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!10 fix CVE-2019-13377

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From: @wcc_140409
Reviewed-by: @overweight
Signed-off-by: @overweight
This commit is contained in:
openeuler-ci-bot 2020-12-28 11:31:27 +08:00 committed by Gitee
commit 78d8e617d1
10 changed files with 707 additions and 10 deletions
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28
CVE-2019-13377-1.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
From e43f08991f00820c1f711ca254021d5f83b5cd7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2019 18:52:34 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 1/6] SAE: Use const_time_memcmp() for pwd_value >= prime
comparison
This reduces timing and memory access pattern differences for an
operation that could depend on the used password.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8e14b030e558d23f65d761895c07089404e61cf1)
diff --git a/src/common/sae.c b/src/common/sae.c
index 72b7954..4741753 100644
--- a/src/common/sae.c
+++ b/src/common/sae.c
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-value",
pwd_value, sae->tmp->prime_len);
- if (os_memcmp(pwd_value, prime, sae->tmp->prime_len) >= 0)
+ if (const_time_memcmp(pwd_value, prime, sae->tmp->prime_len) >= 0)
return 0;
x_cand = crypto_bignum_init_set(pwd_value, sae->tmp->prime_len);
--
2.23.0

246
CVE-2019-13377-2-pre.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
From 8b093db2c3f489a74b67f687becf750d24fcf626 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Sat, 13 Apr 2019 17:30:22 +0300
Subject: EAP-pwd: Remove unused checks for cofactor > 1 cases
None of the ECC groups supported in the implementation had a cofactor
greater than 1, so these checks are unreachable and for all cases, the
cofactor is known to be 1. Furthermore, RFC 5931 explicitly disallow use
of ECC groups with cofactor larger than 1, so this checks cannot be
needed for any curve that is compliant with the RFC.
Remove the unneeded group cofactor checks to simplify the
implementation.
---
src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c | 53 ++---------------------------------------
src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 23 +++---------------
src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 23 ++----------------
3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 92 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
index ccd3627..cd7cd0f 100644
--- a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
+++ b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
u8 found = 0; /* 0 (false) or 0xff (true) to be used as const_time_*
* mask */
size_t primebytelen = 0, primebitlen;
- struct crypto_bignum *x_candidate = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
+ struct crypto_bignum *x_candidate = NULL;
const struct crypto_bignum *prime;
u8 mask, found_ctr = 0, is_odd = 0;
@@ -159,21 +159,15 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
os_memset(x_bin, 0, sizeof(x_bin));
prime = crypto_ec_get_prime(grp->group);
- cofactor = crypto_bignum_init();
grp->pwe = crypto_ec_point_init(grp->group);
tmp1 = crypto_bignum_init();
pm1 = crypto_bignum_init();
one = crypto_bignum_init_set((const u8 *) "\x01", 1);
- if (!cofactor || !grp->pwe || !tmp1 || !pm1 || !one) {
+ if ( !grp->pwe || !tmp1 || !pm1 || !one) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to create bignums");
goto fail;
}
- if (crypto_ec_cofactor(grp->group, cofactor) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to get cofactor for "
- "curve");
- goto fail;
- }
primebitlen = crypto_ec_prime_len_bits(grp->group);
primebytelen = crypto_ec_prime_len(grp->group);
if ((prfbuf = os_malloc(primebytelen)) == NULL) {
@@ -342,19 +336,6 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
goto fail;
}
- if (!crypto_bignum_is_one(cofactor)) {
- /* make sure the point is not in a small sub-group */
- if (crypto_ec_point_mul(grp->group, grp->pwe, cofactor,
- grp->pwe) != 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
- "EAP-pwd: cannot multiply generator by order");
- goto fail;
- }
- if (crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(grp->group, grp->pwe)) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: point is at infinity");
- goto fail;
- }
- }
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: found a PWE in %02d tries", found_ctr);
if (0) {
@@ -364,7 +345,6 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
ret = 1;
}
/* cleanliness and order.... */
- crypto_bignum_deinit(cofactor, 1);
crypto_bignum_deinit(x_candidate, 1);
crypto_bignum_deinit(pm1, 0);
crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp1, 1);
@@ -491,35 +471,7 @@ struct crypto_ec_point * eap_pwd_get_element(EAP_PWD_group *group,
goto fail;
}
- cofactor = crypto_bignum_init();
- if (!cofactor || crypto_ec_cofactor(group->group, cofactor) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
- "EAP-pwd: Unable to get cofactor for curve");
- goto fail;
- }
-
- if (!crypto_bignum_is_one(cofactor)) {
- struct crypto_ec_point *point;
- int ok = 1;
-
- /* check to ensure peer's element is not in a small sub-group */
- point = crypto_ec_point_init(group->group);
- if (!point ||
- crypto_ec_point_mul(group->group, element,
- cofactor, point) != 0 ||
- crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(group->group, point))
- ok = 0;
- crypto_ec_point_deinit(point, 0);
-
- if (!ok) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
- "EAP-pwd: Small sub-group check on peer element failed");
- goto fail;
- }
- }
-
out:
- crypto_bignum_deinit(cofactor, 0);
return element;
fail:
crypto_ec_point_deinit(element, 0);
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
index 8064f3f..1ed00e2 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
const u8 *payload, size_t payload_len)
{
struct crypto_ec_point *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
- struct crypto_bignum *mask = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
+ struct crypto_bignum *mask = NULL;
const u8 *ptr;
u8 *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL;
size_t prime_len, order_len;
@@ -370,20 +370,14 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
data->private_value = crypto_bignum_init();
data->my_element = crypto_ec_point_init(data->grp->group);
- cofactor = crypto_bignum_init();
data->my_scalar = crypto_bignum_init();
mask = crypto_bignum_init();
- if (!data->private_value || !data->my_element || !cofactor ||
+ if (!data->private_value || !data->my_element ||
!data->my_scalar || !mask) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): scalar allocation fail");
goto fin;
}
- if (crypto_ec_cofactor(data->grp->group, cofactor) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd (peer): unable to get cofactor "
- "for curve");
- goto fin;
- }
if (crypto_bignum_rand(data->private_value,
crypto_ec_get_order(data->grp->group)) < 0 ||
@@ -470,17 +464,9 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
goto fin;
}
- /* ensure that the shared key isn't in a small sub-group */
- if (!crypto_bignum_is_one(cofactor)) {
- if (crypto_ec_point_mul(data->grp->group, K, cofactor, K) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (peer): cannot multiply "
- "shared key point by order");
- goto fin;
- }
- }
/*
- * This check is strictly speaking just for the case above where
+ * This check is strictly speaking just for the case where
* co-factor > 1 but it was suggested that even though this is probably
* never going to happen it is a simple and safe check "just to be
* sure" so let's be safe.
@@ -529,7 +515,6 @@ fin:
os_free(scalar);
os_free(element);
crypto_bignum_deinit(mask, 1);
- crypto_bignum_deinit(cofactor, 1);
crypto_ec_point_deinit(K, 1);
crypto_ec_point_deinit(point, 1);
if (data->outbuf == NULL)
diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
index b952b67..aa0f0d8 100644
--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
@@ -602,7 +602,6 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
const u8 *payload, size_t payload_len)
{
const u8 *ptr;
- struct crypto_bignum *cofactor = NULL;
struct crypto_ec_point *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
int res = 0;
size_t prime_len, order_len;
@@ -621,20 +620,14 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
}
data->k = crypto_bignum_init();
- cofactor = crypto_bignum_init();
point = crypto_ec_point_init(data->grp->group);
K = crypto_ec_point_init(data->grp->group);
- if (!data->k || !cofactor || !point || !K) {
+ if (!data->k || !point || !K) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (server): peer data allocation "
"fail");
goto fin;
}
- if (crypto_ec_cofactor(data->grp->group, cofactor) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (server): unable to get "
- "cofactor for curve");
- goto fin;
- }
/* element, x then y, followed by scalar */
ptr = payload;
@@ -666,18 +659,9 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
goto fin;
}
- /* ensure that the shared key isn't in a small sub-group */
- if (!crypto_bignum_is_one(cofactor)) {
- if (crypto_ec_point_mul(data->grp->group, K, cofactor,
- K) != 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-PWD (server): cannot "
- "multiply shared key point by order!\n");
- goto fin;
- }
- }
/*
- * This check is strictly speaking just for the case above where
+ * This check is strictly speaking just for the case where
* co-factor > 1 but it was suggested that even though this is probably
* never going to happen it is a simple and safe check "just to be
* sure" so let's be safe.
@@ -697,7 +681,6 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
fin:
crypto_ec_point_deinit(K, 1);
crypto_ec_point_deinit(point, 1);
- crypto_bignum_deinit(cofactor, 1);
if (res)
eap_pwd_state(data, PWD_Confirm_Req);
--
2.23.0

43
CVE-2019-13377-2-pre1.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
From 92e1b96c26a84e503847bdd22ebadf697c4031ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Sat, 13 Apr 2019 17:20:57 +0300
Subject: EAP-pwd: Disallow ECC groups with a prime under 256 bits
Based on the SAE implementation guidance update to not allow ECC groups
with a prime that is under 256 bits, reject groups 25, 26, and 27 in
EAP-pwd.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
diff --git a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
index a2dd386..ccd3627 100644
--- a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
+++ b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
@@ -84,11 +84,23 @@ static int eap_pwd_kdf(const u8 *key, size_t keylen, const u8 *label,
return 0;
}
+static int eap_pwd_suitable_group(u16 num)
+{
+ /* Do not allow ECC groups with prime under 256 bits based on guidance
+ * for the similar design in SAE. */
+ return num == 19 || num == 20 || num == 21 ||
+ num == 28 || num == 29 || num == 30;
+}
EAP_PWD_group * get_eap_pwd_group(u16 num)
{
EAP_PWD_group *grp;
grp = os_zalloc(sizeof(EAP_PWD_group));
+ if (!eap_pwd_suitable_group(num)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unsuitable group %u", num);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
if (!grp)
return NULL;
grp->group = crypto_ec_init(num);
--
2.23.0

70
CVE-2019-13377-2.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
From 20d7bd83c43fb24c4cf84d3045254d3ee1957166 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2019 19:07:05 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 2/6] EAP-pwd: Use const_time_memcmp() for pwd_value >= prime
comparison
This reduces timing and memory access pattern differences for an
operation that could depend on the used password.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7958223fdcfe82479e6ed71019a84f6d4cbf799c)
---
src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c | 13 ++++++++-----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
index cd7cd0f..a2aaafe 100644
--- a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
+++ b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
u8 qnr_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
u8 qr_or_qnr_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
u8 x_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
+ u8 prime_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
struct crypto_bignum *tmp1 = NULL, *tmp2 = NULL, *pm1 = NULL;
struct crypto_hash *hash;
unsigned char pwe_digest[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *prfbuf = NULL, ctr;
@@ -159,6 +160,11 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
os_memset(x_bin, 0, sizeof(x_bin));
prime = crypto_ec_get_prime(grp->group);
+ primebitlen = crypto_ec_prime_len_bits(grp->group);
+ primebytelen = crypto_ec_prime_len(grp->group);
+ if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(prime, prime_bin, sizeof(prime_bin),
+ primebytelen) < 0)
+ return -1;
grp->pwe = crypto_ec_point_init(grp->group);
tmp1 = crypto_bignum_init();
pm1 = crypto_bignum_init();
@@ -168,8 +174,6 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
goto fail;
}
- primebitlen = crypto_ec_prime_len_bits(grp->group);
- primebytelen = crypto_ec_prime_len(grp->group);
if ((prfbuf = os_malloc(primebytelen)) == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to malloc space for prf "
"buffer");
@@ -235,6 +239,8 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
if (primebitlen % 8)
buf_shift_right(prfbuf, primebytelen,
8 - primebitlen % 8);
+ if (const_time_memcmp(prfbuf, prime_bin, primebytelen) >= 0)
+ continue;
crypto_bignum_deinit(x_candidate, 1);
x_candidate = crypto_bignum_init_set(prfbuf, primebytelen);
@@ -244,9 +250,6 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
goto fail;
}
- if (crypto_bignum_cmp(x_candidate, prime) >= 0)
- continue;
-
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: x_candidate",
prfbuf, primebytelen);
const_time_select_bin(found, x_bin, prfbuf, primebytelen,
--
2.23.0

66
CVE-2019-13377-3.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
From ee34d8cfbd0fbf7ba7429531d4bee1c43b074d8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2019 19:23:05 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 3/6] OpenSSL: Use BN_bn2binpad() or BN_bn2bin_padded() if
available
This converts crypto_bignum_to_bin() to use the OpenSSL/BoringSSL
functions BN_bn2binpad()/BN_bn2bin_padded(), when available, to avoid
differences in runtime and memory access patterns depending on the
leading bytes of the BIGNUM value.
OpenSSL 1.0.2 and LibreSSL do not include such functions, so those cases
are still using the previous implementation where the BN_num_bytes()
call may result in different memory access pattern.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1e237903f5b5d3117342daf006c5878cdb45e3d3)
---
src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c b/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
index 748a7ad..00b61b9 100644
--- a/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
+++ b/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
@@ -1129,14 +1129,27 @@ void crypto_bignum_deinit(struct crypto_bignum *n, int clear)
int crypto_bignum_to_bin(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
u8 *buf, size_t buflen, size_t padlen)
{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+#else /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+#else
int num_bytes, offset;
+#endif
+#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
if (TEST_FAIL())
return -1;
if (padlen > buflen)
return -1;
-
+#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
+ if (BN_bn2bin_padded(buf, padlen, (const BIGNUM *) a) == 0)
+ return -1;
+ return padlen;
+#else /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ return BN_bn2binpad((const BIGNUM *) a, buf, padlen);
+#else
num_bytes = BN_num_bytes((const BIGNUM *) a);
if ((size_t) num_bytes > buflen)
return -1;
@@ -1149,6 +1162,8 @@ int crypto_bignum_to_bin(const struct crypto_bignum *a,
BN_bn2bin((const BIGNUM *) a, buf + offset);
return num_bytes + offset;
+#endif
+#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
}
--
2.23.0

59
CVE-2019-13377-4.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
From a25b48118d75f3c2d7cb1b2c3b4cffb13091a34c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 23:01:06 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 4/6] SAE: Run through prf result processing even if it >=
prime
This reduces differences in timing and memory access within the
hunting-and-pecking loop for ECC groups that have a prime that is not
close to a power of two (e.g., Brainpool curves).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
(cherry picked from commit 147bf7b88a9c231322b5b574263071ca6dbb0503)
---
src/common/sae.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/common/sae.c b/src/common/sae.c
index 4741753..e155a71 100644
--- a/src/common/sae.c
+++ b/src/common/sae.c
@@ -274,6 +274,8 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
struct crypto_bignum *y_sqr, *x_cand;
int res;
size_t bits;
+ int cmp_prime;
+ unsigned int in_range;
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-seed", pwd_seed, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
@@ -287,8 +289,13 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-value",
pwd_value, sae->tmp->prime_len);
- if (const_time_memcmp(pwd_value, prime, sae->tmp->prime_len) >= 0)
- return 0;
+ cmp_prime = const_time_memcmp(pwd_value, prime, sae->tmp->prime_len);
+ /* Create a const_time mask for selection based on prf result
+ * being smaller than prime. */
+ in_range = const_time_fill_msb((unsigned int) cmp_prime);
+ /* The algorithm description would skip the next steps if
+ * cmp_prime >= 0 (reutnr 0 here), but go through them regardless to
+ * minimize externally observable differences in behavior. */
x_cand = crypto_bignum_init_set(pwd_value, sae->tmp->prime_len);
if (!x_cand)
@@ -300,7 +307,9 @@ static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed,
res = is_quadratic_residue_blind(sae, prime, bits, qr, qnr, y_sqr);
crypto_bignum_deinit(y_sqr, 1);
- return res;
+ if (res < 0)
+ return res;
+ return const_time_select_int(in_range, res, 0);
}
--
2.23.0

58
CVE-2019-13377-5.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
From 00a6cc73da61b03c146b6c341d0d1e572bcef432 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 23:02:51 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 5/6] EAP-pwd: Run through prf result processing even if it >=
prime
This reduces differences in timing and memory access within the
hunting-and-pecking loop for ECC groups that have a prime that is not
close to a power of two (e.g., Brainpool curves).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
(cherry picked from commit cd803299ca485eb857e37c88f973fccfbb8600e5)
---
src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c | 13 ++++++++++---
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
index a2aaafe..8e7966e 100644
--- a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
+++ b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
@@ -153,6 +153,8 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
struct crypto_bignum *x_candidate = NULL;
const struct crypto_bignum *prime;
u8 mask, found_ctr = 0, is_odd = 0;
+ int cmp_prime;
+ unsigned int in_range;
if (grp->pwe)
return -1;
@@ -239,8 +241,13 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
if (primebitlen % 8)
buf_shift_right(prfbuf, primebytelen,
8 - primebitlen % 8);
- if (const_time_memcmp(prfbuf, prime_bin, primebytelen) >= 0)
- continue;
+ cmp_prime = const_time_memcmp(prfbuf, prime_bin, primebytelen);
+ /* Create a const_time mask for selection based on prf result
+ * being smaller than prime. */
+ in_range = const_time_fill_msb((unsigned int) cmp_prime);
+ /* The algorithm description would skip the next steps if
+ * cmp_prime >= 0, but go through them regardless to minimize
+ * externally observable differences in behavior. */
crypto_bignum_deinit(x_candidate, 1);
x_candidate = crypto_bignum_init_set(prfbuf, primebytelen);
@@ -308,7 +315,7 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
goto fail;
mask = const_time_eq(res, check);
found_ctr = const_time_select_u8(found, found_ctr, ctr);
- found |= mask;
+ found |= mask & in_range;
}
if (found == 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
--
2.23.0

59
CVE-2019-13377-6-pre.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
From db54db11aec763b6fc74715c36e0f9de0d65e206 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2019 18:01:07 +0300
Subject: SAE: Reject unsuitable groups based on REVmd changes
The rules defining which DH groups are suitable for SAE use were
accepted into IEEE 802.11 REVmd based on this document:
https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/19/11-19-0387-02-000m-addressing-some-sae-comments.docx
Enforce those rules in production builds of wpa_supplicant and hostapd.
CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS=y builds can still be used to select any o the
implemented groups to maintain testing coverage.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
---
src/common/sae.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/common/sae.c b/src/common/sae.c
index e155a71..91b6b41 100644
--- a/src/common/sae.c
+++ b/src/common/sae.c
@@ -17,11 +17,32 @@
#include "ieee802_11_defs.h"
#include "sae.h"
+static int sae_suitable_group(int group)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
+ /* Allow all groups for testing purposes in non-production builds. */
+ return 1;
+#else /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
+ /* Enforce REVmd rules on which SAE groups are suitable for production
+ * purposes: FFC groups whose prime is >= 3072 bits and ECC groups
+ * defined over a prime field whose prime is >= 256 bits. Furthermore,
+ * ECC groups defined over a characteristic 2 finite field and ECC
+ * groups with a co-factor greater than 1 are not suitable. */
+ return group == 19 || group == 20 || group == 21 ||
+ group == 28 || group == 29 || group == 30 ||
+ group == 15 || group == 16 || group == 17 || group == 18;
+#endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
+}
int sae_set_group(struct sae_data *sae, int group)
{
struct sae_temporary_data *tmp;
+ if (!sae_suitable_group(group)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Reject unsuitable group %d", group);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
sae_clear_data(sae);
tmp = sae->tmp = os_zalloc(sizeof(*tmp));
if (tmp == NULL)
--
2.23.0

53
CVE-2019-13377-6.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
From 558518ed63202e5358116ab7e0afd5e85490f2ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Sat, 27 Jul 2019 23:19:17 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 6/6] dragonfly: Disable use of groups using Brainpool curves
Disable groups that use Brainpool curves for now since they leak more
timing information due to the prime not being close to a power of two.
This removes use of groups 28, 29, and 30 from SAE and EAP-pwd.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
(cherry picked from commit 876c5eaa6dae1a87a17603fc489a44c29eedc2e3)
---
src/common/sae.c | 7 +++++--
src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c | 3 +--
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/common/sae.c b/src/common/sae.c
index 91b6b41..5ef6c4c 100644
--- a/src/common/sae.c
+++ b/src/common/sae.c
@@ -27,9 +27,12 @@ static int sae_suitable_group(int group)
* purposes: FFC groups whose prime is >= 3072 bits and ECC groups
* defined over a prime field whose prime is >= 256 bits. Furthermore,
* ECC groups defined over a characteristic 2 finite field and ECC
- * groups with a co-factor greater than 1 are not suitable. */
+ * groups with a co-factor greater than 1 are not suitable. Disable
+ * groups that use Brainpool curves as well for now since they leak more
+ * timing information due to the prime not being close to a power of
+ * two. */
+
return group == 19 || group == 20 || group == 21 ||
- group == 28 || group == 29 || group == 30 ||
group == 15 || group == 16 || group == 17 || group == 18;
#endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
}
diff --git a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
index 8e7966e..bac2796 100644
--- a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
+++ b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
@@ -88,8 +88,7 @@ static int eap_pwd_suitable_group(u16 num)
{
/* Do not allow ECC groups with prime under 256 bits based on guidance
* for the similar design in SAE. */
- return num == 19 || num == 20 || num == 21 ||
- num == 28 || num == 29 || num == 30;
+ return num == 19 || num == 20 || num == 21;
}
EAP_PWD_group * get_eap_pwd_group(u16 num)
{
--
2.23.0

35
wpa_supplicant.spec
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
Name: wpa_supplicant
Epoch: 1
Version: 2.6
Release: 26
Release: 27
Summary: A WPA Supplicant with support for WPA and WPA2 (IEEE 802.11i / RSN)
License: BSD
Url: https://w1.fi/wpa_supplicant/
@ -52,14 +52,14 @@ Patch6035: macsec-0036-mka-Fix-the-order-of-operations-in-secure-channel-de.
Patch6036: macsec-0037-mka-Fix-use-after-free-when-receive-secure-channels-.patch
Patch6037: macsec-0038-mka-Fix-use-after-free-when-transmit-secure-channels.patch
Patch6038: macsec-0039-macsec_linux-Fix-NULL-pointer-dereference-on-error-c.patch
Patch6039: https://w1.fi/security/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch
Patch6040: https://w1.fi/security/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch
Patch6041: https://w1.fi/security/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch
Patch6042: https://w1.fi/security/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch
Patch6043: https://w1.fi/security/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch
Patch6044: https://w1.fi/security/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
Patch6045: https://w1.fi/security/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch
Patch6046: https://w1.fi/security/2017-1/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch
Patch6039: rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch
Patch6040: rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch
Patch6041: rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch
Patch6042: rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch
Patch6043: rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch
Patch6044: rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
Patch6045: rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch
Patch6046: rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch
Patch6047: rh1451834-nl80211-Fix-race-condition-in-detecting-MAC-change.patch
Patch6048: rh1462262-use-system-openssl-ciphers.patch
Patch6049: rh1465138-openssl-Fix-openssl-1-1-private-key-callback.patch
@ -81,12 +81,21 @@ Patch6064: CVE-2019-9497.patch
Patch6065: CVE-2019-9498-and-CVE-2019-9499.patch
Patch6066: CVE-2019-11555-1.patch
Patch6067: CVE-2019-11555-2.patch
Patch6068: https://w1.fi/security/2018-1/rebased-v2.6-0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch
Patch6068: rebased-v2.6-0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch
Patch6069: CVE-2019-9499.patch
Patch6070: CVE-2019-9495-pre1.patch
Patch6071: CVE-2019-9495-pre2.patch
Patch6072: CVE-2019-9495-pre3.patch
Patch6073: CVE-2019-9495.patch
Patch6074: CVE-2019-13377-1.patch
Patch6075: CVE-2019-13377-2-pre1.patch
Patch6076: CVE-2019-13377-2-pre.patch
Patch6077: CVE-2019-13377-2.patch
Patch6078: CVE-2019-13377-3.patch
Patch6079: CVE-2019-13377-4.patch
Patch60710: CVE-2019-13377-5.patch
Patch60711: CVE-2019-13377-6-pre.patch
Patch60712: CVE-2019-13377-6.patch
Patch9000: add-options-of-wpa_supplicant-service.patch
Patch9001: allow-to-override-names-of-qt4-tools.patch
@ -183,6 +192,12 @@ install -m644 %{name}/doc/docbook/*.5 %{buildroot}%{_mandir}/man5
%{_mandir}/man5/*
%changelog
* Thu Dec 24 2020 wuchaochao <wuchaochao4@huawei.com> - 1:2.6-27
- Type:cves
- ID: CVE-2019-13377
- SUG:NA
- DESC: fix CVE-2019-13377
* Tue Feb 04 2020 zhouyihang <zhouyihang1@huawei.com> - 1:2.6-26
- Type:cves
- ID: CVE-2019-9495