uboot-tools/backport-0003-CVE-2021-27097.patch

From 6f3c2d8aa5e6cbd80b5e869bbbddecb66c329d01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2021 17:08:10 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] image: Add an option to do a full check of the FIT

Some strange modifications of the FIT can introduce security risks. Add an
option to check it thoroughly, using libfdt's fdt_check_full() function.

Enable this by default if signature verification is enabled.

CVE-2021-27097

Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Bruce Monroe <bruce.monroe@intel.com>
Reported-by: Arie Haenel <arie.haenel@intel.com>
Reported-by: Julien Lenoir <julien.lenoir@intel.com>
---
 Kconfig            | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 common/image-fit.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Kconfig b/Kconfig
index 8f3fba08..11b480f6 100644
--- a/Kconfig
+++ b/Kconfig
@@ -365,6 +365,15 @@ config FIT_ENABLE_SHA256_SUPPORT
 	  SHA256 variant is supported: SHA512 and others are not currently
 	  supported in U-Boot.
 
+config FIT_FULL_CHECK
+	bool "Do a full check of the FIT before using it"
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable this do a full check of the FIT to make sure it is valid. This
+	  helps to protect against carefully crafted FITs which take advantage
+	  of bugs or omissions in the code. This includes a bad structure,
+	  multiple root nodes and the like.
+
 config FIT_SIGNATURE
 	bool "Enable signature verification of FIT uImages"
 	depends on DM
@@ -372,6 +381,7 @@ config FIT_SIGNATURE
 	select RSA
 	select RSA_VERIFY
 	select IMAGE_SIGN_INFO
+	select FIT_FULL_CHECK
 	help
 	  This option enables signature verification of FIT uImages,
 	  using a hash signed and verified using RSA. If
@@ -455,6 +465,14 @@ config SPL_FIT_PRINT
 	help
 	  Support printing the content of the fitImage in a verbose manner in SPL.
 
+config SPL_FIT_FULL_CHECK
+	bool "Do a full check of the FIT before using it"
+	help
+	  Enable this do a full check of the FIT to make sure it is valid. This
+	  helps to protect against carefully crafted FITs which take advantage
+	  of bugs or omissions in the code. This includes a bad structure,
+	  multiple root nodes and the like.
+
 config SPL_FIT_SIGNATURE
 	bool "Enable signature verification of FIT firmware within SPL"
 	depends on SPL_DM
@@ -462,6 +480,7 @@ config SPL_FIT_SIGNATURE
 	select SPL_RSA
 	select SPL_RSA_VERIFY
 	select SPL_IMAGE_SIGN_INFO
+	select SPL_FIT_FULL_CHECK
 
 config SPL_LOAD_FIT
 	bool "Enable SPL loading U-Boot as a FIT (basic fitImage features)"
diff --git a/common/image-fit.c b/common/image-fit.c
index 470321c5..e49baea7 100644
--- a/common/image-fit.c
+++ b/common/image-fit.c
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@
 #include <u-boot/crc.h>
 #else
 #include <linux/compiler.h>
-#include <linux/kconfig.h>
 #include <common.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <log.h>
@@ -29,6 +28,7 @@ DECLARE_GLOBAL_DATA_PTR;
 
 #include <bootm.h>
 #include <image.h>
+#include <linux/kconfig.h>
 #include <bootstage.h>
 #include <u-boot/crc.h>
 #include <u-boot/md5.h>
@@ -1547,6 +1547,22 @@ int fit_check_format(const void *fit, ulong size)
 		return -ENOEXEC;
 	}
 
+	if (CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(FIT_FULL_CHECK)) {
+		/*
+		 * If we are not given the size, make do wtih calculating it.
+		 * This is not as secure, so we should consider a flag to
+		 * control this.
+		 */
+		if (size == IMAGE_SIZE_INVAL)
+			size = fdt_totalsize(fit);
+		ret = fdt_check_full(fit, size);
+
+		if (ret) {
+			log_debug("FIT check error %d\n", ret);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
 	/* mandatory / node 'description' property */
 	if (!fdt_getprop(fit, 0, FIT_DESC_PROP, NULL)) {
 		log_debug("Wrong FIT format: no description\n");
-- 
2.23.0