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(cherry picked from commit dc86afa7d17f12540dfc1b35c8d081d51996415f)
This commit is contained in:
h30032433 2024-03-27 14:31:57 +08:00 committed by openeuler-sync-bot
parent 3d4d4de28d
commit 6b2a2cf984
4 changed files with 302 additions and 1 deletions
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65
backport-core-exec-do-not-crash-with-UtmpMode-user-without-Us.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
From cba1060f8854fd9a11dac8e2b02126d2f3bb14ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yu Watanabe <watanabe.yu+github@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2024 13:04:28 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] core/exec: do not crash with UtmpMode=user without User=
setting
Fixes https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2264404.
Replaces #31356.
(cherry picked from commit d42b81f93f81e45f7a4053c6522ec3a2145ff136)
Conflict:NA
Reference:https://github.com/systemd/systemd-stable/commit/cba1060f8854fd9a11dac8e2b02126d2f3bb14ba
---
src/core/exec-invoke.c | 12 +++++++++++-
src/shared/utmp-wtmp.c | 1 +
2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/core/exec-invoke.c b/src/core/exec-invoke.c
index 70d963e269..9927e5d1e7 100644
--- a/src/core/exec-invoke.c
+++ b/src/core/exec-invoke.c
@@ -4340,6 +4340,16 @@ int exec_invoke(
#if ENABLE_UTMP
if (context->utmp_id) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *username_alloc = NULL;
+
+ if (!username && context->utmp_mode == EXEC_UTMP_USER) {
+ username_alloc = uid_to_name(uid_is_valid(uid) ? uid : saved_uid);
+ if (!username_alloc) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_USER;
+ return log_oom();
+ }
+ }
+
const char *line = context->tty_path ?
(path_startswith(context->tty_path, "/dev/") ?: context->tty_path) :
NULL;
@@ -4348,7 +4358,7 @@ int exec_invoke(
context->utmp_mode == EXEC_UTMP_INIT ? INIT_PROCESS :
context->utmp_mode == EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN ? LOGIN_PROCESS :
USER_PROCESS,
- username);
+ username ?: username_alloc);
}
#endif
diff --git a/src/shared/utmp-wtmp.c b/src/shared/utmp-wtmp.c
index 6c3238a9c6..267b350276 100644
--- a/src/shared/utmp-wtmp.c
+++ b/src/shared/utmp-wtmp.c
@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ int utmp_put_init_process(const char *id, pid_t pid, pid_t sid, const char *line
int r;
assert(id);
+ assert(ut_type != USER_PROCESS || user);
init_timestamp(&store, 0);
--
2.33.0

189
backport-resolved-limit-the-number-of-signature-validations-i.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
From 1ebdb19ff194120109b08bbf888bdcc502f83211 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ronan Pigott <ronan@rjp.ie>
Date: Sat, 24 Feb 2024 18:21:24 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] resolved: limit the number of signature validations in a
transaction
It has been demonstrated that tolerating an unbounded number of dnssec
signature validations is a bad idea. It is easy for a maliciously
crafted DNS reply to contain as many keytag collisions as desired,
causing us to iterate every dnskey and signature combination in vain.
The solution is to impose a maximum number of validations we will
tolerate. While collisions are not hard to craft, I still expect they
are unlikely in the wild so it should be safe to pick fairly small
values.
Here two limits are imposed: one on the maximum number of invalid
signatures encountered per rrset, and another on the total number of
validations performed per transaction.
(cherry picked from commit 67d0ce8843d612a2245d0966197d4f528b911b66)
Conflict:NA
Reference:https://github.com/systemd/systemd-stable/commit/1ebdb19ff194120109b08bbf888bdcc502f83211
---
src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.h | 9 ++++++++-
src/resolve/resolved-dns-transaction.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c
index 2580c2333c..aa87820dca 100644
--- a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c
+++ b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c
@@ -1169,6 +1169,7 @@ int dnssec_verify_rrset_search(
DnsResourceRecord **ret_rrsig) {
bool found_rrsig = false, found_invalid = false, found_expired_rrsig = false, found_unsupported_algorithm = false;
+ unsigned nvalidations = 0;
DnsResourceRecord *rrsig;
int r;
@@ -1214,6 +1215,14 @@ int dnssec_verify_rrset_search(
if (realtime == USEC_INFINITY)
realtime = now(CLOCK_REALTIME);
+ /* Have we seen an unreasonable number of invalid signaures? */
+ if (nvalidations > DNSSEC_INVALID_MAX) {
+ if (ret_rrsig)
+ *ret_rrsig = NULL;
+ *result = DNSSEC_TOO_MANY_VALIDATIONS;
+ return (int) nvalidations;
+ }
+
/* Yay, we found a matching RRSIG with a matching
* DNSKEY, awesome. Now let's verify all entries of
* the RRSet against the RRSIG and DNSKEY
@@ -1223,6 +1232,8 @@ int dnssec_verify_rrset_search(
if (r < 0)
return r;
+ nvalidations++;
+
switch (one_result) {
case DNSSEC_VALIDATED:
@@ -1233,7 +1244,7 @@ int dnssec_verify_rrset_search(
*ret_rrsig = rrsig;
*result = one_result;
- return 0;
+ return (int) nvalidations;
case DNSSEC_INVALID:
/* If the signature is invalid, let's try another
@@ -1280,7 +1291,7 @@ int dnssec_verify_rrset_search(
if (ret_rrsig)
*ret_rrsig = NULL;
- return 0;
+ return (int) nvalidations;
}
int dnssec_has_rrsig(DnsAnswer *a, const DnsResourceKey *key) {
@@ -2564,6 +2575,7 @@ static const char* const dnssec_result_table[_DNSSEC_RESULT_MAX] = {
[DNSSEC_FAILED_AUXILIARY] = "failed-auxiliary",
[DNSSEC_NSEC_MISMATCH] = "nsec-mismatch",
[DNSSEC_INCOMPATIBLE_SERVER] = "incompatible-server",
+ [DNSSEC_TOO_MANY_VALIDATIONS] = "too-many-validations",
};
DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(dnssec_result, DnssecResult);
diff --git a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.h b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.h
index 954bb3ef9d..29b90130a3 100644
--- a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.h
+++ b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.h
@@ -9,12 +9,13 @@ typedef enum DnssecVerdict DnssecVerdict;
#include "resolved-dns-rr.h"
enum DnssecResult {
- /* These five are returned by dnssec_verify_rrset() */
+ /* These six are returned by dnssec_verify_rrset() */
DNSSEC_VALIDATED,
DNSSEC_VALIDATED_WILDCARD, /* Validated via a wildcard RRSIG, further NSEC/NSEC3 checks necessary */
DNSSEC_INVALID,
DNSSEC_SIGNATURE_EXPIRED,
DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM,
+ DNSSEC_TOO_MANY_VALIDATIONS,
/* These two are added by dnssec_verify_rrset_search() */
DNSSEC_NO_SIGNATURE,
@@ -45,6 +46,12 @@ enum DnssecVerdict {
/* The longest digest we'll ever generate, of all digest algorithms we support */
#define DNSSEC_HASH_SIZE_MAX (MAX(20, 32))
+/* The most invalid signatures we will tolerate for a single rrset */
+#define DNSSEC_INVALID_MAX 5
+
+/* The total number of signature validations we will tolerate for a single transaction */
+#define DNSSEC_VALIDATION_MAX 64
+
int dnssec_rrsig_match_dnskey(DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, bool revoked_ok);
int dnssec_key_match_rrsig(const DnsResourceKey *key, DnsResourceRecord *rrsig);
diff --git a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-transaction.c b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-transaction.c
index 6c931d71dc..8ff5653dff 100644
--- a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-transaction.c
+++ b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-transaction.c
@@ -3163,11 +3163,14 @@ static int dnssec_validate_records(
DnsTransaction *t,
Phase phase,
bool *have_nsec,
+ unsigned *nvalidations,
DnsAnswer **validated) {
DnsResourceRecord *rr;
int r;
+ assert(nvalidations);
+
/* Returns negative on error, 0 if validation failed, 1 to restart validation, 2 when finished. */
DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rr, t->answer) {
@@ -3209,6 +3212,7 @@ static int dnssec_validate_records(
&rrsig);
if (r < 0)
return r;
+ *nvalidations += r;
log_debug("Looking at %s: %s", strna(dns_resource_record_to_string(rr)), dnssec_result_to_string(result));
@@ -3406,7 +3410,8 @@ static int dnssec_validate_records(
DNSSEC_SIGNATURE_EXPIRED,
DNSSEC_NO_SIGNATURE))
manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, DNSSEC_BOGUS, rr->key);
- else /* DNSSEC_MISSING_KEY or DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM */
+ else /* DNSSEC_MISSING_KEY, DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM,
+ or DNSSEC_TOO_MANY_VALIDATIONS */
manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, DNSSEC_INDETERMINATE, rr->key);
/* This is a primary response to our question, and it failed validation.
@@ -3499,13 +3504,21 @@ int dns_transaction_validate_dnssec(DnsTransaction *t) {
return r;
phase = DNSSEC_PHASE_DNSKEY;
- for (;;) {
+ for (unsigned nvalidations = 0;;) {
bool have_nsec = false;
- r = dnssec_validate_records(t, phase, &have_nsec, &validated);
+ r = dnssec_validate_records(t, phase, &have_nsec, &nvalidations, &validated);
if (r <= 0)
return r;
+ if (nvalidations > DNSSEC_VALIDATION_MAX) {
+ /* This reply requires an onerous number of signature validations to verify. Let's
+ * not waste our time trying, as this shouldn't happen for well-behaved domains
+ * anyway. */
+ t->answer_dnssec_result = DNSSEC_TOO_MANY_VALIDATIONS;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
/* Try again as long as we managed to achieve something */
if (r == 1)
continue;
--
2.33.0

39
backport-resolved-reduce-the-maximum-nsec3-iterations-to-100.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
From 572692f0bdd6a3fabe3dd4a3e8e5565cc69b5e14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ronan Pigott <ronan@rjp.ie>
Date: Sun, 25 Feb 2024 00:23:32 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] resolved: reduce the maximum nsec3 iterations to 100
According to RFC9267, the 2500 value is not helpful, and in fact it can
be harmful to permit a large number of iterations. Combined with limits
on the number of signature validations, I expect this will mitigate the
impact of maliciously crafted domains designed to cause excessive
cryptographic work.
(cherry picked from commit eba291124bc11f03732d1fc468db3bfac069f9cb)
Conflict:NA
Reference:https://github.com/systemd/systemd-stable/commit/572692f0bdd6a3fabe3dd4a3e8e5565cc69b5e14
---
src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c
index aa87820dca..a192d82083 100644
--- a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c
+++ b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c
@@ -28,8 +28,9 @@ DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC_FULL(EC_KEY*, EC_KEY_free, NULL);
/* Permit a maximum clock skew of 1h 10min. This should be enough to deal with DST confusion */
#define SKEW_MAX (1*USEC_PER_HOUR + 10*USEC_PER_MINUTE)
-/* Maximum number of NSEC3 iterations we'll do. RFC5155 says 2500 shall be the maximum useful value */
-#define NSEC3_ITERATIONS_MAX 2500
+/* Maximum number of NSEC3 iterations we'll do. RFC5155 says 2500 shall be the maximum useful value, but
+ * RFC9276 § 3.2 says that we should reduce the acceptable iteration count */
+#define NSEC3_ITERATIONS_MAX 100
/*
* The DNSSEC Chain of trust:
--
2.33.0

10
systemd.spec
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@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
Name: systemd Name: systemd
Url: https://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd Url: https://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd
Version: 255 Version: 255
Release: 6 Release: 7
License: MIT and LGPLv2+ and GPLv2+ License: MIT and LGPLv2+ and GPLv2+
Summary: System and Service Manager Summary: System and Service Manager
@ -54,6 +54,9 @@ Source108: sense_data.py
Patch6001: backport-Revert-sysctl.d-switch-net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter-f.patch Patch6001: backport-Revert-sysctl.d-switch-net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter-f.patch
Patch6002: backport-Avoid-tmp-being-mounted-as-tmpfs-without-the-user-s-.patch Patch6002: backport-Avoid-tmp-being-mounted-as-tmpfs-without-the-user-s-.patch
Patch6003: backport-temporarily-disable-test-seccomp.patch Patch6003: backport-temporarily-disable-test-seccomp.patch
Patch6004: backport-core-exec-do-not-crash-with-UtmpMode-user-without-Us.patch
Patch6005: backport-resolved-limit-the-number-of-signature-validations-i.patch
Patch6006: backport-resolved-reduce-the-maximum-nsec3-iterations-to-100.patch
Patch9008: update-rtc-with-system-clock-when-shutdown.patch Patch9008: update-rtc-with-system-clock-when-shutdown.patch
Patch9009: udev-add-actions-while-rename-netif-failed.patch Patch9009: udev-add-actions-while-rename-netif-failed.patch
@ -1635,6 +1638,11 @@ fi
%{_libdir}/security/pam_systemd_loadkey.so %{_libdir}/security/pam_systemd_loadkey.so
%changelog %changelog
* Wed Mar 27 2024 huyubiao <huyubiao@huawei.com> - 255-7
- DESC:add backport-core-exec-do-not-crash-with-UtmpMode-user-without-Us.patch
backport-resolved-limit-the-number-of-signature-validations-i.patch
backport-resolved-reduce-the-maximum-nsec3-iterations-to-100.patch
* Mon Mar 18 2024 huyubiao <huyubiao@huawei.com> - 255-6 * Mon Mar 18 2024 huyubiao <huyubiao@huawei.com> - 255-6
- switch systemd back to cgroup v1 to prevent the docker.service startup failure - switch systemd back to cgroup v1 to prevent the docker.service startup failure