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fix cves

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hht8 2020-05-19 15:36:49 +08:00
parent dda52a8334
commit e68feb1fe0
9 changed files with 1177 additions and 1 deletions
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112
CVE-2019-12418.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
From 1fc9f589dbdd8295cf313b2667ab041c425f99c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: remm <remm@apache.org>
Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2019 13:39:31 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Refactor JMX remote RMI registry creation
---
.../mbeans/JmxRemoteLifecycleListener.java | 65 ++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/java/org/apache/catalina/mbeans/JmxRemoteLifecycleListener.java b/java/org/apache/catalina/mbeans/JmxRemoteLifecycleListener.java
index ae04294..e832935 100644
--- a/java/org/apache/catalina/mbeans/JmxRemoteLifecycleListener.java
+++ b/java/org/apache/catalina/mbeans/JmxRemoteLifecycleListener.java
@@ -25,10 +25,11 @@ import java.net.MalformedURLException;
import java.net.ServerSocket;
import java.net.Socket;
import java.net.UnknownHostException;
+import java.rmi.AccessException;
import java.rmi.AlreadyBoundException;
+import java.rmi.NotBoundException;
+import java.rmi.Remote;
import java.rmi.RemoteException;
-import java.rmi.registry.LocateRegistry;
-import java.rmi.registry.Registry;
import java.rmi.server.RMIClientSocketFactory;
import java.rmi.server.RMIServerSocketFactory;
import java.security.NoSuchAlgorithmException;
@@ -301,18 +302,6 @@ public class JmxRemoteLifecycleListener implements LifecycleListener {
RMIClientSocketFactory registryCsf, RMIServerSocketFactory registrySsf,
RMIClientSocketFactory serverCsf, RMIServerSocketFactory serverSsf) {
- // Create the RMI registry
- Registry registry;
- try {
- registry = LocateRegistry.createRegistry(
- theRmiRegistryPort, registryCsf, registrySsf);
- } catch (RemoteException e) {
- log.error(sm.getString(
- "jmxRemoteLifecycleListener.createRegistryFailed",
- serverName, Integer.toString(theRmiRegistryPort)), e);
- return null;
- }
-
if (bindAddress == null) {
bindAddress = "localhost";
}
@@ -333,11 +322,20 @@ public class JmxRemoteLifecycleListener implements LifecycleListener {
cs = new RMIConnectorServer(serviceUrl, theEnv, server,
ManagementFactory.getPlatformMBeanServer());
cs.start();
- registry.bind("jmxrmi", server.toStub());
+ Remote jmxServer = server.toStub();
+ // Create the RMI registry
+ try {
+ new JmxRegistry(theRmiRegistryPort, registryCsf, registrySsf, "jmxrmi", jmxServer);
+ } catch (RemoteException e) {
+ log.error(sm.getString(
+ "jmxRemoteLifecycleListener.createRegistryFailed",
+ serverName, Integer.toString(theRmiRegistryPort)), e);
+ return null;
+ }
log.info(sm.getString("jmxRemoteLifecycleListener.start",
Integer.toString(theRmiRegistryPort),
Integer.toString(theRmiServerPort), serverName));
- } catch (IOException | AlreadyBoundException e) {
+ } catch (IOException e) {
log.error(sm.getString(
"jmxRemoteLifecycleListener.createServerFailed",
serverName), e);
@@ -493,4 +491,39 @@ public class JmxRemoteLifecycleListener implements LifecycleListener {
return true;
}
}
+
+
+ private static class JmxRegistry extends sun.rmi.registry.RegistryImpl {
+ private static final long serialVersionUID = -3772054804656428217L;
+ private final String jmxName;
+ private final Remote jmxServer;
+ public JmxRegistry(int port, RMIClientSocketFactory csf,
+ RMIServerSocketFactory ssf, String jmxName, Remote jmxServer) throws RemoteException {
+ super(port, csf, ssf);
+ this.jmxName = jmxName;
+ this.jmxServer = jmxServer;
+ }
+ @Override
+ public Remote lookup(String name)
+ throws RemoteException, NotBoundException {
+ return (jmxName.equals(name)) ? jmxServer : null;
+ }
+ @Override
+ public void bind(String name, Remote obj)
+ throws RemoteException, AlreadyBoundException, AccessException {
+ }
+ @Override
+ public void unbind(String name)
+ throws RemoteException, NotBoundException, AccessException {
+ }
+ @Override
+ public void rebind(String name, Remote obj)
+ throws RemoteException, AccessException {
+ }
+ @Override
+ public String[] list() throws RemoteException {
+ return new String[] { jmxName };
+ }
+ }
+
}
--
2.23.0

137
CVE-2019-17563.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
From fabfa49abf917e126dbcf299fed40a1ab96d6f7a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: wang_yue111 <wangyue92@huawei.com>
Date: Fri, 15 May 2020 17:17:57 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] 2
---
.../authenticator/AuthenticatorBase.java | 7 ++--
.../catalina/authenticator/Constants.java | 3 ++
.../authenticator/FormAuthenticator.java | 36 +++++--------------
3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
diff --git a/java/org/apache/catalina/authenticator/AuthenticatorBase.java b/java/org/apache/catalina/authenticator/AuthenticatorBase.java
index 880ebde..47d562b 100644
--- a/java/org/apache/catalina/authenticator/AuthenticatorBase.java
+++ b/java/org/apache/catalina/authenticator/AuthenticatorBase.java
@@ -1021,10 +1021,11 @@ public abstract class AuthenticatorBase extends ValveBase
}
// Cache the authentication information in our session, if any
- if (cache) {
- if (session != null) {
+ if (session != null) {
+ if (cache) {
session.setAuthType(authType);
session.setPrincipal(principal);
+ } else {
if (username != null) {
session.setNote(Constants.SESS_USERNAME_NOTE, username);
} else {
diff --git a/java/org/apache/catalina/authenticator/Constants.java b/java/org/apache/catalina/authenticator/Constants.java
index 452a4f0..c9580d6 100644
--- a/java/org/apache/catalina/authenticator/Constants.java
+++ b/java/org/apache/catalina/authenticator/Constants.java
@@ -93,7 +93,10 @@ public class Constants {
/**
* The previously authenticated principal (if caching is disabled).
+ *
+ * @deprecated Unused. Will be removed in Tomcat 10.
*/
+ @Deprecated
public static final String FORM_PRINCIPAL_NOTE =
"org.apache.catalina.authenticator.PRINCIPAL";
diff --git a/java/org/apache/catalina/authenticator/FormAuthenticator.java b/java/org/apache/catalina/authenticator/FormAuthenticator.java
index 1b54ddd..44c783e 100644
--- a/java/org/apache/catalina/authenticator/FormAuthenticator.java
+++ b/java/org/apache/catalina/authenticator/FormAuthenticator.java
@@ -133,10 +133,6 @@ public class FormAuthenticator
protected boolean doAuthenticate(Request request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws IOException {
- if (checkForCachedAuthentication(request, response, true)) {
- return true;
- }
-
// References to objects we will need later
Session session = null;
Principal principal = null;
@@ -158,11 +154,8 @@ public class FormAuthenticator
principal =
context.getRealm().authenticate(username, password);
if (principal != null) {
- session.setNote(Constants.FORM_PRINCIPAL_NOTE, principal);
+ register(request, response, principal, HttpServletRequest.FORM_AUTH, username, password);
if (!matchRequest(request)) {
- register(request, response, principal,
- HttpServletRequest.FORM_AUTH,
- username, password);
return true;
}
}
@@ -181,17 +174,6 @@ public class FormAuthenticator
+ session.getIdInternal()
+ "'");
}
- principal = (Principal)
- session.getNote(Constants.FORM_PRINCIPAL_NOTE);
- register(request, response, principal, HttpServletRequest.FORM_AUTH,
- (String) session.getNote(Constants.SESS_USERNAME_NOTE),
- (String) session.getNote(Constants.SESS_PASSWORD_NOTE));
- // If we're caching principals we no longer need the username
- // and password in the session, so remove them
- if (cache) {
- session.removeNote(Constants.SESS_USERNAME_NOTE);
- session.removeNote(Constants.SESS_PASSWORD_NOTE);
- }
if (restoreRequest(request, session)) {
if (log.isDebugEnabled()) {
log.debug("Proceed to restored request");
@@ -206,6 +188,12 @@ public class FormAuthenticator
}
}
+ // This check has to be after the previous check for a matching request
+ // because that matching request may also include a cached Principal.
+ if (checkForCachedAuthentication(request, response, true)) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
// Acquire references to objects we will need to evaluate
String contextPath = request.getContextPath();
String requestURI = request.getDecodedRequestURI();
@@ -297,12 +285,7 @@ public class FormAuthenticator
return false;
}
- // Save the authenticated Principal in our session
- session.setNote(Constants.FORM_PRINCIPAL_NOTE, principal);
-
- // Save the username and password as well
- session.setNote(Constants.SESS_USERNAME_NOTE, username);
- session.setNote(Constants.SESS_PASSWORD_NOTE, password);
+ register(request, response, principal, HttpServletRequest.FORM_AUTH, username, password);
// Redirect the user to the original request URI (which will cause
// the original request to be restored)
@@ -510,7 +493,7 @@ public class FormAuthenticator
}
// Is there a saved principal?
- if (session.getNote(Constants.FORM_PRINCIPAL_NOTE) == null) {
+ if (cache && session.getPrincipal() == null || !cache && request.getPrincipal() == null) {
return false;
}
@@ -541,7 +524,6 @@ public class FormAuthenticator
SavedRequest saved = (SavedRequest)
session.getNote(Constants.FORM_REQUEST_NOTE);
session.removeNote(Constants.FORM_REQUEST_NOTE);
- session.removeNote(Constants.FORM_PRINCIPAL_NOTE);
if (saved == null) {
return false;
}
--
2.23.0

443
CVE-2020-1935.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,443 @@
From 8bfb0ff7f25fe7555a5eb2f7984f73546c11aa26 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mark Thomas <markt@apache.org>
Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2020 20:53:25 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Stricter header value parsing
---
.../coyote/http11/AbstractHttp11Protocol.java | 51 ++++++++++---
.../coyote/http11/Http11InputBuffer.java | 51 +++++++++----
.../apache/coyote/http11/Http11Processor.java | 2 +-
.../apache/tomcat/util/http/MimeHeaders.java | 2 +-
.../tomcat/util/http/parser/HttpParser.java | 11 +++
.../coyote/http11/TestHttp11InputBuffer.java | 74 +++++++++++++++----
webapps/docs/config/http.xml | 11 ++-
8 files changed, 164 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
diff --git a/java/org/apache/coyote/http11/AbstractHttp11Protocol.java b/java/org/apache/coyote/http11/AbstractHttp11Protocol.java
index e5ab885..9d10cbf 100644
--- a/java/org/apache/coyote/http11/AbstractHttp11Protocol.java
+++ b/java/org/apache/coyote/http11/AbstractHttp11Protocol.java
@@ -136,27 +136,56 @@ public abstract class AbstractHttp11Protocol<S> extends AbstractProtocol<S> {
}
- private boolean rejectIllegalHeaderName = true;
+ private boolean rejectIllegalHeader = true;
/**
- * If an HTTP request is received that contains an illegal header name (i.e.
- * the header name is not a token) will the request be rejected (with a 400
- * response) or will the illegal header be ignored.
+ * If an HTTP request is received that contains an illegal header name or
+ * value (e.g. the header name is not a token) will the request be rejected
+ * (with a 400 response) or will the illegal header be ignored?
*
* @return {@code true} if the request will be rejected or {@code false} if
* the header will be ignored
*/
- public boolean getRejectIllegalHeaderName() { return rejectIllegalHeaderName; }
+ public boolean getRejectIllegalHeader() { return rejectIllegalHeader; }
/**
- * If an HTTP request is received that contains an illegal header name (i.e.
- * the header name is not a token) should the request be rejected (with a
- * 400 response) or should the illegal header be ignored.
+ * If an HTTP request is received that contains an illegal header name or
+ * value (e.g. the header name is not a token) should the request be
+ * rejected (with a 400 response) or should the illegal header be ignored?
+ *
+ * @param rejectIllegalHeader {@code true} to reject requests with illegal
+ * header names or values, {@code false} to
+ * ignore the header
+ */
+ public void setRejectIllegalHeader(boolean rejectIllegalHeader) {
+ this.rejectIllegalHeader = rejectIllegalHeader;
+ }
+ /**
+ * If an HTTP request is received that contains an illegal header name or
+ * value (e.g. the header name is not a token) will the request be rejected
+ * (with a 400 response) or will the illegal header be ignored?
+ *
+ * @return {@code true} if the request will be rejected or {@code false} if
+ * the header will be ignored
+ *
+ * @deprecated Now an alias for {@link #getRejectIllegalHeader()}. Will be
+ * removed in Tomcat 10 onwards.
+ */
+ @Deprecated
+ public boolean getRejectIllegalHeaderName() { return rejectIllegalHeader; }
+ /**
+ * If an HTTP request is received that contains an illegal header name or
+ * value (e.g. the header name is not a token) should the request be
+ * rejected (with a 400 response) or should the illegal header be ignored?
*
* @param rejectIllegalHeaderName {@code true} to reject requests with
- * illegal header names, {@code false} to
- * ignore the header
+ * illegal header names or values,
+ * {@code false} to ignore the header
+ *
+ * @deprecated Now an alias for {@link #setRejectIllegalHeader(boolean)}.
+ * Will be removed in Tomcat 10 onwards.
*/
+ @Deprecated
public void setRejectIllegalHeaderName(boolean rejectIllegalHeaderName) {
- this.rejectIllegalHeaderName = rejectIllegalHeaderName;
+ this.rejectIllegalHeader = rejectIllegalHeaderName;
}
diff --git a/java/org/apache/coyote/http11/Http11InputBuffer.java b/java/org/apache/coyote/http11/Http11InputBuffer.java
index 2dc7c17..57c670e 100644
--- a/java/org/apache/coyote/http11/Http11InputBuffer.java
+++ b/java/org/apache/coyote/http11/Http11InputBuffer.java
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ public class Http11InputBuffer implements InputBuffer, ApplicationBufferHandler
private final MimeHeaders headers;
- private final boolean rejectIllegalHeaderName;
+ private final boolean rejectIllegalHeader;
/**
* State.
@@ -150,13 +150,13 @@ public class Http11InputBuffer implements InputBuffer, ApplicationBufferHandler
// ----------------------------------------------------------- Constructors
public Http11InputBuffer(Request request, int headerBufferSize,
- boolean rejectIllegalHeaderName, HttpParser httpParser) {
+ boolean rejectIllegalHeader, HttpParser httpParser) {
this.request = request;
headers = request.getMimeHeaders();
this.headerBufferSize = headerBufferSize;
- this.rejectIllegalHeaderName = rejectIllegalHeaderName;
+ this.rejectIllegalHeader = rejectIllegalHeader;
this.httpParser = httpParser;
filterLibrary = new InputFilter[0];
@@ -752,6 +752,8 @@ public class Http11InputBuffer implements InputBuffer, ApplicationBufferHandler
//
byte chr = 0;
+ byte prevChr = 0;
+
while (headerParsePos == HeaderParsePosition.HEADER_START) {
// Read new bytes if needed
@@ -762,17 +764,23 @@ public class Http11InputBuffer implements InputBuffer, ApplicationBufferHandler
}
}
+ prevChr = chr;
chr = byteBuffer.get();
- if (chr == Constants.CR) {
- // Skip
- } else if (chr == Constants.LF) {
+ if (chr == Constants.CR && prevChr != Constants.CR) {
+ // Possible start of CRLF - process the next byte.
+ } else if (prevChr == Constants.CR && chr == Constants.LF) {
return HeaderParseStatus.DONE;
} else {
- byteBuffer.position(byteBuffer.position() - 1);
+ if (prevChr == 0) {
+ // Must have only read one byte
+ byteBuffer.position(byteBuffer.position() - 1);
+ } else {
+ // Must have read two bytes (first was CR, second was not LF)
+ byteBuffer.position(byteBuffer.position() - 2);
+ }
break;
}
-
}
if (headerParsePos == HeaderParsePosition.HEADER_START) {
@@ -868,11 +876,22 @@ public class Http11InputBuffer implements InputBuffer, ApplicationBufferHandler
}
}
+ prevChr = chr;
chr = byteBuffer.get();
if (chr == Constants.CR) {
- // Skip
- } else if (chr == Constants.LF) {
+ // Possible start of CRLF - process the next byte.
+ } else if (prevChr == Constants.CR && chr == Constants.LF) {
eol = true;
+ } else if (prevChr == Constants.CR) {
+ // Invalid value
+ // Delete the header (it will be the most recent one)
+ headers.removeHeader(headers.size() - 1);
+ return skipLine();
+ } else if (chr != Constants.HT && HttpParser.isControl(chr)) {
+ // Invalid value
+ // Delete the header (it will be the most recent one)
+ headers.removeHeader(headers.size() - 1);
+ return skipLine();
} else if (chr == Constants.SP || chr == Constants.HT) {
byteBuffer.put(headerData.realPos, chr);
headerData.realPos++;
@@ -924,6 +943,9 @@ public class Http11InputBuffer implements InputBuffer, ApplicationBufferHandler
headerParsePos = HeaderParsePosition.HEADER_SKIPLINE;
boolean eol = false;
+ byte chr = 0;
+ byte prevChr = 0;
+
// Reading bytes until the end of the line
while (!eol) {
@@ -935,21 +957,22 @@ public class Http11InputBuffer implements InputBuffer, ApplicationBufferHandler
}
int pos = byteBuffer.position();
- byte chr = byteBuffer.get();
+ prevChr = chr;
+ chr = byteBuffer.get();
if (chr == Constants.CR) {
// Skip
- } else if (chr == Constants.LF) {
+ } else if (prevChr == Constants.CR && chr == Constants.LF) {
eol = true;
} else {
headerData.lastSignificantChar = pos;
}
}
- if (rejectIllegalHeaderName || log.isDebugEnabled()) {
+ if (rejectIllegalHeader || log.isDebugEnabled()) {
String message = sm.getString("iib.invalidheader",
new String(byteBuffer.array(), headerData.start,
headerData.lastSignificantChar - headerData.start + 1,
StandardCharsets.ISO_8859_1));
- if (rejectIllegalHeaderName) {
+ if (rejectIllegalHeader) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException(message);
}
log.debug(message);
diff --git a/java/org/apache/coyote/http11/Http11Processor.java b/java/org/apache/coyote/http11/Http11Processor.java
index df002e0..86556ec 100644
--- a/java/org/apache/coyote/http11/Http11Processor.java
+++ b/java/org/apache/coyote/http11/Http11Processor.java
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ public class Http11Processor extends AbstractProcessor {
protocol.getRelaxedQueryChars());
inputBuffer = new Http11InputBuffer(request, protocol.getMaxHttpHeaderSize(),
- protocol.getRejectIllegalHeaderName(), httpParser);
+ protocol.getRejectIllegalHeader(), httpParser);
request.setInputBuffer(inputBuffer);
outputBuffer = new Http11OutputBuffer(response, protocol.getMaxHttpHeaderSize());
diff --git a/java/org/apache/tomcat/util/http/MimeHeaders.java b/java/org/apache/tomcat/util/http/MimeHeaders.java
index 59504ee..b76b274 100644
--- a/java/org/apache/tomcat/util/http/MimeHeaders.java
+++ b/java/org/apache/tomcat/util/http/MimeHeaders.java
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ public class MimeHeaders {
* reset and swap with last header
* @param idx the index of the header to remove.
*/
- private void removeHeader(int idx) {
+ public void removeHeader(int idx) {
MimeHeaderField mh = headers[idx];
mh.recycle();
diff --git a/java/org/apache/tomcat/util/http/parser/HttpParser.java b/java/org/apache/tomcat/util/http/parser/HttpParser.java
index 827f2c5..644b1d1 100644
--- a/java/org/apache/tomcat/util/http/parser/HttpParser.java
+++ b/java/org/apache/tomcat/util/http/parser/HttpParser.java
@@ -317,6 +317,17 @@ public class HttpParser {
}
+ public static boolean isControl(int c) {
+ // Fast for valid control characters, slower for some incorrect
+ // ones
+ try {
+ return IS_CONTROL[c];
+ } catch (ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException ex) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+
// Skip any LWS and position to read the next character. The next character
// is returned as being able to 'peek()' it allows a small optimisation in
// some cases.
diff --git a/test/org/apache/coyote/http11/TestHttp11InputBuffer.java b/test/org/apache/coyote/http11/TestHttp11InputBuffer.java
index 131fa21..e60a474 100644
--- a/test/org/apache/coyote/http11/TestHttp11InputBuffer.java
+++ b/test/org/apache/coyote/http11/TestHttp11InputBuffer.java
@@ -163,13 +163,13 @@ public class TestHttp11InputBuffer extends TomcatBaseTest {
@Test
- public void testBug51557Separators() throws Exception {
+ public void testBug51557SeparatorsInName() throws Exception {
char httpSeparators[] = new char[] {
'\t', ' ', '\"', '(', ')', ',', '/', ':', ';', '<',
'=', '>', '?', '@', '[', '\\', ']', '{', '}' };
for (char s : httpSeparators) {
- doTestBug51557Char(s);
+ doTestBug51557CharInName(s);
tearDown();
setUp();
}
@@ -177,13 +177,38 @@ public class TestHttp11InputBuffer extends TomcatBaseTest {
@Test
- public void testBug51557Ctl() throws Exception {
+ public void testBug51557CtlInName() throws Exception {
for (int i = 0; i < 31; i++) {
- doTestBug51557Char((char) i);
+ doTestBug51557CharInName((char) i);
+ tearDown();
+ setUp();
+ }
+ doTestBug51557CharInName((char) 127);
+ }
+
+
+ @Test
+ public void testBug51557CtlInValue() throws Exception {
+ for (int i = 0; i < 31; i++) {
+ if (i == '\t') {
+ // TAB is allowed
+ continue;
+ }
+ doTestBug51557InvalidCharInValue((char) i);
+ tearDown();
+ setUp();
+ }
+ doTestBug51557InvalidCharInValue((char) 127);
+ }
+
+
+ @Test
+ public void testBug51557ObsTextInValue() throws Exception {
+ for (int i = 128; i < 255; i++) {
+ doTestBug51557ValidCharInValue((char) i);
tearDown();
setUp();
}
- doTestBug51557Char((char) 127);
}
@@ -226,7 +251,7 @@ public class TestHttp11InputBuffer extends TomcatBaseTest {
}
- private void doTestBug51557Char(char s) {
+ private void doTestBug51557CharInName(char s) {
Bug51557Client client =
new Bug51557Client("X-Bug" + s + "51557", "invalid");
@@ -236,6 +261,29 @@ public class TestHttp11InputBuffer extends TomcatBaseTest {
Assert.assertTrue(client.isResponseBodyOK());
}
+
+ private void doTestBug51557InvalidCharInValue(char s) {
+ Bug51557Client client =
+ new Bug51557Client("X-Bug51557-Invalid", "invalid" + s + "invalid");
+
+ client.doRequest();
+ Assert.assertTrue("Testing [" + (int) s + "]", client.isResponse200());
+ Assert.assertEquals("Testing [" + (int) s + "]", "abcd", client.getResponseBody());
+ Assert.assertTrue(client.isResponseBodyOK());
+ }
+
+
+ private void doTestBug51557ValidCharInValue(char s) {
+ Bug51557Client client =
+ new Bug51557Client("X-Bug51557-Valid", "valid" + s + "valid");
+
+ client.doRequest();
+ Assert.assertTrue("Testing [" + (int) s + "]", client.isResponse200());
+ Assert.assertEquals("Testing [" + (int) s + "]", "valid" + s + "validabcd", client.getResponseBody());
+ Assert.assertTrue(client.isResponseBodyOK());
+ }
+
+
/**
* Bug 51557 test client.
*/
@@ -243,12 +291,12 @@ public class TestHttp11InputBuffer extends TomcatBaseTest {
private final String headerName;
private final String headerLine;
- private final boolean rejectIllegalHeaderName;
+ private final boolean rejectIllegalHeader;
public Bug51557Client(String headerName) {
this.headerName = headerName;
this.headerLine = headerName;
- this.rejectIllegalHeaderName = false;
+ this.rejectIllegalHeader = false;
}
public Bug51557Client(String headerName, String headerValue) {
@@ -256,10 +304,10 @@ public class TestHttp11InputBuffer extends TomcatBaseTest {
}
public Bug51557Client(String headerName, String headerValue,
- boolean rejectIllegalHeaderName) {
+ boolean rejectIllegalHeader) {
this.headerName = headerName;
this.headerLine = headerName + ": " + headerValue;
- this.rejectIllegalHeaderName = rejectIllegalHeaderName;
+ this.rejectIllegalHeader = rejectIllegalHeader;
}
private Exception doRequest() {
@@ -273,8 +321,8 @@ public class TestHttp11InputBuffer extends TomcatBaseTest {
try {
Connector connector = tomcat.getConnector();
- connector.setProperty("rejectIllegalHeaderName",
- Boolean.toString(rejectIllegalHeaderName));
+ connector.setProperty("rejectIllegalHeader",
+ Boolean.toString(rejectIllegalHeader));
tomcat.start();
setPort(connector.getLocalPort());
@@ -548,7 +596,7 @@ public class TestHttp11InputBuffer extends TomcatBaseTest {
try {
Connector connector = tomcat.getConnector();
- connector.setProperty("rejectIllegalHeaderName", "false");
+ connector.setProperty("rejectIllegalHeader", "false");
tomcat.start();
setPort(connector.getLocalPort());
diff --git a/webapps/docs/config/http.xml b/webapps/docs/config/http.xml
index ebb277d..3902c9a 100644
--- a/webapps/docs/config/http.xml
+++ b/webapps/docs/config/http.xml
@@ -551,14 +551,19 @@
expected concurrent requests (synchronous and asynchronous).</p>
</attribute>
- <attribute name="rejectIllegalHeaderName" required="false">
- <p>If an HTTP request is received that contains an illegal header name
- (i.e. the header name is not a token) this setting determines if the
+ <attribute name="rejectIllegalHeader" required="false">
+ <p>If an HTTP request is received that contains an illegal header name or
+ value (e.g. the header name is not a token) this setting determines if the
request will be rejected with a 400 response (<code>true</code>) or if the
illegal header be ignored (<code>false</code>). The default value is
<code>true</code> which will cause the request to be rejected.</p>
</attribute>
+ <attribute name="rejectIllegalHeaderName" required="false">
+ <p>This attribute is deprecated. It will be removed in Tomcat 10 onwards.
+ It is now an alias for <strong>rejectIllegalHeader</strong>.</p>
+ </attribute>
+
<attribute name="relaxedPathChars" required="false">
<p>The <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc7230.txt">HTTP/1.1
specification</a> requires that certain characters are %nn encoded when
--
2.23.0

50
CVE-2020-1938-1.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
From 0e8a50f0a5958744bea1fd6768c862e04d3b7e75 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mark Thomas <markt@apache.org>
Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2020 13:02:13 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Change the default bind address for AJP to the loopback
address
---
java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AbstractAjpProtocol.java | 4 ++++
webapps/docs/changelog.xml | 4 ++++
webapps/docs/config/ajp.xml | 5 +----
3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AbstractAjpProtocol.java b/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AbstractAjpProtocol.java
index 2500abd7ad..8e0593b771 100644
--- a/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AbstractAjpProtocol.java
+++ b/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AbstractAjpProtocol.java
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
*/
package org.apache.coyote.ajp;
+import java.net.InetAddress;
+
import org.apache.coyote.AbstractProtocol;
import org.apache.coyote.Processor;
import org.apache.coyote.UpgradeProtocol;
@@ -46,6 +48,8 @@ public AbstractAjpProtocol(AbstractEndpoint<S,?> endpoint) {
setConnectionTimeout(Constants.DEFAULT_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT);
// AJP does not use Send File
getEndpoint().setUseSendfile(false);
+ // AJP listens on loopback by default
+ getEndpoint().setAddress(InetAddress.getLoopbackAddress());
ConnectionHandler<S> cHandler = new ConnectionHandler<>(this);
setHandler(cHandler);
getEndpoint().setHandler(cHandler);
diff --git a/webapps/docs/config/ajp.xml b/webapps/docs/config/ajp.xml
index c70af91eae..5535a062e7 100644
--- a/webapps/docs/config/ajp.xml
+++ b/webapps/docs/config/ajp.xml
@@ -308,10 +308,7 @@
<attribute name="address" required="false">
<p>For servers with more than one IP address, this attribute
specifies which address will be used for listening on the specified
- port. By default, this port will be used on all IP addresses
- associated with the server. A value of <code>127.0.0.1</code>
- indicates that the Connector will only listen on the loopback
- interface.</p>
+ port. By default, the loopback address will be used.</p>
</attribute>
<attribute name="bindOnInit" required="false">

160
CVE-2020-1938-2.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
From 9ac90532e9a7d239f90952edb229b07c80a9a3eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mark Thomas <markt@apache.org>
Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2020 14:24:33 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Rename requiredSecret to secret and add secretRequired
AJP Connector will not start if secretRequired="true" and secret is set
to null or zero length String.
---
.../coyote/ajp/AbstractAjpProtocol.java | 49 +++++++++++++++++--
java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AjpProcessor.java | 12 ++---
.../apache/coyote/ajp/LocalStrings.properties | 1 +
webapps/docs/config/ajp.xml | 12 ++++-
5 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AbstractAjpProtocol.java b/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AbstractAjpProtocol.java
index 8e0593b771..81da7da6d1 100644
--- a/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AbstractAjpProtocol.java
+++ b/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AbstractAjpProtocol.java
@@ -143,17 +143,48 @@ public void setTomcatAuthorization(boolean tomcatAuthorization) {
}
- private String requiredSecret = null;
+ private String secret = null;
+ /**
+ * Set the secret that must be included with every request.
+ *
+ * @param secret The required secret
+ */
+ public void setSecret(String secret) {
+ this.secret = secret;
+ }
+ protected String getSecret() {
+ return secret;
+ }
/**
* Set the required secret that must be included with every request.
*
* @param requiredSecret The required secret
+ *
+ * @deprecated Replaced by {@link #setSecret(String)}.
+ * Will be removed in Tomcat 11 onwards
*/
+ @Deprecated
public void setRequiredSecret(String requiredSecret) {
- this.requiredSecret = requiredSecret;
+ setSecret(requiredSecret);
}
+ /**
+ * @return The current secret
+ *
+ * @deprecated Replaced by {@link #getSecret()}.
+ * Will be removed in Tomcat 11 onwards
+ */
+ @Deprecated
protected String getRequiredSecret() {
- return requiredSecret;
+ return getSecret();
+ }
+
+
+ private boolean secretRequired = true;
+ public void setSecretRequired(boolean secretRequired) {
+ this.secretRequired = secretRequired;
+ }
+ public boolean getSecretRequired() {
+ return secretRequired;
}
@@ -210,4 +241,16 @@ protected Processor createUpgradeProcessor(SocketWrapperBase<?> socket,
throw new IllegalStateException(sm.getString("ajpprotocol.noUpgradeHandler",
upgradeToken.getHttpUpgradeHandler().getClass().getName()));
}
+
+
+ @Override
+ public void init() throws Exception {
+ if (getSecretRequired()) {
+ String secret = getSecret();
+ if (secret == null || secret.length() == 0) {
+ throw new IllegalArgumentException(sm.getString("ajpprotocol.nosecret"));
+ }
+ }
+ super.init();
+ }
}
diff --git a/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AjpProcessor.java b/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AjpProcessor.java
index a3e628d2eb..d466de2c09 100644
--- a/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AjpProcessor.java
+++ b/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AjpProcessor.java
@@ -698,8 +698,8 @@ private void prepareRequest() {
}
// Decode extra attributes
- String requiredSecret = protocol.getRequiredSecret();
- boolean secret = false;
+ String secret = protocol.getSecret();
+ boolean secretPresentInRequest = false;
byte attributeCode;
while ((attributeCode = requestHeaderMessage.getByte())
!= Constants.SC_A_ARE_DONE) {
@@ -801,9 +801,9 @@ private void prepareRequest() {
case Constants.SC_A_SECRET:
requestHeaderMessage.getBytes(tmpMB);
- if (requiredSecret != null) {
- secret = true;
- if (!tmpMB.equals(requiredSecret)) {
+ if (secret != null) {
+ secretPresentInRequest = true;
+ if (!tmpMB.equals(secret)) {
response.setStatus(403);
setErrorState(ErrorState.CLOSE_CLEAN, null);
}
@@ -819,7 +819,7 @@ private void prepareRequest() {
}
// Check if secret was submitted if required
- if ((requiredSecret != null) && !secret) {
+ if ((secret != null) && !secretPresentInRequest) {
response.setStatus(403);
setErrorState(ErrorState.CLOSE_CLEAN, null);
}
diff --git a/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/LocalStrings.properties b/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/LocalStrings.properties
index 9b569bbc6e..01de92a424 100644
--- a/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/LocalStrings.properties
+++ b/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/LocalStrings.properties
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ ajpprocessor.request.prepare=Error preparing request
# limitations under the License.
ajpprotocol.noSSL=SSL is not supported with AJP. The SSL host configuration for [{0}] was ignored
+ajpprotocol.nosecret=The AJP Connector is configured with secretRequired="true" but the secret attribute is either null or "". This combination is not valid.
ajpprotocol.noUpgrade=Upgrade is not supported with AJP. The UpgradeProtocol configuration for [{0}] was ignored
ajpprotocol.noUpgradeHandler=Upgrade is not supported with AJP. The HttpUpgradeHandler [{0}] can not be processed
diff --git a/webapps/docs/config/ajp.xml b/webapps/docs/config/ajp.xml
index 5535a062e7..3999a13e66 100644
--- a/webapps/docs/config/ajp.xml
+++ b/webapps/docs/config/ajp.xml
@@ -428,8 +428,18 @@
expected concurrent requests (synchronous and asynchronous).</p>
</attribute>
- <attribute name="requiredSecret" required="false">
+ <attribute name="secret" required="false">
<p>Only requests from workers with this secret keyword will be accepted.
+ The default value is <code>null</code>. This attrbute must be specified
+ with a non-null, non-zero length value unless
+ <strong>secretRequired</strong> is explicitly configured to be
+ <code>false</code>.</p>
+ </attribute>
+
+ <attribute name="secretRequired" required="false">
+ <p>If this attribute is <code>true</code>, the AJP Connector will only
+ start if the <strong>secret</strong> attribute is configured with a
+ non-null, non-zero length value. The default value is <code>true</code>.
</p>
</attribute>

142
CVE-2020-1938-3.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
From 64fa5b99442589ef0bf2a7fcd71ad2bc68b35fad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mark Thomas <markt@apache.org>
Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2020 15:04:12 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Add new AJP attribute allowedArbitraryRequestAttributes
Requests with unrecognised attributes will be blocked with a 403
---
.../coyote/ajp/AbstractAjpProtocol.java | 13 +++++++
java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AjpProcessor.java | 36 ++++++++++++++++++-
webapps/docs/config/ajp.xml | 19 ++++++++++
4 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AbstractAjpProtocol.java b/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AbstractAjpProtocol.java
index 81da7da6d1..a2f5e2844a 100644
--- a/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AbstractAjpProtocol.java
+++ b/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AbstractAjpProtocol.java
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
package org.apache.coyote.ajp;
import java.net.InetAddress;
+import java.util.regex.Pattern;
import org.apache.coyote.AbstractProtocol;
import org.apache.coyote.Processor;
@@ -188,6 +189,18 @@ public boolean getSecretRequired() {
}
+ private Pattern allowedArbitraryRequestAttributesPattern;
+ public void setAllowedArbitraryRequestAttributes(String allowedArbitraryRequestAttributes) {
+ this.allowedArbitraryRequestAttributesPattern = Pattern.compile(allowedArbitraryRequestAttributes);
+ }
+ public String getAllowedArbitraryRequestAttributes() {
+ return allowedArbitraryRequestAttributesPattern.pattern();
+ }
+ protected Pattern getAllowedArbitraryRequestAttributesPattern() {
+ return allowedArbitraryRequestAttributesPattern;
+ }
+
+
/**
* AJP packet size.
*/
diff --git a/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AjpProcessor.java b/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AjpProcessor.java
index d466de2c09..f3d783f546 100644
--- a/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AjpProcessor.java
+++ b/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AjpProcessor.java
@@ -25,6 +25,11 @@
import java.security.NoSuchProviderException;
import java.security.cert.CertificateFactory;
import java.security.cert.X509Certificate;
+import java.util.Collections;
+import java.util.HashSet;
+import java.util.Set;
+import java.util.regex.Matcher;
+import java.util.regex.Pattern;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse;
@@ -78,6 +83,9 @@
private static final byte[] pongMessageArray;
+ private static final Set<String> javaxAttributes;
+
+
static {
// Allocate the end message array
AjpMessage endMessage = new AjpMessage(16);
@@ -118,6 +126,14 @@
pongMessageArray = new byte[pongMessage.getLen()];
System.arraycopy(pongMessage.getBuffer(), 0, pongMessageArray,
0, pongMessage.getLen());
+
+ // Build the Set of javax attributes
+ Set<String> s = new HashSet<>();
+ s.add("javax.servlet.request.cipher_suite");
+ s.add("javax.servlet.request.key_size");
+ s.add("javax.servlet.request.ssl_session");
+ s.add("javax.servlet.request.X509Certificate");
+ javaxAttributes= Collections.unmodifiableSet(s);
}
@@ -728,8 +744,26 @@ private void prepareRequest() {
}
} else if(n.equals(Constants.SC_A_SSL_PROTOCOL)) {
request.setAttribute(SSLSupport.PROTOCOL_VERSION_KEY, v);
+ } else if (n.equals("JK_LB_ACTIVATION")) {
+ request.setAttribute(n, v);
+ } else if (javaxAttributes.contains(n)) {
+ request.setAttribute(n, v);
} else {
- request.setAttribute(n, v );
+ // All 'known' attributes will be processed by the previous
+ // blocks. Any remaining attribute is an 'arbitrary' one.
+ Pattern pattern = protocol.getAllowedArbitraryRequestAttributesPattern();
+ if (pattern == null) {
+ response.setStatus(403);
+ setErrorState(ErrorState.CLOSE_CLEAN, null);
+ } else {
+ Matcher m = pattern.matcher(n);
+ if (m.matches()) {
+ request.setAttribute(n, v);
+ } else {
+ response.setStatus(403);
+ setErrorState(ErrorState.CLOSE_CLEAN, null);
+ }
+ }
}
break;
diff --git a/webapps/docs/config/ajp.xml b/webapps/docs/config/ajp.xml
index 3999a13e66..69348a18e2 100644
--- a/webapps/docs/config/ajp.xml
+++ b/webapps/docs/config/ajp.xml
@@ -311,6 +311,25 @@
port. By default, the loopback address will be used.</p>
</attribute>
+ <attribute name="allowedArbitraryRequestAttributes" required="false">
+ <p>The AJP protocol passes some information from the reverse proxy to the
+ AJP connector using request attributes. These attributes are:</p>
+ <ul>
+ <li>javax.servlet.request.cipher_suite</li>
+ <li>javax.servlet.request.key_size</li>
+ <li>javax.servlet.request.ssl_session</li>
+ <li>javax.servlet.request.X509Certificate</li>
+ <li>AJP_LOCAL_ADDR</li>
+ <li>AJP_REMOTE_PORT</li>
+ <li>AJP_SSL_PROTOCOL</li>
+ <li>JK_LB_ACTIVATION</li>
+ </ul>
+ <p>The AJP protocol supports the passing of arbitrary request attributes.
+ Requests containing arbitrary request attributes will be rejected with a
+ 403 response unless the entire attribute name matches this regular
+ expression. If not specified, the default value is <code>null</code>.</p>
+ </attribute>
+
<attribute name="bindOnInit" required="false">
<p>Controls when the socket used by the connector is bound. By default it
is bound when the connector is initiated and unbound when the connector is

86
CVE-2020-1938-4.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
From 5716044b61cb5b638d8f0de848ac64df03184bc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: wang_yue111 <wangyue92@huawei.com>
Date: Mon, 18 May 2020 15:23:19 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] 3
---
conf/server.xml | 5 ++++-
.../apache/coyote/ajp/AbstractAjpProtocol.java | 18 +++++++++---------
java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AjpProcessor.java | 2 +-
webapps/docs/config/ajp.xml | 2 +-
4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/conf/server.xml b/conf/server.xml
index fce8922..81a4e16 100644
--- a/conf/server.xml
+++ b/conf/server.xml
@@ -113,7 +113,10 @@
-->
<!-- Define an AJP 1.3 Connector on port 8009 -->
- <Connector port="8009" protocol="AJP/1.3" redirectPort="8443" />
+ <Connector protocol="AJP/1.3"
+ address="::1"
+ port="8009"
+ redirectPort="8443" />
<!-- An Engine represents the entry point (within Catalina) that processes
diff --git a/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AbstractAjpProtocol.java b/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AbstractAjpProtocol.java
index a2f5e28..0bbd1e6 100644
--- a/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AbstractAjpProtocol.java
+++ b/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AbstractAjpProtocol.java
@@ -189,15 +189,15 @@ public abstract class AbstractAjpProtocol<S> extends AbstractProtocol<S> {
}
- private Pattern allowedArbitraryRequestAttributesPattern;
- public void setAllowedArbitraryRequestAttributes(String allowedArbitraryRequestAttributes) {
- this.allowedArbitraryRequestAttributesPattern = Pattern.compile(allowedArbitraryRequestAttributes);
- }
- public String getAllowedArbitraryRequestAttributes() {
- return allowedArbitraryRequestAttributesPattern.pattern();
- }
- protected Pattern getAllowedArbitraryRequestAttributesPattern() {
- return allowedArbitraryRequestAttributesPattern;
+ private Pattern allowedRequestAttributesPattern;
+ public void setAllowedRequestAttributesPattern(String allowedRequestAttributesPattern) {
+ this.allowedRequestAttributesPattern = Pattern.compile(allowedRequestAttributesPattern);
+ }
+ public String getAllowedRequestAttributesPattern() {
+ return allowedRequestAttributesPattern.pattern();
+ }
+ protected Pattern getAllowedRequestAttributesPatternInternal() {
+ return allowedRequestAttributesPattern;
}
diff --git a/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AjpProcessor.java b/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AjpProcessor.java
index cc11a20..bf2cf86 100644
--- a/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AjpProcessor.java
+++ b/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AjpProcessor.java
@@ -746,7 +746,7 @@ public class AjpProcessor extends AbstractProcessor {
} else {
// All 'known' attributes will be processed by the previous
// blocks. Any remaining attribute is an 'arbitrary' one.
- Pattern pattern = protocol.getAllowedArbitraryRequestAttributesPattern();
+ Pattern pattern = protocol.getAllowedRequestAttributesPatternInternal();
if (pattern == null) {
response.setStatus(403);
setErrorState(ErrorState.CLOSE_CLEAN, null);
diff --git a/webapps/docs/config/ajp.xml b/webapps/docs/config/ajp.xml
index 17107e4..622e7ca 100644
--- a/webapps/docs/config/ajp.xml
+++ b/webapps/docs/config/ajp.xml
@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@
port. By default, the loopback address will be used.</p>
</attribute>
- <attribute name="allowedArbitraryRequestAttributes" required="false">
+ <attribute name="allowedRequestAttributesPattern" required="false">
<p>The AJP protocol passes some information from the reverse proxy to the
AJP connector using request attributes. These attributes are:</p>
<ul>
--
2.23.0

32
CVE-2020-1938-5.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
From 49ad3f954f69c6e838c8cd112ad79aa5fa8e7153 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mark Thomas <markt@apache.org>
Date: Wed, 5 Feb 2020 14:47:48 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Refactor secret check
Moving the check to start allows invalid configurations to be fixed via
JMX and changes to be made followed by stop()/start() for those changes
to take effect.
---
java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AbstractAjpProtocol.java | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AbstractAjpProtocol.java b/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AbstractAjpProtocol.java
index 63ff6c5a63..7cfdf0accf 100644
--- a/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AbstractAjpProtocol.java
+++ b/java/org/apache/coyote/ajp/AbstractAjpProtocol.java
@@ -257,13 +257,13 @@ protected Processor createUpgradeProcessor(SocketWrapperBase<?> socket,
@Override
- public void init() throws Exception {
+ public void start() throws Exception {
if (getSecretRequired()) {
String secret = getSecret();
if (secret == null || secret.length() == 0) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException(sm.getString("ajpprotocol.nosecret"));
}
}
- super.init();
+ super.start();
}
}

16
tomcat.spec
View File

@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
Name: tomcat
Epoch: 1
Version: %{major_version}.%{minor_version}.%{micro_version}
Release: 12
Release: 13
Summary: Implementation of the Java Servlet, JavaServer Pages, Java Expression Language and Java WebSocket technologies
License: ASL 2.0
URL: http://tomcat.apache.org/
@ -58,6 +58,14 @@ Patch6012: CVE-2018-11784.patch
Patch6013: CVE-2019-0221.patch
Patch6014: CVE-2019-10072-1.patch
Patch6015: CVE-2019-10072-2.patch
Patch6016: CVE-2019-17563.patch
Patch6017: CVE-2019-12418.patch
Patch6018: CVE-2020-1938-1.patch
Patch6019: CVE-2020-1938-2.patch
Patch6020: CVE-2020-1938-3.patch
Patch6021: CVE-2020-1938-4.patch
Patch6022: CVE-2020-1938-5.patch
Patch6023: CVE-2020-1935.patch
BuildRequires: ecj >= 1:4.6.1 findutils apache-commons-collections apache-commons-daemon
BuildRequires: apache-commons-dbcp apache-commons-pool tomcat-taglibs-standard ant
@ -459,6 +467,12 @@ fi
%{_javadocdir}/%{name}
%changelog
* Tue May 19 2020 huanghaitao <huanghaitao8@huawei.com> - 1:9.0.10-13
- Type:cves
- ID: CVE-2019-17563 CVE-2019-12418 CVE-2020-1935 CVE-2020-1938
- SUG:restart
- DESC: fix CVE-2019-17563 CVE-2019-12418CVE-2020-1935 CVE-2020-1938
* Mon May 11 2020 Guoshuai Sun<sunguoshuai@huawei.com> - 1:9.0.10-12
- Add install require ecj package