- int ret = 0;
- u32 channel = sa->sc->channel;
+ int ret;
+ u32 channel;
+
+ ret = macsec_qca_lookup_receive_channel(priv, sa->sc, &channel);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: channel=%d, an=%d", __func__, channel,
sa->an);
@@ -739,14 +840,12 @@ static int macsec_qca_disable_receive_sa(void *priv, struct receive_sa *sa)
static int macsec_qca_get_available_transmit_sc(void *priv, u32 *channel)
{
struct macsec_qca_data *drv = priv;
- int ret = 0;
u32 sc_ch = 0;
bool in_use = FALSE;
for (sc_ch = 0; sc_ch < MAXSC; sc_ch++) {
- ret = nss_macsec_secy_tx_sc_in_used_get(drv->secy_id, sc_ch,
- &in_use);
- if (ret)
+ if (nss_macsec_secy_tx_sc_in_used_get(drv->secy_id, sc_ch,
+ &in_use))
continue;
if (!in_use) {
@@ -767,10 +866,14 @@ static int macsec_qca_create_transmit_sc(void *priv, struct transmit_sc *sc,
unsigned int conf_offset)
{
struct macsec_qca_data *drv = priv;
- int ret = 0;
+ int ret;
fal_tx_class_lut_t entry;
u8 psci[ETH_ALEN + 2];
- u32 channel = sc->channel;
+ u32 channel;
+
+ ret = macsec_qca_get_available_transmit_sc(priv, &channel);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: channel=%d", __func__, channel);
@@ -793,6 +896,8 @@ static int macsec_qca_create_transmit_sc(void *priv, struct transmit_sc *sc,
channel,
conf_offset);
+ macsec_qca_register_transmit_channel(drv, sc, channel);
+
return ret;
}
@@ -800,9 +905,13 @@ static int macsec_qca_create_transmit_sc(void *priv, struct transmit_sc *sc,
static int macsec_qca_delete_transmit_sc(void *priv, struct transmit_sc *sc)
{
struct macsec_qca_data *drv = priv;
- int ret = 0;
+ int ret;
fal_tx_class_lut_t entry;
- u32 channel = sc->channel;
+ u32 channel;
+
+ ret = macsec_qca_lookup_transmit_channel(priv, sc, &channel);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: channel=%d", __func__, channel);
@@ -819,11 +928,15 @@ static int macsec_qca_delete_transmit_sc(void *priv, struct transmit_sc *sc)
static int macsec_qca_create_transmit_sa(void *priv, struct transmit_sa *sa)
{
struct macsec_qca_data *drv = priv;
- int ret = 0;
+ int ret;
u8 tci = 0;
fal_tx_sak_t tx_sak;
int i;
- u32 channel = sa->sc->channel;
+ u32 channel;
+
+ ret = macsec_qca_lookup_transmit_channel(priv, sa->sc, &channel);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"%s: channel=%d, an=%d, next_pn=0x%x, confidentiality=%d",
@@ -858,9 +971,12 @@ static int macsec_qca_create_transmit_sa(void *priv, struct transmit_sa *sa)
static int macsec_qca_enable_transmit_sa(void *priv, struct transmit_sa *sa)
{
struct macsec_qca_data *drv = priv;
- int ret = 0;
- u32 channel = sa->sc->channel;
+ int ret;
+ u32 channel;
+ ret = macsec_qca_lookup_transmit_channel(priv, sa->sc, &channel);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: channel=%d, an=%d", __func__, channel,
sa->an);
@@ -875,8 +991,12 @@ static int macsec_qca_enable_transmit_sa(void *priv, struct transmit_sa *sa)
static int macsec_qca_disable_transmit_sa(void *priv, struct transmit_sa *sa)
{
struct macsec_qca_data *drv = priv;
- int ret = 0;
- u32 channel = sa->sc->channel;
+ int ret;
+ u32 channel;
+
+ ret = macsec_qca_lookup_transmit_channel(priv, sa->sc, &channel);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: channel=%d, an=%d", __func__, channel,
sa->an);
@@ -907,13 +1027,11 @@ const struct wpa_driver_ops wpa_driver_macsec_qca_ops = {
.get_receive_lowest_pn = macsec_qca_get_receive_lowest_pn,
.get_transmit_next_pn = macsec_qca_get_transmit_next_pn,
.set_transmit_next_pn = macsec_qca_set_transmit_next_pn,
- .get_available_receive_sc = macsec_qca_get_available_receive_sc,
.create_receive_sc = macsec_qca_create_receive_sc,
.delete_receive_sc = macsec_qca_delete_receive_sc,
.create_receive_sa = macsec_qca_create_receive_sa,
.enable_receive_sa = macsec_qca_enable_receive_sa,
.disable_receive_sa = macsec_qca_disable_receive_sa,
- .get_available_transmit_sc = macsec_qca_get_available_transmit_sc,
.create_transmit_sc = macsec_qca_create_transmit_sc,
.delete_transmit_sc = macsec_qca_delete_transmit_sc,
.create_transmit_sa = macsec_qca_create_transmit_sa,
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
index 52eeeff..38a8293 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
@@ -440,8 +440,8 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_init_receive_sa(struct receive_sc *psc, u8 an, u32 lowest_pn,
dl_list_add(&psc->sa_list, &psa->list);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
- "KaY: Create receive SA(AN: %hhu lowest_pn: %u of SC(channel: %d)",
- an, lowest_pn, psc->channel);
+ "KaY: Create receive SA(AN: %hhu lowest_pn: %u of SC",
+ an, lowest_pn);
return psa;
}
@@ -465,8 +465,7 @@ static void ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_receive_sa(struct receive_sa *psa)
* ieee802_1x_kay_init_receive_sc -
*/
static struct receive_sc *
-ieee802_1x_kay_init_receive_sc(const struct ieee802_1x_mka_sci *psci,
- int channel)
+ieee802_1x_kay_init_receive_sc(const struct ieee802_1x_mka_sci *psci)
{
struct receive_sc *psc;
@@ -480,13 +479,12 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_init_receive_sc(const struct ieee802_1x_mka_sci *psci,
}
os_memcpy(&psc->sci, psci, sizeof(psc->sci));
- psc->channel = channel;
os_get_time(&psc->created_time);
psc->receiving = FALSE;
dl_list_init(&psc->sa_list);
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "KaY: Create receive SC(channel: %d)", channel);
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "KaY: Create receive SC");
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SCI: ", (u8 *)psci, sizeof(*psci));
return psc;
@@ -502,8 +500,7 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_receive_sc(
{
struct receive_sa *psa, *pre_sa;
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "KaY: Delete receive SC(channel: %d)",
- psc->channel);
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "KaY: Delete receive SC");
dl_list_for_each_safe(psa, pre_sa, &psc->sa_list, struct receive_sa,
list) {
secy_disable_receive_sa(participant->kay, psa);
@@ -552,7 +549,6 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_create_live_peer(struct ieee802_1x_mka_participant *participant,
{
struct ieee802_1x_kay_peer *peer;
struct receive_sc *rxsc;
- u32 sc_ch = 0;
peer = ieee802_1x_kay_create_peer(mi, mn);
if (!peer)
@@ -561,9 +557,7 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_create_live_peer(struct ieee802_1x_mka_participant *participant,
os_memcpy(&peer->sci, &participant->current_peer_sci,
sizeof(peer->sci));
- secy_get_available_receive_sc(participant->kay, &sc_ch);
-
- rxsc = ieee802_1x_kay_init_receive_sc(&peer->sci, sc_ch);
+ rxsc = ieee802_1x_kay_init_receive_sc(&peer->sci);
if (!rxsc) {
os_free(peer);
return NULL;
@@ -611,12 +605,10 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_move_live_peer(struct ieee802_1x_mka_participant *participant,
{
struct ieee802_1x_kay_peer *peer;
struct receive_sc *rxsc;
- u32 sc_ch = 0;
peer = ieee802_1x_kay_get_potential_peer(participant, mi);
- rxsc = ieee802_1x_kay_init_receive_sc(&participant->current_peer_sci,
- sc_ch);
+ rxsc = ieee802_1x_kay_init_receive_sc(&participant->current_peer_sci);
if (!rxsc)
return NULL;
@@ -631,8 +623,6 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_move_live_peer(struct ieee802_1x_mka_participant *participant,
dl_list_del(&peer->list);
dl_list_add_tail(&participant->live_peers, &peer->list);
- secy_get_available_receive_sc(participant->kay, &sc_ch);
-
dl_list_add(&participant->rxsc_list, &rxsc->list);
secy_create_receive_sc(participant->kay, rxsc);
@@ -2438,8 +2428,8 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_init_transmit_sa(struct transmit_sc *psc, u8 an, u32 next_PN,
dl_list_add(&psc->sa_list, &psa->list);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
- "KaY: Create transmit SA(an: %hhu, next_PN: %u) of SC(channel: %d)",
- an, next_PN, psc->channel);
+ "KaY: Create transmit SA(an: %hhu, next_PN: %u) of SC",
+ an, next_PN);
return psa;
}
@@ -2463,8 +2453,7 @@ static void ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_transmit_sa(struct transmit_sa *psa)
* init_transmit_sc -
*/
static struct transmit_sc *
-ieee802_1x_kay_init_transmit_sc(const struct ieee802_1x_mka_sci *sci,
- int channel)
+ieee802_1x_kay_init_transmit_sc(const struct ieee802_1x_mka_sci *sci)
{
struct transmit_sc *psc;
@@ -2474,7 +2463,6 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_init_transmit_sc(const struct ieee802_1x_mka_sci *sci,
return NULL;
}
os_memcpy(&psc->sci, sci, sizeof(psc->sci));
- psc->channel = channel;
os_get_time(&psc->created_time);
psc->transmitting = FALSE;
@@ -2482,7 +2470,7 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_init_transmit_sc(const struct ieee802_1x_mka_sci *sci,
psc->enciphering_sa = FALSE;
dl_list_init(&psc->sa_list);
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "KaY: Create transmit SC(channel: %d)", channel);
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "KaY: Create transmit SC");
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SCI: ", (u8 *)sci , sizeof(*sci));
return psc;
@@ -2498,8 +2486,7 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_transmit_sc(
{
struct transmit_sa *psa, *tmp;
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "KaY: Delete transmit SC(channel: %d)",
- psc->channel);
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "KaY: Delete transmit SC");
dl_list_for_each_safe(psa, tmp, &psc->sa_list, struct transmit_sa,
list) {
secy_disable_transmit_sa(participant->kay, psa);
@@ -3089,7 +3076,6 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_init(struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ctx, enum macsec_policy policy,
/* Initialize the SecY must be prio to CP, as CP will control SecY */
secy_init_macsec(kay);
- secy_get_available_transmit_sc(kay, &kay->sc_ch);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "KaY: secy init macsec done");
@@ -3250,8 +3236,7 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_create_mka(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, struct mka_key_name *ckn,
dl_list_init(&participant->sak_list);
participant->new_key = NULL;
dl_list_init(&participant->rxsc_list);
- participant->txsc = ieee802_1x_kay_init_transmit_sc(&kay->actor_sci,
- kay->sc_ch);
+ participant->txsc = ieee802_1x_kay_init_transmit_sc(&kay->actor_sci);
secy_cp_control_protect_frames(kay, kay->macsec_protect);
secy_cp_control_replay(kay, kay->macsec_replay_protect,
kay->macsec_replay_window);
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
index bf6fbe5..c6fa387 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
@@ -80,8 +80,6 @@ struct transmit_sc {
u8 enciphering_sa; /* AN encipheringSA (read only) */
/* not defined data */
- unsigned int channel;
-
struct dl_list list;
struct dl_list sa_list;
};
@@ -109,8 +107,6 @@ struct receive_sc {
struct os_time created_time; /* Time createdTime */
- unsigned int channel;
-
struct dl_list list;
struct dl_list sa_list;
};
@@ -146,7 +142,6 @@ struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx {
int (*get_receive_lowest_pn)(void *ctx, struct receive_sa *sa);
int (*get_transmit_next_pn)(void *ctx, struct transmit_sa *sa);
int (*set_transmit_next_pn)(void *ctx, struct transmit_sa *sa);
- int (*get_available_receive_sc)(void *ctx, u32 *channel);
int (*create_receive_sc)(void *ctx, struct receive_sc *sc,
enum validate_frames vf,
enum confidentiality_offset co);
@@ -154,7 +149,6 @@ struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx {
int (*create_receive_sa)(void *ctx, struct receive_sa *sa);
int (*enable_receive_sa)(void *ctx, struct receive_sa *sa);
int (*disable_receive_sa)(void *ctx, struct receive_sa *sa);
- int (*get_available_transmit_sc)(void *ctx, u32 *channel);
int (*create_transmit_sc)(void *ctx, struct transmit_sc *sc,
enum confidentiality_offset co);
int (*delete_transmit_sc)(void *ctx, struct transmit_sc *sc);
@@ -209,7 +203,6 @@ struct ieee802_1x_kay {
u8 mka_version;
u8 algo_agility[4];
- u32 sc_ch;
u32 pn_exhaustion;
Boolean port_enable;
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c
index 32ee816..b57c670 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c
@@ -196,26 +196,6 @@ int secy_set_transmit_next_pn(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
}
-int secy_get_available_receive_sc(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, u32 *channel)
-{
- struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ops;
-
- if (!kay) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "KaY: %s params invalid", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
-
- ops = kay->ctx;
- if (!ops || !ops->get_available_receive_sc) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
- "KaY: secy get_available_receive_sc operation not supported");
- return -1;
- }
-
- return ops->get_available_receive_sc(ops->ctx, channel);
-}
-
-
int secy_create_receive_sc(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, struct receive_sc *rxsc)
{
struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ops;
@@ -320,26 +300,6 @@ int secy_disable_receive_sa(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, struct receive_sa *rxsa)
}
-int secy_get_available_transmit_sc(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, u32 *channel)
-{
- struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ops;
-
- if (!kay) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "KaY: %s params invalid", __func__);
- return -1;
- }
-
- ops = kay->ctx;
- if (!ops || !ops->get_available_transmit_sc) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
- "KaY: secy get_available_transmit_sc operation not supported");
- return -1;
- }
-
- return ops->get_available_transmit_sc(ops->ctx, channel);
-}
-
-
int secy_create_transmit_sc(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
struct transmit_sc *txsc)
{
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.h b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.h
index bfd5737..59f0baa 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.h
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.h
@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ int secy_get_transmit_next_pn(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
struct transmit_sa *txsa);
int secy_set_transmit_next_pn(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
struct transmit_sa *txsa);
-int secy_get_available_receive_sc(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, u32 *channel);
int secy_create_receive_sc(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, struct receive_sc *rxsc);
int secy_delete_receive_sc(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, struct receive_sc *rxsc);
int secy_create_receive_sa(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, struct receive_sa *rxsa);
@@ -43,7 +42,6 @@ int secy_enable_receive_sa(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, struct receive_sa *rxsa);
int secy_disable_receive_sa(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
struct receive_sa *rxsa);
-int secy_get_available_transmit_sc(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, u32 *channel);
int secy_create_transmit_sc(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
struct transmit_sc *txsc);
int secy_delete_transmit_sc(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h b/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h
index f8efddc..244e386 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h
@@ -780,15 +780,6 @@ static inline int wpa_drv_set_transmit_next_pn(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
return wpa_s->driver->set_transmit_next_pn(wpa_s->drv_priv, sa);
}
-static inline int wpa_drv_get_available_receive_sc(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
- u32 *channel)
-{
- if (!wpa_s->driver->get_available_receive_sc)
- return -1;
- return wpa_s->driver->get_available_receive_sc(wpa_s->drv_priv,
- channel);
-}
-
static inline int
wpa_drv_create_receive_sc(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, struct receive_sc *sc,
unsigned int conf_offset, int validation)
@@ -832,15 +823,6 @@ static inline int wpa_drv_disable_receive_sa(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
}
static inline int
-wpa_drv_get_available_transmit_sc(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, u32 *channel)
-{
- if (!wpa_s->driver->get_available_transmit_sc)
- return -1;
- return wpa_s->driver->get_available_transmit_sc(wpa_s->drv_priv,
- channel);
-}
-
-static inline int
wpa_drv_create_transmit_sc(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, struct transmit_sc *sc,
unsigned int conf_offset)
{
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
index 29b7b56..64364f7 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
@@ -86,12 +86,6 @@ static int wpas_set_transmit_next_pn(void *wpa_s, struct transmit_sa *sa)
}
-static int wpas_get_available_receive_sc(void *wpa_s, u32 *channel)
-{
- return wpa_drv_get_available_receive_sc(wpa_s, channel);
-}
-
-
static unsigned int conf_offset_val(enum confidentiality_offset co)
{
switch (co) {
@@ -138,12 +132,6 @@ static int wpas_disable_receive_sa(void *wpa_s, struct receive_sa *sa)
}
-static int wpas_get_available_transmit_sc(void *wpa_s, u32 *channel)
-{
- return wpa_drv_get_available_transmit_sc(wpa_s, channel);
-}
-
-
static int
wpas_create_transmit_sc(void *wpa_s, struct transmit_sc *sc,
enum confidentiality_offset co)
@@ -205,13 +193,11 @@ int ieee802_1x_alloc_kay_sm(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, struct wpa_ssid *ssid)
kay_ctx->get_receive_lowest_pn = wpas_get_receive_lowest_pn;
kay_ctx->get_transmit_next_pn = wpas_get_transmit_next_pn;
kay_ctx->set_transmit_next_pn = wpas_set_transmit_next_pn;
- kay_ctx->get_available_receive_sc = wpas_get_available_receive_sc;
kay_ctx->create_receive_sc = wpas_create_receive_sc;
kay_ctx->delete_receive_sc = wpas_delete_receive_sc;
kay_ctx->create_receive_sa = wpas_create_receive_sa;
kay_ctx->enable_receive_sa = wpas_enable_receive_sa;
kay_ctx->disable_receive_sa = wpas_disable_receive_sa;
- kay_ctx->get_available_transmit_sc = wpas_get_available_transmit_sc;
kay_ctx->create_transmit_sc = wpas_create_transmit_sc;
kay_ctx->delete_transmit_sc = wpas_delete_transmit_sc;
kay_ctx->create_transmit_sa = wpas_create_transmit_sa;
--
2.7.4

180
macsec-0009-mka-Sync-structs-definitions-with-IEEE-Std-802.1X-20.patch
View File

@ -1,180 +0,0 @@
From 6b6175b788c5f44ff40f61003cbdb315dfabe0a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <6b6175b788c5f44ff40f61003cbdb315dfabe0a2.1488376601.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Fri, 21 Oct 2016 14:45:27 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] mka: Sync structs definitions with IEEE Std 802.1X-2010
Document some data structures from IEEE Std 802.1X-2010, and add the
(not used yet) struct ieee802_1x_mka_dist_cak_body.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
---
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h | 8 +++-
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay_i.h | 97 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 103 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
index c6fa387..e2ba180 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
struct macsec_init_params;
-#define MI_LEN 12
+#define MI_LEN 12 /* 96-bit Member Identifier */
#define MAX_KEY_LEN 32 /* 32 bytes, 256 bits */
#define MAX_CKN_LEN 32 /* 32 bytes, 256 bits */
@@ -24,6 +24,12 @@ struct macsec_init_params;
#define MKA_LIFE_TIME 6000
#define MKA_SAK_RETIRE_TIME 3000
+/**
+ * struct ieee802_1x_mka_ki - Key Identifier (KI)
+ * @mi: Key Server's Member Identifier
+ * @kn: Key Number, assigned by the Key Server
+ * IEEE 802.1X-2010 9.8 SAK generation, distribution, and selection
+ */
struct ieee802_1x_mka_ki {
u8 mi[MI_LEN];
u32 kn;
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay_i.h b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay_i.h
index e3d7db4..0c4bb8e 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay_i.h
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay_i.h
@@ -168,6 +168,22 @@ struct ieee802_1x_mka_hdr {
#define MKA_HDR_LEN sizeof(struct ieee802_1x_mka_hdr)
+/**
+ * struct ieee802_1x_mka_basic_body - Basic Parameter Set (Figure 11-8)
+ * @version: MKA Version Identifier
+ * @priority: Key Server Priority
+ * @length: Parameter set body length
+ * @macsec_capability: MACsec capability, as defined in ieee802_1x_defs.h
+ * @macsec_desired: the participant wants MACsec to be used to protect frames
+ * (9.6.1)
+ * @key_server: the participant has not decided that another participant is or
+ * will be the key server (9.5.1)
+ * @length1: Parameter set body length (cont)
+ * @actor_mi: Actor's Member Identifier
+ * @actor_mn: Actor's Message Number
+ * @algo_agility: Algorithm Agility parameter
+ * @ckn: CAK Name
+ */
struct ieee802_1x_mka_basic_body {
/* octet 1 */
u8 version;
@@ -197,6 +213,14 @@ struct ieee802_1x_mka_basic_body {
u8 ckn[0];
};
+/**
+ * struct ieee802_1x_mka_peer_body - Live Peer List and Potential Peer List
+ * parameter sets (Figure 11-9)
+ * @type: Parameter set type (1 or 2)
+ * @length: Parameter set body length
+ * @length1: Parameter set body length (cont)
+ * @peer: array of (MI, MN) pairs
+ */
struct ieee802_1x_mka_peer_body {
/* octet 1 */
u8 type;
@@ -217,6 +241,28 @@ struct ieee802_1x_mka_peer_body {
/* followed by Peers */
};
+/**
+ * struct ieee802_1x_mka_sak_use_body - MACsec SAK Use parameter set (Figure
+ * 11-10)
+ * @type: MKA message type
+ * @lan: latest key AN
+ * @ltx: latest key TX
+ * @lrx: latest key RX
+ * @oan: old key AN
+ * @otx: old key TX
+ * @orx: old key RX
+ * @ptx: plain TX, ie protectFrames is False
+ * @prx: plain RX, ie validateFrames is not Strict
+ * @delay_protect: True if LPNs are being reported sufficiently frequently to
+ * allow the recipient to provide data delay protection. If False, the LPN
+ * can be reported as zero.
+ * @lsrv_mi: latest key server MI
+ * @lkn: latest key number (together with MI, form the KI)
+ * @llpn: latest lowest acceptable PN (LPN)
+ * @osrv_mi: old key server MI
+ * @okn: old key number (together with MI, form the KI)
+ * @olpn: old lowest acceptable PN (LPN)
+ */
struct ieee802_1x_mka_sak_use_body {
/* octet 1 */
u8 type;
@@ -270,7 +316,21 @@ struct ieee802_1x_mka_sak_use_body {
be32 olpn;
};
-
+/**
+ * struct ieee802_1x_mka_dist_sak_body - Distributed SAK parameter set
+ * (GCM-AES-128, Figure 11-11)
+ * @type: Parameter set type (4)
+ * @length: Parameter set body length
+ * @length1: Parameter set body length (cont)
+ * Total parameter body length values:
+ * - 0 for plain text
+ * - 28 for GCM-AES-128
+ * - 36 or more for other cipher suites
+ * @confid_offset: confidentiality offset, as defined in ieee802_1x_defs.h
+ * @dan: distributed AN (0 for plain text)
+ * @kn: Key Number
+ * @sak: AES Key Wrap of SAK (see 9.8)
+ */
struct ieee802_1x_mka_dist_sak_body {
/* octet 1 */
u8 type;
@@ -303,6 +363,41 @@ struct ieee802_1x_mka_dist_sak_body {
u8 sak[0];
};
+/**
+ * struct ieee802_1x_mka_dist_cak_body - Distributed CAK parameter set (Figure
+ * 11-13)
+ * @type: Parameter set type (5)
+ * @length: Parameter set body length
+ * @length1: Parameter set body length (cont)
+ * Total parameter body length values:
+ * - 0 for plain text
+ * - 28 for GCM-AES-128
+ * - 36 or more for other cipher suites
+ * @cak: AES Key Wrap of CAK (see 9.8)
+ * @ckn: CAK Name
+ */
+struct ieee802_1x_mka_dist_cak_body {
+ /* octet 1 */
+ u8 type;
+ /* octet 2 */
+ u8 reserve;
+ /* octet 3 */
+#if __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+ u8 length:4;
+ u8 reserve1:4;
+#elif __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN
+ u8 reserve1:4;
+ u8 length:4;
+#endif
+ /* octet 4 */
+ u8 length1;
+
+ /* octet 5 - 28 */
+ u8 cak[24];
+
+ /* followed by CAK Name, 29- */
+ u8 ckn[0];
+};
struct ieee802_1x_mka_icv_body {
/* octet 1 */
--
2.7.4

388
macsec-0010-mka-Add-support-for-removing-SAs.patch
View File

@ -1,388 +0,0 @@
From 23c3528a8461681b23c94ed441cd94c8d528bebe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <23c3528a8461681b23c94ed441cd94c8d528bebe.1488376601.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Fri, 21 Oct 2016 14:45:28 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] mka: Add support for removing SAs
So that the core can notify drivers that need to perform some operations
when an SA is deleted.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
---
src/drivers/driver.h | 16 +++++++++
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c | 81 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h | 2 ++
src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++
src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.h | 3 ++
wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h | 16 +++++++++
wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c | 14 ++++++++
7 files changed, 154 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver.h b/src/drivers/driver.h
index 54ae6b7..9a6db90 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver.h
+++ b/src/drivers/driver.h
@@ -3419,6 +3419,14 @@ struct wpa_driver_ops {
int (*create_receive_sa)(void *priv, struct receive_sa *sa);
/**
+ * delete_receive_sa - Delete secure association for receive
+ * @priv: Private driver interface data from init()
+ * @sa: Secure association
+ * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure
+ */
+ int (*delete_receive_sa)(void *priv, struct receive_sa *sa);
+
+ /**
* enable_receive_sa - enable the SA for receive
* @priv: private driver interface data from init()
* @sa: secure association
@@ -3461,6 +3469,14 @@ struct wpa_driver_ops {
int (*create_transmit_sa)(void *priv, struct transmit_sa *sa);
/**
+ * delete_transmit_sa - Delete secure association for transmit
+ * @priv: Private driver interface data from init()
+ * @sa: Secure association
+ * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure
+ */
+ int (*delete_transmit_sa)(void *priv, struct transmit_sa *sa);
+
+ /**
* enable_transmit_sa - enable SA for transmit
* @priv: private driver interface data from init()
* @sa: secure association
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
index 38a8293..e312d04 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
@@ -491,6 +491,15 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_init_receive_sc(const struct ieee802_1x_mka_sci *psci)
}
+static void ieee802_1x_delete_receive_sa(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
+ struct receive_sa *sa)
+{
+ secy_disable_receive_sa(kay, sa);
+ secy_delete_receive_sa(kay, sa);
+ ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_receive_sa(sa);
+}
+
+
/**
* ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_receive_sc -
**/
@@ -502,10 +511,9 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_receive_sc(
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "KaY: Delete receive SC");
dl_list_for_each_safe(psa, pre_sa, &psc->sa_list, struct receive_sa,
- list) {
- secy_disable_receive_sa(participant->kay, psa);
- ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_receive_sa(psa);
- }
+ list)
+ ieee802_1x_delete_receive_sa(participant->kay, psa);
+
dl_list_del(&psc->list);
os_free(psc);
}
@@ -2270,6 +2278,16 @@ ieee802_1x_participant_send_mkpdu(
static void ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_transmit_sa(struct transmit_sa *psa);
+
+static void ieee802_1x_delete_transmit_sa(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
+ struct transmit_sa *sa)
+{
+ secy_disable_transmit_sa(kay, sa);
+ secy_delete_transmit_sa(kay, sa);
+ ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_transmit_sa(sa);
+}
+
+
/**
* ieee802_1x_participant_timer -
*/
@@ -2344,8 +2362,7 @@ static void ieee802_1x_participant_timer(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
dl_list_for_each_safe(txsa, pre_txsa,
&participant->txsc->sa_list,
struct transmit_sa, list) {
- secy_disable_transmit_sa(kay, txsa);
- ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_transmit_sa(txsa);
+ ieee802_1x_delete_transmit_sa(kay, txsa);
}
ieee802_1x_cp_connect_authenticated(kay->cp);
@@ -2487,11 +2504,8 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_transmit_sc(
struct transmit_sa *psa, *tmp;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "KaY: Delete transmit SC");
- dl_list_for_each_safe(psa, tmp, &psc->sa_list, struct transmit_sa,
- list) {
- secy_disable_transmit_sa(participant->kay, psa);
- ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_transmit_sa(psa);
- }
+ dl_list_for_each_safe(psa, tmp, &psc->sa_list, struct transmit_sa, list)
+ ieee802_1x_delete_transmit_sa(participant->kay, psa);
os_free(psc);
}
@@ -2569,6 +2583,32 @@ int ieee802_1x_kay_set_old_sa_attr(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
}
+static struct transmit_sa * lookup_txsa_by_an(struct transmit_sc *txsc, u8 an)
+{
+ struct transmit_sa *txsa;
+
+ dl_list_for_each(txsa, &txsc->sa_list, struct transmit_sa, list) {
+ if (txsa->an == an)
+ return txsa;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+
+static struct receive_sa * lookup_rxsa_by_an(struct receive_sc *rxsc, u8 an)
+{
+ struct receive_sa *rxsa;
+
+ dl_list_for_each(rxsa, &rxsc->sa_list, struct receive_sa, list) {
+ if (rxsa->an == an)
+ return rxsa;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+
/**
* ieee802_1x_kay_create_sas -
*/
@@ -2603,6 +2643,9 @@ int ieee802_1x_kay_create_sas(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
}
dl_list_for_each(rxsc, &principal->rxsc_list, struct receive_sc, list) {
+ while ((rxsa = lookup_rxsa_by_an(rxsc, latest_sak->an)) != NULL)
+ ieee802_1x_delete_receive_sa(kay, rxsa);
+
rxsa = ieee802_1x_kay_init_receive_sa(rxsc, latest_sak->an, 1,
latest_sak);
if (!rxsa)
@@ -2611,6 +2654,10 @@ int ieee802_1x_kay_create_sas(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
secy_create_receive_sa(kay, rxsa);
}
+ while ((txsa = lookup_txsa_by_an(principal->txsc, latest_sak->an)) !=
+ NULL)
+ ieee802_1x_delete_transmit_sa(kay, txsa);
+
txsa = ieee802_1x_kay_init_transmit_sa(principal->txsc, latest_sak->an,
1, latest_sak);
if (!txsa)
@@ -2644,20 +2691,16 @@ int ieee802_1x_kay_delete_sas(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
/* remove the transmit sa */
dl_list_for_each_safe(txsa, pre_txsa, &principal->txsc->sa_list,
struct transmit_sa, list) {
- if (is_ki_equal(&txsa->pkey->key_identifier, ki)) {
- secy_disable_transmit_sa(kay, txsa);
- ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_transmit_sa(txsa);
- }
+ if (is_ki_equal(&txsa->pkey->key_identifier, ki))
+ ieee802_1x_delete_transmit_sa(kay, txsa);
}
/* remove the receive sa */
dl_list_for_each(rxsc, &principal->rxsc_list, struct receive_sc, list) {
dl_list_for_each_safe(rxsa, pre_rxsa, &rxsc->sa_list,
struct receive_sa, list) {
- if (is_ki_equal(&rxsa->pkey->key_identifier, ki)) {
- secy_disable_receive_sa(kay, rxsa);
- ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_receive_sa(rxsa);
- }
+ if (is_ki_equal(&rxsa->pkey->key_identifier, ki))
+ ieee802_1x_delete_receive_sa(kay, rxsa);
}
}
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
index e2ba180..5233cb2 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
@@ -153,12 +153,14 @@ struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx {
enum confidentiality_offset co);
int (*delete_receive_sc)(void *ctx, struct receive_sc *sc);
int (*create_receive_sa)(void *ctx, struct receive_sa *sa);
+ int (*delete_receive_sa)(void *ctx, struct receive_sa *sa);
int (*enable_receive_sa)(void *ctx, struct receive_sa *sa);
int (*disable_receive_sa)(void *ctx, struct receive_sa *sa);
int (*create_transmit_sc)(void *ctx, struct transmit_sc *sc,
enum confidentiality_offset co);
int (*delete_transmit_sc)(void *ctx, struct transmit_sc *sc);
int (*create_transmit_sa)(void *ctx, struct transmit_sa *sa);
+ int (*delete_transmit_sa)(void *ctx, struct transmit_sa *sa);
int (*enable_transmit_sa)(void *ctx, struct transmit_sa *sa);
int (*disable_transmit_sa)(void *ctx, struct transmit_sa *sa);
};
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c
index b57c670..b1a9d22 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c
@@ -256,6 +256,26 @@ int secy_create_receive_sa(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, struct receive_sa *rxsa)
}
+int secy_delete_receive_sa(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, struct receive_sa *rxsa)
+{
+ struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ops;
+
+ if (!kay || !rxsa) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "KaY: %s params invalid", __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ops = kay->ctx;
+ if (!ops || !ops->delete_receive_sa) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
+ "KaY: secy delete_receive_sa operation not supported");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return ops->delete_receive_sa(ops->ctx, rxsa);
+}
+
+
int secy_enable_receive_sa(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, struct receive_sa *rxsa)
{
struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ops;
@@ -363,6 +383,27 @@ int secy_create_transmit_sa(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
}
+int secy_delete_transmit_sa(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
+ struct transmit_sa *txsa)
+{
+ struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ops;
+
+ if (!kay || !txsa) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "KaY: %s params invalid", __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ops = kay->ctx;
+ if (!ops || !ops->delete_transmit_sa) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
+ "KaY: secy delete_transmit_sa operation not supported");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return ops->delete_transmit_sa(ops->ctx, txsa);
+}
+
+
int secy_enable_transmit_sa(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
struct transmit_sa *txsa)
{
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.h b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.h
index 59f0baa..477120b 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.h
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.h
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ int secy_set_transmit_next_pn(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
int secy_create_receive_sc(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, struct receive_sc *rxsc);
int secy_delete_receive_sc(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, struct receive_sc *rxsc);
int secy_create_receive_sa(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, struct receive_sa *rxsa);
+int secy_delete_receive_sa(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, struct receive_sa *rxsa);
int secy_enable_receive_sa(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, struct receive_sa *rxsa);
int secy_disable_receive_sa(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
struct receive_sa *rxsa);
@@ -48,6 +49,8 @@ int secy_delete_transmit_sc(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
struct transmit_sc *txsc);
int secy_create_transmit_sa(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
struct transmit_sa *txsa);
+int secy_delete_transmit_sa(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
+ struct transmit_sa *txsa);
int secy_enable_transmit_sa(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
struct transmit_sa *txsa);
int secy_disable_transmit_sa(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h b/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h
index 244e386..c9bb20d 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h
@@ -806,6 +806,14 @@ static inline int wpa_drv_create_receive_sa(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
return wpa_s->driver->create_receive_sa(wpa_s->drv_priv, sa);
}
+static inline int wpa_drv_delete_receive_sa(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
+ struct receive_sa *sa)
+{
+ if (!wpa_s->driver->delete_receive_sa)
+ return -1;
+ return wpa_s->driver->delete_receive_sa(wpa_s->drv_priv, sa);
+}
+
static inline int wpa_drv_enable_receive_sa(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
struct receive_sa *sa)
{
@@ -848,6 +856,14 @@ static inline int wpa_drv_create_transmit_sa(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
return wpa_s->driver->create_transmit_sa(wpa_s->drv_priv, sa);
}
+static inline int wpa_drv_delete_transmit_sa(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
+ struct transmit_sa *sa)
+{
+ if (!wpa_s->driver->delete_transmit_sa)
+ return -1;
+ return wpa_s->driver->delete_transmit_sa(wpa_s->drv_priv, sa);
+}
+
static inline int wpa_drv_enable_transmit_sa(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
struct transmit_sa *sa)
{
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
index 64364f7..e032330 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
@@ -120,6 +120,12 @@ static int wpas_create_receive_sa(void *wpa_s, struct receive_sa *sa)
}
+static int wpas_delete_receive_sa(void *wpa_s, struct receive_sa *sa)
+{
+ return wpa_drv_delete_receive_sa(wpa_s, sa);
+}
+
+
static int wpas_enable_receive_sa(void *wpa_s, struct receive_sa *sa)
{
return wpa_drv_enable_receive_sa(wpa_s, sa);
@@ -152,6 +158,12 @@ static int wpas_create_transmit_sa(void *wpa_s, struct transmit_sa *sa)
}
+static int wpas_delete_transmit_sa(void *wpa_s, struct transmit_sa *sa)
+{
+ return wpa_drv_delete_transmit_sa(wpa_s, sa);
+}
+
+
static int wpas_enable_transmit_sa(void *wpa_s, struct transmit_sa *sa)
{
return wpa_drv_enable_transmit_sa(wpa_s, sa);
@@ -196,11 +208,13 @@ int ieee802_1x_alloc_kay_sm(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, struct wpa_ssid *ssid)
kay_ctx->create_receive_sc = wpas_create_receive_sc;
kay_ctx->delete_receive_sc = wpas_delete_receive_sc;
kay_ctx->create_receive_sa = wpas_create_receive_sa;
+ kay_ctx->delete_receive_sa = wpas_delete_receive_sa;
kay_ctx->enable_receive_sa = wpas_enable_receive_sa;
kay_ctx->disable_receive_sa = wpas_disable_receive_sa;
kay_ctx->create_transmit_sc = wpas_create_transmit_sc;
kay_ctx->delete_transmit_sc = wpas_delete_transmit_sc;
kay_ctx->create_transmit_sa = wpas_create_transmit_sa;
+ kay_ctx->delete_transmit_sa = wpas_delete_transmit_sa;
kay_ctx->enable_transmit_sa = wpas_enable_transmit_sa;
kay_ctx->disable_transmit_sa = wpas_disable_transmit_sa;
--
2.7.4

149
macsec-0011-mka-Implement-reference-counting-on-data_key.patch
View File

@ -1,149 +0,0 @@
From 99b82bf53792d48b5d0c3f9edcccc6e53c9510fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <99b82bf53792d48b5d0c3f9edcccc6e53c9510fe.1488376601.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Fri, 21 Oct 2016 14:45:29 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] mka: Implement reference counting on data_key
struct data_key already had a 'user' field for reference counting, but
it was basically unused.
Add an ieee802_1x_kay_use_data_key() function to take a reference on a
key, and use ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_data_key() to release the reference.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
---
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h | 2 +-
2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
index e312d04..63bbd13 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
@@ -411,6 +411,8 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_get_peer_sci(struct ieee802_1x_mka_participant *participant,
}
+static void ieee802_1x_kay_use_data_key(struct data_key *pkey);
+
/**
* ieee802_1x_kay_init_receive_sa -
*/
@@ -429,6 +431,7 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_init_receive_sa(struct receive_sc *psc, u8 an, u32 lowest_pn,
return NULL;
}
+ ieee802_1x_kay_use_data_key(key);
psa->pkey = key;
psa->lowest_pn = lowest_pn;
psa->next_pn = lowest_pn;
@@ -447,11 +450,14 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_init_receive_sa(struct receive_sc *psc, u8 an, u32 lowest_pn,
}
+static void ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_data_key(struct data_key *pkey);
+
/**
* ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_receive_sa -
*/
static void ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_receive_sa(struct receive_sa *psa)
{
+ ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_data_key(psa->pkey);
psa->pkey = NULL;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"KaY: Delete receive SA(an: %hhu) of SC",
@@ -1612,6 +1618,7 @@ ieee802_1x_mka_decode_dist_sak_body(
sa_key->an = body->dan;
ieee802_1x_kay_init_data_key(sa_key);
+ ieee802_1x_kay_use_data_key(sa_key);
dl_list_add(&participant->sak_list, &sa_key->list);
ieee802_1x_cp_set_ciphersuite(kay->cp, cs->id);
@@ -1873,7 +1880,17 @@ static struct mka_param_body_handler mka_body_handler[] = {
/**
- * ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_data_key -
+ * ieee802_1x_kay_use_data_key - Take reference on a key
+ */
+static void ieee802_1x_kay_use_data_key(struct data_key *pkey)
+{
+ pkey->user++;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_data_key - Release reference on a key and
+ * free if there are no remaining users
*/
static void ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_data_key(struct data_key *pkey)
{
@@ -1884,7 +1901,6 @@ static void ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_data_key(struct data_key *pkey)
if (pkey->user > 1)
return;
- dl_list_del(&pkey->list);
os_free(pkey->key);
os_free(pkey);
}
@@ -1994,7 +2010,9 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_generate_new_sak(struct ieee802_1x_mka_participant *participant)
participant->new_key = sa_key;
+ ieee802_1x_kay_use_data_key(sa_key);
dl_list_add(&participant->sak_list, &sa_key->list);
+
ieee802_1x_cp_set_ciphersuite(kay->cp, cs->id);
ieee802_1x_cp_sm_step(kay->cp);
ieee802_1x_cp_set_offset(kay->cp, kay->macsec_confidentiality);
@@ -2436,6 +2454,7 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_init_transmit_sa(struct transmit_sc *psc, u8 an, u32 next_PN,
psa->confidentiality = FALSE;
psa->an = an;
+ ieee802_1x_kay_use_data_key(key);
psa->pkey = key;
psa->next_pn = next_PN;
psa->sc = psc;
@@ -2457,6 +2476,7 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_init_transmit_sa(struct transmit_sc *psc, u8 an, u32 next_PN,
*/
static void ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_transmit_sa(struct transmit_sa *psa)
{
+ ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_data_key(psa->pkey);
psa->pkey = NULL;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"KaY: Delete transmit SA(an: %hhu) of SC",
@@ -2708,6 +2728,7 @@ int ieee802_1x_kay_delete_sas(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
dl_list_for_each_safe(sa_key, pre_key, &principal->sak_list,
struct data_key, list) {
if (is_ki_equal(&sa_key->key_identifier, ki)) {
+ dl_list_del(&sa_key->list);
ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_data_key(sa_key);
break;
}
@@ -3375,8 +3396,7 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_delete_mka(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, struct mka_key_name *ckn)
sak = dl_list_entry(participant->sak_list.next,
struct data_key, list);
dl_list_del(&sak->list);
- os_free(sak->key);
- os_free(sak);
+ ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_data_key(sak);
}
while (!dl_list_empty(&participant->rxsc_list)) {
rxsc = dl_list_entry(participant->rxsc_list.next,
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
index 5233cb2..576a8a0 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ struct data_key {
Boolean rx_latest;
Boolean tx_latest;
- int user; /* FIXME: to indicate if it can be delete safely */
+ int user;
struct dl_list list;
};
--
2.7.4

66
macsec-0012-mka-Fix-getting-capabilities-from-the-driver.patch
View File

@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
From 088d53dd15b14a1868b70fd0b8d695ac6b68f642 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <088d53dd15b14a1868b70fd0b8d695ac6b68f642.1488376601.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2016 18:06:23 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] mka: Fix getting capabilities from the driver
In commit a25e4efc9e428d968e83398bd8c9c94698ba5851 ('mka: Add driver op
to get macsec capabilities') I added some code to check the driver's
capabilities. This commit has two problems:
- wrong enum type set in kay->macsec_confidentiality
- ignores that drivers could report MACSEC_CAP_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, in
which case the MKA would claim that MACsec is supported.
Fix this by interpreting MACSEC_CAP_NOT_IMPLEMENTED in the same way as a
DO_NOT_SECURE policy, and set the correct value in
kay->macsec_confidentiality.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
---
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c | 16 +++++++++-------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
index 63bbd13..2841b10 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
@@ -3111,7 +3111,14 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_init(struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ctx, enum macsec_policy policy,
dl_list_init(&kay->participant_list);
- if (policy == DO_NOT_SECURE) {
+ if (policy != DO_NOT_SECURE &&
+ secy_get_capability(kay, &kay->macsec_capable) < 0) {
+ os_free(kay);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (policy == DO_NOT_SECURE ||
+ kay->macsec_capable == MACSEC_CAP_NOT_IMPLEMENTED) {
kay->macsec_capable = MACSEC_CAP_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
kay->macsec_desired = FALSE;
kay->macsec_protect = FALSE;
@@ -3120,11 +3127,6 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_init(struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ctx, enum macsec_policy policy,
kay->macsec_replay_window = 0;
kay->macsec_confidentiality = CONFIDENTIALITY_NONE;
} else {
- if (secy_get_capability(kay, &kay->macsec_capable) < 0) {
- os_free(kay);
- return NULL;
- }
-
kay->macsec_desired = TRUE;
kay->macsec_protect = TRUE;
kay->macsec_validate = Strict;
@@ -3133,7 +3135,7 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_init(struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ctx, enum macsec_policy policy,
if (kay->macsec_capable >= MACSEC_CAP_INTEG_AND_CONF)
kay->macsec_confidentiality = CONFIDENTIALITY_OFFSET_0;
else
- kay->macsec_confidentiality = MACSEC_CAP_INTEGRITY;
+ kay->macsec_confidentiality = CONFIDENTIALITY_NONE;
}
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "KaY: state machine created");
--
2.7.4

317
macsec-0013-wpa_supplicant-Allow-pre-shared-CAK-CKN-pair-for-MKA.patch
View File

@ -1,317 +0,0 @@
From ad51731abf06efb284d020578eb34e7b1daeb23e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <ad51731abf06efb284d020578eb34e7b1daeb23e.1488376601.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Wed, 2 Nov 2016 16:38:35 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] wpa_supplicant: Allow pre-shared (CAK,CKN) pair for MKA
This enables configuring key_mgmt=NONE + mka_ckn + mka_cak.
This allows wpa_supplicant to work in a peer-to-peer mode, where peers
are authenticated by the pre-shared (CAK,CKN) pair. In this mode, peers
can act as key server to distribute keys for the MACsec instances.
This is what some MACsec switches support, and even without HW
support, it's a convenient way to setup a network.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
---
wpa_supplicant/config.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
wpa_supplicant/config_file.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++
wpa_supplicant/config_ssid.h | 20 ++++++++++++
wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c | 7 +++-
wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf | 8 +++++
wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.h | 10 ++++++
7 files changed, 193 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
index a0b64b2..9011389 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
@@ -1828,6 +1828,69 @@ static char * wpa_config_write_mesh_basic_rates(const struct parse_data *data,
#endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
+#ifdef CONFIG_MACSEC
+
+static int wpa_config_parse_mka_cak(const struct parse_data *data,
+ struct wpa_ssid *ssid, int line,
+ const char *value)
+{
+ if (hexstr2bin(value, ssid->mka_cak, MACSEC_CAK_LEN) ||
+ value[MACSEC_CAK_LEN * 2] != '\0') {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: Invalid MKA-CAK '%s'.",
+ line, value);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ssid->mka_psk_set |= MKA_PSK_SET_CAK;
+
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_MSGDUMP, "MKA-CAK", ssid->mka_cak, MACSEC_CAK_LEN);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int wpa_config_parse_mka_ckn(const struct parse_data *data,
+ struct wpa_ssid *ssid, int line,
+ const char *value)
+{
+ if (hexstr2bin(value, ssid->mka_ckn, MACSEC_CKN_LEN) ||
+ value[MACSEC_CKN_LEN * 2] != '\0') {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: Invalid MKA-CKN '%s'.",
+ line, value);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ssid->mka_psk_set |= MKA_PSK_SET_CKN;
+
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_MSGDUMP, "MKA-CKN", ssid->mka_ckn, MACSEC_CKN_LEN);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+#ifndef NO_CONFIG_WRITE
+
+static char * wpa_config_write_mka_cak(const struct parse_data *data,
+ struct wpa_ssid *ssid)
+{
+ if (!(ssid->mka_psk_set & MKA_PSK_SET_CAK))
+ return NULL;
+
+ return wpa_config_write_string_hex(ssid->mka_cak, MACSEC_CAK_LEN);
+}
+
+
+static char * wpa_config_write_mka_ckn(const struct parse_data *data,
+ struct wpa_ssid *ssid)
+{
+ if (!(ssid->mka_psk_set & MKA_PSK_SET_CKN))
+ return NULL;
+ return wpa_config_write_string_hex(ssid->mka_ckn, MACSEC_CKN_LEN);
+}
+
+#endif /* NO_CONFIG_WRITE */
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */
+
+
/* Helper macros for network block parser */
#ifdef OFFSET
@@ -2062,6 +2125,8 @@ static const struct parse_data ssid_fields[] = {
{ INT(beacon_int) },
#ifdef CONFIG_MACSEC
{ INT_RANGE(macsec_policy, 0, 1) },
+ { FUNC_KEY(mka_cak) },
+ { FUNC_KEY(mka_ckn) },
#endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */
#ifdef CONFIG_HS20
{ INT(update_identifier) },
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config_file.c b/wpa_supplicant/config_file.c
index 7ae1654..172508e 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/config_file.c
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/config_file.c
@@ -662,6 +662,40 @@ static void write_psk_list(FILE *f, struct wpa_ssid *ssid)
#endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
+#ifdef CONFIG_MACSEC
+
+static void write_mka_cak(FILE *f, struct wpa_ssid *ssid)
+{
+ char *value;
+
+ if (!(ssid->mka_psk_set & MKA_PSK_SET_CAK))
+ return;
+
+ value = wpa_config_get(ssid, "mka_cak");
+ if (!value)
+ return;
+ fprintf(f, "\tmka_cak=%s\n", value);
+ os_free(value);
+}
+
+
+static void write_mka_ckn(FILE *f, struct wpa_ssid *ssid)
+{
+ char *value;
+
+ if (!(ssid->mka_psk_set & MKA_PSK_SET_CKN))
+ return;
+
+ value = wpa_config_get(ssid, "mka_ckn");
+ if (!value)
+ return;
+ fprintf(f, "\tmka_ckn=%s\n", value);
+ os_free(value);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */
+
+
static void wpa_config_write_network(FILE *f, struct wpa_ssid *ssid)
{
int i;
@@ -772,6 +806,8 @@ static void wpa_config_write_network(FILE *f, struct wpa_ssid *ssid)
INT(beacon_int);
#ifdef CONFIG_MACSEC
INT(macsec_policy);
+ write_mka_cak(f, ssid);
+ write_mka_ckn(f, ssid);
#endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */
#ifdef CONFIG_HS20
INT(update_identifier);
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config_ssid.h b/wpa_supplicant/config_ssid.h
index 010b594..a530cda 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/config_ssid.h
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/config_ssid.h
@@ -728,6 +728,26 @@ struct wpa_ssid {
* determine whether to use a secure session or not.
*/
int macsec_policy;
+
+ /**
+ * mka_ckn - MKA pre-shared CKN
+ */
+#define MACSEC_CKN_LEN 32
+ u8 mka_ckn[MACSEC_CKN_LEN];
+
+ /**
+ * mka_cak - MKA pre-shared CAK
+ */
+#define MACSEC_CAK_LEN 16
+ u8 mka_cak[MACSEC_CAK_LEN];
+
+#define MKA_PSK_SET_CKN BIT(0)
+#define MKA_PSK_SET_CAK BIT(1)
+#define MKA_PSK_SET (MKA_PSK_SET_CKN | MKA_PSK_SET_CAK)
+ /**
+ * mka_psk_set - Whether mka_ckn and mka_cak are set
+ */
+ u8 mka_psk_set;
#endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */
#ifdef CONFIG_HS20
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c
index 5d6326a..0bfc39d 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c
@@ -329,7 +329,12 @@ void wpa_supplicant_initiate_eapol(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s)
eapol_sm_notify_config(wpa_s->eapol, &ssid->eap, &eapol_conf);
- ieee802_1x_alloc_kay_sm(wpa_s, ssid);
+#ifdef CONFIG_MACSEC
+ if (wpa_s->key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_NONE && ssid->mka_psk_set)
+ ieee802_1x_create_preshared_mka(wpa_s, ssid);
+ else
+ ieee802_1x_alloc_kay_sm(wpa_s, ssid);
+#endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */
#endif /* IEEE8021X_EAPOL */
}
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
index 047ca90..8fa740b 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
@@ -892,6 +892,14 @@ fast_reauth=1
# 1: MACsec enabled - Should secure, accept key server's advice to
# determine whether to use a secure session or not.
#
+# mka_cak and mka_ckn: IEEE 802.1X/MACsec pre-shared authentication mode
+# This allows to configure MACsec with a pre-shared key using a (CAK,CKN) pair.
+# In this mode, instances of wpa_supplicant can act as peers, one of
+# which will become the key server and start distributing SAKs.
+# mka_cak (CAK = Secure Connectivity Association Key) takes a 16-bytes (128 bit)
+# hex-string (32 hex-digits)
+# mka_ckn (CKN = CAK Name) takes a 32-bytes (256 bit) hex-string (64 hex-digits)
+#
# mixed_cell: This option can be used to configure whether so called mixed
# cells, i.e., networks that use both plaintext and encryption in the same
# SSID, are allowed when selecting a BSS from scan results.
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
index e032330..80b98d9 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
@@ -371,3 +371,51 @@ fail:
return res;
}
+
+
+void * ieee802_1x_create_preshared_mka(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
+ struct wpa_ssid *ssid)
+{
+ struct mka_key *cak;
+ struct mka_key_name *ckn;
+ void *res;
+
+ if ((ssid->mka_psk_set & MKA_PSK_SET) != MKA_PSK_SET)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (ieee802_1x_alloc_kay_sm(wpa_s, ssid) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (!wpa_s->kay || wpa_s->kay->policy == DO_NOT_SECURE)
+ return NULL;
+
+ ckn = os_zalloc(sizeof(*ckn));
+ if (!ckn)
+ goto dealloc;
+
+ cak = os_zalloc(sizeof(*cak));
+ if (!cak)
+ goto free_ckn;
+
+ cak->len = MACSEC_CAK_LEN;
+ os_memcpy(cak->key, ssid->mka_cak, cak->len);
+
+ ckn->len = MACSEC_CKN_LEN;
+ os_memcpy(ckn->name, ssid->mka_ckn, ckn->len);
+
+ res = ieee802_1x_kay_create_mka(wpa_s->kay, ckn, cak, 0, PSK, FALSE);
+ if (res)
+ return res;
+
+ /* Failed to create MKA */
+ os_free(cak);
+
+ /* fallthrough */
+
+free_ckn:
+ os_free(ckn);
+dealloc:
+ ieee802_1x_dealloc_kay_sm(wpa_s);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.h b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.h
index b7236d0..81f8e0c 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.h
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.h
@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@ void * ieee802_1x_notify_create_actor(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
const u8 *peer_addr);
void ieee802_1x_dealloc_kay_sm(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s);
+void * ieee802_1x_create_preshared_mka(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
+ struct wpa_ssid *ssid);
+
#else /* CONFIG_MACSEC */
static inline int ieee802_1x_alloc_kay_sm(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
@@ -36,6 +39,13 @@ static inline void ieee802_1x_dealloc_kay_sm(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s)
{
}
+static inline void *
+ieee802_1x_create_preshared_mka(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
+ struct wpa_ssid *ssid)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
#endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */
#endif /* WPAS_KAY_H */
--
2.7.4

42
macsec-0014-mka-Disable-peer-detection-timeout-for-PSK-mode.patch
View File

@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
From 008e224dbb518f44aac46b0c8e55448bd907e43d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <008e224dbb518f44aac46b0c8e55448bd907e43d.1488376601.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Wed, 2 Nov 2016 16:38:36 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] mka: Disable peer detection timeout for PSK mode
The first peer may take a long time to come up. In PSK mode we are
basically in a p2p system, and we cannot know when a peer will join the
key exchange. Wait indefinitely, and let the administrator decide if
they want to abort.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
---
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c | 12 ++++++++++--
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
index 2841b10..19b2c2f 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
@@ -3339,8 +3339,16 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_create_mka(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, struct mka_key_name *ckn,
usecs = os_random() % (MKA_HELLO_TIME * 1000);
eloop_register_timeout(0, usecs, ieee802_1x_participant_timer,
participant, NULL);
- participant->mka_life = MKA_LIFE_TIME / 1000 + time(NULL) +
- usecs / 1000000;
+
+ /* Disable MKA lifetime for PSK mode.
+ * The peer(s) can take a long time to come up, because we
+ * create a "standby" MKA, and we need it to remain live until
+ * some peer appears.
+ */
+ if (mode != PSK) {
+ participant->mka_life = MKA_LIFE_TIME / 1000 + time(NULL) +
+ usecs / 1000000;
+ }
return participant;
--
2.7.4

165
macsec-0015-wpa_supplicant-Add-macsec_integ_only-setting-for-MKA.patch
View File

@ -1,165 +0,0 @@
From 7b4d546e3dae57a39e50a91e47b8fcf3447b4978 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <7b4d546e3dae57a39e50a91e47b8fcf3447b4978.1488376601.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Wed, 2 Nov 2016 16:38:37 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] wpa_supplicant: Add macsec_integ_only setting for MKA
So that the user can turn encryption on (MACsec provides
confidentiality+integrity) or off (MACsec provides integrity only). This
commit adds the configuration parameter while the actual behavior change
to disable encryption in the driver is handled in the following commit.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
---
src/common/ieee802_1x_defs.h | 6 ++++++
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c | 1 +
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h | 1 +
wpa_supplicant/config.c | 1 +
wpa_supplicant/config_file.c | 1 +
wpa_supplicant/config_ssid.h | 12 ++++++++++++
wpa_supplicant/wpa_cli.c | 1 +
wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf | 7 +++++++
wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c | 9 ++++++++-
9 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/common/ieee802_1x_defs.h b/src/common/ieee802_1x_defs.h
index a0c1d1b..280c439 100644
--- a/src/common/ieee802_1x_defs.h
+++ b/src/common/ieee802_1x_defs.h
@@ -25,6 +25,12 @@ enum macsec_policy {
* Disabled MACsec - do not secure sessions.
*/
DO_NOT_SECURE,
+
+ /**
+ * Should secure sessions, and try to use encryption.
+ * Like @SHOULD_SECURE, this follows the key server's decision.
+ */
+ SHOULD_ENCRYPT,
};
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
index 19b2c2f..7664e2d 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
@@ -3129,6 +3129,7 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_init(struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ctx, enum macsec_policy policy,
} else {
kay->macsec_desired = TRUE;
kay->macsec_protect = TRUE;
+ kay->macsec_encrypt = policy == SHOULD_ENCRYPT;
kay->macsec_validate = Strict;
kay->macsec_replay_protect = FALSE;
kay->macsec_replay_window = 0;
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
index 576a8a0..618e45b 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ struct ieee802_1x_kay {
enum macsec_cap macsec_capable;
Boolean macsec_desired;
Boolean macsec_protect;
+ Boolean macsec_encrypt;
Boolean macsec_replay_protect;
u32 macsec_replay_window;
enum validate_frames macsec_validate;
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
index 9011389..afb631e 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
@@ -2125,6 +2125,7 @@ static const struct parse_data ssid_fields[] = {
{ INT(beacon_int) },
#ifdef CONFIG_MACSEC
{ INT_RANGE(macsec_policy, 0, 1) },
+ { INT_RANGE(macsec_integ_only, 0, 1) },
{ FUNC_KEY(mka_cak) },
{ FUNC_KEY(mka_ckn) },
#endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config_file.c b/wpa_supplicant/config_file.c
index 172508e..f605fa9 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/config_file.c
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/config_file.c
@@ -808,6 +808,7 @@ static void wpa_config_write_network(FILE *f, struct wpa_ssid *ssid)
INT(macsec_policy);
write_mka_cak(f, ssid);
write_mka_ckn(f, ssid);
+ INT(macsec_integ_only);
#endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */
#ifdef CONFIG_HS20
INT(update_identifier);
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config_ssid.h b/wpa_supplicant/config_ssid.h
index a530cda..b8c3192 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/config_ssid.h
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/config_ssid.h
@@ -730,6 +730,18 @@ struct wpa_ssid {
int macsec_policy;
/**
+ * macsec_integ_only - Determines how MACsec are transmitted
+ *
+ * This setting applies only when MACsec is in use, i.e.,
+ * - macsec_policy is enabled
+ * - the key server has decided to enable MACsec
+ *
+ * 0: Encrypt traffic (default)
+ * 1: Integrity only
+ */
+ int macsec_integ_only;
+
+ /**
* mka_ckn - MKA pre-shared CKN
*/
#define MACSEC_CKN_LEN 32
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_cli.c b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_cli.c
index 4877989..aed95e6 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_cli.c
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_cli.c
@@ -1390,6 +1390,7 @@ static const char *network_fields[] = {
"ap_max_inactivity", "dtim_period", "beacon_int",
#ifdef CONFIG_MACSEC
"macsec_policy",
+ "macsec_integ_only",
#endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */
#ifdef CONFIG_HS20
"update_identifier",
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
index 8fa740b..b23c5e6 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
@@ -892,6 +892,13 @@ fast_reauth=1
# 1: MACsec enabled - Should secure, accept key server's advice to
# determine whether to use a secure session or not.
#
+# macsec_integ_only: IEEE 802.1X/MACsec transmit mode
+# This setting applies only when MACsec is in use, i.e.,
+# - macsec_policy is enabled
+# - the key server has decided to enable MACsec
+# 0: Encrypt traffic (default)
+# 1: Integrity only
+#
# mka_cak and mka_ckn: IEEE 802.1X/MACsec pre-shared authentication mode
# This allows to configure MACsec with a pre-shared key using a (CAK,CKN) pair.
# In this mode, instances of wpa_supplicant can act as peers, one of
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
index 80b98d9..6343154 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
@@ -187,7 +187,14 @@ int ieee802_1x_alloc_kay_sm(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, struct wpa_ssid *ssid)
if (!ssid || ssid->macsec_policy == 0)
return 0;
- policy = ssid->macsec_policy == 1 ? SHOULD_SECURE : DO_NOT_SECURE;
+ if (ssid->macsec_policy == 1) {
+ if (ssid->macsec_integ_only == 1)
+ policy = SHOULD_SECURE;
+ else
+ policy = SHOULD_ENCRYPT;
+ } else {
+ policy = DO_NOT_SECURE;
+ }
kay_ctx = os_zalloc(sizeof(*kay_ctx));
if (!kay_ctx)
--
2.7.4

177
macsec-0016-mka-Add-enable_encrypt-op-and-call-it-from-CP-state-.patch
View File

@ -1,177 +0,0 @@
From 1d3d0666a6ed345da39886426c4416a4debfd094 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <1d3d0666a6ed345da39886426c4416a4debfd094.1488376602.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Wed, 2 Nov 2016 16:38:38 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] mka: Add enable_encrypt op and call it from CP state machine
This allows MKA to turn encryption on/off down to the driver.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
---
src/drivers/driver.h | 9 +++++++++
src/pae/ieee802_1x_cp.c | 4 ++++
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h | 1 +
src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.h | 1 +
wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h | 8 ++++++++
wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c | 7 +++++++
7 files changed, 50 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver.h b/src/drivers/driver.h
index 9a6db90..0cb68ba 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver.h
+++ b/src/drivers/driver.h
@@ -3339,6 +3339,15 @@ struct wpa_driver_ops {
int (*enable_protect_frames)(void *priv, Boolean enabled);
/**
+ * enable_encrypt - Set encryption status
+ * @priv: Private driver interface data
+ * @enabled: TRUE = encrypt outgoing traffic
+ * FALSE = integrity-only protection on outgoing traffic
+ * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure (or if not supported)
+ */
+ int (*enable_encrypt)(void *priv, Boolean enabled);
+
+ /**
* set_replay_protect - Set replay protect status and window size
* @priv: Private driver interface data
* @enabled: TRUE = replay protect enabled
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_cp.c b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_cp.c
index e294e64..360fcd3 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_cp.c
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_cp.c
@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ SM_STATE(CP, ALLOWED)
secy_cp_control_enable_port(sm->kay, sm->controlled_port_enabled);
secy_cp_control_protect_frames(sm->kay, sm->protect_frames);
+ secy_cp_control_encrypt(sm->kay, sm->kay->macsec_encrypt);
secy_cp_control_validate_frames(sm->kay, sm->validate_frames);
secy_cp_control_replay(sm->kay, sm->replay_protect, sm->replay_window);
}
@@ -177,6 +178,7 @@ SM_STATE(CP, AUTHENTICATED)
secy_cp_control_enable_port(sm->kay, sm->controlled_port_enabled);
secy_cp_control_protect_frames(sm->kay, sm->protect_frames);
+ secy_cp_control_encrypt(sm->kay, sm->kay->macsec_encrypt);
secy_cp_control_validate_frames(sm->kay, sm->validate_frames);
secy_cp_control_replay(sm->kay, sm->replay_protect, sm->replay_window);
}
@@ -203,6 +205,7 @@ SM_STATE(CP, SECURED)
secy_cp_control_confidentiality_offset(sm->kay,
sm->confidentiality_offset);
secy_cp_control_protect_frames(sm->kay, sm->protect_frames);
+ secy_cp_control_encrypt(sm->kay, sm->kay->macsec_encrypt);
secy_cp_control_validate_frames(sm->kay, sm->validate_frames);
secy_cp_control_replay(sm->kay, sm->replay_protect, sm->replay_window);
}
@@ -466,6 +469,7 @@ struct ieee802_1x_cp_sm * ieee802_1x_cp_sm_init(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay)
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "CP: state machine created");
secy_cp_control_protect_frames(sm->kay, sm->protect_frames);
+ secy_cp_control_encrypt(sm->kay, sm->kay->macsec_encrypt);
secy_cp_control_validate_frames(sm->kay, sm->validate_frames);
secy_cp_control_replay(sm->kay, sm->replay_protect, sm->replay_window);
secy_cp_control_enable_port(sm->kay, sm->controlled_port_enabled);
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
index 618e45b..fb49f62 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx {
int (*macsec_deinit)(void *ctx);
int (*macsec_get_capability)(void *priv, enum macsec_cap *cap);
int (*enable_protect_frames)(void *ctx, Boolean enabled);
+ int (*enable_encrypt)(void *ctx, Boolean enabled);
int (*set_replay_protect)(void *ctx, Boolean enabled, u32 window);
int (*set_current_cipher_suite)(void *ctx, u64 cs);
int (*enable_controlled_port)(void *ctx, Boolean enabled);
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c
index b1a9d22..ab5339b 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.c
@@ -45,6 +45,26 @@ int secy_cp_control_protect_frames(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, Boolean enabled)
}
+int secy_cp_control_encrypt(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, Boolean enabled)
+{
+ struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ops;
+
+ if (!kay) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "KaY: %s params invalid", __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ops = kay->ctx;
+ if (!ops || !ops->enable_encrypt) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
+ "KaY: secy enable_encrypt operation not supported");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return ops->enable_encrypt(ops->ctx, enabled);
+}
+
+
int secy_cp_control_replay(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, Boolean enabled, u32 win)
{
struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ops;
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.h b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.h
index 477120b..9fb29c3 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.h
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_secy_ops.h
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ int secy_deinit_macsec(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay);
int secy_cp_control_validate_frames(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
enum validate_frames vf);
int secy_cp_control_protect_frames(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, Boolean flag);
+int secy_cp_control_encrypt(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, Boolean enabled);
int secy_cp_control_replay(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, Boolean flag, u32 win);
int secy_cp_control_current_cipher_suite(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, u64 cs);
int secy_cp_control_confidentiality_offset(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h b/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h
index c9bb20d..cf08556 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/driver_i.h
@@ -731,6 +731,14 @@ static inline int wpa_drv_enable_protect_frames(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
return wpa_s->driver->enable_protect_frames(wpa_s->drv_priv, enabled);
}
+static inline int wpa_drv_enable_encrypt(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
+ Boolean enabled)
+{
+ if (!wpa_s->driver->enable_encrypt)
+ return -1;
+ return wpa_s->driver->enable_encrypt(wpa_s->drv_priv, enabled);
+}
+
static inline int wpa_drv_set_replay_protect(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
Boolean enabled, u32 window)
{
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
index 6343154..2ff4895 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
@@ -50,6 +50,12 @@ static int wpas_enable_protect_frames(void *wpa_s, Boolean enabled)
}
+static int wpas_enable_encrypt(void *wpa_s, Boolean enabled)
+{
+ return wpa_drv_enable_encrypt(wpa_s, enabled);
+}
+
+
static int wpas_set_replay_protect(void *wpa_s, Boolean enabled, u32 window)
{
return wpa_drv_set_replay_protect(wpa_s, enabled, window);
@@ -206,6 +212,7 @@ int ieee802_1x_alloc_kay_sm(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, struct wpa_ssid *ssid)
kay_ctx->macsec_deinit = wpas_macsec_deinit;
kay_ctx->macsec_get_capability = wpas_macsec_get_capability;
kay_ctx->enable_protect_frames = wpas_enable_protect_frames;
+ kay_ctx->enable_encrypt = wpas_enable_encrypt;
kay_ctx->set_replay_protect = wpas_set_replay_protect;
kay_ctx->set_current_cipher_suite = wpas_set_current_cipher_suite;
kay_ctx->enable_controlled_port = wpas_enable_controlled_port;
--
2.7.4

145
macsec-0017-wpa_supplicant-Allow-configuring-the-MACsec-port-for.patch
View File

@ -1,145 +0,0 @@
From e0d9fd344d20bb35efcd5c37ece0a5d67632439d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <e0d9fd344d20bb35efcd5c37ece0a5d67632439d.1488376602.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Wed, 2 Nov 2016 16:38:39 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] wpa_supplicant: Allow configuring the MACsec port for MKA
Previously, wpa_supplicant only supported hardcoded port == 1 in the
SCI, but users may want to choose a different port.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
---
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c | 4 ++--
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h | 2 +-
wpa_supplicant/config.c | 1 +
wpa_supplicant/config_file.c | 1 +
wpa_supplicant/config_ssid.h | 9 +++++++++
wpa_supplicant/wpa_cli.c | 1 +
wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf | 4 ++++
wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c | 4 ++--
8 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
index 7664e2d..3a495ca 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
@@ -3071,7 +3071,7 @@ static void kay_l2_receive(void *ctx, const u8 *src_addr, const u8 *buf,
*/
struct ieee802_1x_kay *
ieee802_1x_kay_init(struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ctx, enum macsec_policy policy,
- const char *ifname, const u8 *addr)
+ u16 port, const char *ifname, const u8 *addr)
{
struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay;
@@ -3093,7 +3093,7 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_init(struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ctx, enum macsec_policy policy,
os_strlcpy(kay->if_name, ifname, IFNAMSIZ);
os_memcpy(kay->actor_sci.addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
- kay->actor_sci.port = host_to_be16(0x0001);
+ kay->actor_sci.port = host_to_be16(port ? port : 0x0001);
kay->actor_priority = DEFAULT_PRIO_NOT_KEY_SERVER;
/* While actor acts as a key server, shall distribute sakey */
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
index fb49f62..ea5a0dd 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ struct ieee802_1x_kay {
struct ieee802_1x_kay *
ieee802_1x_kay_init(struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ctx, enum macsec_policy policy,
- const char *ifname, const u8 *addr);
+ u16 port, const char *ifname, const u8 *addr);
void ieee802_1x_kay_deinit(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay);
struct ieee802_1x_mka_participant *
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
index afb631e..2120a6e 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
@@ -2126,6 +2126,7 @@ static const struct parse_data ssid_fields[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_MACSEC
{ INT_RANGE(macsec_policy, 0, 1) },
{ INT_RANGE(macsec_integ_only, 0, 1) },
+ { INT_RANGE(macsec_port, 1, 65534) },
{ FUNC_KEY(mka_cak) },
{ FUNC_KEY(mka_ckn) },
#endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config_file.c b/wpa_supplicant/config_file.c
index f605fa9..2e3d57e 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/config_file.c
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/config_file.c
@@ -809,6 +809,7 @@ static void wpa_config_write_network(FILE *f, struct wpa_ssid *ssid)
write_mka_cak(f, ssid);
write_mka_ckn(f, ssid);
INT(macsec_integ_only);
+ INT(macsec_port);
#endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */
#ifdef CONFIG_HS20
INT(update_identifier);
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config_ssid.h b/wpa_supplicant/config_ssid.h
index b8c3192..fe0f7fa 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/config_ssid.h
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/config_ssid.h
@@ -742,6 +742,15 @@ struct wpa_ssid {
int macsec_integ_only;
/**
+ * macsec_port - MACsec port (in SCI)
+ *
+ * Port component of the SCI.
+ *
+ * Range: 1-65534 (default: 1)
+ */
+ int macsec_port;
+
+ /**
* mka_ckn - MKA pre-shared CKN
*/
#define MACSEC_CKN_LEN 32
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_cli.c b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_cli.c
index aed95e6..f11028a 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_cli.c
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_cli.c
@@ -1391,6 +1391,7 @@ static const char *network_fields[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_MACSEC
"macsec_policy",
"macsec_integ_only",
+ "macsec_port",
#endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */
#ifdef CONFIG_HS20
"update_identifier",
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
index b23c5e6..82aa24e 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
@@ -899,6 +899,10 @@ fast_reauth=1
# 0: Encrypt traffic (default)
# 1: Integrity only
#
+# macsec_port: IEEE 802.1X/MACsec port
+# Port component of the SCI
+# Range: 1-65534 (default: 1)
+#
# mka_cak and mka_ckn: IEEE 802.1X/MACsec pre-shared authentication mode
# This allows to configure MACsec with a pre-shared key using a (CAK,CKN) pair.
# In this mode, instances of wpa_supplicant can act as peers, one of
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
index 2ff4895..d3fefda 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
@@ -232,8 +232,8 @@ int ieee802_1x_alloc_kay_sm(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, struct wpa_ssid *ssid)
kay_ctx->enable_transmit_sa = wpas_enable_transmit_sa;
kay_ctx->disable_transmit_sa = wpas_disable_transmit_sa;
- res = ieee802_1x_kay_init(kay_ctx, policy, wpa_s->ifname,
- wpa_s->own_addr);
+ res = ieee802_1x_kay_init(kay_ctx, policy, ssid->macsec_port,
+ wpa_s->ifname, wpa_s->own_addr);
if (res == NULL) {
os_free(kay_ctx);
return -1;
--
2.7.4

459
macsec-0018-drivers-Move-common-definitions-for-wired-drivers-ou.patch
View File

@ -1,459 +0,0 @@
From 0abc8d10cc357d71fff74470c613442f9070ae93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <0abc8d10cc357d71fff74470c613442f9070ae93.1488376602.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Sun, 27 Nov 2016 20:08:44 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] drivers: Move common definitions for wired drivers out
Refactor the common parts of wired drivers code into a shared file, so
that they can be reused by other drivers. The macsec_qca driver already
contains a lot of code duplication from the wired driver, and the
macsec_linux driver would do the same. A structure to hold data common
to all wired drivers is added and used in all these drivers.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
---
src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c | 65 ++++++++++++-------------
src/drivers/driver_wired.c | 99 +++++++++++++++++++--------------------
src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h | 25 ++++++++++
3 files changed, 103 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
index 22d414c..6391e08 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include "common/ieee802_1x_defs.h"
#include "pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h"
#include "driver.h"
+#include "driver_wired_common.h"
#include "nss_macsec_secy.h"
#include "nss_macsec_secy_rx.h"
@@ -53,21 +54,14 @@
#pragma pack(pop)
#endif /* _MSC_VER */
-static const u8 pae_group_addr[ETH_ALEN] =
-{ 0x01, 0x80, 0xc2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03 };
-
struct channel_map {
struct ieee802_1x_mka_sci sci;
};
struct macsec_qca_data {
- char ifname[IFNAMSIZ + 1];
- u32 secy_id;
- void *ctx;
+ struct driver_wired_common_data common;
- int sock; /* raw packet socket for driver access */
- int pf_sock;
- int membership, multi, iff_allmulti, iff_up;
+ u32 secy_id;
/* shadow */
Boolean always_include_sci;
@@ -322,43 +316,43 @@ static void * macsec_qca_init(void *ctx, const char *ifname)
drv = os_zalloc(sizeof(*drv));
if (drv == NULL)
return NULL;
- os_strlcpy(drv->ifname, ifname, sizeof(drv->ifname));
- drv->ctx = ctx;
+ os_strlcpy(drv->common.ifname, ifname, sizeof(drv->common.ifname));
+ drv->common.ctx = ctx;
/* Board specific settings */
- if (os_memcmp("eth2", drv->ifname, 4) == 0)
+ if (os_memcmp("eth2", drv->common.ifname, 4) == 0)
drv->secy_id = 1;
- else if (os_memcmp("eth3", drv->ifname, 4) == 0)
+ else if (os_memcmp("eth3", drv->common.ifname, 4) == 0)
drv->secy_id = 2;
else
drv->secy_id = -1;
#ifdef __linux__
- drv->pf_sock = socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
- if (drv->pf_sock < 0)
+ drv->common.pf_sock = socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
+ if (drv->common.pf_sock < 0)
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "socket(PF_PACKET): %s", strerror(errno));
#else /* __linux__ */
- drv->pf_sock = -1;
+ drv->common.pf_sock = -1;
#endif /* __linux__ */
if (macsec_qca_get_ifflags(ifname, &flags) == 0 &&
!(flags & IFF_UP) &&
macsec_qca_set_ifflags(ifname, flags | IFF_UP) == 0) {
- drv->iff_up = 1;
+ drv->common.iff_up = 1;
}
- if (macsec_qca_multicast_membership(drv->pf_sock,
- if_nametoindex(drv->ifname),
+ if (macsec_qca_multicast_membership(drv->common.pf_sock,
+ if_nametoindex(drv->common.ifname),
pae_group_addr, 1) == 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"%s: Added multicast membership with packet socket",
__func__);
- drv->membership = 1;
+ drv->common.membership = 1;
} else if (macsec_qca_multi(ifname, pae_group_addr, 1) == 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"%s: Added multicast membership with SIOCADDMULTI",
__func__);
- drv->multi = 1;
+ drv->common.multi = 1;
} else if (macsec_qca_get_ifflags(ifname, &flags) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "%s: Could not get interface flags",
__func__);
@@ -375,7 +369,7 @@ static void * macsec_qca_init(void *ctx, const char *ifname)
return NULL;
} else {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Enabled allmulti mode", __func__);
- drv->iff_allmulti = 1;
+ drv->common.iff_allmulti = 1;
}
#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) || defined(__FreeBSD_kernel__)
{
@@ -397,39 +391,40 @@ static void macsec_qca_deinit(void *priv)
struct macsec_qca_data *drv = priv;
int flags;
- if (drv->membership &&
- macsec_qca_multicast_membership(drv->pf_sock,
- if_nametoindex(drv->ifname),
+ if (drv->common.membership &&
+ macsec_qca_multicast_membership(drv->common.pf_sock,
+ if_nametoindex(drv->common.ifname),
pae_group_addr, 0) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"%s: Failed to remove PAE multicast group (PACKET)",
__func__);
}
- if (drv->multi &&
- macsec_qca_multi(drv->ifname, pae_group_addr, 0) < 0) {
+ if (drv->common.multi &&
+ macsec_qca_multi(drv->common.ifname, pae_group_addr, 0) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"%s: Failed to remove PAE multicast group (SIOCDELMULTI)",
__func__);
}
- if (drv->iff_allmulti &&
- (macsec_qca_get_ifflags(drv->ifname, &flags) < 0 ||
- macsec_qca_set_ifflags(drv->ifname, flags & ~IFF_ALLMULTI) < 0)) {
+ if (drv->common.iff_allmulti &&
+ (macsec_qca_get_ifflags(drv->common.ifname, &flags) < 0 ||
+ macsec_qca_set_ifflags(drv->common.ifname,
+ flags & ~IFF_ALLMULTI) < 0)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Failed to disable allmulti mode",
__func__);
}
- if (drv->iff_up &&
- macsec_qca_get_ifflags(drv->ifname, &flags) == 0 &&
+ if (drv->common.iff_up &&
+ macsec_qca_get_ifflags(drv->common.ifname, &flags) == 0 &&
(flags & IFF_UP) &&
- macsec_qca_set_ifflags(drv->ifname, flags & ~IFF_UP) < 0) {
+ macsec_qca_set_ifflags(drv->common.ifname, flags & ~IFF_UP) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Failed to set the interface down",
__func__);
}
- if (drv->pf_sock != -1)
- close(drv->pf_sock);
+ if (drv->common.pf_sock != -1)
+ close(drv->common.pf_sock);
os_free(drv);
}
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_wired.c b/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
index 422a220..b6f79e3 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include "common.h"
#include "eloop.h"
#include "driver.h"
+#include "driver_wired_common.h"
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#undef IFNAMSIZ
@@ -42,20 +43,12 @@ struct ieee8023_hdr {
#pragma pack(pop)
#endif /* _MSC_VER */
-static const u8 pae_group_addr[ETH_ALEN] =
-{ 0x01, 0x80, 0xc2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03 };
-
struct wpa_driver_wired_data {
- char ifname[IFNAMSIZ + 1];
- void *ctx;
+ struct driver_wired_common_data common;
- int sock; /* raw packet socket for driver access */
int dhcp_sock; /* socket for dhcp packets */
int use_pae_group_addr;
-
- int pf_sock;
- int membership, multi, iff_allmulti, iff_up;
};
@@ -208,21 +201,22 @@ static int wired_init_sockets(struct wpa_driver_wired_data *drv, u8 *own_addr)
struct sockaddr_in addr2;
int n = 1;
- drv->sock = socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_PAE));
- if (drv->sock < 0) {
+ drv->common.sock = socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_PAE));
+ if (drv->common.sock < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "socket[PF_PACKET,SOCK_RAW]: %s",
strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
- if (eloop_register_read_sock(drv->sock, handle_read, drv->ctx, NULL)) {
+ if (eloop_register_read_sock(drv->common.sock, handle_read,
+ drv->common.ctx, NULL)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Could not register read socket");
return -1;
}
os_memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr));
- os_strlcpy(ifr.ifr_name, drv->ifname, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name));
- if (ioctl(drv->sock, SIOCGIFINDEX, &ifr) != 0) {
+ os_strlcpy(ifr.ifr_name, drv->common.ifname, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name));
+ if (ioctl(drv->common.sock, SIOCGIFINDEX, &ifr) != 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "ioctl(SIOCGIFINDEX): %s",
strerror(errno));
return -1;
@@ -234,13 +228,14 @@ static int wired_init_sockets(struct wpa_driver_wired_data *drv, u8 *own_addr)
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Opening raw packet socket for ifindex %d",
addr.sll_ifindex);
- if (bind(drv->sock, (struct sockaddr *) &addr, sizeof(addr)) < 0) {
+ if (bind(drv->common.sock, (struct sockaddr *) &addr, sizeof(addr)) < 0)
+ {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "bind: %s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
/* filter multicast address */
- if (wired_multicast_membership(drv->sock, ifr.ifr_ifindex,
+ if (wired_multicast_membership(drv->common.sock, ifr.ifr_ifindex,
pae_group_addr, 1) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "wired: Failed to add multicast group "
"membership");
@@ -248,8 +243,8 @@ static int wired_init_sockets(struct wpa_driver_wired_data *drv, u8 *own_addr)
}
os_memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr));
- os_strlcpy(ifr.ifr_name, drv->ifname, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name));
- if (ioctl(drv->sock, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &ifr) != 0) {
+ os_strlcpy(ifr.ifr_name, drv->common.ifname, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name));
+ if (ioctl(drv->common.sock, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &ifr) != 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "ioctl(SIOCGIFHWADDR): %s",
strerror(errno));
return -1;
@@ -269,8 +264,8 @@ static int wired_init_sockets(struct wpa_driver_wired_data *drv, u8 *own_addr)
return -1;
}
- if (eloop_register_read_sock(drv->dhcp_sock, handle_dhcp, drv->ctx,
- NULL)) {
+ if (eloop_register_read_sock(drv->dhcp_sock, handle_dhcp,
+ drv->common.ctx, NULL)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Could not register read socket");
return -1;
}
@@ -294,7 +289,7 @@ static int wired_init_sockets(struct wpa_driver_wired_data *drv, u8 *own_addr)
}
os_memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr));
- os_strlcpy(ifr.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, drv->ifname, IFNAMSIZ);
+ os_strlcpy(ifr.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, drv->common.ifname, IFNAMSIZ);
if (setsockopt(drv->dhcp_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_BINDTODEVICE,
(char *) &ifr, sizeof(ifr)) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
@@ -343,7 +338,7 @@ static int wired_send_eapol(void *priv, const u8 *addr,
pos = (u8 *) (hdr + 1);
os_memcpy(pos, data, data_len);
- res = send(drv->sock, (u8 *) hdr, len, 0);
+ res = send(drv->common.sock, (u8 *) hdr, len, 0);
os_free(hdr);
if (res < 0) {
@@ -368,8 +363,9 @@ static void * wired_driver_hapd_init(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
return NULL;
}
- drv->ctx = hapd;
- os_strlcpy(drv->ifname, params->ifname, sizeof(drv->ifname));
+ drv->common.ctx = hapd;
+ os_strlcpy(drv->common.ifname, params->ifname,
+ sizeof(drv->common.ifname));
drv->use_pae_group_addr = params->use_pae_group_addr;
if (wired_init_sockets(drv, params->own_addr)) {
@@ -385,9 +381,9 @@ static void wired_driver_hapd_deinit(void *priv)
{
struct wpa_driver_wired_data *drv = priv;
- if (drv->sock >= 0) {
- eloop_unregister_read_sock(drv->sock);
- close(drv->sock);
+ if (drv->common.sock >= 0) {
+ eloop_unregister_read_sock(drv->common.sock);
+ close(drv->common.sock);
}
if (drv->dhcp_sock >= 0) {
@@ -564,33 +560,33 @@ static void * wpa_driver_wired_init(void *ctx, const char *ifname)
drv = os_zalloc(sizeof(*drv));
if (drv == NULL)
return NULL;
- os_strlcpy(drv->ifname, ifname, sizeof(drv->ifname));
- drv->ctx = ctx;
+ os_strlcpy(drv->common.ifname, ifname, sizeof(drv->common.ifname));
+ drv->common.ctx = ctx;
#ifdef __linux__
- drv->pf_sock = socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
- if (drv->pf_sock < 0)
+ drv->common.pf_sock = socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
+ if (drv->common.pf_sock < 0)
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "socket(PF_PACKET): %s", strerror(errno));
#else /* __linux__ */
- drv->pf_sock = -1;
+ drv->common.pf_sock = -1;
#endif /* __linux__ */
if (wpa_driver_wired_get_ifflags(ifname, &flags) == 0 &&
!(flags & IFF_UP) &&
wpa_driver_wired_set_ifflags(ifname, flags | IFF_UP) == 0) {
- drv->iff_up = 1;
+ drv->common.iff_up = 1;
}
- if (wired_multicast_membership(drv->pf_sock,
- if_nametoindex(drv->ifname),
+ if (wired_multicast_membership(drv->common.pf_sock,
+ if_nametoindex(drv->common.ifname),
pae_group_addr, 1) == 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Added multicast membership with "
"packet socket", __func__);
- drv->membership = 1;
+ drv->common.membership = 1;
} else if (wpa_driver_wired_multi(ifname, pae_group_addr, 1) == 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Added multicast membership with "
"SIOCADDMULTI", __func__);
- drv->multi = 1;
+ drv->common.multi = 1;
} else if (wpa_driver_wired_get_ifflags(ifname, &flags) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "%s: Could not get interface "
"flags", __func__);
@@ -608,7 +604,7 @@ static void * wpa_driver_wired_init(void *ctx, const char *ifname)
} else {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Enabled allmulti mode",
__func__);
- drv->iff_allmulti = 1;
+ drv->common.iff_allmulti = 1;
}
#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) || defined(__FreeBSD_kernel__)
{
@@ -630,38 +626,39 @@ static void wpa_driver_wired_deinit(void *priv)
struct wpa_driver_wired_data *drv = priv;
int flags;
- if (drv->membership &&
- wired_multicast_membership(drv->pf_sock,
- if_nametoindex(drv->ifname),
+ if (drv->common.membership &&
+ wired_multicast_membership(drv->common.pf_sock,
+ if_nametoindex(drv->common.ifname),
pae_group_addr, 0) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Failed to remove PAE multicast "
"group (PACKET)", __func__);
}
- if (drv->multi &&
- wpa_driver_wired_multi(drv->ifname, pae_group_addr, 0) < 0) {
+ if (drv->common.multi &&
+ wpa_driver_wired_multi(drv->common.ifname, pae_group_addr, 0) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Failed to remove PAE multicast "
"group (SIOCDELMULTI)", __func__);
}
- if (drv->iff_allmulti &&
- (wpa_driver_wired_get_ifflags(drv->ifname, &flags) < 0 ||
- wpa_driver_wired_set_ifflags(drv->ifname,
+ if (drv->common.iff_allmulti &&
+ (wpa_driver_wired_get_ifflags(drv->common.ifname, &flags) < 0 ||
+ wpa_driver_wired_set_ifflags(drv->common.ifname,
flags & ~IFF_ALLMULTI) < 0)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Failed to disable allmulti mode",
__func__);
}
- if (drv->iff_up &&
- wpa_driver_wired_get_ifflags(drv->ifname, &flags) == 0 &&
+ if (drv->common.iff_up &&
+ wpa_driver_wired_get_ifflags(drv->common.ifname, &flags) == 0 &&
(flags & IFF_UP) &&
- wpa_driver_wired_set_ifflags(drv->ifname, flags & ~IFF_UP) < 0) {
+ wpa_driver_wired_set_ifflags(drv->common.ifname,
+ flags & ~IFF_UP) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Failed to set the interface down",
__func__);
}
- if (drv->pf_sock != -1)
- close(drv->pf_sock);
+ if (drv->common.pf_sock != -1)
+ close(drv->common.pf_sock);
os_free(drv);
}
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8d9dd37
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+/*
+ * Common definitions for Wired Ethernet driver interfaces
+ * Copyright (c) 2005-2009, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, Gunter Burchardt <tira@isx.de>
+ *
+ * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
+ * See README for more details.
+ */
+
+#ifndef DRIVER_WIRED_COMMON_H
+#define DRIVER_WIRED_COMMON_H
+
+struct driver_wired_common_data {
+ char ifname[IFNAMSIZ + 1];
+ void *ctx;
+
+ int sock; /* raw packet socket for driver access */
+ int pf_sock;
+ int membership, multi, iff_allmulti, iff_up;
+};
+
+static const u8 pae_group_addr[ETH_ALEN] =
+{ 0x01, 0x80, 0xc2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03 };
+
+#endif /* DRIVER_WIRED_COMMON_H */
--
2.7.4

239
macsec-0019-drivers-Move-wired_multicast_membership-to-a-common-.patch
View File

@ -1,239 +0,0 @@
From b0906ef770ec5a74221bcb4e63dbbc8682f49d5a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <b0906ef770ec5a74221bcb4e63dbbc8682f49d5a.1488376602.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Sun, 27 Nov 2016 20:08:45 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] drivers: Move wired_multicast_membership() to a common file
This continues refactoring of the common parts of wired drivers code
into a shared file, so that they can be reused by other drivers.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
---
src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c | 40 +++++----------------------
src/drivers/driver_wired.c | 28 -------------------
src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h | 2 ++
src/drivers/drivers.mak | 6 +++++
src/drivers/drivers.mk | 5 ++++
6 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
index 6391e08..e04fb0f 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
@@ -76,34 +76,6 @@ struct macsec_qca_data {
};
-static int macsec_qca_multicast_membership(int sock, int ifindex,
- const u8 *addr, int add)
-{
-#ifdef __linux__
- struct packet_mreq mreq;
-
- if (sock < 0)
- return -1;
-
- os_memset(&mreq, 0, sizeof(mreq));
- mreq.mr_ifindex = ifindex;
- mreq.mr_type = PACKET_MR_MULTICAST;
- mreq.mr_alen = ETH_ALEN;
- os_memcpy(mreq.mr_address, addr, ETH_ALEN);
-
- if (setsockopt(sock, SOL_PACKET,
- add ? PACKET_ADD_MEMBERSHIP : PACKET_DROP_MEMBERSHIP,
- &mreq, sizeof(mreq)) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "setsockopt: %s", strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
- return 0;
-#else /* __linux__ */
- return -1;
-#endif /* __linux__ */
-}
-
-
static int macsec_qca_get_ssid(void *priv, u8 *ssid)
{
ssid[0] = 0;
@@ -341,9 +313,9 @@ static void * macsec_qca_init(void *ctx, const char *ifname)
drv->common.iff_up = 1;
}
- if (macsec_qca_multicast_membership(drv->common.pf_sock,
- if_nametoindex(drv->common.ifname),
- pae_group_addr, 1) == 0) {
+ if (wired_multicast_membership(drv->common.pf_sock,
+ if_nametoindex(drv->common.ifname),
+ pae_group_addr, 1) == 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"%s: Added multicast membership with packet socket",
__func__);
@@ -392,9 +364,9 @@ static void macsec_qca_deinit(void *priv)
int flags;
if (drv->common.membership &&
- macsec_qca_multicast_membership(drv->common.pf_sock,
- if_nametoindex(drv->common.ifname),
- pae_group_addr, 0) < 0) {
+ wired_multicast_membership(drv->common.pf_sock,
+ if_nametoindex(drv->common.ifname),
+ pae_group_addr, 0) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"%s: Failed to remove PAE multicast group (PACKET)",
__func__);
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_wired.c b/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
index b6f79e3..68c55fd 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
@@ -76,34 +76,6 @@ struct dhcp_message {
};
-static int wired_multicast_membership(int sock, int ifindex,
- const u8 *addr, int add)
-{
-#ifdef __linux__
- struct packet_mreq mreq;
-
- if (sock < 0)
- return -1;
-
- os_memset(&mreq, 0, sizeof(mreq));
- mreq.mr_ifindex = ifindex;
- mreq.mr_type = PACKET_MR_MULTICAST;
- mreq.mr_alen = ETH_ALEN;
- os_memcpy(mreq.mr_address, addr, ETH_ALEN);
-
- if (setsockopt(sock, SOL_PACKET,
- add ? PACKET_ADD_MEMBERSHIP : PACKET_DROP_MEMBERSHIP,
- &mreq, sizeof(mreq)) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "setsockopt: %s", strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
- return 0;
-#else /* __linux__ */
- return -1;
-#endif /* __linux__ */
-}
-
-
#ifdef __linux__
static void handle_data(void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
{
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3969880
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/*
+ * Common functions for Wired Ethernet driver interfaces
+ * Copyright (c) 2005-2009, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, Gunter Burchardt <tira@isx.de>
+ *
+ * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
+ * See README for more details.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "eloop.h"
+#include "driver.h"
+#include "driver_wired_common.h"
+
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <net/if.h>
+#ifdef __linux__
+#include <netpacket/packet.h>
+#include <net/if_arp.h>
+#include <net/if.h>
+#endif /* __linux__ */
+#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) || defined(__FreeBSD_kernel__)
+#include <net/if_dl.h>
+#include <net/if_media.h>
+#endif /* defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) || defined(__FreeBSD_kernel__) */
+#ifdef __sun__
+#include <sys/sockio.h>
+#endif /* __sun__ */
+
+
+int wired_multicast_membership(int sock, int ifindex, const u8 *addr, int add)
+{
+#ifdef __linux__
+ struct packet_mreq mreq;
+
+ if (sock < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ os_memset(&mreq, 0, sizeof(mreq));
+ mreq.mr_ifindex = ifindex;
+ mreq.mr_type = PACKET_MR_MULTICAST;
+ mreq.mr_alen = ETH_ALEN;
+ os_memcpy(mreq.mr_address, addr, ETH_ALEN);
+
+ if (setsockopt(sock, SOL_PACKET,
+ add ? PACKET_ADD_MEMBERSHIP : PACKET_DROP_MEMBERSHIP,
+ &mreq, sizeof(mreq)) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "setsockopt: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+#else /* __linux__ */
+ return -1;
+#endif /* __linux__ */
+}
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
index 8d9dd37..39a57a6 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
@@ -22,4 +22,6 @@ struct driver_wired_common_data {
static const u8 pae_group_addr[ETH_ALEN] =
{ 0x01, 0x80, 0xc2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03 };
+int wired_multicast_membership(int sock, int ifindex, const u8 *addr, int add);
+
#endif /* DRIVER_WIRED_COMMON_H */
diff --git a/src/drivers/drivers.mak b/src/drivers/drivers.mak
index c6d3f81..282da50 100644
--- a/src/drivers/drivers.mak
+++ b/src/drivers/drivers.mak
@@ -15,11 +15,17 @@ DRV_AP_LIBS =
ifdef CONFIG_DRIVER_WIRED
DRV_CFLAGS += -DCONFIG_DRIVER_WIRED
DRV_OBJS += ../src/drivers/driver_wired.o
+NEED_DRV_WIRED_COMMON=1
endif
ifdef CONFIG_DRIVER_MACSEC_QCA
DRV_CFLAGS += -DCONFIG_DRIVER_MACSEC_QCA
DRV_OBJS += ../src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.o
+NEED_DRV_WIRED_COMMON=1
+endif
+
+ifdef NEED_DRV_WIRED_COMMON
+DRV_OBJS += ../src/drivers/driver_wired_common.o
endif
ifdef CONFIG_DRIVER_NL80211
diff --git a/src/drivers/drivers.mk b/src/drivers/drivers.mk
index c6fe4c2..508f834 100644
--- a/src/drivers/drivers.mk
+++ b/src/drivers/drivers.mk
@@ -15,6 +15,11 @@ DRV_AP_LIBS =
ifdef CONFIG_DRIVER_WIRED
DRV_CFLAGS += -DCONFIG_DRIVER_WIRED
DRV_OBJS += src/drivers/driver_wired.c
+NEED_DRV_WIRED_COMMON=1
+endif
+
+ifdef NEED_DRV_WIRED_COMMON
+DRV_OBJS += src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c
endif
ifdef CONFIG_DRIVER_NL80211
--
2.7.4

268
macsec-0020-drivers-Move-driver_wired_multi-to-a-common-file.patch
View File

@ -1,268 +0,0 @@
From 693124a1e4f1c2be5ee67f412eb511c3b5b808bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <693124a1e4f1c2be5ee67f412eb511c3b5b808bd.1488376602.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Sun, 27 Nov 2016 20:08:46 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] drivers: Move driver_wired_multi() to a common file
This continues refactoring of the common parts of wired drivers code
into a shared file, so that they can be reused by other drivers.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
---
src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c | 59 ++-------------------------------------
src/drivers/driver_wired.c | 59 ++-------------------------------------
src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h | 1 +
4 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 114 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
index e04fb0f..6c07e01 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
@@ -178,61 +178,6 @@ static int macsec_qca_get_ifstatus(const char *ifname, int *status)
#endif /* defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) || defined(FreeBSD_kernel__) */
-static int macsec_qca_multi(const char *ifname, const u8 *addr, int add)
-{
- struct ifreq ifr;
- int s;
-
-#ifdef __sun__
- return -1;
-#endif /* __sun__ */
-
- s = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
- if (s < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "socket: %s", strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
-
- os_memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr));
- os_strlcpy(ifr.ifr_name, ifname, IFNAMSIZ);
-#ifdef __linux__
- ifr.ifr_hwaddr.sa_family = AF_UNSPEC;
- os_memcpy(ifr.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data, addr, ETH_ALEN);
-#endif /* __linux__ */
-#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) || defined(__FreeBSD_kernel__)
- {
- struct sockaddr_dl *dlp;
- dlp = (struct sockaddr_dl *) &ifr.ifr_addr;
- dlp->sdl_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_dl);
- dlp->sdl_family = AF_LINK;
- dlp->sdl_index = 0;
- dlp->sdl_nlen = 0;
- dlp->sdl_alen = ETH_ALEN;
- dlp->sdl_slen = 0;
- os_memcpy(LLADDR(dlp), addr, ETH_ALEN);
- }
-#endif /* defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) || defined(FreeBSD_kernel__) */
-#if defined(__NetBSD__) || defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__APPLE__)
- {
- struct sockaddr *sap;
- sap = (struct sockaddr *) &ifr.ifr_addr;
- sap->sa_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr);
- sap->sa_family = AF_UNSPEC;
- os_memcpy(sap->sa_data, addr, ETH_ALEN);
- }
-#endif /* defined(__NetBSD__) || defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__APPLE__) */
-
- if (ioctl(s, add ? SIOCADDMULTI : SIOCDELMULTI, (caddr_t) &ifr) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "ioctl[SIOC{ADD/DEL}MULTI]: %s",
- strerror(errno));
- close(s);
- return -1;
- }
- close(s);
- return 0;
-}
-
-
static void __macsec_drv_init(struct macsec_qca_data *drv)
{
int ret = 0;
@@ -320,7 +265,7 @@ static void * macsec_qca_init(void *ctx, const char *ifname)
"%s: Added multicast membership with packet socket",
__func__);
drv->common.membership = 1;
- } else if (macsec_qca_multi(ifname, pae_group_addr, 1) == 0) {
+ } else if (driver_wired_multi(ifname, pae_group_addr, 1) == 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"%s: Added multicast membership with SIOCADDMULTI",
__func__);
@@ -373,7 +318,7 @@ static void macsec_qca_deinit(void *priv)
}
if (drv->common.multi &&
- macsec_qca_multi(drv->common.ifname, pae_group_addr, 0) < 0) {
+ driver_wired_multi(drv->common.ifname, pae_group_addr, 0) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"%s: Failed to remove PAE multicast group (SIOCDELMULTI)",
__func__);
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_wired.c b/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
index 68c55fd..20c66e3 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
@@ -469,61 +469,6 @@ static int wpa_driver_wired_get_ifstatus(const char *ifname, int *status)
#endif /* defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) || defined(FreeBSD_kernel__) */
-static int wpa_driver_wired_multi(const char *ifname, const u8 *addr, int add)
-{
- struct ifreq ifr;
- int s;
-
-#ifdef __sun__
- return -1;
-#endif /* __sun__ */
-
- s = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
- if (s < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "socket: %s", strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
-
- os_memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr));
- os_strlcpy(ifr.ifr_name, ifname, IFNAMSIZ);
-#ifdef __linux__
- ifr.ifr_hwaddr.sa_family = AF_UNSPEC;
- os_memcpy(ifr.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data, addr, ETH_ALEN);
-#endif /* __linux__ */
-#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) || defined(__FreeBSD_kernel__)
- {
- struct sockaddr_dl *dlp;
- dlp = (struct sockaddr_dl *) &ifr.ifr_addr;
- dlp->sdl_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_dl);
- dlp->sdl_family = AF_LINK;
- dlp->sdl_index = 0;
- dlp->sdl_nlen = 0;
- dlp->sdl_alen = ETH_ALEN;
- dlp->sdl_slen = 0;
- os_memcpy(LLADDR(dlp), addr, ETH_ALEN);
- }
-#endif /* defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) || defined(FreeBSD_kernel__) */
-#if defined(__NetBSD__) || defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__APPLE__)
- {
- struct sockaddr *sap;
- sap = (struct sockaddr *) &ifr.ifr_addr;
- sap->sa_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr);
- sap->sa_family = AF_UNSPEC;
- os_memcpy(sap->sa_data, addr, ETH_ALEN);
- }
-#endif /* defined(__NetBSD__) || defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__APPLE__) */
-
- if (ioctl(s, add ? SIOCADDMULTI : SIOCDELMULTI, (caddr_t) &ifr) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "ioctl[SIOC{ADD/DEL}MULTI]: %s",
- strerror(errno));
- close(s);
- return -1;
- }
- close(s);
- return 0;
-}
-
-
static void * wpa_driver_wired_init(void *ctx, const char *ifname)
{
struct wpa_driver_wired_data *drv;
@@ -555,7 +500,7 @@ static void * wpa_driver_wired_init(void *ctx, const char *ifname)
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Added multicast membership with "
"packet socket", __func__);
drv->common.membership = 1;
- } else if (wpa_driver_wired_multi(ifname, pae_group_addr, 1) == 0) {
+ } else if (driver_wired_multi(ifname, pae_group_addr, 1) == 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Added multicast membership with "
"SIOCADDMULTI", __func__);
drv->common.multi = 1;
@@ -607,7 +552,7 @@ static void wpa_driver_wired_deinit(void *priv)
}
if (drv->common.multi &&
- wpa_driver_wired_multi(drv->common.ifname, pae_group_addr, 0) < 0) {
+ driver_wired_multi(drv->common.ifname, pae_group_addr, 0) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Failed to remove PAE multicast "
"group (SIOCDELMULTI)", __func__);
}
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c
index 3969880..4cb04da 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c
@@ -30,6 +30,63 @@
#endif /* __sun__ */
+int driver_wired_multi(const char *ifname, const u8 *addr, int add)
+{
+ struct ifreq ifr;
+ int s;
+
+#ifdef __sun__
+ return -1;
+#endif /* __sun__ */
+
+ s = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
+ if (s < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "socket: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ os_memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr));
+ os_strlcpy(ifr.ifr_name, ifname, IFNAMSIZ);
+#ifdef __linux__
+ ifr.ifr_hwaddr.sa_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+ os_memcpy(ifr.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data, addr, ETH_ALEN);
+#endif /* __linux__ */
+#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) || defined(__FreeBSD_kernel__)
+ {
+ struct sockaddr_dl *dlp;
+
+ dlp = (struct sockaddr_dl *) &ifr.ifr_addr;
+ dlp->sdl_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_dl);
+ dlp->sdl_family = AF_LINK;
+ dlp->sdl_index = 0;
+ dlp->sdl_nlen = 0;
+ dlp->sdl_alen = ETH_ALEN;
+ dlp->sdl_slen = 0;
+ os_memcpy(LLADDR(dlp), addr, ETH_ALEN);
+ }
+#endif /* defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) || defined(FreeBSD_kernel__) */
+#if defined(__NetBSD__) || defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__APPLE__)
+ {
+ struct sockaddr *sap;
+
+ sap = (struct sockaddr *) &ifr.ifr_addr;
+ sap->sa_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr);
+ sap->sa_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+ os_memcpy(sap->sa_data, addr, ETH_ALEN);
+ }
+#endif /* defined(__NetBSD__) || defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__APPLE__) */
+
+ if (ioctl(s, add ? SIOCADDMULTI : SIOCDELMULTI, (caddr_t) &ifr) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "ioctl[SIOC{ADD/DEL}MULTI]: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ close(s);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ close(s);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
int wired_multicast_membership(int sock, int ifindex, const u8 *addr, int add)
{
#ifdef __linux__
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
index 39a57a6..9bbe94f 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ struct driver_wired_common_data {
static const u8 pae_group_addr[ETH_ALEN] =
{ 0x01, 0x80, 0xc2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03 };
+int driver_wired_multi(const char *ifname, const u8 *addr, int add);
int wired_multicast_membership(int sock, int ifindex, const u8 *addr, int add);
#endif /* DRIVER_WIRED_COMMON_H */
--
2.7.4

212
macsec-0021-drivers-Move-driver_wired_get_ifflags-to-a-common-fi.patch
View File

@ -1,212 +0,0 @@
From 567b7d4ec29cd5b97b00703b5afb03d023abb532 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <567b7d4ec29cd5b97b00703b5afb03d023abb532.1488376602.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Sun, 27 Nov 2016 20:08:47 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] drivers: Move driver_wired_get_ifflags() to a common file
This continues refactoring of the common parts of wired drivers code
into a shared file, so that they can be reused by other drivers.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
---
src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c | 33 ++++-----------------------------
src/drivers/driver_wired.c | 33 ++++-----------------------------
src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h | 1 +
4 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
index 6c07e01..d0d4611 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
@@ -99,31 +99,6 @@ static int macsec_qca_get_capa(void *priv, struct wpa_driver_capa *capa)
}
-static int macsec_qca_get_ifflags(const char *ifname, int *flags)
-{
- struct ifreq ifr;
- int s;
-
- s = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
- if (s < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "socket: %s", strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
-
- os_memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr));
- os_strlcpy(ifr.ifr_name, ifname, IFNAMSIZ);
- if (ioctl(s, SIOCGIFFLAGS, (caddr_t) &ifr) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "ioctl[SIOCGIFFLAGS]: %s",
- strerror(errno));
- close(s);
- return -1;
- }
- close(s);
- *flags = ifr.ifr_flags & 0xffff;
- return 0;
-}
-
-
static int macsec_qca_set_ifflags(const char *ifname, int flags)
{
struct ifreq ifr;
@@ -252,7 +227,7 @@ static void * macsec_qca_init(void *ctx, const char *ifname)
drv->common.pf_sock = -1;
#endif /* __linux__ */
- if (macsec_qca_get_ifflags(ifname, &flags) == 0 &&
+ if (driver_wired_get_ifflags(ifname, &flags) == 0 &&
!(flags & IFF_UP) &&
macsec_qca_set_ifflags(ifname, flags | IFF_UP) == 0) {
drv->common.iff_up = 1;
@@ -270,7 +245,7 @@ static void * macsec_qca_init(void *ctx, const char *ifname)
"%s: Added multicast membership with SIOCADDMULTI",
__func__);
drv->common.multi = 1;
- } else if (macsec_qca_get_ifflags(ifname, &flags) < 0) {
+ } else if (driver_wired_get_ifflags(ifname, &flags) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "%s: Could not get interface flags",
__func__);
os_free(drv);
@@ -325,7 +300,7 @@ static void macsec_qca_deinit(void *priv)
}
if (drv->common.iff_allmulti &&
- (macsec_qca_get_ifflags(drv->common.ifname, &flags) < 0 ||
+ (driver_wired_get_ifflags(drv->common.ifname, &flags) < 0 ||
macsec_qca_set_ifflags(drv->common.ifname,
flags & ~IFF_ALLMULTI) < 0)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Failed to disable allmulti mode",
@@ -333,7 +308,7 @@ static void macsec_qca_deinit(void *priv)
}
if (drv->common.iff_up &&
- macsec_qca_get_ifflags(drv->common.ifname, &flags) == 0 &&
+ driver_wired_get_ifflags(drv->common.ifname, &flags) == 0 &&
(flags & IFF_UP) &&
macsec_qca_set_ifflags(drv->common.ifname, flags & ~IFF_UP) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Failed to set the interface down",
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_wired.c b/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
index 20c66e3..ad49eaf 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
@@ -390,31 +390,6 @@ static int wpa_driver_wired_get_capa(void *priv, struct wpa_driver_capa *capa)
}
-static int wpa_driver_wired_get_ifflags(const char *ifname, int *flags)
-{
- struct ifreq ifr;
- int s;
-
- s = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
- if (s < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "socket: %s", strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
-
- os_memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr));
- os_strlcpy(ifr.ifr_name, ifname, IFNAMSIZ);
- if (ioctl(s, SIOCGIFFLAGS, (caddr_t) &ifr) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "ioctl[SIOCGIFFLAGS]: %s",
- strerror(errno));
- close(s);
- return -1;
- }
- close(s);
- *flags = ifr.ifr_flags & 0xffff;
- return 0;
-}
-
-
static int wpa_driver_wired_set_ifflags(const char *ifname, int flags)
{
struct ifreq ifr;
@@ -488,7 +463,7 @@ static void * wpa_driver_wired_init(void *ctx, const char *ifname)
drv->common.pf_sock = -1;
#endif /* __linux__ */
- if (wpa_driver_wired_get_ifflags(ifname, &flags) == 0 &&
+ if (driver_wired_get_ifflags(ifname, &flags) == 0 &&
!(flags & IFF_UP) &&
wpa_driver_wired_set_ifflags(ifname, flags | IFF_UP) == 0) {
drv->common.iff_up = 1;
@@ -504,7 +479,7 @@ static void * wpa_driver_wired_init(void *ctx, const char *ifname)
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Added multicast membership with "
"SIOCADDMULTI", __func__);
drv->common.multi = 1;
- } else if (wpa_driver_wired_get_ifflags(ifname, &flags) < 0) {
+ } else if (driver_wired_get_ifflags(ifname, &flags) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "%s: Could not get interface "
"flags", __func__);
os_free(drv);
@@ -558,7 +533,7 @@ static void wpa_driver_wired_deinit(void *priv)
}
if (drv->common.iff_allmulti &&
- (wpa_driver_wired_get_ifflags(drv->common.ifname, &flags) < 0 ||
+ (driver_wired_get_ifflags(drv->common.ifname, &flags) < 0 ||
wpa_driver_wired_set_ifflags(drv->common.ifname,
flags & ~IFF_ALLMULTI) < 0)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Failed to disable allmulti mode",
@@ -566,7 +541,7 @@ static void wpa_driver_wired_deinit(void *priv)
}
if (drv->common.iff_up &&
- wpa_driver_wired_get_ifflags(drv->common.ifname, &flags) == 0 &&
+ driver_wired_get_ifflags(drv->common.ifname, &flags) == 0 &&
(flags & IFF_UP) &&
wpa_driver_wired_set_ifflags(drv->common.ifname,
flags & ~IFF_UP) < 0) {
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c
index 4cb04da..a84dcc7 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c
@@ -30,6 +30,31 @@
#endif /* __sun__ */
+int driver_wired_get_ifflags(const char *ifname, int *flags)
+{
+ struct ifreq ifr;
+ int s;
+
+ s = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
+ if (s < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "socket: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ os_memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr));
+ os_strlcpy(ifr.ifr_name, ifname, IFNAMSIZ);
+ if (ioctl(s, SIOCGIFFLAGS, (caddr_t) &ifr) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "ioctl[SIOCGIFFLAGS]: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ close(s);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ close(s);
+ *flags = ifr.ifr_flags & 0xffff;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
int driver_wired_multi(const char *ifname, const u8 *addr, int add)
{
struct ifreq ifr;
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
index 9bbe94f..b8ed0e0 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ struct driver_wired_common_data {
static const u8 pae_group_addr[ETH_ALEN] =
{ 0x01, 0x80, 0xc2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03 };
+int driver_wired_get_ifflags(const char *ifname, int *flags);
int driver_wired_multi(const char *ifname, const u8 *addr, int add);
int wired_multicast_membership(int sock, int ifindex, const u8 *addr, int add);
--
2.7.4

218
macsec-0022-drivers-Move-driver_wired_set_ifflags-to-a-common-fi.patch
View File

@ -1,218 +0,0 @@
From d718a5d975de2309dc4478a62f3475cb0726f2a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <d718a5d975de2309dc4478a62f3475cb0726f2a1.1488376602.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Sun, 27 Nov 2016 20:08:48 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] drivers: Move driver_wired_set_ifflags() to a common file
This continues refactoring of the common parts of wired drivers code
into a shared file, so that they can be reused by other drivers.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
---
src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c | 35 +++++------------------------------
src/drivers/driver_wired.c | 37 +++++--------------------------------
src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h | 1 +
4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
index d0d4611..31cb0dc 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
@@ -99,31 +99,6 @@ static int macsec_qca_get_capa(void *priv, struct wpa_driver_capa *capa)
}
-static int macsec_qca_set_ifflags(const char *ifname, int flags)
-{
- struct ifreq ifr;
- int s;
-
- s = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
- if (s < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "socket: %s", strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
-
- os_memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr));
- os_strlcpy(ifr.ifr_name, ifname, IFNAMSIZ);
- ifr.ifr_flags = flags & 0xffff;
- if (ioctl(s, SIOCSIFFLAGS, (caddr_t) &ifr) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "ioctl[SIOCSIFFLAGS]: %s",
- strerror(errno));
- close(s);
- return -1;
- }
- close(s);
- return 0;
-}
-
-
#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) || defined(__FreeBSD_kernel__)
static int macsec_qca_get_ifstatus(const char *ifname, int *status)
{
@@ -229,7 +204,7 @@ static void * macsec_qca_init(void *ctx, const char *ifname)
if (driver_wired_get_ifflags(ifname, &flags) == 0 &&
!(flags & IFF_UP) &&
- macsec_qca_set_ifflags(ifname, flags | IFF_UP) == 0) {
+ driver_wired_set_ifflags(ifname, flags | IFF_UP) == 0) {
drv->common.iff_up = 1;
}
@@ -254,7 +229,7 @@ static void * macsec_qca_init(void *ctx, const char *ifname)
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"%s: Interface is already configured for multicast",
__func__);
- } else if (macsec_qca_set_ifflags(ifname, flags | IFF_ALLMULTI) < 0) {
+ } else if (driver_wired_set_ifflags(ifname, flags | IFF_ALLMULTI) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "%s: Failed to enable allmulti",
__func__);
os_free(drv);
@@ -301,8 +276,8 @@ static void macsec_qca_deinit(void *priv)
if (drv->common.iff_allmulti &&
(driver_wired_get_ifflags(drv->common.ifname, &flags) < 0 ||
- macsec_qca_set_ifflags(drv->common.ifname,
- flags & ~IFF_ALLMULTI) < 0)) {
+ driver_wired_set_ifflags(drv->common.ifname,
+ flags & ~IFF_ALLMULTI) < 0)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Failed to disable allmulti mode",
__func__);
}
@@ -310,7 +285,7 @@ static void macsec_qca_deinit(void *priv)
if (drv->common.iff_up &&
driver_wired_get_ifflags(drv->common.ifname, &flags) == 0 &&
(flags & IFF_UP) &&
- macsec_qca_set_ifflags(drv->common.ifname, flags & ~IFF_UP) < 0) {
+ driver_wired_set_ifflags(drv->common.ifname, flags & ~IFF_UP) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Failed to set the interface down",
__func__);
}
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_wired.c b/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
index ad49eaf..953fa3d 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
@@ -390,31 +390,6 @@ static int wpa_driver_wired_get_capa(void *priv, struct wpa_driver_capa *capa)
}
-static int wpa_driver_wired_set_ifflags(const char *ifname, int flags)
-{
- struct ifreq ifr;
- int s;
-
- s = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
- if (s < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "socket: %s", strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
-
- os_memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr));
- os_strlcpy(ifr.ifr_name, ifname, IFNAMSIZ);
- ifr.ifr_flags = flags & 0xffff;
- if (ioctl(s, SIOCSIFFLAGS, (caddr_t) &ifr) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "ioctl[SIOCSIFFLAGS]: %s",
- strerror(errno));
- close(s);
- return -1;
- }
- close(s);
- return 0;
-}
-
-
#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) || defined(__FreeBSD_kernel__)
static int wpa_driver_wired_get_ifstatus(const char *ifname, int *status)
{
@@ -465,7 +440,7 @@ static void * wpa_driver_wired_init(void *ctx, const char *ifname)
if (driver_wired_get_ifflags(ifname, &flags) == 0 &&
!(flags & IFF_UP) &&
- wpa_driver_wired_set_ifflags(ifname, flags | IFF_UP) == 0) {
+ driver_wired_set_ifflags(ifname, flags | IFF_UP) == 0) {
drv->common.iff_up = 1;
}
@@ -487,8 +462,7 @@ static void * wpa_driver_wired_init(void *ctx, const char *ifname)
} else if (flags & IFF_ALLMULTI) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Interface is already configured "
"for multicast", __func__);
- } else if (wpa_driver_wired_set_ifflags(ifname,
- flags | IFF_ALLMULTI) < 0) {
+ } else if (driver_wired_set_ifflags(ifname, flags | IFF_ALLMULTI) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "%s: Failed to enable allmulti",
__func__);
os_free(drv);
@@ -534,8 +508,8 @@ static void wpa_driver_wired_deinit(void *priv)
if (drv->common.iff_allmulti &&
(driver_wired_get_ifflags(drv->common.ifname, &flags) < 0 ||
- wpa_driver_wired_set_ifflags(drv->common.ifname,
- flags & ~IFF_ALLMULTI) < 0)) {
+ driver_wired_set_ifflags(drv->common.ifname,
+ flags & ~IFF_ALLMULTI) < 0)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Failed to disable allmulti mode",
__func__);
}
@@ -543,8 +517,7 @@ static void wpa_driver_wired_deinit(void *priv)
if (drv->common.iff_up &&
driver_wired_get_ifflags(drv->common.ifname, &flags) == 0 &&
(flags & IFF_UP) &&
- wpa_driver_wired_set_ifflags(drv->common.ifname,
- flags & ~IFF_UP) < 0) {
+ driver_wired_set_ifflags(drv->common.ifname, flags & ~IFF_UP) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Failed to set the interface down",
__func__);
}
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c
index a84dcc7..52f22de 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c
@@ -55,6 +55,31 @@ int driver_wired_get_ifflags(const char *ifname, int *flags)
}
+int driver_wired_set_ifflags(const char *ifname, int flags)
+{
+ struct ifreq ifr;
+ int s;
+
+ s = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
+ if (s < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "socket: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ os_memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr));
+ os_strlcpy(ifr.ifr_name, ifname, IFNAMSIZ);
+ ifr.ifr_flags = flags & 0xffff;
+ if (ioctl(s, SIOCSIFFLAGS, (caddr_t) &ifr) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "ioctl[SIOCSIFFLAGS]: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ close(s);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ close(s);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
int driver_wired_multi(const char *ifname, const u8 *addr, int add)
{
struct ifreq ifr;
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
index b8ed0e0..e2d8bbe 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static const u8 pae_group_addr[ETH_ALEN] =
{ 0x01, 0x80, 0xc2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03 };
int driver_wired_get_ifflags(const char *ifname, int *flags);
+int driver_wired_set_ifflags(const char *ifname, int flags);
int driver_wired_multi(const char *ifname, const u8 *addr, int add);
int wired_multicast_membership(int sock, int ifindex, const u8 *addr, int add);
--
2.7.4

166
macsec-0023-drivers-Move-driver_wired_get_ifstatus-to-a-common-f.patch
View File

@ -1,166 +0,0 @@
From 5a55ec38edd875fc6dc54c0483e1f96ad9cf8cf9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <5a55ec38edd875fc6dc54c0483e1f96ad9cf8cf9.1488376602.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Sun, 27 Nov 2016 20:08:49 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] drivers: Move driver_wired_get_ifstatus() to a common file
This continues refactoring of the common parts of wired drivers code
into a shared file, so that they can be reused by other drivers.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
---
src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c | 31 +------------------------------
src/drivers/driver_wired.c | 31 +------------------------------
src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h | 1 +
4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
index 31cb0dc..786e2e8 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
@@ -99,35 +99,6 @@ static int macsec_qca_get_capa(void *priv, struct wpa_driver_capa *capa)
}
-#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) || defined(__FreeBSD_kernel__)
-static int macsec_qca_get_ifstatus(const char *ifname, int *status)
-{
- struct ifmediareq ifmr;
- int s;
-
- s = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
- if (s < 0) {
- wpa_print(MSG_ERROR, "socket: %s", strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
-
- os_memset(&ifmr, 0, sizeof(ifmr));
- os_strlcpy(ifmr.ifm_name, ifname, IFNAMSIZ);
- if (ioctl(s, SIOCGIFMEDIA, (caddr_t) &ifmr) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "ioctl[SIOCGIFMEDIA]: %s",
- strerror(errno));
- close(s);
- return -1;
- }
- close(s);
- *status = (ifmr.ifm_status & (IFM_ACTIVE | IFM_AVALID)) ==
- (IFM_ACTIVE | IFM_AVALID);
-
- return 0;
-}
-#endif /* defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) || defined(FreeBSD_kernel__) */
-
-
static void __macsec_drv_init(struct macsec_qca_data *drv)
{
int ret = 0;
@@ -243,7 +214,7 @@ static void * macsec_qca_init(void *ctx, const char *ifname)
int status;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: waiting for link to become active",
__func__);
- while (macsec_qca_get_ifstatus(ifname, &status) == 0 &&
+ while (driver_wired_get_ifstatus(ifname, &status) == 0 &&
status == 0)
sleep(1);
}
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_wired.c b/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
index 953fa3d..db83683 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
@@ -390,35 +390,6 @@ static int wpa_driver_wired_get_capa(void *priv, struct wpa_driver_capa *capa)
}
-#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) || defined(__FreeBSD_kernel__)
-static int wpa_driver_wired_get_ifstatus(const char *ifname, int *status)
-{
- struct ifmediareq ifmr;
- int s;
-
- s = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
- if (s < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "socket: %s", strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
-
- os_memset(&ifmr, 0, sizeof(ifmr));
- os_strlcpy(ifmr.ifm_name, ifname, IFNAMSIZ);
- if (ioctl(s, SIOCGIFMEDIA, (caddr_t) &ifmr) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "ioctl[SIOCGIFMEDIA]: %s",
- strerror(errno));
- close(s);
- return -1;
- }
- close(s);
- *status = (ifmr.ifm_status & (IFM_ACTIVE | IFM_AVALID)) ==
- (IFM_ACTIVE | IFM_AVALID);
-
- return 0;
-}
-#endif /* defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) || defined(FreeBSD_kernel__) */
-
-
static void * wpa_driver_wired_init(void *ctx, const char *ifname)
{
struct wpa_driver_wired_data *drv;
@@ -477,7 +448,7 @@ static void * wpa_driver_wired_init(void *ctx, const char *ifname)
int status;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: waiting for link to become active",
__func__);
- while (wpa_driver_wired_get_ifstatus(ifname, &status) == 0 &&
+ while (driver_wired_get_ifstatus(ifname, &status) == 0 &&
status == 0)
sleep(1);
}
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c
index 52f22de..e55e2c7 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c
@@ -162,3 +162,32 @@ int wired_multicast_membership(int sock, int ifindex, const u8 *addr, int add)
return -1;
#endif /* __linux__ */
}
+
+
+#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) || defined(__FreeBSD_kernel__)
+int driver_wired_get_ifstatus(const char *ifname, int *status)
+{
+ struct ifmediareq ifmr;
+ int s;
+
+ s = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
+ if (s < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "socket: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ os_memset(&ifmr, 0, sizeof(ifmr));
+ os_strlcpy(ifmr.ifm_name, ifname, IFNAMSIZ);
+ if (ioctl(s, SIOCGIFMEDIA, (caddr_t) &ifmr) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "ioctl[SIOCGIFMEDIA]: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ close(s);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ close(s);
+ *status = (ifmr.ifm_status & (IFM_ACTIVE | IFM_AVALID)) ==
+ (IFM_ACTIVE | IFM_AVALID);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) || defined(FreeBSD_kernel__) */
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
index e2d8bbe..c8e347a 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
@@ -26,5 +26,6 @@ int driver_wired_get_ifflags(const char *ifname, int *flags);
int driver_wired_set_ifflags(const char *ifname, int flags);
int driver_wired_multi(const char *ifname, const u8 *addr, int add);
int wired_multicast_membership(int sock, int ifindex, const u8 *addr, int add);
+int driver_wired_get_ifstatus(const char *ifname, int *status);
#endif /* DRIVER_WIRED_COMMON_H */
--
2.7.4

261
macsec-0024-drivers-Move-driver_wired_init_common-to-a-common-fi.patch
View File

@ -1,261 +0,0 @@
From ed5ae6119307b981eb9d0eaff3fa2ca53e79e629 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <ed5ae6119307b981eb9d0eaff3fa2ca53e79e629.1488376602.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Sun, 27 Nov 2016 20:08:50 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] drivers: Move driver_wired_init_common() to a common file
This continues refactoring of the common parts of wired drivers code
into a shared file, so that they can be reused by other drivers.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
---
src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c | 59 ++---------------------------------
src/drivers/driver_wired.c | 53 +------------------------------
src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h | 3 ++
4 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 108 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
index 786e2e8..26003b0 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
@@ -149,76 +149,23 @@ static void __macsec_drv_deinit(struct macsec_qca_data *drv)
static void * macsec_qca_init(void *ctx, const char *ifname)
{
struct macsec_qca_data *drv;
- int flags;
drv = os_zalloc(sizeof(*drv));
if (drv == NULL)
return NULL;
- os_strlcpy(drv->common.ifname, ifname, sizeof(drv->common.ifname));
- drv->common.ctx = ctx;
/* Board specific settings */
- if (os_memcmp("eth2", drv->common.ifname, 4) == 0)
+ if (os_memcmp("eth2", ifname, 4) == 0)
drv->secy_id = 1;
- else if (os_memcmp("eth3", drv->common.ifname, 4) == 0)
+ else if (os_memcmp("eth3", ifname, 4) == 0)
drv->secy_id = 2;
else
drv->secy_id = -1;
-#ifdef __linux__
- drv->common.pf_sock = socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
- if (drv->common.pf_sock < 0)
- wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "socket(PF_PACKET): %s", strerror(errno));
-#else /* __linux__ */
- drv->common.pf_sock = -1;
-#endif /* __linux__ */
-
- if (driver_wired_get_ifflags(ifname, &flags) == 0 &&
- !(flags & IFF_UP) &&
- driver_wired_set_ifflags(ifname, flags | IFF_UP) == 0) {
- drv->common.iff_up = 1;
- }
-
- if (wired_multicast_membership(drv->common.pf_sock,
- if_nametoindex(drv->common.ifname),
- pae_group_addr, 1) == 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
- "%s: Added multicast membership with packet socket",
- __func__);
- drv->common.membership = 1;
- } else if (driver_wired_multi(ifname, pae_group_addr, 1) == 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
- "%s: Added multicast membership with SIOCADDMULTI",
- __func__);
- drv->common.multi = 1;
- } else if (driver_wired_get_ifflags(ifname, &flags) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "%s: Could not get interface flags",
- __func__);
- os_free(drv);
- return NULL;
- } else if (flags & IFF_ALLMULTI) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
- "%s: Interface is already configured for multicast",
- __func__);
- } else if (driver_wired_set_ifflags(ifname, flags | IFF_ALLMULTI) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "%s: Failed to enable allmulti",
- __func__);
+ if (driver_wired_init_common(&drv->common, ifname, ctx) < 0) {
os_free(drv);
return NULL;
- } else {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Enabled allmulti mode", __func__);
- drv->common.iff_allmulti = 1;
- }
-#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) || defined(__FreeBSD_kernel__)
- {
- int status;
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: waiting for link to become active",
- __func__);
- while (driver_wired_get_ifstatus(ifname, &status) == 0 &&
- status == 0)
- sleep(1);
}
-#endif /* defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) || defined(FreeBSD_kernel__) */
return drv;
}
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_wired.c b/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
index db83683..38476af 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
@@ -393,66 +393,15 @@ static int wpa_driver_wired_get_capa(void *priv, struct wpa_driver_capa *capa)
static void * wpa_driver_wired_init(void *ctx, const char *ifname)
{
struct wpa_driver_wired_data *drv;
- int flags;
drv = os_zalloc(sizeof(*drv));
if (drv == NULL)
return NULL;
- os_strlcpy(drv->common.ifname, ifname, sizeof(drv->common.ifname));
- drv->common.ctx = ctx;
-
-#ifdef __linux__
- drv->common.pf_sock = socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
- if (drv->common.pf_sock < 0)
- wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "socket(PF_PACKET): %s", strerror(errno));
-#else /* __linux__ */
- drv->common.pf_sock = -1;
-#endif /* __linux__ */
-
- if (driver_wired_get_ifflags(ifname, &flags) == 0 &&
- !(flags & IFF_UP) &&
- driver_wired_set_ifflags(ifname, flags | IFF_UP) == 0) {
- drv->common.iff_up = 1;
- }
- if (wired_multicast_membership(drv->common.pf_sock,
- if_nametoindex(drv->common.ifname),
- pae_group_addr, 1) == 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Added multicast membership with "
- "packet socket", __func__);
- drv->common.membership = 1;
- } else if (driver_wired_multi(ifname, pae_group_addr, 1) == 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Added multicast membership with "
- "SIOCADDMULTI", __func__);
- drv->common.multi = 1;
- } else if (driver_wired_get_ifflags(ifname, &flags) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "%s: Could not get interface "
- "flags", __func__);
+ if (driver_wired_init_common(&drv->common, ifname, ctx) < 0) {
os_free(drv);
return NULL;
- } else if (flags & IFF_ALLMULTI) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Interface is already configured "
- "for multicast", __func__);
- } else if (driver_wired_set_ifflags(ifname, flags | IFF_ALLMULTI) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "%s: Failed to enable allmulti",
- __func__);
- os_free(drv);
- return NULL;
- } else {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Enabled allmulti mode",
- __func__);
- drv->common.iff_allmulti = 1;
- }
-#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) || defined(__FreeBSD_kernel__)
- {
- int status;
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: waiting for link to become active",
- __func__);
- while (driver_wired_get_ifstatus(ifname, &status) == 0 &&
- status == 0)
- sleep(1);
}
-#endif /* defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) || defined(FreeBSD_kernel__) */
return drv;
}
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c
index e55e2c7..6f782c2 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c
@@ -191,3 +191,68 @@ int driver_wired_get_ifstatus(const char *ifname, int *status)
return 0;
}
#endif /* defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) || defined(FreeBSD_kernel__) */
+
+
+int driver_wired_init_common(struct driver_wired_common_data *common,
+ const char *ifname, void *ctx)
+{
+ int flags;
+
+ os_strlcpy(common->ifname, ifname, sizeof(common->ifname));
+ common->ctx = ctx;
+
+#ifdef __linux__
+ common->pf_sock = socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
+ if (common->pf_sock < 0)
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "socket(PF_PACKET): %s", strerror(errno));
+#else /* __linux__ */
+ common->pf_sock = -1;
+#endif /* __linux__ */
+
+ if (driver_wired_get_ifflags(ifname, &flags) == 0 &&
+ !(flags & IFF_UP) &&
+ driver_wired_set_ifflags(ifname, flags | IFF_UP) == 0)
+ common->iff_up = 1;
+
+ if (wired_multicast_membership(common->pf_sock,
+ if_nametoindex(common->ifname),
+ pae_group_addr, 1) == 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "%s: Added multicast membership with packet socket",
+ __func__);
+ common->membership = 1;
+ } else if (driver_wired_multi(ifname, pae_group_addr, 1) == 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "%s: Added multicast membership with SIOCADDMULTI",
+ __func__);
+ common->multi = 1;
+ } else if (driver_wired_get_ifflags(ifname, &flags) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "%s: Could not get interface flags",
+ __func__);
+ return -1;
+ } else if (flags & IFF_ALLMULTI) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "%s: Interface is already configured for multicast",
+ __func__);
+ } else if (driver_wired_set_ifflags(ifname,
+ flags | IFF_ALLMULTI) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "%s: Failed to enable allmulti", __func__);
+ return -1;
+ } else {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Enabled allmulti mode", __func__);
+ common->iff_allmulti = 1;
+ }
+#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) || defined(__FreeBSD_kernel__)
+ {
+ int status;
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: waiting for link to become active",
+ __func__);
+ while (driver_wired_get_ifstatus(ifname, &status) == 0 &&
+ status == 0)
+ sleep(1);
+ }
+#endif /* defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) || defined(FreeBSD_kernel__) */
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
index c8e347a..e4f54b9 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
@@ -28,4 +28,7 @@ int driver_wired_multi(const char *ifname, const u8 *addr, int add);
int wired_multicast_membership(int sock, int ifindex, const u8 *addr, int add);
int driver_wired_get_ifstatus(const char *ifname, int *status);
+int driver_wired_init_common(struct driver_wired_common_data *common,
+ const char *ifname, void *ctx);
+
#endif /* DRIVER_WIRED_COMMON_H */
--
2.7.4

176
macsec-0025-drivers-Move-driver_wired_deinit_common-to-a-common-.patch
View File

@ -1,176 +0,0 @@
From ec9cfb96c2db746f26ceaa577953cfc2dc9d0f49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <ec9cfb96c2db746f26ceaa577953cfc2dc9d0f49.1488376602.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Sun, 27 Nov 2016 20:08:51 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] drivers: Move driver_wired_deinit_common() to a common file
This continues refactoring of the common parts of wired drivers code
into a shared file, so that they can be reused by other drivers.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
---
src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c | 37 +----------------------------------
src/drivers/driver_wired.c | 35 +--------------------------------
src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h | 1 +
4 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
index 26003b0..30bf31c 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
@@ -174,43 +174,8 @@ static void * macsec_qca_init(void *ctx, const char *ifname)
static void macsec_qca_deinit(void *priv)
{
struct macsec_qca_data *drv = priv;
- int flags;
-
- if (drv->common.membership &&
- wired_multicast_membership(drv->common.pf_sock,
- if_nametoindex(drv->common.ifname),
- pae_group_addr, 0) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
- "%s: Failed to remove PAE multicast group (PACKET)",
- __func__);
- }
-
- if (drv->common.multi &&
- driver_wired_multi(drv->common.ifname, pae_group_addr, 0) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
- "%s: Failed to remove PAE multicast group (SIOCDELMULTI)",
- __func__);
- }
-
- if (drv->common.iff_allmulti &&
- (driver_wired_get_ifflags(drv->common.ifname, &flags) < 0 ||
- driver_wired_set_ifflags(drv->common.ifname,
- flags & ~IFF_ALLMULTI) < 0)) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Failed to disable allmulti mode",
- __func__);
- }
-
- if (drv->common.iff_up &&
- driver_wired_get_ifflags(drv->common.ifname, &flags) == 0 &&
- (flags & IFF_UP) &&
- driver_wired_set_ifflags(drv->common.ifname, flags & ~IFF_UP) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Failed to set the interface down",
- __func__);
- }
-
- if (drv->common.pf_sock != -1)
- close(drv->common.pf_sock);
+ driver_wired_deinit_common(&drv->common);
os_free(drv);
}
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_wired.c b/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
index 38476af..54217bc 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
@@ -410,41 +410,8 @@ static void * wpa_driver_wired_init(void *ctx, const char *ifname)
static void wpa_driver_wired_deinit(void *priv)
{
struct wpa_driver_wired_data *drv = priv;
- int flags;
-
- if (drv->common.membership &&
- wired_multicast_membership(drv->common.pf_sock,
- if_nametoindex(drv->common.ifname),
- pae_group_addr, 0) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Failed to remove PAE multicast "
- "group (PACKET)", __func__);
- }
-
- if (drv->common.multi &&
- driver_wired_multi(drv->common.ifname, pae_group_addr, 0) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Failed to remove PAE multicast "
- "group (SIOCDELMULTI)", __func__);
- }
-
- if (drv->common.iff_allmulti &&
- (driver_wired_get_ifflags(drv->common.ifname, &flags) < 0 ||
- driver_wired_set_ifflags(drv->common.ifname,
- flags & ~IFF_ALLMULTI) < 0)) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Failed to disable allmulti mode",
- __func__);
- }
-
- if (drv->common.iff_up &&
- driver_wired_get_ifflags(drv->common.ifname, &flags) == 0 &&
- (flags & IFF_UP) &&
- driver_wired_set_ifflags(drv->common.ifname, flags & ~IFF_UP) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Failed to set the interface down",
- __func__);
- }
-
- if (drv->common.pf_sock != -1)
- close(drv->common.pf_sock);
+ driver_wired_deinit_common(&drv->common);
os_free(drv);
}
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c
index 6f782c2..73c2b1b 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c
@@ -256,3 +256,44 @@ int driver_wired_init_common(struct driver_wired_common_data *common,
return 0;
}
+
+
+void driver_wired_deinit_common(struct driver_wired_common_data *common)
+{
+ int flags;
+
+ if (common->membership &&
+ wired_multicast_membership(common->pf_sock,
+ if_nametoindex(common->ifname),
+ pae_group_addr, 0) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "%s: Failed to remove PAE multicast group (PACKET)",
+ __func__);
+ }
+
+ if (common->multi &&
+ driver_wired_multi(common->ifname, pae_group_addr, 0) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "%s: Failed to remove PAE multicast group (SIOCDELMULTI)",
+ __func__);
+ }
+
+ if (common->iff_allmulti &&
+ (driver_wired_get_ifflags(common->ifname, &flags) < 0 ||
+ driver_wired_set_ifflags(common->ifname,
+ flags & ~IFF_ALLMULTI) < 0)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Failed to disable allmulti mode",
+ __func__);
+ }
+
+ if (common->iff_up &&
+ driver_wired_get_ifflags(common->ifname, &flags) == 0 &&
+ (flags & IFF_UP) &&
+ driver_wired_set_ifflags(common->ifname, flags & ~IFF_UP) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Failed to set the interface down",
+ __func__);
+ }
+
+ if (common->pf_sock != -1)
+ close(common->pf_sock);
+}
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
index e4f54b9..f362dbd 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
@@ -30,5 +30,6 @@ int driver_wired_get_ifstatus(const char *ifname, int *status);
int driver_wired_init_common(struct driver_wired_common_data *common,
const char *ifname, void *ctx);
+void driver_wired_deinit_common(struct driver_wired_common_data *common);
#endif /* DRIVER_WIRED_COMMON_H */
--
2.7.4

107
macsec-0026-drivers-Move-driver_wired_get_capa-to-a-common-file.patch
View File

@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
From 9281e5c5ce83648d344808e08f213f4e11a44573 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <9281e5c5ce83648d344808e08f213f4e11a44573.1488376602.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Sun, 27 Nov 2016 20:08:52 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] drivers: Move driver_wired_get_capa() to a common file
This continues refactoring of the common parts of wired drivers code
into a shared file, so that they can be reused by other drivers.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
---
src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c | 10 +---------
src/drivers/driver_wired.c | 10 +---------
src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c | 8 ++++++++
src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h | 1 +
4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
index 30bf31c..15ea4bd 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
@@ -91,14 +91,6 @@ static int macsec_qca_get_bssid(void *priv, u8 *bssid)
}
-static int macsec_qca_get_capa(void *priv, struct wpa_driver_capa *capa)
-{
- os_memset(capa, 0, sizeof(*capa));
- capa->flags = WPA_DRIVER_FLAGS_WIRED;
- return 0;
-}
-
-
static void __macsec_drv_init(struct macsec_qca_data *drv)
{
int ret = 0;
@@ -758,7 +750,7 @@ const struct wpa_driver_ops wpa_driver_macsec_qca_ops = {
.desc = "QCA MACsec Ethernet driver",
.get_ssid = macsec_qca_get_ssid,
.get_bssid = macsec_qca_get_bssid,
- .get_capa = macsec_qca_get_capa,
+ .get_capa = driver_wired_get_capa,
.init = macsec_qca_init,
.deinit = macsec_qca_deinit,
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_wired.c b/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
index 54217bc..fd8a7e3 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
@@ -382,14 +382,6 @@ static int wpa_driver_wired_get_bssid(void *priv, u8 *bssid)
}
-static int wpa_driver_wired_get_capa(void *priv, struct wpa_driver_capa *capa)
-{
- os_memset(capa, 0, sizeof(*capa));
- capa->flags = WPA_DRIVER_FLAGS_WIRED;
- return 0;
-}
-
-
static void * wpa_driver_wired_init(void *ctx, const char *ifname)
{
struct wpa_driver_wired_data *drv;
@@ -424,7 +416,7 @@ const struct wpa_driver_ops wpa_driver_wired_ops = {
.hapd_send_eapol = wired_send_eapol,
.get_ssid = wpa_driver_wired_get_ssid,
.get_bssid = wpa_driver_wired_get_bssid,
- .get_capa = wpa_driver_wired_get_capa,
+ .get_capa = driver_wired_get_capa,
.init = wpa_driver_wired_init,
.deinit = wpa_driver_wired_deinit,
};
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c
index 73c2b1b..b31474d 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c
@@ -164,6 +164,14 @@ int wired_multicast_membership(int sock, int ifindex, const u8 *addr, int add)
}
+int driver_wired_get_capa(void *priv, struct wpa_driver_capa *capa)
+{
+ os_memset(capa, 0, sizeof(*capa));
+ capa->flags = WPA_DRIVER_FLAGS_WIRED;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) || defined(__FreeBSD_kernel__)
int driver_wired_get_ifstatus(const char *ifname, int *status)
{
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
index f362dbd..b926d83 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ int driver_wired_get_ifflags(const char *ifname, int *flags);
int driver_wired_set_ifflags(const char *ifname, int flags);
int driver_wired_multi(const char *ifname, const u8 *addr, int add);
int wired_multicast_membership(int sock, int ifindex, const u8 *addr, int add);
+int driver_wired_get_capa(void *priv, struct wpa_driver_capa *capa);
int driver_wired_get_ifstatus(const char *ifname, int *status);
int driver_wired_init_common(struct driver_wired_common_data *common,
--
2.7.4

107
macsec-0027-drivers-Move-driver_wired_get_bssid-to-a-common-file.patch
View File

@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
From d27c42baea5d52f3f4fdc36ed98c7d10289ad973 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <d27c42baea5d52f3f4fdc36ed98c7d10289ad973.1488376602.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Sun, 27 Nov 2016 20:08:53 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] drivers: Move driver_wired_get_bssid() to a common file
This continues refactoring of the common parts of wired drivers code
into a shared file, so that they can be reused by other drivers.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
---
src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c | 10 +---------
src/drivers/driver_wired.c | 10 +---------
src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c | 8 ++++++++
src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h | 1 +
4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
index 15ea4bd..4bbc59f 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
@@ -83,14 +83,6 @@ static int macsec_qca_get_ssid(void *priv, u8 *ssid)
}
-static int macsec_qca_get_bssid(void *priv, u8 *bssid)
-{
- /* Report PAE group address as the "BSSID" for macsec connection. */
- os_memcpy(bssid, pae_group_addr, ETH_ALEN);
- return 0;
-}
-
-
static void __macsec_drv_init(struct macsec_qca_data *drv)
{
int ret = 0;
@@ -749,7 +741,7 @@ const struct wpa_driver_ops wpa_driver_macsec_qca_ops = {
.name = "macsec_qca",
.desc = "QCA MACsec Ethernet driver",
.get_ssid = macsec_qca_get_ssid,
- .get_bssid = macsec_qca_get_bssid,
+ .get_bssid = driver_wired_get_bssid,
.get_capa = driver_wired_get_capa,
.init = macsec_qca_init,
.deinit = macsec_qca_deinit,
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_wired.c b/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
index fd8a7e3..ad34627 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
@@ -374,14 +374,6 @@ static int wpa_driver_wired_get_ssid(void *priv, u8 *ssid)
}
-static int wpa_driver_wired_get_bssid(void *priv, u8 *bssid)
-{
- /* Report PAE group address as the "BSSID" for wired connection. */
- os_memcpy(bssid, pae_group_addr, ETH_ALEN);
- return 0;
-}
-
-
static void * wpa_driver_wired_init(void *ctx, const char *ifname)
{
struct wpa_driver_wired_data *drv;
@@ -415,7 +407,7 @@ const struct wpa_driver_ops wpa_driver_wired_ops = {
.hapd_deinit = wired_driver_hapd_deinit,
.hapd_send_eapol = wired_send_eapol,
.get_ssid = wpa_driver_wired_get_ssid,
- .get_bssid = wpa_driver_wired_get_bssid,
+ .get_bssid = driver_wired_get_bssid,
.get_capa = driver_wired_get_capa,
.init = wpa_driver_wired_init,
.deinit = wpa_driver_wired_deinit,
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c
index b31474d..d30d3a4 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c
@@ -164,6 +164,14 @@ int wired_multicast_membership(int sock, int ifindex, const u8 *addr, int add)
}
+int driver_wired_get_bssid(void *priv, u8 *bssid)
+{
+ /* Report PAE group address as the "BSSID" for wired connection. */
+ os_memcpy(bssid, pae_group_addr, ETH_ALEN);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
int driver_wired_get_capa(void *priv, struct wpa_driver_capa *capa)
{
os_memset(capa, 0, sizeof(*capa));
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
index b926d83..493987a 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ int driver_wired_get_ifflags(const char *ifname, int *flags);
int driver_wired_set_ifflags(const char *ifname, int flags);
int driver_wired_multi(const char *ifname, const u8 *addr, int add);
int wired_multicast_membership(int sock, int ifindex, const u8 *addr, int add);
+int driver_wired_get_bssid(void *priv, u8 *bssid);
int driver_wired_get_capa(void *priv, struct wpa_driver_capa *capa);
int driver_wired_get_ifstatus(const char *ifname, int *status);
--
2.7.4

104
macsec-0028-drivers-Move-driver_wired_get_ssid-to-a-common-file.patch
View File

@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
From 8618313b6ef1c40002836ffc56d70466ea80d44e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <8618313b6ef1c40002836ffc56d70466ea80d44e.1488376602.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Sun, 27 Nov 2016 20:08:54 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] drivers: Move driver_wired_get_ssid() to a common file
This continues refactoring of the common parts of wired drivers code
into a shared file, so that they can be reused by other drivers.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
---
src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c | 9 +--------
src/drivers/driver_wired.c | 9 +--------
src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c | 7 +++++++
src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h | 1 +
4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
index 4bbc59f..d3be19c 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_qca.c
@@ -76,13 +76,6 @@ struct macsec_qca_data {
};
-static int macsec_qca_get_ssid(void *priv, u8 *ssid)
-{
- ssid[0] = 0;
- return 0;
-}
-
-
static void __macsec_drv_init(struct macsec_qca_data *drv)
{
int ret = 0;
@@ -740,7 +733,7 @@ static int macsec_qca_disable_transmit_sa(void *priv, struct transmit_sa *sa)
const struct wpa_driver_ops wpa_driver_macsec_qca_ops = {
.name = "macsec_qca",
.desc = "QCA MACsec Ethernet driver",
- .get_ssid = macsec_qca_get_ssid,
+ .get_ssid = driver_wired_get_ssid,
.get_bssid = driver_wired_get_bssid,
.get_capa = driver_wired_get_capa,
.init = macsec_qca_init,
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_wired.c b/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
index ad34627..7e09dcf 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_wired.c
@@ -367,13 +367,6 @@ static void wired_driver_hapd_deinit(void *priv)
}
-static int wpa_driver_wired_get_ssid(void *priv, u8 *ssid)
-{
- ssid[0] = 0;
- return 0;
-}
-
-
static void * wpa_driver_wired_init(void *ctx, const char *ifname)
{
struct wpa_driver_wired_data *drv;
@@ -406,7 +399,7 @@ const struct wpa_driver_ops wpa_driver_wired_ops = {
.hapd_init = wired_driver_hapd_init,
.hapd_deinit = wired_driver_hapd_deinit,
.hapd_send_eapol = wired_send_eapol,
- .get_ssid = wpa_driver_wired_get_ssid,
+ .get_ssid = driver_wired_get_ssid,
.get_bssid = driver_wired_get_bssid,
.get_capa = driver_wired_get_capa,
.init = wpa_driver_wired_init,
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c
index d30d3a4..2e169d7 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.c
@@ -164,6 +164,13 @@ int wired_multicast_membership(int sock, int ifindex, const u8 *addr, int add)
}
+int driver_wired_get_ssid(void *priv, u8 *ssid)
+{
+ ssid[0] = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
int driver_wired_get_bssid(void *priv, u8 *bssid)
{
/* Report PAE group address as the "BSSID" for wired connection. */
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
index 493987a..7e1a4ae 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_wired_common.h
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ int driver_wired_get_ifflags(const char *ifname, int *flags);
int driver_wired_set_ifflags(const char *ifname, int flags);
int driver_wired_multi(const char *ifname, const u8 *addr, int add);
int wired_multicast_membership(int sock, int ifindex, const u8 *addr, int add);
+int driver_wired_get_ssid(void *priv, u8 *ssid);
int driver_wired_get_bssid(void *priv, u8 *bssid);
int driver_wired_get_capa(void *priv, struct wpa_driver_capa *capa);
int driver_wired_get_ifstatus(const char *ifname, int *status);
--
2.7.4

1397
macsec-0029-macsec_linux-Add-a-driver-for-macsec-on-Linux-kernel.patch
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

49
macsec-0030-mka-Remove-references-to-macsec_qca-from-wpa_supplic.patch
View File

@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
From ba5ea116873a2f4046e4d3f37ab8215a3846f614 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <ba5ea116873a2f4046e4d3f37ab8215a3846f614.1488376602.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Sun, 27 Nov 2016 20:08:56 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] mka: Remove references to macsec_qca from wpa_supplicant.conf
Make the documentation generic, as this is no longer the only macsec
driver.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
---
wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf | 10 ++++------
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
index 82aa24e..edb230d 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
@@ -98,9 +98,7 @@ eapol_version=1
# parameters (e.g., WPA IE generation); this mode can also be used with
# non-WPA drivers when using IEEE 802.1X mode; do not try to associate with
# APs (i.e., external program needs to control association). This mode must
-# also be used when using wired Ethernet drivers.
-# Note: macsec_qca driver is one type of Ethernet driver which implements
-# macsec feature.
+# also be used when using wired Ethernet drivers (including MACsec).
# 2: like 0, but associate with APs using security policy and SSID (but not
# BSSID); this can be used, e.g., with ndiswrapper and NDIS drivers to
# enable operation with hidden SSIDs and optimized roaming; in this mode,
@@ -881,13 +879,13 @@ fast_reauth=1
# bit0 (1): require dynamically generated unicast WEP key
# bit1 (2): require dynamically generated broadcast WEP key
# (3 = require both keys; default)
-# Note: When using wired authentication (including macsec_qca driver),
+# Note: When using wired authentication (including MACsec drivers),
# eapol_flags must be set to 0 for the authentication to be completed
# successfully.
#
# macsec_policy: IEEE 802.1X/MACsec options
-# This determines how sessions are secured with MACsec. It is currently
-# applicable only when using the macsec_qca driver interface.
+# This determines how sessions are secured with MACsec (only for MACsec
+# drivers).
# 0: MACsec not in use (default)
# 1: MACsec enabled - Should secure, accept key server's advice to
# determine whether to use a secure session or not.
--
2.7.4

120
macsec-0031-PAE-Make-KaY-specific-details-available-via-control-.patch
View File

@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
From 7508c2ad99cef6d0691190063ec7735b7759f836 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <7508c2ad99cef6d0691190063ec7735b7759f836.1488376602.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Badrish Adiga H R <badrish.adigahr@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2016 01:40:53 +0530
Subject: [PATCH] PAE: Make KaY specific details available via control
interface
Add KaY details to the STATUS command output.
Signed-off-by: Badrish Adiga H R <badrish.adigahr@hpe.com>
---
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h | 3 +++
wpa_supplicant/ctrl_iface.c | 6 ++++++
3 files changed, 58 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
index 1d6d9a9..cf5782a 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
@@ -1641,6 +1641,7 @@ ieee802_1x_mka_decode_dist_sak_body(
ieee802_1x_cp_signal_newsak(kay->cp);
ieee802_1x_cp_sm_step(kay->cp);
+ kay->rcvd_keys++;
participant->to_use_sak = TRUE;
return 0;
@@ -3519,3 +3520,51 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_change_cipher_suite(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
return 0;
}
+
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE
+/**
+ * ieee802_1x_kay_get_status - Get IEEE 802.1X KaY status details
+ * @sm: Pointer to KaY allocated with ieee802_1x_kay_init()
+ * @buf: Buffer for status information
+ * @buflen: Maximum buffer length
+ * @verbose: Whether to include verbose status information
+ * Returns: Number of bytes written to buf.
+ *
+ * Query KAY status information. This function fills in a text area with current
+ * status information. If the buffer (buf) is not large enough, status
+ * information will be truncated to fit the buffer.
+ */
+int ieee802_1x_kay_get_status(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, char *buf,
+ size_t buflen)
+{
+ int len;
+
+ if (!kay)
+ return 0;
+
+ len = os_snprintf(buf, buflen,
+ "PAE KaY status=%s\n"
+ "Authenticated=%s\n"
+ "Secured=%s\n"
+ "Failed=%s\n"
+ "Actor Priority=%u\n"
+ "Key Server Priority=%u\n"
+ "Is Key Server=%s\n"
+ "Number of Keys Distributed=%u\n"
+ "Number of Keys Received=%u\n",
+ kay->active ? "Active" : "Not-Active",
+ kay->authenticated ? "Yes" : "No",
+ kay->secured ? "Yes" : "No",
+ kay->failed ? "Yes" : "No",
+ kay->actor_priority,
+ kay->key_server_priority,
+ kay->is_key_server ? "Yes" : "No",
+ kay->dist_kn - 1,
+ kay->rcvd_keys);
+ if (os_snprintf_error(buflen, len))
+ return 0;
+
+ return len;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE */
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
index 9a92d1c..b38e814 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
@@ -208,6 +208,7 @@ struct ieee802_1x_kay {
int mka_algindex; /* MKA alg table index */
u32 dist_kn;
+ u32 rcvd_keys;
u8 dist_an;
time_t dist_time;
@@ -267,5 +268,7 @@ int ieee802_1x_kay_enable_tx_sas(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
int ieee802_1x_kay_enable_rx_sas(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
struct ieee802_1x_mka_ki *lki);
int ieee802_1x_kay_enable_new_info(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay);
+int ieee802_1x_kay_get_status(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, char *buf,
+ size_t buflen);
#endif /* IEEE802_1X_KAY_H */
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/ctrl_iface.c b/wpa_supplicant/ctrl_iface.c
index c943dee..624e894 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/ctrl_iface.c
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/ctrl_iface.c
@@ -2050,6 +2050,12 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_ctrl_iface_status(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
pos += res;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_MACSEC
+ res = ieee802_1x_kay_get_status(wpa_s->kay, pos, end - pos);
+ if (res > 0)
+ pos += res;
+#endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */
+
sess_id = eapol_sm_get_session_id(wpa_s->eapol, &sess_id_len);
if (sess_id) {
char *start = pos;
--
2.7.4

176
macsec-0032-mka-Make-MKA-actor-priority-configurable.patch
View File

@ -1,176 +0,0 @@
From 65dfa872862641c17e4f6276c56fad0a6c18d219 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <65dfa872862641c17e4f6276c56fad0a6c18d219.1488376602.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Badrish Adiga H R <badrish.adigahr@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 5 Dec 2016 06:53:55 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] mka: Make MKA actor priority configurable
This adds a new wpa_supplicant network profile parameter
mka_priority=0..255 to set the priority of the MKA Actor.
Signed-off-by: Badrish Adiga H R <badrish.adigahr@gmail.com>
---
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c | 4 ++--
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h | 2 +-
wpa_supplicant/config.c | 5 +++++
wpa_supplicant/config_file.c | 2 ++
wpa_supplicant/config_ssid.h | 7 +++++++
wpa_supplicant/wpa_cli.c | 1 +
wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf | 8 +++++---
wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c | 3 ++-
8 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
index cf5782a..1004b32 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
@@ -3083,7 +3083,7 @@ static void kay_l2_receive(void *ctx, const u8 *src_addr, const u8 *buf,
*/
struct ieee802_1x_kay *
ieee802_1x_kay_init(struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ctx, enum macsec_policy policy,
- u16 port, const char *ifname, const u8 *addr)
+ u16 port, u8 priority, const char *ifname, const u8 *addr)
{
struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay;
@@ -3106,7 +3106,7 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_init(struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ctx, enum macsec_policy policy,
os_strlcpy(kay->if_name, ifname, IFNAMSIZ);
os_memcpy(kay->actor_sci.addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
kay->actor_sci.port = host_to_be16(port ? port : 0x0001);
- kay->actor_priority = DEFAULT_PRIO_NOT_KEY_SERVER;
+ kay->actor_priority = priority;
/* While actor acts as a key server, shall distribute sakey */
kay->dist_kn = 1;
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
index b38e814..8f394fd 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.h
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ u64 mka_sci_u64(struct ieee802_1x_mka_sci *sci);
struct ieee802_1x_kay *
ieee802_1x_kay_init(struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ctx, enum macsec_policy policy,
- u16 port, const char *ifname, const u8 *addr);
+ u16 port, u8 priority, const char *ifname, const u8 *addr);
void ieee802_1x_kay_deinit(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay);
struct ieee802_1x_mka_participant *
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
index 2120a6e..2a26d2d 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include "common.h"
#include "utils/uuid.h"
#include "utils/ip_addr.h"
+#include "common/ieee802_1x_defs.h"
#include "crypto/sha1.h"
#include "rsn_supp/wpa.h"
#include "eap_peer/eap.h"
@@ -2127,6 +2128,7 @@ static const struct parse_data ssid_fields[] = {
{ INT_RANGE(macsec_policy, 0, 1) },
{ INT_RANGE(macsec_integ_only, 0, 1) },
{ INT_RANGE(macsec_port, 1, 65534) },
+ { INT_RANGE(mka_priority, 0, 255) },
{ FUNC_KEY(mka_cak) },
{ FUNC_KEY(mka_ckn) },
#endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */
@@ -2617,6 +2619,9 @@ void wpa_config_set_network_defaults(struct wpa_ssid *ssid)
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
ssid->ieee80211w = MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION_DEFAULT;
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+#ifdef CONFIG_MACSEC
+ ssid->mka_priority = DEFAULT_PRIO_NOT_KEY_SERVER;
+#endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */
ssid->mac_addr = -1;
}
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config_file.c b/wpa_supplicant/config_file.c
index b9b1d4d..98e3591 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/config_file.c
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/config_file.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include "config.h"
#include "base64.h"
#include "uuid.h"
+#include "common/ieee802_1x_defs.h"
#include "p2p/p2p.h"
#include "eap_peer/eap_methods.h"
#include "eap_peer/eap.h"
@@ -813,6 +814,7 @@ static void wpa_config_write_network(FILE *f, struct wpa_ssid *ssid)
write_mka_ckn(f, ssid);
INT(macsec_integ_only);
INT(macsec_port);
+ INT_DEF(mka_priority, DEFAULT_PRIO_NOT_KEY_SERVER);
#endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */
#ifdef CONFIG_HS20
INT(update_identifier);
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config_ssid.h b/wpa_supplicant/config_ssid.h
index fe0f7fa..69ace37 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/config_ssid.h
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/config_ssid.h
@@ -751,6 +751,13 @@ struct wpa_ssid {
int macsec_port;
/**
+ * mka_priority - Priority of MKA Actor
+ *
+ * Range: 0-255 (default: 255)
+ */
+ int mka_priority;
+
+ /**
* mka_ckn - MKA pre-shared CKN
*/
#define MACSEC_CKN_LEN 32
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_cli.c b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_cli.c
index f11028a..21adc17 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_cli.c
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_cli.c
@@ -1392,6 +1392,7 @@ static const char *network_fields[] = {
"macsec_policy",
"macsec_integ_only",
"macsec_port",
+ "mka_priority",
#endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */
#ifdef CONFIG_HS20
"update_identifier",
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
index edb230d..94cef4a 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
@@ -901,13 +901,15 @@ fast_reauth=1
# Port component of the SCI
# Range: 1-65534 (default: 1)
#
-# mka_cak and mka_ckn: IEEE 802.1X/MACsec pre-shared authentication mode
+# mka_cak, mka_ckn, and mka_priority: IEEE 802.1X/MACsec pre-shared key mode
# This allows to configure MACsec with a pre-shared key using a (CAK,CKN) pair.
-# In this mode, instances of wpa_supplicant can act as peers, one of
-# which will become the key server and start distributing SAKs.
+# In this mode, instances of wpa_supplicant can act as MACsec peers. The peer
+# with lower priority will become the key server and start distributing SAKs.
# mka_cak (CAK = Secure Connectivity Association Key) takes a 16-bytes (128 bit)
# hex-string (32 hex-digits)
# mka_ckn (CKN = CAK Name) takes a 32-bytes (256 bit) hex-string (64 hex-digits)
+# mka_priority (Priority of MKA Actor) is in 0..255 range with 255 being
+# default priority
#
# mixed_cell: This option can be used to configure whether so called mixed
# cells, i.e., networks that use both plaintext and encryption in the same
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
index d3fefda..d087e00 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
@@ -233,7 +233,8 @@ int ieee802_1x_alloc_kay_sm(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, struct wpa_ssid *ssid)
kay_ctx->disable_transmit_sa = wpas_disable_transmit_sa;
res = ieee802_1x_kay_init(kay_ctx, policy, ssid->macsec_port,
- wpa_s->ifname, wpa_s->own_addr);
+ ssid->mka_priority, wpa_s->ifname,
+ wpa_s->own_addr);
if (res == NULL) {
os_free(kay_ctx);
return -1;
--
2.7.4

34
macsec-0033-mka-Fix-an-incorrect-update-of-participant-to_use_sa.patch
View File

@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
From 7faf403f9fb39fea9a0545025cc284ef05e022a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <7faf403f9fb39fea9a0545025cc284ef05e022a7.1488376602.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Badrish Adiga H R <badrish.adigahr@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Jan 2017 17:47:51 +0530
Subject: [PATCH] mka: Fix an incorrect update of participant->to_use_sak
API ieee802_1x_mka_decode_dist_sak_body() wrongly puts
participant->to_use_sak to TRUE, if Distributed SAK Parameter Set of
length 0 is received. In MACsec PSK mode, this stale incorrect value can
create problems while re-establishing CA. In MACsec PSK mode, CA goes
down if interface goes down and ideally we should be able to
re-establish the CA once interface comes up.
Signed-off-by: Badrish Adiga H R <badrish.adigahr@gmail.com>
---
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
index 1004b32..79a6878 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
@@ -1559,7 +1559,7 @@ ieee802_1x_mka_decode_dist_sak_body(
ieee802_1x_cp_connect_authenticated(kay->cp);
ieee802_1x_cp_sm_step(kay->cp);
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "KaY:The Key server advise no MACsec");
- participant->to_use_sak = TRUE;
+ participant->to_use_sak = FALSE;
return 0;
}
--
2.7.4

51
macsec-0034-mka-Some-bug-fixes-for-MACsec-in-PSK-mode.patch
View File

@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
From e54691106b29f41aa3081b00eb4f48e411cebc72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <e54691106b29f41aa3081b00eb4f48e411cebc72.1488376602.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Badrish Adiga H R <badrish.adigahr@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Jan 2017 15:27:10 +0530
Subject: [PATCH] mka: Some bug fixes for MACsec in PSK mode
Issue:
------
The test setup has 2 peers running MACsec in PSK mode, Peer A with
MAC address higher than MAC Address of peer B. Test sequence is
1. Peer B starts with actor_priority 255
2. Peer A starts with priority 16, becomes key server.
3. Peer A stops..
4. Peer A restarts with priority 255, but because of the stale values
participant->is_key_server(=TRUE) and participant->is_elected(=TRUE)
it continues to remain as Key Server.
5. For peer B, key server election happens and since it has lower MAC
address as compared to MAC address of A, it becomes the key server.
Now we have 2 key servers in CA and is not correct.
Root-cause & fix:
-----------------
When number of live peers become 0, the flags such lrx, ltx, orx,
otx, etc. need to be cleared. In MACsec PSK mode, these stale values
create problems while re-establishing CA.
Signed-off-by: Badrish Adiga H R <badrish.adigahr@gmail.com>
---
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
index 79a6878..92fd7ba 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
@@ -2378,6 +2378,12 @@ static void ieee802_1x_participant_timer(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
participant->advised_capability =
MACSEC_CAP_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
participant->to_use_sak = FALSE;
+ participant->ltx = FALSE;
+ participant->lrx = FALSE;
+ participant->otx = FALSE;
+ participant->orx = FALSE;
+ participant->is_key_server = FALSE;
+ participant->is_elected = FALSE;
kay->authenticated = TRUE;
kay->secured = FALSE;
kay->failed = FALSE;
--
2.7.4

70
macsec-0035-mka-Send-MKPDUs-forever-if-mode-is-PSK.patch
View File

@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
From 37e9f511eb0072dbce190cb21e2d48f022173b03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <37e9f511eb0072dbce190cb21e2d48f022173b03.1488376602.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Badrish Adiga H R <badrish.adigahr@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2017 14:28:31 +0530
Subject: [PATCH] mka: Send MKPDUs forever if mode is PSK
Issue: When 2 peers are running MACsec in PSK mode with CA
established, if the interface goes down and comes up after
time > 10 seconds, CA does not get re-established.
Root cause: This is because retry_count of both the peers
would have reached MAX_RETRY_CNT and stays idle for other to
respond. This is clear deadlock situation where peer A waits
for MKA packets from peer B to wake up and vice-versa.
Fix: If MACsec is running in PSK mode, we should send MKPDUs
forever for every 2 seconds.
Signed-off-by: Badrish Adiga H R <badrish.adigahr@gmail.com>
---
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c | 6 ++++--
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay_i.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
index 92fd7ba..e420fc1 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
@@ -2428,7 +2428,8 @@ static void ieee802_1x_participant_timer(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
participant->new_sak = FALSE;
}
- if (participant->retry_count < MAX_RETRY_CNT) {
+ if (participant->retry_count < MAX_RETRY_CNT ||
+ participant->mode == PSK) {
ieee802_1x_participant_send_mkpdu(participant);
participant->retry_count++;
}
@@ -2828,7 +2829,7 @@ int ieee802_1x_kay_enable_new_info(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay)
if (!principal)
return -1;
- if (principal->retry_count < MAX_RETRY_CNT) {
+ if (principal->retry_count < MAX_RETRY_CNT || principal->mode == PSK) {
ieee802_1x_participant_send_mkpdu(principal);
principal->retry_count++;
}
@@ -3368,6 +3369,7 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_create_mka(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, struct mka_key_name *ckn,
participant->mka_life = MKA_LIFE_TIME / 1000 + time(NULL) +
usecs / 1000000;
}
+ participant->mode = mode;
return participant;
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay_i.h b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay_i.h
index 0c4bb8e..bc522d8 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay_i.h
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay_i.h
@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ struct ieee802_1x_mka_participant {
Boolean active;
Boolean participant;
Boolean retain;
+ enum mka_created_mode mode;
enum { DEFAULT, DISABLED, ON_OPER_UP, ALWAYS } activate;
--
2.7.4

47
macsec-0036-mka-Fix-the-order-of-operations-in-secure-channel-de.patch
View File

@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
From 128f6a98b3d4d6ed103db759707309f451db9682 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <128f6a98b3d4d6ed103db759707309f451db9682.1488376602.git.dcaratti@redhat.com>
From: Badrish Adiga H R <badrish.adigahr@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 18 Feb 2017 05:14:15 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] mka: Fix the order of operations in secure channel deletion
The correct order of deleting a secure channel is to purge all the
secure associations in the channel before actually deleting the secure
channel.
Signed-off-by: Badrish Adiga H R <badrish.adigahr@gmail.com>
---
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
index e420fc1..3f9e53d 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
@@ -2361,9 +2361,9 @@ static void ieee802_1x_participant_timer(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
&participant->rxsc_list,
struct receive_sc, list) {
if (sci_equal(&rxsc->sci, &peer->sci)) {
- secy_delete_receive_sc(kay, rxsc);
ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_receive_sc(
participant, rxsc);
+ secy_delete_receive_sc(kay, rxsc);
}
}
dl_list_del(&peer->list);
@@ -3432,11 +3432,11 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_delete_mka(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, struct mka_key_name *ckn)
while (!dl_list_empty(&participant->rxsc_list)) {
rxsc = dl_list_entry(participant->rxsc_list.next,
struct receive_sc, list);
- secy_delete_receive_sc(kay, rxsc);
ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_receive_sc(participant, rxsc);
+ secy_delete_receive_sc(kay, rxsc);
}
- secy_delete_transmit_sc(kay, participant->txsc);
ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_transmit_sc(participant, participant->txsc);
+ secy_delete_transmit_sc(kay, participant->txsc);
os_memset(&participant->cak, 0, sizeof(participant->cak));
os_memset(&participant->kek, 0, sizeof(participant->kek));
--
2.7.4

49
macsec-0037-mka-Fix-use-after-free-when-receive-secure-channels-.patch
View File

@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
From 529d6ed7262f0015552e3b8f6eed8ea4508d7c1f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <529d6ed7262f0015552e3b8f6eed8ea4508d7c1f.1491928737.git.davide.caratti@gmail.com>
From: Davide Caratti <davide.caratti@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Mar 2017 14:01:54 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] mka: Fix use-after-free when receive secure channels are
deleted
ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_receive_sc() frees the receive secure channel data,
but secy_delete_receive_sc() still needs it. Since these two functions
are always called sequentially, secy_delete_receive_sc() can be called
from ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_receive_sc() before rxsc is freed.
Fixes: 128f6a98b3d4 ("mka: Fix the order of operations in secure channel deletion")
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <davide.caratti@gmail.com>
---
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
index 3f9e53d..31905ed 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
@@ -532,6 +532,7 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_receive_sc(
ieee802_1x_delete_receive_sa(participant->kay, psa);
dl_list_del(&psc->list);
+ secy_delete_receive_sc(participant->kay, psc);
os_free(psc);
}
@@ -2363,7 +2364,6 @@ static void ieee802_1x_participant_timer(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
if (sci_equal(&rxsc->sci, &peer->sci)) {
ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_receive_sc(
participant, rxsc);
- secy_delete_receive_sc(kay, rxsc);
}
}
dl_list_del(&peer->list);
@@ -3433,7 +3433,6 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_delete_mka(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, struct mka_key_name *ckn)
rxsc = dl_list_entry(participant->rxsc_list.next,
struct receive_sc, list);
ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_receive_sc(participant, rxsc);
- secy_delete_receive_sc(kay, rxsc);
}
ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_transmit_sc(participant, participant->txsc);
secy_delete_transmit_sc(kay, participant->txsc);
--
2.7.4

41
macsec-0038-mka-Fix-use-after-free-when-transmit-secure-channels.patch
View File

@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
From e50df5d2a265a462b0efc056d360649608f160bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <e50df5d2a265a462b0efc056d360649608f160bf.1491928635.git.davide.caratti@gmail.com>
From: Davide Caratti <davide.caratti@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Mar 2017 14:01:55 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] mka: Fix use-after-free when transmit secure channels are
deleted
ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_transmit_sc() frees the transmit secure channel
data, but secy_delete_transmit_sc() still needs it. Since this functions
are called sequentially, secy_delete_transmit_sc() can be called from
ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_transmit_sc() before txsc is freed.
Fixes: 128f6a98b3d4 ("mka: Fix the order of operations in secure channel deletion")
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <davide.caratti@gmail.com>
---
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
index 31905ed..1d4ed89 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
@@ -2546,6 +2546,7 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_transmit_sc(
dl_list_for_each_safe(psa, tmp, &psc->sa_list, struct transmit_sa, list)
ieee802_1x_delete_transmit_sa(participant->kay, psa);
+ secy_delete_transmit_sc(participant->kay, psc);
os_free(psc);
}
@@ -3435,7 +3436,6 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_delete_mka(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay, struct mka_key_name *ckn)
ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_receive_sc(participant, rxsc);
}
ieee802_1x_kay_deinit_transmit_sc(participant, participant->txsc);
- secy_delete_transmit_sc(kay, participant->txsc);
os_memset(&participant->cak, 0, sizeof(participant->cak));
os_memset(&participant->kek, 0, sizeof(participant->kek));
--
2.7.4

74
macsec-0039-macsec_linux-Fix-NULL-pointer-dereference-on-error-c.patch
View File

@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
From 5db86df6a849684fda6a7ee53978a1ba931848cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <5db86df6a849684fda6a7ee53978a1ba931848cb.1491601565.git.davide.caratti@gmail.com>
From: Davide Caratti <davide.caratti@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2017 10:25:24 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] macsec_linux: Fix NULL pointer dereference on error cases
In case wpa_supplicant is using driver_macsec_linux, but macsec module
is not (yet) loaded in the kernel, nl_socket_alloc() fails and drv->sk
is NULL. In this case, don't call libnl functions rntl_link_add() or
rtnl_link_change() using such NULL pointer, to prevent program from
getting segmentation faults like:
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
nl_socket_get_local_port (sk=sk@entry=0x0) at socket.c:365
365 if (sk->s_local.nl_pid == 0) {
(gdb) p sk
$1 = (const struct nl_sock *) 0x0
(gdb) bt
#0 nl_socket_get_local_port (sk=sk@entry=0x0) at socket.c:365
#1 0x00007ffff79c56a0 in nl_complete_msg (sk=sk@entry=0x0,
msg=msg@entry=0x55555595a1f0) at nl.c:491
#2 0x00007ffff79c56d1 in nl_send_auto (sk=sk@entry=0x0,
msg=msg@entry=0x55555595a1f0) at nl.c:522
#3 0x00007ffff79c652f in nl_send_sync (sk=sk@entry=0x0,
msg=0x55555595a1f0) at nl.c:556
#4 0x00007ffff755faf5 in rtnl_link_add (sk=0x0,
link=link@entry=0x55555595b0f0, flags=flags@entry=1024) at route/link.c:1548
#5 0x000055555567a298 in macsec_drv_create_transmit_sc (priv=0x55555593b130,
sc=0x55555593b320, conf_offset=<optimized out>) at ../src/drivers/driver_macsec_linux.c:998
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <davide.caratti@gmail.com>
---
src/drivers/driver_macsec_linux.c | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_linux.c b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_linux.c
index 5dab77a..0694e60 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_macsec_linux.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_macsec_linux.c
@@ -168,6 +168,9 @@ static int try_commit(struct macsec_drv_data *drv)
{
int err;
+ if (!drv->sk)
+ return 0;
+
if (!drv->link)
return 0;
@@ -982,6 +985,11 @@ static int macsec_drv_create_transmit_sc(
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s", __func__);
+ if (!drv->sk) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, DRV_PREFIX "NULL rtnl socket");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
link = rtnl_link_macsec_alloc();
if (!link) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, DRV_PREFIX "couldn't allocate link");
@@ -1048,6 +1056,9 @@ static int macsec_drv_delete_transmit_sc(void *priv, struct transmit_sc *sc)
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s", __func__);
+ if (!drv->sk)
+ return 0;
+
if (!drv->created_link) {
rtnl_link_put(drv->link);
drv->link = NULL;
--
2.7.4

44
rebased-v2.6-0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch
View File

@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
From 3e34cfdff6b192fe337c6fb3f487f73e96582961 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
Date: Sun, 15 Jul 2018 01:25:53 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] WPA: Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data
Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data in supplicant
processing. When using WPA2, these are frames that have the Encrypted
flag set, but not the MIC flag.
When using WPA2, EAPOL-Key frames that had the Encrypted flag set but
not the MIC flag, had their data field decrypted without first verifying
the MIC. In case the data field was encrypted using RC4 (i.e., when
negotiating TKIP as the pairwise cipher), this meant that
unauthenticated but decrypted data would then be processed. An adversary
could abuse this as a decryption oracle to recover sensitive information
in the data field of EAPOL-Key messages (e.g., the group key).
(CVE-2018-14526)
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
---
src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff -upr wpa_supplicant-2.6.orig/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
--- wpa_supplicant-2.6.orig/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c 2016-10-02 21:51:11.000000000 +0300
+++ wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c 2018-08-08 16:55:11.506831029 +0300
@@ -2016,6 +2016,17 @@ int wpa_sm_rx_eapol(struct wpa_sm *sm, c
if ((sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN || sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_OSEN) &&
(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA)) {
+ /*
+ * Only decrypt the Key Data field if the frame's authenticity
+ * was verified. When using AES-SIV (FILS), the MIC flag is not
+ * set, so this check should only be performed if mic_len != 0
+ * which is the case in this code branch.
+ */
+ if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) {
+ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
+ "WPA: Ignore EAPOL-Key with encrypted but unauthenticated data");
+ goto out;
+ }
if (wpa_supplicant_decrypt_key_data(sm, key, ver, key_data,
&key_data_len))
goto out;

174
rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch
View File

@ -1,174 +0,0 @@
From cf4cab804c7afd5c45505528a8d16e46163243a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 15:15:35 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/8] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake
Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame
processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids
issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing
same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and
also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed
frames on RX side.
This issue was introduced by the commit
0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in
authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple
times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is
needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt
failed.
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
---
src/ap/ieee802_11.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 11 +++++++++++
src/ap/wpa_auth.h | 3 ++-
src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c | 10 ++++++++++
src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h | 1 +
5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
index 4e04169..333035f 100644
--- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
+++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
@@ -1841,6 +1841,7 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
{
struct ieee80211_ht_capabilities ht_cap;
struct ieee80211_vht_capabilities vht_cap;
+ int set = 1;
/*
* Remove the STA entry to ensure the STA PS state gets cleared and
@@ -1848,9 +1849,18 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
* FT-over-the-DS, where a station re-associates back to the same AP but
* skips the authentication flow, or if working with a driver that
* does not support full AP client state.
+ *
+ * Skip this if the STA has already completed FT reassociation and the
+ * TK has been configured since the TX/RX PN must not be reset to 0 for
+ * the same key.
*/
- if (!sta->added_unassoc)
+ if (!sta->added_unassoc &&
+ (!(sta->flags & WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED) ||
+ !wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(sta->wpa_sm))) {
hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr);
+ wpa_auth_sm_event(sta->wpa_sm, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED);
+ set = 0;
+ }
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211N
if (sta->flags & WLAN_STA_HT)
@@ -1873,11 +1883,11 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
sta->flags & WLAN_STA_VHT ? &vht_cap : NULL,
sta->flags | WLAN_STA_ASSOC, sta->qosinfo,
sta->vht_opmode, sta->p2p_ie ? 1 : 0,
- sta->added_unassoc)) {
+ set)) {
hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr,
HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, HOSTAPD_LEVEL_NOTICE,
"Could not %s STA to kernel driver",
- sta->added_unassoc ? "set" : "add");
+ set ? "set" : "add");
if (sta->added_unassoc) {
hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr);
diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
index 3587086..707971d 100644
--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
@@ -1745,6 +1745,9 @@ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event)
#else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
break;
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
+ case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED:
+ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
+ return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
@@ -3250,6 +3253,14 @@ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
}
+int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
+{
+ if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
+ return 0;
+ return sm->tk_already_set;
+}
+
+
int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry)
{
diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
index 0de8d97..97461b0 100644
--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
u8 *data, size_t data_len);
enum wpa_event {
WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH,
- WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT
+ WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED
};
void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event);
@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry);
struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
index 42242a5..e63b99a 100644
--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
@@ -780,6 +780,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
return;
}
+ if (sm->tk_already_set) {
+ /* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX
+ * PN in the driver */
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
+ return;
+ }
+
/* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail
* most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only
* after association has been completed. This function will be called
@@ -792,6 +800,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
/* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
sm->pairwise_set = TRUE;
+ sm->tk_already_set = TRUE;
}
@@ -898,6 +907,7 @@ static int wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
sm->pairwise = pairwise;
sm->PTK_valid = TRUE;
+ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm);
buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
index 72b7eb3..7fd8f05 100644
--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine {
struct wpa_ptk PTK;
Boolean PTK_valid;
Boolean pairwise_set;
+ Boolean tk_already_set;
int keycount;
Boolean Pair;
struct wpa_key_replay_counter {
--
2.7.4

250
rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch
View File

@ -1,250 +0,0 @@
From 927f891007c402fefd1ff384645b3f07597c3ede Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 16:03:24 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/8] Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key
Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a
(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do
not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an
attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the
sequence counter associated to the group key.
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
---
src/common/wpa_common.h | 11 +++++
src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 116 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 4 ++
3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
index af1d0f0..d200285 100644
--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
+++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
@@ -217,6 +217,17 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
size_t tk_len;
};
+struct wpa_gtk {
+ u8 gtk[WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN];
+ size_t gtk_len;
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+struct wpa_igtk {
+ u8 igtk[WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN];
+ size_t igtk_len;
+};
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
/* WPA IE version 1
* 00-50-f2:1 (OUI:OUI type)
diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
index 3c47879..95bd7be 100644
--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
@@ -714,6 +714,15 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
u8 gtk_buf[32];
+ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
+ if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
+ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
+ gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Group Key", gd->gtk, gd->gtk_len);
wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
"WPA: Installing GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
@@ -748,6 +757,9 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
}
os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
+ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
+ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
+
return 0;
}
@@ -854,6 +866,48 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
+{
+ size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
+ u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
+
+ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
+ if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
+ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
+ keyidx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "WPA: IGTK keyid %d pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
+ keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", igtk->igtk, len);
+ if (keyidx > 4095) {
+ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
+ "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
+ broadcast_ether_addr,
+ keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
+ igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
+ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
+ "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
+ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+
+
static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie)
{
@@ -864,30 +918,14 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
if (ie->igtk) {
size_t len;
const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
- u16 keyidx;
+
len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
if (ie->igtk_len != WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len)
return -1;
+
igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK keyid %d "
- "pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
- keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK",
- igtk->igtk, len);
- if (keyidx > 4095) {
- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
- "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
- return -1;
- }
- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
- broadcast_ether_addr,
- keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
- igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
- "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
return -1;
- }
}
return 0;
@@ -2307,7 +2345,7 @@ void wpa_sm_deinit(struct wpa_sm *sm)
*/
void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
{
- int clear_ptk = 1;
+ int clear_keys = 1;
if (sm == NULL)
return;
@@ -2333,11 +2371,11 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
/* Prepare for the next transition */
wpa_ft_prepare_auth_request(sm, NULL);
- clear_ptk = 0;
+ clear_keys = 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
- if (clear_ptk) {
+ if (clear_keys) {
/*
* IEEE 802.11, 8.4.10: Delete PTK SA on (re)association if
* this is not part of a Fast BSS Transition.
@@ -2347,6 +2385,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
sm->tptk_set = 0;
os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
+ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
}
#ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
@@ -2877,6 +2919,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk));
os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
+ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
os_memset(sm->pmk_r0, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk_r0));
@@ -2949,29 +2995,11 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
} else if (subelem_id == WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK) {
- struct wpa_igtk_kde igd;
- u16 keyidx;
-
- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
- keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
- os_memcpy(igd.keyid, buf + 2, 2);
- os_memcpy(igd.pn, buf + 4, 6);
-
- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igd.keyid);
- os_memcpy(igd.igtk, buf + 10, keylen);
-
- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install IGTK (WNM SLEEP)",
- igd.igtk, keylen);
- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
- broadcast_ether_addr,
- keyidx, 0, igd.pn, sizeof(igd.pn),
- igd.igtk, keylen) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the IGTK in "
- "WNM mode");
- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
+
+ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
return -1;
- }
- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
} else {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Unknown element id");
diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
index f653ba6..afc9e37 100644
--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
u8 rx_replay_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
int rx_replay_counter_set;
u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
+ struct wpa_gtk gtk;
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ struct wpa_igtk igtk;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
--
2.7.4

184
rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch
View File

@ -1,184 +0,0 @@
From 8280294e74846ea342389a0cd17215050fa5afe8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:12:24 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 3/8] Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of WNM-Sleep
Mode cases
This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value
separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a
corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the
GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to
detect a possible key reconfiguration.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 2 ++
2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
index 95bd7be..7a2c68d 100644
--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
@@ -709,14 +709,17 @@ struct wpa_gtk_data {
static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
const struct wpa_gtk_data *gd,
- const u8 *key_rsc)
+ const u8 *key_rsc, int wnm_sleep)
{
const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
u8 gtk_buf[32];
/* Detect possible key reinstallation */
- if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
- os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
+ if ((sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
+ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) ||
+ (sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
+ os_memcmp(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
+ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len) == 0)) {
wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
"WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
@@ -757,8 +760,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
}
os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
- sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
- os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
+ if (wnm_sleep) {
+ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
+ os_memcpy(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
+ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len);
+ } else {
+ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
+ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
+ }
return 0;
}
@@ -852,7 +861,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
(wpa_supplicant_check_group_cipher(sm, sm->group_cipher,
gtk_len, gtk_len,
&gd.key_rsc_len, &gd.alg) ||
- wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc))) {
+ wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0))) {
wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
"RSN: Failed to install GTK");
os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
@@ -868,14 +877,18 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk,
+ int wnm_sleep)
{
size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
/* Detect possible key reinstallation */
- if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
- os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
+ if ((sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
+ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) ||
+ (sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len == len &&
+ os_memcmp(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
+ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len) == 0)) {
wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
"WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
keyidx);
@@ -900,8 +913,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
return -1;
}
- sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
- os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
+ if (wnm_sleep) {
+ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len = len;
+ os_memcpy(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
+ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len);
+ } else {
+ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
+ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
+ }
return 0;
}
@@ -924,7 +943,7 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
return -1;
igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 0) < 0)
return -1;
}
@@ -1574,7 +1593,7 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_2(struct wpa_sm *sm,
if (wpa_supplicant_rsc_relaxation(sm, key->key_rsc))
key_rsc = null_rsc;
- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc) ||
+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0) ||
wpa_supplicant_send_2_of_2(sm, key, ver, key_info) < 0)
goto failed;
os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
@@ -2386,8 +2405,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
sm->tptk_set = 0;
os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
+ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
+ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
}
@@ -2920,8 +2941,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
+ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
+ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
@@ -2986,7 +3009,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install GTK (WNM SLEEP)",
gd.gtk, gd.gtk_len);
- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc)) {
+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 1)) {
os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the GTK in "
"WNM mode");
@@ -2998,7 +3021,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 1) < 0)
return -1;
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
} else {
diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
index afc9e37..9a54631 100644
--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
@@ -32,8 +32,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
int rx_replay_counter_set;
u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
struct wpa_gtk gtk;
+ struct wpa_gtk gtk_wnm_sleep;
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
struct wpa_igtk igtk;
+ struct wpa_igtk igtk_wnm_sleep;
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
--
2.7.4

79
rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch
View File

@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
From 8f82bc94e8697a9d47fa8774dfdaaede1084912c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2017 04:22:51 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 4/8] Prevent installation of an all-zero TK
Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver
and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from
trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK.
This fixes the earlier fix in commit
ad00d64e7d8827b3cebd665a0ceb08adabf15e1e ('Fix TK configuration to the
driver in EAPOL-Key 3/4 retry case') which did not take into account
possibility of an extra message 1/4 showing up between retries of
message 3/4.
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
---
src/common/wpa_common.h | 1 +
src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 5 ++---
src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 -
3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
index d200285..1021ccb 100644
--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
+++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
size_t kck_len;
size_t kek_len;
size_t tk_len;
+ int installed; /* 1 if key has already been installed to driver */
};
struct wpa_gtk {
diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
index 7a2c68d..0550a41 100644
--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
@@ -510,7 +510,6 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_4(struct wpa_sm *sm,
os_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
}
sm->tptk_set = 1;
- sm->tk_to_set = 1;
kde = sm->assoc_wpa_ie;
kde_len = sm->assoc_wpa_ie_len;
@@ -615,7 +614,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
enum wpa_alg alg;
const u8 *key_rsc;
- if (!sm->tk_to_set) {
+ if (sm->ptk.installed) {
wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
"WPA: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
return 0;
@@ -659,7 +658,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
/* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */
os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN);
- sm->tk_to_set = 0;
+ sm->ptk.installed = 1;
if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) {
eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_rekey_ptk, sm, NULL);
diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
index 9a54631..41f371f 100644
--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ struct wpa_sm {
struct wpa_ptk ptk, tptk;
int ptk_set, tptk_set;
unsigned int msg_3_of_4_ok:1;
- unsigned int tk_to_set:1;
u8 snonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN];
u8 anonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN]; /* ANonce from the last 1/4 msg */
int renew_snonce;
--
2.7.4

64
rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch
View File

@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
From 12fac09b437a1dc8a0f253e265934a8aaf4d2f8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:32:57 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 5/8] Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce
The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing
the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going
directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to
determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the
new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant.
Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state
for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
index 707971d..bf10cc1 100644
--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
@@ -1901,6 +1901,21 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2)
}
+static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
+{
+ if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
+ "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce");
+ sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce,
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK)
{
u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN];
@@ -2458,9 +2473,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK)
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION);
else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest)
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
- else if (sm->PTKRequest)
- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
- else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
+ else if (sm->PTKRequest) {
+ if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0)
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
+ else
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
+ } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE:
break;
case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT:
--
2.7.4

132
rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
View File

@ -1,132 +0,0 @@
From 6c4bed4f47d1960ec04981a9d50e5076aea5223d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:03:15 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 6/8] TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration
Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has
been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues
related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check
for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so
that behavior does not get modified.
For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was
followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating
the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e.,
ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path
and simple replay attacks are not feasible.
As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if
the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
src/rsn_supp/tdls.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
index e424168..9eb9738 100644
--- a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
+++ b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ struct wpa_tdls_peer {
u8 tk[16]; /* TPK-TK; assuming only CCMP will be used */
} tpk;
int tpk_set;
+ int tk_set; /* TPK-TK configured to the driver */
int tpk_success;
int tpk_in_progress;
@@ -192,6 +193,20 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
u8 rsc[6];
enum wpa_alg alg;
+ if (peer->tk_set) {
+ /*
+ * This same TPK-TK has already been configured to the driver
+ * and this new configuration attempt (likely due to an
+ * unexpected retransmitted frame) would result in clearing
+ * the TX/RX sequence number which can break security, so must
+ * not allow that to happen.
+ */
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TDLS: TPK-TK for the peer " MACSTR
+ " has already been configured to the driver - do not reconfigure",
+ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
os_memset(rsc, 0, 6);
switch (peer->cipher) {
@@ -209,12 +224,15 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
return -1;
}
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Configure pairwise key for peer " MACSTR,
+ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, alg, peer->addr, -1, 1,
rsc, sizeof(rsc), peer->tpk.tk, key_len) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TDLS: Failed to set TPK to the "
"driver");
return -1;
}
+ peer->tk_set = 1;
return 0;
}
@@ -696,7 +714,7 @@ static void wpa_tdls_peer_clear(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
peer->cipher = 0;
peer->qos_info = 0;
peer->wmm_capable = 0;
- peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
+ peer->tk_set = peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
peer->chan_switch_enabled = 0;
os_memset(&peer->tpk, 0, sizeof(peer->tpk));
os_memset(peer->inonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
@@ -1159,6 +1177,7 @@ skip_rsnie:
wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer);
return -1;
}
+ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Initiator Nonce for TPK handshake",
peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
os_memcpy(ftie->Snonce, peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
@@ -1751,6 +1770,19 @@ static int wpa_tdls_addset_peer(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer,
}
+static int tdls_nonce_set(const u8 *nonce)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < WPA_NONCE_LEN; i++) {
+ if (nonce[i])
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
static int wpa_tdls_process_tpk_m1(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr,
const u8 *buf, size_t len)
{
@@ -2004,7 +2036,8 @@ skip_rsn:
peer->rsnie_i_len = kde.rsn_ie_len;
peer->cipher = cipher;
- if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) {
+ if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 ||
+ !tdls_nonce_set(peer->inonce)) {
/*
* There is no point in updating the RNonce for every obtained
* TPK M1 frame (e.g., retransmission due to timeout) with the
@@ -2020,6 +2053,7 @@ skip_rsn:
"TDLS: Failed to get random data for responder nonce");
goto error;
}
+ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
}
#if 0
--
2.7.4

43
rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch
View File

@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
From 53c5eb58e95004f86e65ee9fbfccbc291b139057 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:25:02 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 7/8] WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response without pending
request
Commit 03ed0a52393710be6bdae657d1b36efa146520e5 ('WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep
Mode Response if WNM-Sleep Mode has not been used') started ignoring the
response when no WNM-Sleep Mode Request had been used during the
association. This can be made tighter by clearing the used flag when
successfully processing a response. This adds an additional layer of
protection against unexpected retransmissions of the response frame.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
index 1b3409c..67a07ff 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static void ieee802_11_rx_wnmsleep_resp(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
if (!wpa_s->wnmsleep_used) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
- "WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response frame since WNM-Sleep Mode has not been used in this association");
+ "WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response frame since WNM-Sleep Mode operation has not been requested");
return;
}
@@ -299,6 +299,8 @@ static void ieee802_11_rx_wnmsleep_resp(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
return;
}
+ wpa_s->wnmsleep_used = 0;
+
if (wnmsleep_ie->status == WNM_STATUS_SLEEP_ACCEPT ||
wnmsleep_ie->status == WNM_STATUS_SLEEP_EXIT_ACCEPT_GTK_UPDATE) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Successfully recv WNM-Sleep Response "
--
2.7.4

82
rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch
View File

@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
From b372ab0b7daea719749194dc554b26e6367603f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 12:06:37 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 8/8] FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames
The driver is expected to not report a second association event without
the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this
case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same
pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues,
be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this
even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected
Reassociation Response frame.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 3 +++
src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c | 8 ++++++++
src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
index 0550a41..2a53c6f 100644
--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
@@ -2440,6 +2440,9 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_disassoc(struct wpa_sm *sm)
#ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
wpa_tdls_disassoc(sm);
#endif /* CONFIG_TDLS */
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
+ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
/* Keys are not needed in the WPA state machine anymore */
wpa_sm_drop_sa(sm);
diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
index 205793e..d45bb45 100644
--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ static u8 * wpa_ft_gen_req_ies(struct wpa_sm *sm, size_t *len,
u16 capab;
sm->ft_completed = 0;
+ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
buf_len = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
2 + sm->r0kh_id_len + ric_ies_len + 100;
@@ -681,6 +682,11 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
return -1;
}
+ if (sm->ft_reassoc_completed) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Reassociation has already been completed for this FT protocol instance - ignore unexpected retransmission");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (wpa_ft_parse_ies(ies, ies_len, &parse) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Failed to parse IEs");
return -1;
@@ -781,6 +787,8 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
return -1;
}
+ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 1;
+
if (wpa_ft_process_gtk_subelem(sm, parse.gtk, parse.gtk_len) < 0)
return -1;
diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
index 41f371f..56f88dc 100644
--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ struct wpa_sm {
size_t r0kh_id_len;
u8 r1kh_id[FT_R1KH_ID_LEN];
int ft_completed;
+ int ft_reassoc_completed;
int over_the_ds_in_progress;
u8 target_ap[ETH_ALEN]; /* over-the-DS target AP */
int set_ptk_after_assoc;
--
2.7.4

99
rh1451834-nl80211-Fix-race-condition-in-detecting-MAC-change.patch
View File

@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
From 290834df69556b903b49f2a45671cc62b44f13bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Beniamino Galvani <bgalvani@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 28 Apr 2017 17:59:30 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] nl80211: Fix race condition in detecting MAC change
Commit 3e0272ca00ce1df35b45e7d739dd7e935f13fd84 ('nl80211: Re-read MAC
address on RTM_NEWLINK') added the detection of external changes to MAC
address when the interface is brought up.
If the interface state is changed quickly enough, wpa_supplicant may
receive the netlink message for the !IFF_UP event when the interface
has already been brought up and would ignore the next netlink IFF_UP
message, missing the MAC change.
Fix this by also reloading the MAC address when a !IFF_UP event is
received with the interface up, because this implies that the
interface went down and up again, possibly changing the address.
Signed-off-by: Beniamino Galvani <bgalvani@redhat.com>
---
src/drivers/driver_nl80211.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_nl80211.c b/src/drivers/driver_nl80211.c
index af1cb84..24fad29 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_nl80211.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_nl80211.c
@@ -933,6 +933,30 @@ nl80211_find_drv(struct nl80211_global *global, int idx, u8 *buf, size_t len)
}
+static void nl80211_refresh_mac(struct wpa_driver_nl80211_data *drv,
+ int ifindex)
+{
+ struct i802_bss *bss;
+ u8 addr[ETH_ALEN];
+
+ bss = get_bss_ifindex(drv, ifindex);
+ if (bss &&
+ linux_get_ifhwaddr(drv->global->ioctl_sock,
+ bss->ifname, addr) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "nl80211: %s: failed to re-read MAC address",
+ bss->ifname);
+ } else if (bss && os_memcmp(addr, bss->addr, ETH_ALEN) != 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "nl80211: Own MAC address on ifindex %d (%s) changed from "
+ MACSTR " to " MACSTR,
+ ifindex, bss->ifname,
+ MAC2STR(bss->addr), MAC2STR(addr));
+ os_memcpy(bss->addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
+ }
+}
+
+
static void wpa_driver_nl80211_event_rtm_newlink(void *ctx,
struct ifinfomsg *ifi,
u8 *buf, size_t len)
@@ -997,6 +1021,8 @@ static void wpa_driver_nl80211_event_rtm_newlink(void *ctx,
namebuf[0] = '\0';
if (if_indextoname(ifi->ifi_index, namebuf) &&
linux_iface_up(drv->global->ioctl_sock, namebuf) > 0) {
+ /* Re-read MAC address as it may have changed */
+ nl80211_refresh_mac(drv, ifi->ifi_index);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "nl80211: Ignore interface down "
"event since interface %s is up", namebuf);
drv->ignore_if_down_event = 0;
@@ -1044,27 +1070,8 @@ static void wpa_driver_nl80211_event_rtm_newlink(void *ctx,
"event since interface %s is marked "
"removed", drv->first_bss->ifname);
} else {
- struct i802_bss *bss;
- u8 addr[ETH_ALEN];
-
/* Re-read MAC address as it may have changed */
- bss = get_bss_ifindex(drv, ifi->ifi_index);
- if (bss &&
- linux_get_ifhwaddr(drv->global->ioctl_sock,
- bss->ifname, addr) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
- "nl80211: %s: failed to re-read MAC address",
- bss->ifname);
- } else if (bss &&
- os_memcmp(addr, bss->addr, ETH_ALEN) != 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
- "nl80211: Own MAC address on ifindex %d (%s) changed from "
- MACSTR " to " MACSTR,
- ifi->ifi_index, bss->ifname,
- MAC2STR(bss->addr),
- MAC2STR(addr));
- os_memcpy(bss->addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
- }
+ nl80211_refresh_mac(drv, ifi->ifi_index);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "nl80211: Interface up");
drv->if_disabled = 0;
--
2.9.3

122
rh1462262-use-system-openssl-ciphers.patch
View File

@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
From 61665e43b0509e3d05b2519bf10531bd2163ed66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Beniamino Galvani <bgalvani@redhat.com>
Date: Sun, 9 Jul 2017 11:06:50 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] OpenSSL: Add build option to select default ciphers
Add a build option to select different default ciphers for OpenSSL
instead of the hardcoded default "DEFAULT:!EXP:!LOW".
This new option is useful on distributions where the security level
should be consistent for all applications, as in Fedora [1]. In such
cases the new configuration option would be set to "" or
"PROFILE=SYSTEM" to select the global crypto policy by default.
[1] https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/CryptoPolicy
Signed-off-by: Beniamino Galvani <bgalvani@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2b9891bd6e125d3e28f26afde32e153db658b7cc)
---
src/crypto/tls_openssl.c | 2 +-
wpa_supplicant/Android.mk | 4 ++++
wpa_supplicant/Makefile | 4 ++++
wpa_supplicant/android.config | 4 ++++
wpa_supplicant/defconfig | 4 ++++
wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf | 4 ++--
6 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c
index 23ac64b..c4170b6 100644
--- a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c
+++ b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c
@@ -1017,7 +1017,7 @@ void * tls_init(const struct tls_config *conf)
if (conf && conf->openssl_ciphers)
ciphers = conf->openssl_ciphers;
else
- ciphers = "DEFAULT:!EXP:!LOW";
+ ciphers = TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERS;
if (SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ssl, ciphers) != 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
"OpenSSL: Failed to set cipher string '%s'",
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/Android.mk b/wpa_supplicant/Android.mk
index a8d6a7f..a9dc086 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/Android.mk
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/Android.mk
@@ -971,6 +971,10 @@ ifdef CONFIG_TLS_ADD_DL
LIBS += -ldl
LIBS_p += -ldl
endif
+ifndef CONFIG_TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERS
+CONFIG_TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERS = "DEFAULT:!EXP:!LOW"
+endif
+L_CFLAGS += -DTLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERS=\"$(CONFIG_TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERS)\"
endif
ifeq ($(CONFIG_TLS), gnutls)
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
index 512052e..cc55a52 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
@@ -1020,6 +1020,10 @@ ifdef CONFIG_TLS_ADD_DL
LIBS += -ldl
LIBS_p += -ldl
endif
+ifndef CONFIG_TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERS
+CONFIG_TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERS = "DEFAULT:!EXP:!LOW"
+endif
+CFLAGS += -DTLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERS=\"$(CONFIG_TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERS)\"
endif
ifeq ($(CONFIG_TLS), gnutls)
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/android.config b/wpa_supplicant/android.config
index 02505bb..f3cc838 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/android.config
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/android.config
@@ -291,6 +291,10 @@ CONFIG_IEEE80211W=y
# will be used)
#CONFIG_TLSV12=y
+# Select which ciphers to use by default with OpenSSL if the user does not
+# specify them.
+#CONFIG_TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERS="DEFAULT:!EXP:!LOW"
+
# If CONFIG_TLS=internal is used, additional library and include paths are
# needed for LibTomMath. Alternatively, an integrated, minimal version of
# LibTomMath can be used. See beginning of libtommath.c for details on benefits
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/defconfig b/wpa_supplicant/defconfig
index 1d05198..8b0eb87 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/defconfig
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/defconfig
@@ -316,6 +316,10 @@ CONFIG_PEERKEY=y
# will be used)
#CONFIG_TLSV12=y
+# Select which ciphers to use by default with OpenSSL if the user does not
+# specify them.
+#CONFIG_TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERS="DEFAULT:!EXP:!LOW"
+
# If CONFIG_TLS=internal is used, additional library and include paths are
# needed for LibTomMath. Alternatively, an integrated, minimal version of
# LibTomMath can be used. See beginning of libtommath.c for details on benefits
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
index 1061c98..70989c0 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
@@ -183,13 +183,13 @@ fast_reauth=1
# OpenSSL cipher string
#
# This is an OpenSSL specific configuration option for configuring the default
-# ciphers. If not set, "DEFAULT:!EXP:!LOW" is used as the default.
+# ciphers. If not set, the value configured at build time ("DEFAULT:!EXP:!LOW"
+# by default) is used.
# See https://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/ciphers.html for OpenSSL documentation
# on cipher suite configuration. This is applicable only if wpa_supplicant is
# built to use OpenSSL.
#openssl_ciphers=DEFAULT:!EXP:!LOW
-
# Dynamic EAP methods
# If EAP methods were built dynamically as shared object files, they need to be
# loaded here before being used in the network blocks. By default, EAP methods
--
2.9.3

127
rh1465138-openssl-Fix-openssl-1-1-private-key-callback.patch
View File

@ -1,127 +0,0 @@
From 25b37c54a47e49d591f5752bbf0f510480402cae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Beniamino Galvani <bgalvani@redhat.com>
Date: Sun, 9 Jul 2017 11:14:10 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] OpenSSL: Fix private key password handling with OpenSSL
>= 1.1.0f
Since OpenSSL version 1.1.0f, SSL_use_PrivateKey_file() uses the
callback from the SSL object instead of the one from the CTX, so let's
set the callback on both SSL and CTX. Note that
SSL_set_default_passwd_cb*() is available only in 1.1.0.
Signed-off-by: Beniamino Galvani <bgalvani@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit f665c93e1d28fbab3d9127a8c3985cc32940824f)
---
src/crypto/tls_openssl.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c
index c4170b6..bceb8c3 100644
--- a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c
+++ b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c
@@ -2779,6 +2779,15 @@ static int tls_connection_private_key(struct tls_data *data,
} else
passwd = NULL;
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ /*
+ * In OpenSSL >= 1.1.0f SSL_use_PrivateKey_file() uses the callback
+ * from the SSL object. See OpenSSL commit d61461a75253.
+ */
+ SSL_set_default_passwd_cb(conn->ssl, tls_passwd_cb);
+ SSL_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(conn->ssl, passwd);
+#endif /* >= 1.1.0f && !LibreSSL */
+ /* Keep these for OpenSSL < 1.1.0f */
SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, tls_passwd_cb);
SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ssl_ctx, passwd);
@@ -2869,6 +2878,9 @@ static int tls_connection_private_key(struct tls_data *data,
return -1;
}
ERR_clear_error();
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ SSL_set_default_passwd_cb(conn->ssl, NULL);
+#endif /* >= 1.1.0f && !LibreSSL */
SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, NULL);
os_free(passwd);
--
2.9.3
From b2887d6964a406eb5f88f4ad4e9764c468954382 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Mon, 17 Jul 2017 12:06:17 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] OpenSSL: Clear default_passwd_cb more thoroughly
Previously, the pointer to strdup passwd was left in OpenSSL library
default_passwd_cb_userdata and even the default_passwd_cb was left set
on an error path. To avoid unexpected behavior if something were to
manage to use there pointers, clear them explicitly once done with
loading of the private key.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
(cherry picked from commit 89971d8b1e328a2f79699c953625d1671fd40384)
---
src/crypto/tls_openssl.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c
index bceb8c3..770af9e 100644
--- a/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c
+++ b/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c
@@ -2758,6 +2758,19 @@ static int tls_connection_engine_private_key(struct tls_connection *conn)
}
+static void tls_clear_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx, SSL *ssl)
+{
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ if (ssl) {
+ SSL_set_default_passwd_cb(ssl, NULL);
+ SSL_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ssl, NULL);
+ }
+#endif /* >= 1.1.0f && !LibreSSL */
+ SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, NULL);
+ SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ssl_ctx, NULL);
+}
+
+
static int tls_connection_private_key(struct tls_data *data,
struct tls_connection *conn,
const char *private_key,
@@ -2874,14 +2887,12 @@ static int tls_connection_private_key(struct tls_data *data,
if (!ok) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
"Failed to load private key");
+ tls_clear_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, conn->ssl);
os_free(passwd);
return -1;
}
ERR_clear_error();
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
- SSL_set_default_passwd_cb(conn->ssl, NULL);
-#endif /* >= 1.1.0f && !LibreSSL */
- SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, NULL);
+ tls_clear_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, conn->ssl);
os_free(passwd);
if (!SSL_check_private_key(conn->ssl)) {
@@ -2924,13 +2935,14 @@ static int tls_global_private_key(struct tls_data *data,
tls_read_pkcs12(data, NULL, private_key, passwd)) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
"Failed to load private key");
+ tls_clear_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, NULL);
os_free(passwd);
ERR_clear_error();
return -1;
}
+ tls_clear_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, NULL);
os_free(passwd);
ERR_clear_error();
- SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ssl_ctx, NULL);
if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ssl_ctx)) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
--
2.9.3

106
rh1497640-mka-add-error-handling-for-secy_init_macsec.patch
View File

@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
From 7612e65b9bdfe03e5a018e3c897f4a3292c42ee4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2017 10:34:19 +0200
Subject: mka: Add error handling for secy_init_macsec() calls
secy_init_macsec() can fail (if ->macsec_init fails), and
ieee802_1x_kay_init() should handle this and not let MKA run any
further, because nothing is going to work anyway.
On failure, ieee802_1x_kay_init() must deinit its kay, which will free
kay->ctx, so ieee802_1x_kay_init callers (only ieee802_1x_alloc_kay_sm)
must not do it. Before this patch there is a double-free of the ctx
argument when ieee802_1x_kay_deinit() was called.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
---
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c | 25 ++++++++++++++-----------
wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c | 5 ++---
2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
index ff55f88..c4bfcbc 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
@@ -3100,6 +3100,7 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_init(struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ctx, enum macsec_policy policy,
kay = os_zalloc(sizeof(*kay));
if (!kay) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "KaY-%s: out of memory", __func__);
+ os_free(ctx);
return NULL;
}
@@ -3134,10 +3135,8 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_init(struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ctx, enum macsec_policy policy,
dl_list_init(&kay->participant_list);
if (policy != DO_NOT_SECURE &&
- secy_get_capability(kay, &kay->macsec_capable) < 0) {
- os_free(kay);
- return NULL;
- }
+ secy_get_capability(kay, &kay->macsec_capable) < 0)
+ goto error;
if (policy == DO_NOT_SECURE ||
kay->macsec_capable == MACSEC_CAP_NOT_IMPLEMENTED) {
@@ -3164,16 +3163,17 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_init(struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ctx, enum macsec_policy policy,
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "KaY: state machine created");
/* Initialize the SecY must be prio to CP, as CP will control SecY */
- secy_init_macsec(kay);
+ if (secy_init_macsec(kay) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "KaY: Could not initialize MACsec");
+ goto error;
+ }
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "KaY: secy init macsec done");
/* init CP */
kay->cp = ieee802_1x_cp_sm_init(kay);
- if (kay->cp == NULL) {
- ieee802_1x_kay_deinit(kay);
- return NULL;
- }
+ if (kay->cp == NULL)
+ goto error;
if (policy == DO_NOT_SECURE) {
ieee802_1x_cp_connect_authenticated(kay->cp);
@@ -3184,12 +3184,15 @@ ieee802_1x_kay_init(struct ieee802_1x_kay_ctx *ctx, enum macsec_policy policy,
if (kay->l2_mka == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING,
"KaY: Failed to initialize L2 packet processing for MKA packet");
- ieee802_1x_kay_deinit(kay);
- return NULL;
+ goto error;
}
}
return kay;
+
+error:
+ ieee802_1x_kay_deinit(kay);
+ return NULL;
}
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
index d087e00..587e5c3 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpas_kay.c
@@ -235,10 +235,9 @@ int ieee802_1x_alloc_kay_sm(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, struct wpa_ssid *ssid)
res = ieee802_1x_kay_init(kay_ctx, policy, ssid->macsec_port,
ssid->mka_priority, wpa_s->ifname,
wpa_s->own_addr);
- if (res == NULL) {
- os_free(kay_ctx);
+ /* ieee802_1x_kay_init() frees kay_ctx on failure */
+ if (res == NULL)
return -1;
- }
wpa_s->kay = res;
--
cgit v0.12

78
rh1497640-pae-validate-input-before-pointer.patch
View File

@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
From 0ad5893a2f1f521d44712cd395e067ccf0a397c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michael Braun <michael-dev@fami-braun.de>
Date: Fri, 18 Aug 2017 01:14:28 +0200
Subject: PAE: Validate input before pointer
ieee802_1x_kay_decode_mkpdu() calls ieee802_1x_mka_i_in_peerlist()
before body_len has been checked on all segments.
ieee802_1x_kay_decode_mkpdu() and ieee802_1x_mka_i_in_peerlist() might
continue and thus underflow left_len even if it finds left_len to small
(or before checking).
Additionally, ieee802_1x_mka_dump_peer_body() might perform out of bound
reads in this case.
Fix this by checking left_len and aborting if too small early.
Signed-off-by: Michael Braun <michael-dev@fami-braun.de>
---
src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c | 23 ++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
index c4bfcbc..cad0292 100644
--- a/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
+++ b/src/pae/ieee802_1x_kay.c
@@ -964,21 +964,19 @@ ieee802_1x_mka_i_in_peerlist(struct ieee802_1x_mka_participant *participant,
body_len = get_mka_param_body_len(hdr);
body_type = get_mka_param_body_type(hdr);
- if (body_type != MKA_LIVE_PEER_LIST &&
- body_type != MKA_POTENTIAL_PEER_LIST)
- continue;
-
- ieee802_1x_mka_dump_peer_body(
- (struct ieee802_1x_mka_peer_body *)pos);
-
- if (left_len < (MKA_HDR_LEN + body_len + DEFAULT_ICV_LEN)) {
+ if (left_len < (MKA_HDR_LEN + MKA_ALIGN_LENGTH(body_len) + DEFAULT_ICV_LEN)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
"KaY: MKA Peer Packet Body Length (%zu bytes) is less than the Parameter Set Header Length (%zu bytes) + the Parameter Set Body Length (%zu bytes) + %d bytes of ICV",
left_len, MKA_HDR_LEN,
- body_len, DEFAULT_ICV_LEN);
- continue;
+ MKA_ALIGN_LENGTH(body_len),
+ DEFAULT_ICV_LEN);
+ return FALSE;
}
+ if (body_type != MKA_LIVE_PEER_LIST &&
+ body_type != MKA_POTENTIAL_PEER_LIST)
+ continue;
+
if ((body_len % 16) != 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
"KaY: MKA Peer Packet Body Length (%zu bytes) should be a multiple of 16 octets",
@@ -986,6 +984,9 @@ ieee802_1x_mka_i_in_peerlist(struct ieee802_1x_mka_participant *participant,
continue;
}
+ ieee802_1x_mka_dump_peer_body(
+ (struct ieee802_1x_mka_peer_body *)pos);
+
for (i = 0; i < body_len;
i += sizeof(struct ieee802_1x_mka_peer_id)) {
const struct ieee802_1x_mka_peer_id *peer_mi;
@@ -3018,7 +3019,7 @@ static int ieee802_1x_kay_decode_mkpdu(struct ieee802_1x_kay *kay,
"KaY: MKA Peer Packet Body Length (%zu bytes) is less than the Parameter Set Header Length (%zu bytes) + the Parameter Set Body Length (%zu bytes) + %d bytes of ICV",
left_len, MKA_HDR_LEN,
body_len, DEFAULT_ICV_LEN);
- continue;
+ return -1;
}
if (handled[body_type])
--
cgit v0.12

31
rh1567474-0002-D-Bus-Add-pmf-to-global-capabilities.patch
View File

@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
From 3cdb4ac074f76accf24a51d143db545afad2c90b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <3cdb4ac074f76accf24a51d143db545afad2c90b.1525963467.git.davide.caratti@gmail.com>
From: Stijn Tintel <stijn@linux-ipv6.be>
Date: Thu, 5 Jan 2017 16:06:33 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] D-Bus: Add pmf to global capabilities
This indicates that the wpa_supplicant binary has been compiled with PMF
support.
Signed-off-by: Stijn Tintel <stijn@linux-ipv6.be>
---
wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus_new_handlers.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus_new_handlers.c b/wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus_new_handlers.c
index 094301045..87581c900 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus_new_handlers.c
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus_new_handlers.c
@@ -991,6 +991,9 @@ dbus_bool_t wpas_dbus_getter_global_capabilities(
#ifdef CONFIG_INTERWORKING
capabilities[num_items++] = "interworking";
#endif /* CONFIG_INTERWORKING */
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ capabilities[num_items++] = "pmf";
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
return wpas_dbus_simple_array_property_getter(iter,
DBUS_TYPE_STRING,
--
2.14.3

38
rh1570903-nl80211-Fix-NL80211_ATTR_SMPS_MODE-encoding.patch
View File

@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
From a2426829ce426de82d2fa47071ca41ea81c43307 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <a2426829ce426de82d2fa47071ca41ea81c43307.1527581614.git.davide.caratti@gmail.com>
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Date: Fri, 1 Dec 2017 20:22:44 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] nl80211: Fix NL80211_ATTR_SMPS_MODE encoding
This nl80211 attribute uses NLA_U8 policy in cfg80211 and
hostapd/wpa_supplicant needs to use same size when writing the
attribute.
This fixes AP mode regression triggered by kernel commit "net: netlink:
Update attr validation to require exact length for some types" in
v4.15-rc1 that resulted in the following debug log entry when trying to
enable beaconing:
nl80211: Beacon set failed: -34 (Numerical result out of range)
Fixes: da1080d7215f ("nl80211: Advertise and configure SMPS modes")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
---
src/drivers/driver_nl80211.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/drivers/driver_nl80211.c b/src/drivers/driver_nl80211.c
index 2ce03ed76..7571e77f0 100644
--- a/src/drivers/driver_nl80211.c
+++ b/src/drivers/driver_nl80211.c
@@ -3957,7 +3957,7 @@ static int wpa_driver_nl80211_set_ap(void *priv,
smps_mode = NL80211_SMPS_OFF;
break;
}
- if (nla_put_u32(msg, NL80211_ATTR_SMPS_MODE, smps_mode))
+ if (nla_put_u8(msg, NL80211_ATTR_SMPS_MODE, smps_mode))
goto fail;
}
--
2.17.0

BIN
wpa_supplicant-2.10.tar.gz Normal file
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BIN
wpa_supplicant-2.6.tar.gz
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31
allow-to-override-names-of-qt4-tools.patch → wpa_supplicant-gui-qt4.patch
View File

@ -1,27 +1,27 @@
From 96e803dc2502f1d822258048bb8dd5febe733dc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: openEuler Buildteam <buildteam@openeuler.org>
Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2020 09:25:47 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] allow to override names of the Qt4 tools.
From 9404f356e394604d1d3d6dbffc52abd54260e4d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2015 08:56:35 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] wpa_supplicant: allow overriding the names of the Qt4 tools
This is useful for distributions that ship different versions of Qt in
different locations.
---
wpa_supplicant/Makefile | 7 ++++---
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
wpa_supplicant/Makefile | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
index 371789d..56c319c 100644
--- a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
@@ -21,7 +21,8 @@ export LIBDIR ?= /usr/local/lib/
export INCDIR ?= /usr/local/include/
export BINDIR ?= /usr/local/sbin/
@@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ export INCDIR ?= /usr/local/include
export BINDIR ?= /usr/local/sbin
PKG_CONFIG ?= pkg-config
-
+LRELEASE ?= lrelease
+QMAKE ?= qmake
+LRELEASE ?= lrelease
+
CFLAGS += $(EXTRA_CFLAGS)
CFLAGS += -I$(abspath ../src)
CFLAGS += -I$(abspath ../src/utils)
@@ -1811,10 +1812,10 @@ wpa_gui:
@@ -2039,10 +2042,10 @@ wpa_gui:
@echo "wpa_gui has been removed - see wpa_gui-qt4 for replacement"
wpa_gui-qt4/Makefile:
@ -34,6 +34,3 @@ index 371789d..56c319c 100644
wpa_gui-qt4: wpa_gui-qt4/Makefile wpa_gui-qt4/lang/wpa_gui_de.qm
$(MAKE) -C wpa_gui-qt4
--
1.8.3.1

105
wpa_supplicant.spec
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
Name: wpa_supplicant
Epoch: 1
Version: 2.6
Release: 30
Version: 2.10
Release: 1
Summary: A WPA Supplicant with support for WPA and WPA2 (IEEE 802.11i / RSN)
License: BSD or GPLv2
Url: https://w1.fi/wpa_supplicant/
@ -11,101 +11,7 @@ Source2: %{name}.conf
Source3: %{name}.service
Source5: %{name}.logrotate
#patches number ranging between [0,6000) are from fedora/redhat upstream
#patches number ranging between [6000,9000) are backport from higher versions, including some CVE fixes
Patch0: macsec-0001-mka-Move-structs-transmit-receive-_-sa-sc-to-a-commo.patch
Patch1: macsec-0002-mka-Pass-full-structures-down-to-macsec-drivers-pack.patch
Patch2: macsec-0003-mka-Pass-full-structures-down-to-macsec-drivers-tran.patch
Patch3: macsec-0004-mka-Pass-full-structures-down-to-macsec-drivers-rece.patch
Patch4: macsec-0005-mka-Pass-full-structures-down-to-macsec-drivers-tran.patch
Patch5: macsec-0006-mka-Pass-full-structures-down-to-macsec-drivers-rece.patch
Patch6: macsec-0007-mka-Add-driver-op-to-get-macsec-capabilities.patch
Patch7: macsec-0008-mka-Remove-channel-hacks-from-the-stack-and-the-macs.patch
Patch8: macsec-0009-mka-Sync-structs-definitions-with-IEEE-Std-802.1X-20.patch
Patch9: macsec-0010-mka-Add-support-for-removing-SAs.patch
Patch10: macsec-0011-mka-Implement-reference-counting-on-data_key.patch
Patch11: macsec-0012-mka-Fix-getting-capabilities-from-the-driver.patch
Patch12: macsec-0013-wpa_supplicant-Allow-pre-shared-CAK-CKN-pair-for-MKA.patch
Patch13: macsec-0014-mka-Disable-peer-detection-timeout-for-PSK-mode.patch
Patch14: macsec-0015-wpa_supplicant-Add-macsec_integ_only-setting-for-MKA.patch
Patch15: macsec-0016-mka-Add-enable_encrypt-op-and-call-it-from-CP-state-.patch
Patch16: macsec-0017-wpa_supplicant-Allow-configuring-the-MACsec-port-for.patch
Patch17: macsec-0018-drivers-Move-common-definitions-for-wired-drivers-ou.patch
Patch18: macsec-0019-drivers-Move-wired_multicast_membership-to-a-common-.patch
Patch19: macsec-0020-drivers-Move-driver_wired_multi-to-a-common-file.patch
Patch20: macsec-0021-drivers-Move-driver_wired_get_ifflags-to-a-common-fi.patch
Patch21: macsec-0022-drivers-Move-driver_wired_set_ifflags-to-a-common-fi.patch
Patch22: macsec-0023-drivers-Move-driver_wired_get_ifstatus-to-a-common-f.patch
Patch23: macsec-0024-drivers-Move-driver_wired_init_common-to-a-common-fi.patch
Patch24: macsec-0025-drivers-Move-driver_wired_deinit_common-to-a-common-.patch
Patch25: macsec-0026-drivers-Move-driver_wired_get_capa-to-a-common-file.patch
Patch26: macsec-0027-drivers-Move-driver_wired_get_bssid-to-a-common-file.patch
Patch27: macsec-0028-drivers-Move-driver_wired_get_ssid-to-a-common-file.patch
Patch28: macsec-0029-macsec_linux-Add-a-driver-for-macsec-on-Linux-kernel.patch
Patch29: macsec-0030-mka-Remove-references-to-macsec_qca-from-wpa_supplic.patch
Patch30: macsec-0031-PAE-Make-KaY-specific-details-available-via-control-.patch
Patch31: macsec-0032-mka-Make-MKA-actor-priority-configurable.patch
Patch32: macsec-0033-mka-Fix-an-incorrect-update-of-participant-to_use_sa.patch
Patch33: macsec-0034-mka-Some-bug-fixes-for-MACsec-in-PSK-mode.patch
Patch34: macsec-0035-mka-Send-MKPDUs-forever-if-mode-is-PSK.patch
Patch35: macsec-0036-mka-Fix-the-order-of-operations-in-secure-channel-de.patch
Patch36: macsec-0037-mka-Fix-use-after-free-when-receive-secure-channels-.patch
Patch37: macsec-0038-mka-Fix-use-after-free-when-transmit-secure-channels.patch
Patch38: macsec-0039-macsec_linux-Fix-NULL-pointer-dereference-on-error-c.patch
Patch39: rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch
Patch40: rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch
Patch41: rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch
Patch42: rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch
Patch43: rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch
Patch44: rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
Patch45: rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch
Patch46: rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch
Patch47: rh1451834-nl80211-Fix-race-condition-in-detecting-MAC-change.patch
Patch48: rh1462262-use-system-openssl-ciphers.patch
Patch49: rh1465138-openssl-Fix-openssl-1-1-private-key-callback.patch
Patch50: rh1497640-mka-add-error-handling-for-secy_init_macsec.patch
Patch51: rh1497640-pae-validate-input-before-pointer.patch
Patch52: rh1567474-0002-D-Bus-Add-pmf-to-global-capabilities.patch
Patch53: rh1570903-nl80211-Fix-NL80211_ATTR_SMPS_MODE-encoding.patch
Patch54: CVE-2019-9496-SAE-Fix-confirm-message-validation-in-error-cases.patch
Patch55: CVE-2019-9494-1.patch
Patch56: CVE-2019-9494-2.patch
Patch57: CVE-2019-9494-3.patch
Patch58: CVE-2019-9494-4.patch
Patch59: CVE-2019-9494-5.patch
Patch60: CVE-2019-9494-6.patch
Patch61: CVE-2019-9494-7.patch
Patch62: CVE-2019-9494-8.patch
Patch63: CVE-2019-16275.patch
Patch64: CVE-2019-9497.patch
Patch65: CVE-2019-9498-and-CVE-2019-9499.patch
Patch66: CVE-2019-11555-1.patch
Patch67: CVE-2019-11555-2.patch
Patch68: rebased-v2.6-0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch
Patch69: CVE-2019-9499.patch
Patch70: CVE-2019-9495-pre1.patch
Patch71: CVE-2019-9495-pre2.patch
Patch72: CVE-2019-9495-pre3.patch
Patch73: CVE-2019-9495.patch
Patch74: CVE-2019-13377-1.patch
Patch75: CVE-2019-13377-2-pre1.patch
Patch76: CVE-2019-13377-2-pre.patch
Patch77: CVE-2019-13377-2.patch
Patch78: CVE-2019-13377-3.patch
Patch79: CVE-2019-13377-4.patch
Patch80: CVE-2019-13377-5.patch
Patch81: CVE-2019-13377-6-pre.patch
Patch82: CVE-2019-13377-6.patch
Patch83: add-options-of-wpa_supplicant-service.patch
Patch84: allow-to-override-names-of-qt4-tools.patch
Patch85: CVE-2021-27803.patch
Patch86: CVE-2021-0326.patch
Patch87: backport-Add-support-for-wolfSSL-cryptographic-library.patch
Patch88: backport-Share-common-SAE-and-EAP-pwd-functionality-suitable-.patch
Patch89: backport-0001-CVE-2022-23303-CVE-2022-23304.patch
Patch90: backport-0002-CVE-2022-23303-CVE-2022-23304.patch
Patch91: backport-0003-CVE-2022-23303-CVE-2022-23304.patch
Patch92: backport-0004-CVE-2022-23303-CVE-2022-23304.patch
Patch6000: wpa_supplicant-gui-qt4.patch
BuildRequires: qt-devel >= 4.0 openssl-devel readline-devel dbus-devel libnl3-devel systemd-units docbook-utils
Requires(post): systemd-sysv
@ -162,7 +68,6 @@ install -m755 %{name}/{wpa_passphrase,wpa_cli,wpa_supplicant,eapol_test} %{build
install -Dm644 %{name}/dbus/dbus-wpa_supplicant.conf %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/dbus-1/system.d/wpa_supplicant.conf
install -Dm644 %{name}/dbus/fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1.service %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/dbus-1/system-services/fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1.service
install -Dm644 %{name}/dbus/fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant.service %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/dbus-1/system-services/fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant.service
install -Dm755 %{name}/wpa_gui-qt4/wpa_gui %{buildroot}/%{_bindir}/wpa_gui
@ -182,7 +87,6 @@ install -m644 %{name}/doc/docbook/*.5 %{buildroot}%{_mandir}/man5
%config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/logrotate.d/%{name}
%{_unitdir}/%{name}.service
%{_sysconfdir}/dbus-1/system.d/%{name}.conf
%{_datadir}/dbus-1/system-services/fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant.service
%{_datadir}/dbus-1/system-services/fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1.service
%{_sbindir}/wpa_passphrase
%{_sbindir}/wpa_supplicant
@ -199,6 +103,9 @@ install -m644 %{name}/doc/docbook/*.5 %{buildroot}%{_mandir}/man5
%{_mandir}/man5/*
%changelog
* Thu Mar 31 2022 yuanxin <yuanxin24@h-partners.com> - 1:2.10-1
- update version to 2.10
* Wed Jan 26 2022 shixuantong <shixuantong@huawei.com> - 1:2.6-30
- Type:cves
- ID:CVE-2022-23303 CVE-2022-23304