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!6 update unbound version to 1.10.1

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Merge pull request !6 from eaglegai/master
This commit is contained in:
openeuler-ci-bot 2020-07-29 09:44:46 +08:00 committed by Gitee
commit 9f9eef1c04
10 changed files with 89 additions and 784 deletions
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227
CVE-2019-18934.patch
View File

@ -1,227 +0,0 @@
From 34e52a4313d59b9d57e928c44300fd81e1a48910 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "W.C.A. Wijngaards" <wouter@nlnetlabs.nl>
Date: Tue, 19 Nov 2019 07:49:59 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Fix CVE-2019-18934, shell execution in ipsecmod.
---
ipsecmod/ipsecmod.c | 147 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 120 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ipsecmod/ipsecmod.c b/ipsecmod/ipsecmod.c
index c8400c633..9e916d604 100644
--- a/ipsecmod/ipsecmod.c
+++ b/ipsecmod/ipsecmod.c
@@ -161,6 +161,71 @@ generate_request(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id, uint8_t* name,
return 1;
}
+/**
+ * Check if the string passed is a valid domain name with safe characters to
+ * pass to a shell.
+ * This will only allow:
+ * - digits
+ * - alphas
+ * - hyphen (not at the start)
+ * - dot (not at the start, or the only character)
+ * - underscore
+ * @param s: pointer to the string.
+ * @param slen: string's length.
+ * @return true if s only contains safe characters; false otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+domainname_has_safe_characters(char* s, size_t slen) {
+ size_t i;
+ for(i = 0; i < slen; i++) {
+ if(s[i] == '\0') return 1;
+ if((s[i] == '-' && i != 0)
+ || (s[i] == '.' && (i != 0 || s[1] == '\0'))
+ || (s[i] == '_') || (s[i] >= '0' && s[i] <= '9')
+ || (s[i] >= 'A' && s[i] <= 'Z')
+ || (s[i] >= 'a' && s[i] <= 'z')) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if the stringified IPSECKEY RDATA contains safe characters to pass to
+ * a shell.
+ * This is only relevant for checking the gateway when the gateway type is 3
+ * (domainname).
+ * @param s: pointer to the string.
+ * @param slen: string's length.
+ * @return true if s contains only safe characters; false otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+ipseckey_has_safe_characters(char* s, size_t slen) {
+ int precedence, gateway_type, algorithm;
+ char* gateway;
+ gateway = (char*)calloc(slen, sizeof(char));
+ if(!gateway) {
+ log_err("ipsecmod: out of memory when calling the hook");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if(sscanf(s, "%d %d %d %s ",
+ &precedence, &gateway_type, &algorithm, gateway) != 4) {
+ free(gateway);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if(gateway_type != 3) {
+ free(gateway);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if(domainname_has_safe_characters(gateway, slen)) {
+ free(gateway);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ free(gateway);
+ return 0;
+}
+
/**
* Prepare the data and call the hook.
*
@@ -175,7 +240,7 @@ call_hook(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct ipsecmod_qstate* iq,
{
size_t slen, tempdata_len, tempstring_len, i;
char str[65535], *s, *tempstring;
- int w;
+ int w = 0, w_temp, qtype;
struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset_key;
struct packed_rrset_data* rrset_data;
uint8_t *tempdata;
@@ -192,9 +257,9 @@ call_hook(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct ipsecmod_qstate* iq,
memset(s, 0, slen);
/* Copy the hook into the buffer. */
- sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, "%s", qstate->env->cfg->ipsecmod_hook);
+ w += sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, "%s", qstate->env->cfg->ipsecmod_hook);
/* Put space into the buffer. */
- sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, " ");
+ w += sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, " ");
/* Copy the qname into the buffer. */
tempstring = sldns_wire2str_dname(qstate->qinfo.qname,
qstate->qinfo.qname_len);
@@ -202,68 +267,96 @@ call_hook(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct ipsecmod_qstate* iq,
log_err("ipsecmod: out of memory when calling the hook");
return 0;
}
- sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, "\"%s\"", tempstring);
+ if(!domainname_has_safe_characters(tempstring, strlen(tempstring))) {
+ log_err("ipsecmod: qname has unsafe characters");
+ free(tempstring);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ w += sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, "\"%s\"", tempstring);
free(tempstring);
/* Put space into the buffer. */
- sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, " ");
+ w += sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, " ");
/* Copy the IPSECKEY TTL into the buffer. */
rrset_data = (struct packed_rrset_data*)iq->ipseckey_rrset->entry.data;
- sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, "\"%ld\"", (long)rrset_data->ttl);
+ w += sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, "\"%ld\"", (long)rrset_data->ttl);
/* Put space into the buffer. */
- sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, " ");
- /* Copy the A/AAAA record(s) into the buffer. Start and end this section
- * with a double quote. */
+ w += sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, " ");
rrset_key = reply_find_answer_rrset(&qstate->return_msg->qinfo,
qstate->return_msg->rep);
+ /* Double check that the records are indeed A/AAAA.
+ * This should never happen as this function is only executed for A/AAAA
+ * queries but make sure we don't pass anything other than A/AAAA to the
+ * shell. */
+ qtype = ntohs(rrset_key->rk.type);
+ if(qtype != LDNS_RR_TYPE_AAAA && qtype != LDNS_RR_TYPE_A) {
+ log_err("ipsecmod: Answer is not of A or AAAA type");
+ return 0;
+ }
rrset_data = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset_key->entry.data;
- sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, "\"");
+ /* Copy the A/AAAA record(s) into the buffer. Start and end this section
+ * with a double quote. */
+ w += sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, "\"");
for(i=0; i<rrset_data->count; i++) {
if(i > 0) {
/* Put space into the buffer. */
- sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, " ");
+ w += sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, " ");
}
/* Ignore the first two bytes, they are the rr_data len. */
- w = sldns_wire2str_rdata_buf(rrset_data->rr_data[i] + 2,
+ w_temp = sldns_wire2str_rdata_buf(rrset_data->rr_data[i] + 2,
rrset_data->rr_len[i] - 2, s, slen, qstate->qinfo.qtype);
- if(w < 0) {
+ if(w_temp < 0) {
/* Error in printout. */
- return -1;
- } else if((size_t)w >= slen) {
+ log_err("ipsecmod: Error in printing IP address");
+ return 0;
+ } else if((size_t)w_temp >= slen) {
s = NULL; /* We do not want str to point outside of buffer. */
slen = 0;
- return -1;
+ log_err("ipsecmod: shell command too long");
+ return 0;
} else {
- s += w;
- slen -= w;
+ s += w_temp;
+ slen -= w_temp;
+ w += w_temp;
}
}
- sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, "\"");
+ w += sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, "\"");
/* Put space into the buffer. */
- sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, " ");
+ w += sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, " ");
/* Copy the IPSECKEY record(s) into the buffer. Start and end this section
* with a double quote. */
- sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, "\"");
+ w += sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, "\"");
rrset_data = (struct packed_rrset_data*)iq->ipseckey_rrset->entry.data;
for(i=0; i<rrset_data->count; i++) {
if(i > 0) {
/* Put space into the buffer. */
- sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, " ");
+ w += sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, " ");
}
/* Ignore the first two bytes, they are the rr_data len. */
tempdata = rrset_data->rr_data[i] + 2;
tempdata_len = rrset_data->rr_len[i] - 2;
/* Save the buffer pointers. */
tempstring = s; tempstring_len = slen;
- w = sldns_wire2str_ipseckey_scan(&tempdata, &tempdata_len, &s, &slen,
- NULL, 0);
+ w_temp = sldns_wire2str_ipseckey_scan(&tempdata, &tempdata_len, &s,
+ &slen, NULL, 0);
/* There was an error when parsing the IPSECKEY; reset the buffer
* pointers to their previous values. */
- if(w == -1){
+ if(w_temp == -1) {
s = tempstring; slen = tempstring_len;
+ } else if(w_temp > 0) {
+ if(!ipseckey_has_safe_characters(
+ tempstring, tempstring_len - slen)) {
+ log_err("ipsecmod: ipseckey has unsafe characters");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ w += w_temp;
}
}
- sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, "\"");
- verbose(VERB_ALGO, "ipsecmod: hook command: '%s'", str);
+ w += sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, "\"");
+ if(w >= (int)sizeof(str)) {
+ log_err("ipsecmod: shell command too long");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ verbose(VERB_ALGO, "ipsecmod: shell command: '%s'", str);
/* ipsecmod-hook should return 0 on success. */
if(system(str) != 0)
return 0;

74
unbound-1.10.0-auth-callback.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
--- a/services/authzone.c 2020-04-16 13:01:10.550618034 +0200
+++ b/services/authzone.c 2020-04-16 13:07:04.624476160 +0200
@@ -5331,7 +5331,7 @@
log_assert(xfr->task_transfer);
lock_basic_lock(&xfr->lock);
env = xfr->task_transfer->env;
- if(env->outnet->want_to_quit) {
+ if(!env || env->outnet->want_to_quit) {
lock_basic_unlock(&xfr->lock);
return; /* stop on quit */
}
@@ -5770,7 +5770,7 @@
log_assert(xfr->task_transfer);
lock_basic_lock(&xfr->lock);
env = xfr->task_transfer->env;
- if(env->outnet->want_to_quit) {
+ if(!env || env->outnet->want_to_quit) {
lock_basic_unlock(&xfr->lock);
return; /* stop on quit */
}
@@ -5812,7 +5812,7 @@
log_assert(xfr->task_transfer);
lock_basic_lock(&xfr->lock);
env = xfr->task_transfer->env;
- if(env->outnet->want_to_quit) {
+ if(!env || env->outnet->want_to_quit) {
lock_basic_unlock(&xfr->lock);
return 0; /* stop on quit */
}
@@ -5893,7 +5893,7 @@
log_assert(xfr->task_transfer);
lock_basic_lock(&xfr->lock);
env = xfr->task_transfer->env;
- if(env->outnet->want_to_quit) {
+ if(!env || env->outnet->want_to_quit) {
lock_basic_unlock(&xfr->lock);
return 0; /* stop on quit */
}
@@ -6107,7 +6107,7 @@
log_assert(xfr->task_probe);
lock_basic_lock(&xfr->lock);
env = xfr->task_probe->env;
- if(env->outnet->want_to_quit) {
+ if(!env || env->outnet->want_to_quit) {
lock_basic_unlock(&xfr->lock);
return; /* stop on quit */
}
@@ -6143,7 +6143,7 @@
log_assert(xfr->task_probe);
lock_basic_lock(&xfr->lock);
env = xfr->task_probe->env;
- if(env->outnet->want_to_quit) {
+ if(!env || env->outnet->want_to_quit) {
lock_basic_unlock(&xfr->lock);
return 0; /* stop on quit */
}
@@ -6388,7 +6388,7 @@
log_assert(xfr->task_probe);
lock_basic_lock(&xfr->lock);
env = xfr->task_probe->env;
- if(env->outnet->want_to_quit) {
+ if(!env || env->outnet->want_to_quit) {
lock_basic_unlock(&xfr->lock);
return; /* stop on quit */
}
@@ -6465,7 +6465,7 @@
log_assert(xfr->task_nextprobe);
lock_basic_lock(&xfr->lock);
env = xfr->task_nextprobe->env;
- if(env->outnet->want_to_quit) {
+ if(!env || env->outnet->want_to_quit) {
lock_basic_unlock(&xfr->lock);
return; /* stop on quit */
}

BIN
unbound-1.10.1.tar.gz Normal file
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Binary file not shown.

320
unbound-1.7.2-python3-devel.patch
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@ -1,320 +0,0 @@
From b5aab36d41f374eddb0f66f28f251588f53a1e1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Wouter Wijngaards <wouter@nlnetlabs.nl>
Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2018 05:46:36 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] - #4109: Fix that package config depends on python
unconditionally.
git-svn-id: file:///svn/unbound/trunk@4757 be551aaa-1e26-0410-a405-d3ace91eadb9
---
configure | 257 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------
configure.ac | 5 +-
2 files changed, 137 insertions(+), 125 deletions(-)
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index 3f1c372a..2a1687ae 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -670,9 +670,6 @@ SYSTEMD_DAEMON_LIBS
SYSTEMD_DAEMON_CFLAGS
SYSTEMD_LIBS
SYSTEMD_CFLAGS
-PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR
-PKG_CONFIG_PATH
-PKG_CONFIG
staticexe
PC_LIBEVENT_DEPENDENCY
UNBOUND_EVENT_UNINSTALL
@@ -697,6 +694,9 @@ swig
SWIG_LIB
SWIG
PC_PY_DEPENDENCY
+PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR
+PKG_CONFIG_PATH
+PKG_CONFIG
PY_MAJOR_VERSION
PYTHON_SITE_PKG
PYTHON_LDFLAGS
@@ -16930,7 +16930,136 @@ $as_echo "#define HAVE_PYTHON 1" >>confdefs.h
CPPFLAGS="$PYTHON_CPPFLAGS"
fi
ub_have_python=yes
- PC_PY_DEPENDENCY="python"
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+if test "x$ac_cv_env_PKG_CONFIG_set" != "xset"; then
+ if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
+ # Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}pkg-config", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}pkg-config; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_PKG_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $PKG_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_PKG_CONFIG="$PKG_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_PKG_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+PKG_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_PKG_CONFIG
+if test -n "$PKG_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PKG_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$PKG_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+fi
+if test -z "$ac_cv_path_PKG_CONFIG"; then
+ ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG=$PKG_CONFIG
+ # Extract the first word of "pkg-config", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy pkg-config; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG="$ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG
+if test -n "$ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test "x$ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG" = x; then
+ PKG_CONFIG=""
+ else
+ case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
+yes:)
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5
+$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;}
+ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
+esac
+ PKG_CONFIG=$ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG
+ fi
+else
+ PKG_CONFIG="$ac_cv_path_PKG_CONFIG"
+fi
+
+fi
+if test -n "$PKG_CONFIG"; then
+ _pkg_min_version=0.9.0
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking pkg-config is at least version $_pkg_min_version" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking pkg-config is at least version $_pkg_min_version... " >&6; }
+ if $PKG_CONFIG --atleast-pkgconfig-version $_pkg_min_version; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
+ else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+ PKG_CONFIG=""
+ fi
+fi
+ if test -n "$PKG_CONFIG" && \
+ { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$PKG_CONFIG --exists --print-errors \"\"python\${PY_MAJOR_VERSION}\"\""; } >&5
+ ($PKG_CONFIG --exists --print-errors ""python${PY_MAJOR_VERSION}"") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ test $ac_status = 0; }; then
+ PC_PY_DEPENDENCY="python${PY_MAJOR_VERSION}"
+else
+ PC_PY_DEPENDENCY="python"
+fi
# Check for SWIG
@@ -18960,126 +19089,6 @@ else
fi
have_systemd=no
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-if test "x$ac_cv_env_PKG_CONFIG_set" != "xset"; then
- if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
- # Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}pkg-config", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}pkg-config; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_path_PKG_CONFIG+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- case $PKG_CONFIG in
- [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
- ac_cv_path_PKG_CONFIG="$PKG_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
- ;;
- *)
- as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $PATH
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
- ac_cv_path_PKG_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
- ;;
-esac
-fi
-PKG_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_PKG_CONFIG
-if test -n "$PKG_CONFIG"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PKG_CONFIG" >&5
-$as_echo "$PKG_CONFIG" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
-
-fi
-if test -z "$ac_cv_path_PKG_CONFIG"; then
- ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG=$PKG_CONFIG
- # Extract the first word of "pkg-config", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy pkg-config; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- case $ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG in
- [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
- ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG="$ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
- ;;
- *)
- as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $PATH
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
- ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
- ;;
-esac
-fi
-ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG
-if test -n "$ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
- if test "x$ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG" = x; then
- PKG_CONFIG=""
- else
- case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
-yes:)
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;}
-ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
-esac
- PKG_CONFIG=$ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG
- fi
-else
- PKG_CONFIG="$ac_cv_path_PKG_CONFIG"
-fi
-
-fi
-if test -n "$PKG_CONFIG"; then
- _pkg_min_version=0.9.0
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking pkg-config is at least version $_pkg_min_version" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking pkg-config is at least version $_pkg_min_version... " >&6; }
- if $PKG_CONFIG --atleast-pkgconfig-version $_pkg_min_version; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- PKG_CONFIG=""
- fi
-fi
if test "x$enable_systemd" != xno; then :
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 1828253c..b2c95d1a 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -586,7 +586,10 @@ if test x_$ub_test_python != x_no; then
CPPFLAGS="$PYTHON_CPPFLAGS"
fi
ub_have_python=yes
- PC_PY_DEPENDENCY="python"
+ PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG
+ PKG_CHECK_EXISTS(["python${PY_MAJOR_VERSION}"],
+ [PC_PY_DEPENDENCY="python${PY_MAJOR_VERSION}"],
+ [PC_PY_DEPENDENCY="python"])
AC_SUBST(PC_PY_DEPENDENCY)
# Check for SWIG
--
2.14.4

31
unbound-1.7.2-python3-pkgconfig.patch
View File

@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
From bca54a8b252d4a75e940424dc761c6a4e487eb84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Wouter Wijngaards <wouter@nlnetlabs.nl>
Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2018 06:07:31 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] =?UTF-8?q?-=20Patch,=20do=20not=20export=20python=20f?=
=?UTF-8?q?rom=20pkg-config,=20from=20Petr=20Men=C5=A1=C3=ADk.?=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
git-svn-id: file:///svn/unbound/trunk@4758 be551aaa-1e26-0410-a405-d3ace91eadb9
---
contrib/libunbound.pc.in | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/contrib/libunbound.pc.in b/contrib/libunbound.pc.in
index 0cb9f875..810c5713 100644
--- a/contrib/libunbound.pc.in
+++ b/contrib/libunbound.pc.in
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ Name: unbound
Description: Library with validating, recursive, and caching DNS resolver
URL: http://www.unbound.net
Version: @PACKAGE_VERSION@
-Requires: @PC_LIBEVENT_DEPENDENCY@ @PC_PY_DEPENDENCY@
+Requires: libcrypto libssl @PC_LIBEVENT_DEPENDENCY@
+Requires.private: @PC_PY_DEPENDENCY@
Libs: -L${libdir} -lunbound -lssl -lcrypto
Libs.private: @SSLLIB@ @LIBS@
Cflags: -I${includedir}
--
2.14.4

182
unbound-1.7.3-anchor-fallback.patch
View File

@ -1,182 +0,0 @@
From 81e9f82a8ddd811d7ebafe2fd0ee5af836d0b405 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Wouter Wijngaards <wouter@nlnetlabs.nl>
Date: Wed, 4 Jul 2018 10:02:16 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] - Fix #4112: Fix that unbound-anchor -f /etc/resolv.conf will
not pass if DNSSEC is not enabled. New option -R allows fallback from
resolv.conf to direct queries.
git-svn-id: file:///svn/unbound/trunk@4770 be551aaa-1e26-0410-a405-d3ace91eadb9
---
doc/unbound-anchor.8.in | 5 ++++
smallapp/unbound-anchor.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
2 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/unbound-anchor.8.in b/doc/unbound-anchor.8.in
index 02a3e781..e114eb25 100644
--- a/doc/unbound-anchor.8.in
+++ b/doc/unbound-anchor.8.in
@@ -109,6 +109,11 @@ It does so, because the tool when used for bootstrapping the recursive
resolver, cannot use that recursive resolver itself because it is bootstrapping
that server.
.TP
+.B \-R
+Allow fallback from \-f resolv.conf file to direct root servers query.
+It allows you to prefer local resolvers, but fallback automatically
+to direct root query if they do not respond or do not support DNSSEC.
+.TP
.B \-v
More verbose. Once prints informational messages, multiple times may enable
large debug amounts (such as full certificates or byte\-dumps of downloaded
diff --git a/smallapp/unbound-anchor.c b/smallapp/unbound-anchor.c
index b3009108..f3985090 100644
--- a/smallapp/unbound-anchor.c
+++ b/smallapp/unbound-anchor.c
@@ -192,9 +192,10 @@ usage(void)
printf("-n name signer's subject emailAddress, default %s\n", P7SIGNER);
printf("-4 work using IPv4 only\n");
printf("-6 work using IPv6 only\n");
- printf("-f resolv.conf use given resolv.conf to resolve -u name\n");
- printf("-r root.hints use given root.hints to resolve -u name\n"
+ printf("-f resolv.conf use given resolv.conf\n");
+ printf("-r root.hints use given root.hints\n"
" builtin root hints are used by default\n");
+ printf("-R fallback from -f to root query on error\n");
printf("-v more verbose\n");
printf("-C conf debug, read config\n");
printf("-P port use port for https connect, default 443\n");
@@ -1920,8 +1921,7 @@ static int
do_certupdate(const char* root_anchor_file, const char* root_cert_file,
const char* urlname, const char* xmlname, const char* p7sname,
const char* p7signer, const char* res_conf, const char* root_hints,
- const char* debugconf, int ip4only, int ip6only, int port,
- struct ub_result* dnskey)
+ const char* debugconf, int ip4only, int ip6only, int port)
{
STACK_OF(X509)* cert;
BIO *xml, *p7s;
@@ -1961,7 +1961,6 @@ do_certupdate(const char* root_anchor_file, const char* root_cert_file,
#ifndef S_SPLINT_S
sk_X509_pop_free(cert, X509_free);
#endif
- ub_resolve_free(dnskey);
ip_list_free(ip_list);
return 1;
}
@@ -2199,16 +2198,33 @@ probe_date_allows_certupdate(const char* root_anchor_file)
return 0;
}
+static struct ub_result *
+fetch_root_key(const char* root_anchor_file, const char* res_conf,
+ const char* root_hints, const char* debugconf,
+ int ip4only, int ip6only)
+{
+ struct ub_ctx* ctx;
+ struct ub_result* dnskey;
+
+ ctx = create_unbound_context(res_conf, root_hints, debugconf,
+ ip4only, ip6only);
+ add_5011_probe_root(ctx, root_anchor_file);
+ dnskey = prime_root_key(ctx);
+ ub_ctx_delete(ctx);
+ return dnskey;
+}
+
/** perform the unbound-anchor work */
static int
do_root_update_work(const char* root_anchor_file, const char* root_cert_file,
const char* urlname, const char* xmlname, const char* p7sname,
const char* p7signer, const char* res_conf, const char* root_hints,
- const char* debugconf, int ip4only, int ip6only, int force, int port)
+ const char* debugconf, int ip4only, int ip6only, int force,
+ int res_conf_fallback, int port)
{
- struct ub_ctx* ctx;
struct ub_result* dnskey;
int used_builtin = 0;
+ int rcode;
/* see if builtin rootanchor needs to be provided, or if
* rootanchor is 'revoked-trust-point' */
@@ -2217,12 +2233,22 @@ do_root_update_work(const char* root_anchor_file, const char* root_cert_file,
/* make unbound context with 5011-probe for root anchor,
* and probe . DNSKEY */
- ctx = create_unbound_context(res_conf, root_hints, debugconf,
- ip4only, ip6only);
- add_5011_probe_root(ctx, root_anchor_file);
- dnskey = prime_root_key(ctx);
- ub_ctx_delete(ctx);
-
+ dnskey = fetch_root_key(root_anchor_file, res_conf,
+ root_hints, debugconf, ip4only, ip6only);
+ rcode = dnskey->rcode;
+
+ if (res_conf_fallback && res_conf && !dnskey->secure) {
+ if (verb) printf("%s failed, retrying direct\n", res_conf);
+ ub_resolve_free(dnskey);
+ /* try direct query without res_conf */
+ dnskey = fetch_root_key(root_anchor_file, NULL,
+ root_hints, debugconf, ip4only, ip6only);
+ if (rcode != 0 && dnskey->rcode == 0) {
+ res_conf = NULL;
+ rcode = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
/* if secure: exit */
if(dnskey->secure && !force) {
if(verb) printf("success: the anchor is ok\n");
@@ -2230,18 +2256,18 @@ do_root_update_work(const char* root_anchor_file, const char* root_cert_file,
return used_builtin;
}
if(force && verb) printf("debug cert update forced\n");
+ ub_resolve_free(dnskey);
/* if not (and NOERROR): check date and do certupdate */
- if((dnskey->rcode == 0 &&
+ if((rcode == 0 &&
probe_date_allows_certupdate(root_anchor_file)) || force) {
if(do_certupdate(root_anchor_file, root_cert_file, urlname,
xmlname, p7sname, p7signer, res_conf, root_hints,
- debugconf, ip4only, ip6only, port, dnskey))
+ debugconf, ip4only, ip6only, port))
return 1;
return used_builtin;
}
if(verb) printf("fail: the anchor is NOT ok and could not be fixed\n");
- ub_resolve_free(dnskey);
return used_builtin;
}
@@ -2264,8 +2290,9 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[])
const char* root_hints = NULL;
const char* debugconf = NULL;
int dolist=0, ip4only=0, ip6only=0, force=0, port = HTTPS_PORT;
+ int res_conf_fallback = 0;
/* parse the options */
- while( (c=getopt(argc, argv, "46C:FP:a:c:f:hln:r:s:u:vx:")) != -1) {
+ while( (c=getopt(argc, argv, "46C:FRP:a:c:f:hln:r:s:u:vx:")) != -1) {
switch(c) {
case 'l':
dolist = 1;
@@ -2300,6 +2327,9 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[])
case 'r':
root_hints = optarg;
break;
+ case 'R':
+ res_conf_fallback = 1;
+ break;
case 'C':
debugconf = optarg;
break;
@@ -2346,5 +2376,5 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[])
return do_root_update_work(root_anchor_file, root_cert_file, urlname,
xmlname, p7sname, p7signer, res_conf, root_hints, debugconf,
- ip4only, ip6only, force, port);
+ ip4only, ip6only, force, res_conf_fallback, port);
}
--
2.14.4

12
unbound-1.7.3-host-any.patch
View File

@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/smallapp/unbound-host.c b/smallapp/unbound-host.c
index 53bf3277..f02511fe 100644
--- a/smallapp/unbound-host.c
+++ b/smallapp/unbound-host.c
@@ -340,6 +340,7 @@ pretty_output(char* q, int t, int c, struct ub_result* result, int docname)
exit(1);
}
printf("%s\n", s);
+ free(s);
} else printf(" has no %s record", tstr);
printf(" %s\n", secstatus);
}

BIN
unbound-1.7.3.tar.gz
View File

Binary file not shown.

1
unbound.conf
View File

@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ server:
# are present, they are processed in order.
# Our SElinux policy does not allow non-ephemeral ports to be used
outgoing-port-avoid: 0-32767
outgoing-port-avoid: 61000-65535
# number of outgoing simultaneous tcp buffers to hold per thread.
# outgoing-num-tcp: 10

26
unbound.spec
View File

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
%{!?delete_la: %global delete_la find $RPM_BUILD_ROOT -type f -name "*.la" -delete}
Name: unbound
Version: 1.7.3
Release: 14
Version: 1.10.1
Release: 1
Summary: Unbound is a validating, recursive, caching DNS resolver
License: BSD
Url: https://nlnetlabs.nl/projects/unbound/about/
@ -21,14 +21,11 @@ Source11: unbound.sysconfig
Source12: unbound-anchor.timer
Source13: unbound-anchor.service
Patch0001: unbound-1.7.2-python3-devel.patch
Patch0002: unbound-1.7.2-python3-pkgconfig.patch
Patch0003: unbound-1.7.3-anchor-fallback.patch
Patch0004: unbound-1.7.3-host-any.patch
Patch0005: CVE-2019-18934.patch
Patch0001: unbound-1.10.0-auth-callback.patch
BuildRequires: make flex swig pkgconfig systemd python-unversioned-command
BuildRequires: libevent-devel expat-devel openssl-devel python3-devel
BuildRequires: unbound-libs
%{?systemd_requires}
Requires: %{name}-libs = %{version}-%{release}
@ -75,10 +72,9 @@ Package help includes includes man pages for unbound.
%setup -qcn %{name}-%{version}
pushd %{name}-%{version}
%patch0001 -p1 -b .python3
%patch0002 -p1 -b .python3
%patch0003 -p1 -b .anchor-fallback
%patch0004 -p1 -b .host-any
%patch0001 -p1
cp -pr doc pythonmod libunbound ../
popd
@ -121,7 +117,7 @@ install -p -m 0644 %{SOURCE11} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/sysconfig/unbound
install -p -m 0644 %{SOURCE12} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_unitdir}/unbound-anchor.timer
install -p -m 0644 %{SOURCE13} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_unitdir}/unbound-anchor.service
cp -a %{_libdir}/libunbound.so.2* %{buildroot}%{_libdir}
%delete_la
@ -233,6 +229,12 @@ popd
%{_mandir}/man*
%changelog
* Tue Jul 28 2020 gaihuiying <gaihuiying1@huawei.com> - 1.10.1-1
- Type:requirement
- ID:NA
- SUG:NA
- DESC:update unbound version to 1.10.1
* Wed Feb 19 2020 hexiujun <hexiujun1@huawei.com> - 1.7.3-14
- Type:enhancement
- ID:NA