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update version to 6.6

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xh 2023-12-19 15:26:04 +08:00
parent 79813e0a42
commit 6e8699454c
15 changed files with 230 additions and 3920 deletions
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122
backport-0001-CVE-2023-5824.patch
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@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
From 5921355e474ffbff2cb577c3622ce0e686e8996a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
Date: Sat, 11 Mar 2023 05:48:14 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Replaced clientReplyContext::tempBuffer with old_reqofs
(#1304)
The tempBuffer data member was not actually used as a buffer. We only
used its offset field, and only for saving reqofs (which has a different
type than tempBuffer.offset!). Replaced the buffer with old_reqofs,
consistent with the rest of the "saved stale entry state" code.
Also fixed old_reqsize type to match reqsize and grouped that member
with the other private "saved stale entry state" fields.
Bad old types probably did not trigger runtime failures because the
associated saved numbers are saved at the very beginning of fetching the
entry, when all these accumulation-related counters are still small.
The remaining reqofs and reqsize types are wrong for platforms where
size_t is not uint64_t, but fixing that deserves a dedicated change. For
now, we just made the types of "old_" and "current" members consistent.
Reference:https://github.com/squid-cache/squid/commit/5921355e474ffbff2cb577c3622ce0e686e8996a
Conflict:NA
---
src/client_side_reply.cc | 12 ++++++------
src/client_side_reply.h | 6 +++---
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/client_side_reply.cc b/src/client_side_reply.cc
index 0004137cbc9..606a3ecafff 100644
--- a/src/client_side_reply.cc
+++ b/src/client_side_reply.cc
@@ -66,7 +66,6 @@ clientReplyContext::~clientReplyContext()
/* old_entry might still be set if we didn't yet get the reply
* code in HandleIMSReply() */
removeStoreReference(&old_sc, &old_entry);
- safe_free(tempBuffer.data);
cbdataReferenceDone(http);
HTTPMSGUNLOCK(reply);
}
@@ -76,7 +75,6 @@ clientReplyContext::clientReplyContext(ClientHttpRequest *clientContext) :
http(cbdataReference(clientContext)),
headers_sz(0),
sc(nullptr),
- old_reqsize(0),
reqsize(0),
reqofs(0),
ourNode(nullptr),
@@ -84,6 +82,8 @@ clientReplyContext::clientReplyContext(ClientHttpRequest *clientContext) :
old_entry(nullptr),
old_sc(nullptr),
old_lastmod(-1),
+ old_reqofs(0),
+ old_reqsize(0),
deleting(false),
collapsedRevalidation(crNone)
{
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ clientReplyContext::saveState()
old_lastmod = http->request->lastmod;
old_etag = http->request->etag;
old_reqsize = reqsize;
- tempBuffer.offset = reqofs;
+ old_reqofs = reqofs;
/* Prevent accessing the now saved entries */
http->storeEntry(nullptr);
sc = nullptr;
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ clientReplyContext::restoreState()
http->storeEntry(old_entry);
sc = old_sc;
reqsize = old_reqsize;
- reqofs = tempBuffer.offset;
+ reqofs = old_reqofs;
http->request->lastmod = old_lastmod;
http->request->etag = old_etag;
/* Prevent accessed the old saved entries */
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ clientReplyContext::restoreState()
old_lastmod = -1;
old_etag.clean();
old_reqsize = 0;
- tempBuffer.offset = 0;
+ old_reqofs = 0;
}
void
@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ clientReplyContext::sendClientUpstreamResponse()
http->storeEntry()->clearPublicKeyScope();
/* here the data to send is the data we just received */
- tempBuffer.offset = 0;
+ old_reqofs = 0;
old_reqsize = 0;
/* sendMoreData tracks the offset as well.
* Force it back to zero */
diff --git a/src/client_side_reply.h b/src/client_side_reply.h
index 68b45715b33..32a38bc95e1 100644
--- a/src/client_side_reply.h
+++ b/src/client_side_reply.h
@@ -74,8 +74,6 @@ class clientReplyContext : public RefCountable, public StoreClient
/// Not to be confused with ClientHttpRequest::Out::headers_sz.
int headers_sz;
store_client *sc; /* The store_client we're using */
- StoreIOBuffer tempBuffer; /* For use in validating requests via IMS */
- int old_reqsize; /* ... again, for the buffer */
size_t reqsize;
size_t reqofs;
char tempbuf[HTTP_REQBUF_SZ]; ///< a temporary buffer if we need working storage
@@ -135,11 +133,13 @@ class clientReplyContext : public RefCountable, public StoreClient
/// TODO: Exclude internal Store match bans from the "mismatch" category.
const char *firstStoreLookup_ = nullptr;
+ /* (stale) cache hit information preserved during IMS revalidation */
StoreEntry *old_entry;
- /* ... for entry to be validated */
store_client *old_sc;
time_t old_lastmod;
String old_etag;
+ size_t old_reqofs;
+ size_t old_reqsize;
bool deleting;

3247
backport-0002-CVE-2023-5824.patch
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39
backport-CVE-2023-46724.patch
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@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
From b70f864940225dfe69f9f653f948e787f99c3810 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andreas Weigel <andreas.weigel@securepoint.de>
Date: Wed, 18 Oct 2023 04:14:31 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Fix validation of certificates with CN=* (#1523)
The bug was discovered and detailed by Joshua Rogers at
https://megamansec.github.io/Squid-Security-Audit/
where it was filed as "Buffer UnderRead in SSL CN Parsing".
Conflict:NA
Reference:https://github.com/squid-cache/squid/commit/b70f864940225dfe69f9f653f948e787f99c3810
---
src/anyp/Uri.cc | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/anyp/Uri.cc b/src/anyp/Uri.cc
index 3eed2366abd..ef77d4f766b 100644
--- a/src/anyp/Uri.cc
+++ b/src/anyp/Uri.cc
@@ -175,6 +175,10 @@ urlInitialize(void)
assert(0 == matchDomainName("*.foo.com", ".foo.com", mdnHonorWildcards));
assert(0 != matchDomainName("*.foo.com", "foo.com", mdnHonorWildcards));
+ assert(0 != matchDomainName("foo.com", ""));
+ assert(0 != matchDomainName("foo.com", "", mdnHonorWildcards));
+ assert(0 != matchDomainName("foo.com", "", mdnRejectSubsubDomains));
+
/* more cases? */
}
@@ -828,6 +832,8 @@ matchDomainName(const char *h, const char *d, MatchDomainNameFlags flags)
return -1;
dl = strlen(d);
+ if (dl == 0)
+ return 1;
/*
* Start at the ends of the two strings and work towards the

180
backport-CVE-2023-46846.patch
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@ -1,180 +0,0 @@
From 6cfa10d94ca15a764a1d975597d8024582ef19be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Amos Jeffries <yadij@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2023 08:44:16 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] RFC 9112: Improve HTTP chunked encoding compliance (#1498)
Reference:http://www.squid-cache.org/Versions/v6/SQUID-2023_1.patch
Conflict:NA
---
src/http/one/Parser.cc | 8 +-------
src/http/one/Parser.h | 4 +---
src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 23 ++++++++++++++++++-----
src/parser/Tokenizer.cc | 12 ++++++++++++
src/parser/Tokenizer.h | 7 +++++++
5 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.cc b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
index 964371b4e..b1908316a 100644
--- a/src/http/one/Parser.cc
+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
@@ -65,16 +65,10 @@ Http::One::Parser::DelimiterCharacters()
void
Http::One::Parser::skipLineTerminator(Tokenizer &tok) const
{
- if (tok.skip(Http1::CrLf()))
- return;
-
if (Config.onoff.relaxed_header_parser && tok.skipOne(CharacterSet::LF))
return;
- if (tok.atEnd() || (tok.remaining().length() == 1 && tok.remaining().at(0) == '\r'))
- throw InsufficientInput();
-
- throw TexcHere("garbage instead of CRLF line terminator");
+ tok.skipRequired("line-terminating CRLF", Http1::CrLf());
}
/// all characters except the LF line terminator
diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.h b/src/http/one/Parser.h
index 5892a7a59..503c61d3f 100644
--- a/src/http/one/Parser.h
+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.h
@@ -124,9 +124,7 @@ protected:
* detect and skip the CRLF or (if tolerant) LF line terminator
* consume from the tokenizer.
*
- * \throws exception on bad or InsuffientInput.
- * \retval true only if line terminator found.
- * \retval false incomplete or missing line terminator, need more data.
+ * \throws exception on bad or InsufficientInput
*/
void skipLineTerminator(Tokenizer &) const;
diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
index d9138fe9a..9cce10fdc 100644
--- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
@@ -91,6 +91,11 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkSize(Tokenizer &tok)
{
Must(theChunkSize <= 0); // Should(), really
+ static const SBuf bannedHexPrefixLower("0x");
+ static const SBuf bannedHexPrefixUpper("0X");
+ if (tok.skip(bannedHexPrefixLower) || tok.skip(bannedHexPrefixUpper))
+ throw TextException("chunk starts with 0x", Here());
+
int64_t size = -1;
if (tok.int64(size, 16, false) && !tok.atEnd()) {
if (size < 0)
@@ -121,7 +126,7 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
// bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
try {
parseChunkExtensions(tok); // a possibly empty chunk-ext list
- skipLineTerminator(tok);
+ tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
buf_ = tok.remaining();
parsingStage_ = theChunkSize ? Http1::HTTP_PARSE_CHUNK : Http1::HTTP_PARSE_MIME;
return true;
@@ -132,12 +137,14 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
// other exceptions bubble up to kill message parsing
}
-/// Parses the chunk-ext list (RFC 7230 section 4.1.1 and its Errata #4667):
+/// Parses the chunk-ext list (RFC 9112 section 7.1.1:
/// chunk-ext = *( BWS ";" BWS chunk-ext-name [ BWS "=" BWS chunk-ext-val ] )
void
-Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &tok)
+Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &callerTok)
{
do {
+ auto tok = callerTok;
+
ParseBws(tok); // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
if (!tok.skip(';'))
@@ -145,6 +152,7 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &tok)
parseOneChunkExtension(tok);
buf_ = tok.remaining(); // got one extension
+ callerTok = tok;
} while (true);
}
@@ -158,11 +166,14 @@ Http::One::ChunkExtensionValueParser::Ignore(Tokenizer &tok, const SBuf &extName
/// Parses a single chunk-ext list element:
/// chunk-ext = *( BWS ";" BWS chunk-ext-name [ BWS "=" BWS chunk-ext-val ] )
void
-Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseOneChunkExtension(Tokenizer &tok)
+Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseOneChunkExtension(Tokenizer &callerTok)
{
+ auto tok = callerTok;
+
ParseBws(tok); // Bug 4492: ICAP servers send SP before chunk-ext-name
const auto extName = tok.prefix("chunk-ext-name", CharacterSet::TCHAR);
+ callerTok = tok; // in case we determine that this is a valueless chunk-ext
ParseBws(tok);
@@ -176,6 +187,8 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseOneChunkExtension(Tokenizer &tok)
customExtensionValueParser->parse(tok, extName);
else
ChunkExtensionValueParser::Ignore(tok, extName);
+
+ callerTok = tok;
}
bool
@@ -209,7 +222,7 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkEnd(Tokenizer &tok)
Must(theLeftBodySize == 0); // Should(), really
try {
- skipLineTerminator(tok);
+ tok.skipRequired("chunk CRLF", Http1::CrLf());
buf_ = tok.remaining(); // parse checkpoint
theChunkSize = 0; // done with the current chunk
parsingStage_ = Http1::HTTP_PARSE_CHUNK_SZ;
diff --git a/src/parser/Tokenizer.cc b/src/parser/Tokenizer.cc
index 2bac7fb1f..2843a44af 100644
--- a/src/parser/Tokenizer.cc
+++ b/src/parser/Tokenizer.cc
@@ -147,6 +147,18 @@ Parser::Tokenizer::skipAll(const CharacterSet &tokenChars)
return success(prefixLen);
}
+void
+Parser::Tokenizer::skipRequired(const char *description, const SBuf &tokenToSkip)
+{
+ if (skip(tokenToSkip) || tokenToSkip.isEmpty())
+ return;
+
+ if (tokenToSkip.startsWith(buf_))
+ throw InsufficientInput();
+
+ throw TextException(ToSBuf("cannot skip ", description), Here());
+}
+
bool
Parser::Tokenizer::skipOne(const CharacterSet &chars)
{
diff --git a/src/parser/Tokenizer.h b/src/parser/Tokenizer.h
index 7bae1ccbb..3cfa7dd6c 100644
--- a/src/parser/Tokenizer.h
+++ b/src/parser/Tokenizer.h
@@ -115,6 +115,13 @@ public:
*/
SBuf::size_type skipAll(const CharacterSet &discardables);
+ /** skips a given character sequence (string);
+ * does nothing if the sequence is empty
+ *
+ * \throws exception on mismatching prefix or InsufficientInput
+ */
+ void skipRequired(const char *description, const SBuf &tokenToSkip);
+
/** Removes a single trailing character from the set.
*
* \return whether a character was removed
--
2.25.1

42
backport-CVE-2023-46847.patch
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@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
From dc0e10bec3334053c1a5297e50dd7052ea18aef0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alex Bason <nonsleepr@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 15 Oct 2023 13:04:47 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Fix stack buffer overflow when parsing Digest Authorization
(#1517)
The bug was discovered and detailed by Joshua Rogers at
https://megamansec.github.io/Squid-Security-Audit/digest-overflow.html
where it was filed as "Stack Buffer Overflow in Digest Authentication".
Reference:http://www.squid-cache.org/Versions/v6/SQUID-2023_3.patch
Conflict:NA
---
src/auth/digest/Config.cc | 10 +++++++---
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/auth/digest/Config.cc b/src/auth/digest/Config.cc
index f00e2ba68..3c070d242 100644
--- a/src/auth/digest/Config.cc
+++ b/src/auth/digest/Config.cc
@@ -827,11 +827,15 @@ Auth::Digest::Config::decode(char const *proxy_auth, const HttpRequest *request,
break;
case DIGEST_NC:
- if (value.size() != 8) {
+ if (value.size() == 8) {
+ // for historical reasons, the nc value MUST be exactly 8 bytes
+ static_assert(sizeof(digest_request->nc) == 8 + 1);
+ xstrncpy(digest_request->nc, value.rawBuf(), value.size() + 1);
+ debugs(29, 9, "Found noncecount '" << digest_request->nc << "'");
+ } else {
debugs(29, 9, "Invalid nc '" << value << "' in '" << temp << "'");
+ digest_request->nc[0] = 0;
}
- xstrncpy(digest_request->nc, value.rawBuf(), value.size() + 1);
- debugs(29, 9, "Found noncecount '" << digest_request->nc << "'");
break;
case DIGEST_CNONCE:
--
2.25.1

49
backport-CVE-2023-46848.patch
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@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
From 7de01969a793b2fdb476e354a9fcda272d400d27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
Date: Thu, 25 May 2023 02:10:28 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Fix userinfo percent-encoding (#1367)
%X expects an unsigned int, and that is what we were giving it. However,
to get to the correct unsigned int value from a (signed) char, one has
to cast to an unsigned char (or equivalent) first.
Broken since inception in commit 7b75100.
Also adjusted similar (commented out) ext_edirectory_userip_acl code.
Reference:http://www.squid-cache.org/Versions/v6/SQUID-2023_5.patch
Conflict:NA
---
src/acl/external/eDirectory_userip/ext_edirectory_userip_acl.cc | 2 +-
src/anyp/Uri.cc | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/acl/external/eDirectory_userip/ext_edirectory_userip_acl.cc b/src/acl/external/eDirectory_userip/ext_edirectory_userip_acl.cc
index bf124d24f..e3f33e209 100644
--- a/src/acl/external/eDirectory_userip/ext_edirectory_userip_acl.cc
+++ b/src/acl/external/eDirectory_userip/ext_edirectory_userip_acl.cc
@@ -1555,7 +1555,7 @@ MainSafe(int argc, char **argv)
/* BINARY DEBUGGING *
local_printfx("while() -> bufa[%" PRIuSIZE "]: %s", k, bufa);
for (i = 0; i < k; ++i)
- local_printfx("%02X", bufa[i]);
+ local_printfx("%02X", static_cast<unsigned int>(static_cast<unsigned char>(bufa[i])));
local_printfx("\n");
* BINARY DEBUGGING */
/* Check for CRLF */
diff --git a/src/anyp/Uri.cc b/src/anyp/Uri.cc
index e37293996..eca2c2357 100644
--- a/src/anyp/Uri.cc
+++ b/src/anyp/Uri.cc
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ AnyP::Uri::Encode(const SBuf &buf, const CharacterSet &ignore)
while (!tk.atEnd()) {
// TODO: Add Tokenizer::parseOne(void).
const auto ch = tk.remaining()[0];
- output.appendf("%%%02X", static_cast<unsigned int>(ch)); // TODO: Optimize using a table
+ output.appendf("%%%02X", static_cast<unsigned int>(static_cast<unsigned char>(ch))); // TODO: Optimize using a table
(void)tk.skip(ch);
if (tk.prefix(goodSection, ignore))
--
2.25.1

34
backport-CVE-2023-49285.patch
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@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
From deee944f9a12c9fd399ce52f3e2526bb573a9470 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Oct 2023 19:41:45 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] RFC 1123: Fix date parsing (#1538)
The bug was discovered and detailed by Joshua Rogers at
https://megamansec.github.io/Squid-Security-Audit/datetime-overflow.html
where it was filed as "1-Byte Buffer OverRead in RFC 1123 date/time
Handling".
Conflict:NA
Reference:https://github.com/squid-cache/squid/commit/deee944f9a12c9fd399ce52f3e2526bb573a9470
---
src/time/rfc1123.cc | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/time/rfc1123.cc b/src/time/rfc1123.cc
index d89d22262f6..7524959edb0 100644
--- a/src/time/rfc1123.cc
+++ b/src/time/rfc1123.cc
@@ -50,7 +50,13 @@ make_month(const char *s)
char month[3];
month[0] = xtoupper(*s);
+ if (!month[0])
+ return -1; // protects *(s + 1) below
+
month[1] = xtolower(*(s + 1));
+ if (!month[1])
+ return -1; // protects *(s + 2) below
+
month[2] = xtolower(*(s + 2));
for (i = 0; i < 12; i++)

85
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@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
From 6014c6648a2a54a4ecb7f952ea1163e0798f9264 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
Date: Fri, 27 Oct 2023 21:27:20 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Exit without asserting when helper process startup fails
(#1543)
... to dup() after fork() and before execvp().
Assertions are for handling program logic errors. Helper initialization
code already handled system call errors correctly (i.e. by exiting the
newly created helper process with an error), except for a couple of
assert()s that could be triggered by dup(2) failures.
This bug was discovered and detailed by Joshua Rogers at
https://megamansec.github.io/Squid-Security-Audit/ipc-assert.html
where it was filed as 'Assertion in Squid "Helper" Process Creator'.
Conflict:NA
Reference:https://github.com/squid-cache/squid/commit/6014c6648a2a54a4ecb7f952ea1163e0798f9264
---
src/ipc.cc | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/ipc.cc b/src/ipc.cc
index 40d34b4755a..1afc4d5cf3c 100644
--- a/src/ipc.cc
+++ b/src/ipc.cc
@@ -22,6 +22,11 @@
#include <chrono>
#include <thread>
+#include <cstdlib>
+
+#if HAVE_UNISTD_H
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif
static const char *hello_string = "hi there\n";
#ifndef HELLO_BUF_SZ
@@ -362,6 +367,22 @@ ipcCreate(int type, const char *prog, const char *const args[], const char *name
}
PutEnvironment();
+
+ // A dup(2) wrapper that reports and exits the process on errors. The
+ // exiting logic is only suitable for this child process context.
+ const auto dupOrExit = [prog,name](const int oldFd) {
+ const auto newFd = dup(oldFd);
+ if (newFd < 0) {
+ const auto savedErrno = errno;
+ debugs(54, DBG_CRITICAL, "ERROR: Helper process initialization failure: " << name <<
+ Debug::Extra << "helper (CHILD) PID: " << getpid() <<
+ Debug::Extra << "helper program name: " << prog <<
+ Debug::Extra << "dup(2) system call error for FD " << oldFd << ": " << xstrerr(savedErrno));
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ return newFd;
+ };
+
/*
* This double-dup stuff avoids problems when one of
* crfd, cwfd, or debug_log are in the rage 0-2.
@@ -369,17 +390,16 @@ ipcCreate(int type, const char *prog, const char *const args[], const char *name
do {
/* First make sure 0-2 is occupied by something. Gets cleaned up later */
- x = dup(crfd);
- assert(x > -1);
- } while (x < 3 && x > -1);
+ x = dupOrExit(crfd);
+ } while (x < 3);
close(x);
- t1 = dup(crfd);
+ t1 = dupOrExit(crfd);
- t2 = dup(cwfd);
+ t2 = dupOrExit(cwfd);
- t3 = dup(fileno(debug_log));
+ t3 = dupOrExit(fileno(debug_log));
assert(t1 > 2 && t2 > 2 && t3 > 2);

86
backport-CVE-2023-50269.patch
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@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
From 45b6522eb80a6d12f75630fe1c132b52fc3f1624 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Thomas Leroy <32497783+p4zuu@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2023 07:35:46 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Limit the number of allowed X-Forwarded-For hops (#1589)
Squid will ignore all X-Forwarded-For elements listed after the first 64
addresses allowed by the follow_x_forwarded_for directive. A different
limit can be specified by defining a C++ SQUID_X_FORWARDED_FOR_HOP_MAX
macro, but that macro is not a supported Squid configuration interface
and may change or disappear at any time.
Squid will log a cache.log ERROR if the hop limit has been reached.
This change works around problematic ACLChecklist and/or slow ACLs
implementation that results in immediate nonBlockingCheck() callbacks.
Such callbacks have caused many bugs and development complications. In
clientFollowXForwardedForCheck() context, they lead to indirect
recursion that was bound only by the number of allowed XFF entries,
which could reach thousands and exhaust Squid process call stack.
This recursion bug was discovered and detailed by Joshua Rogers at
https://megamansec.github.io/Squid-Security-Audit/xff-stackoverflow.html
where it was filed as "X-Forwarded-For Stack Overflow".
Conflict: NA
Reference: https://github.com/squid-cache/squid/commit/45b6522eb80a6d12f75630fe1c132b52fc3f1624
---
src/ClientRequestContext.h | 7 ++++++-
src/client_side_request.cc | 17 +++++++++++++++--
2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/ClientRequestContext.h b/src/ClientRequestContext.h
index 16c33bba4bc..0997f5d22b6 100644
--- a/src/ClientRequestContext.h
+++ b/src/ClientRequestContext.h
@@ -80,8 +80,13 @@ class ClientRequestContext : public RefCountable
#if USE_OPENSSL
bool sslBumpCheckDone = false;
#endif
- ErrorState *error = nullptr; ///< saved error page for centralized/delayed processing
+
bool readNextRequest = false; ///< whether Squid should read after error handling
+ ErrorState *error = nullptr; ///< saved error page for centralized/delayed processing
+
+#if FOLLOW_X_FORWARDED_FOR
+ size_t currentXffHopNumber = 0; ///< number of X-Forwarded-For header values processed so far
+#endif
};
#endif /* SQUID_CLIENTREQUESTCONTEXT_H */
diff --git a/src/client_side_request.cc b/src/client_side_request.cc
index 5b5b5af8086..7f802d4219e 100644
--- a/src/client_side_request.cc
+++ b/src/client_side_request.cc
@@ -75,6 +75,11 @@
#endif
#if FOLLOW_X_FORWARDED_FOR
+
+#if !defined(SQUID_X_FORWARDED_FOR_HOP_MAX)
+#define SQUID_X_FORWARDED_FOR_HOP_MAX 64
+#endif
+
static void clientFollowXForwardedForCheck(Acl::Answer answer, void *data);
#endif /* FOLLOW_X_FORWARDED_FOR */
@@ -437,8 +442,16 @@ clientFollowXForwardedForCheck(Acl::Answer answer, void *data)
/* override the default src_addr tested if we have to go deeper than one level into XFF */
Filled(calloutContext->acl_checklist)->src_addr = request->indirect_client_addr;
}
- calloutContext->acl_checklist->nonBlockingCheck(clientFollowXForwardedForCheck, data);
- return;
+ if (++calloutContext->currentXffHopNumber < SQUID_X_FORWARDED_FOR_HOP_MAX) {
+ calloutContext->acl_checklist->nonBlockingCheck(clientFollowXForwardedForCheck, data);
+ return;
+ }
+ const auto headerName = Http::HeaderLookupTable.lookup(Http::HdrType::X_FORWARDED_FOR).name;
+ debugs(28, DBG_CRITICAL, "ERROR: Ignoring trailing " << headerName << " addresses" <<
+ Debug::Extra << "addresses allowed by follow_x_forwarded_for: " << calloutContext->currentXffHopNumber <<
+ Debug::Extra << "last/accepted address: " << request->indirect_client_addr <<
+ Debug::Extra << "ignored trailing addresses: " << request->x_forwarded_for_iterator);
+ // fall through to resume clientAccessCheck() processing
}
}
--

196
backport-squid-crash-half-closed.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
From 5da786ef2a708559f5b53a05b7db6de0b64ce885 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Sep 2023 07:49:36 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Bug 4156: comm.cc "!commHasHalfClosedMonitor(fd)" assertion
(#1443)
This bug is specific to "half_closed_clients on" configurations.
assertion failed: ... "isOpen(fd) && !commHasHalfClosedMonitor(fd)"
location: comm.cc:1583 in commStartHalfClosedMonitor()
Squid asserts because Server schedules comm_read() after receiving EOF:
That extra read results in another EOF notification, and an attempt to
start monitoring an already monitored half-closed connection.
Upon detecting a potentially half-closed connection,
Server::doClientRead() should clear flags.readMore to prevent Server
from scheduling another comm_read(), but it does not and cannot do that
(without significant refactoring) because
* Server does not have access to flags.readMore
* flags.readMore hack is used for more than just "read more"
We worked around the above limitation by re-detecting half-closed
conditions and clearing flags.readMore after clientParseRequests(). That
fixed the bug but further increased poor code duplication across
ConnStateData::afterClientRead() and ConnStateData::kick() methods. We
then refactored by merging and moving that duplicated code into
clientParseRequests() and renamed that method to make backports safer.
Conflict: NA
Reference: https://github.com/squid-cache/squid/commit/5da786
---
src/client_side.cc | 67 ++++++++++++-----------------------
src/client_side.h | 2 +-
src/tests/stub_client_side.cc | 2 +-
3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/client_side.cc b/src/client_side.cc
index e62bcf0fc7d..bd9cf6a7d5f 100644
--- a/src/client_side.cc
+++ b/src/client_side.cc
@@ -932,7 +932,7 @@ ConnStateData::kick()
* We are done with the response, and we are either still receiving request
* body (early response!) or have already stopped receiving anything.
*
- * If we are still receiving, then clientParseRequest() below will fail.
+ * If we are still receiving, then parseRequests() below will fail.
* (XXX: but then we will call readNextRequest() which may succeed and
* execute a smuggled request as we are not done with the current request).
*
@@ -952,28 +952,12 @@ ConnStateData::kick()
* Attempt to parse a request from the request buffer.
* If we've been fed a pipelined request it may already
* be in our read buffer.
- *
- \par
- * This needs to fall through - if we're unlucky and parse the _last_ request
- * from our read buffer we may never re-register for another client read.
*/
- if (clientParseRequests()) {
- debugs(33, 3, clientConnection << ": parsed next request from buffer");
- }
+ parseRequests();
- /** \par
- * Either we need to kick-start another read or, if we have
- * a half-closed connection, kill it after the last request.
- * This saves waiting for half-closed connections to finished being
- * half-closed _AND_ then, sometimes, spending "Timeout" time in
- * the keepalive "Waiting for next request" state.
- */
- if (commIsHalfClosed(clientConnection->fd) && pipeline.empty()) {
- debugs(33, 3, "half-closed client with no pending requests, closing");
- clientConnection->close();
+ if (!isOpen())
return;
- }
/** \par
* At this point we either have a parsed request (which we've
@@ -1882,16 +1866,11 @@ ConnStateData::receivedFirstByte()
resetReadTimeout(Config.Timeout.request);
}
-/**
- * Attempt to parse one or more requests from the input buffer.
- * Returns true after completing parsing of at least one request [header]. That
- * includes cases where parsing ended with an error (e.g., a huge request).
- */
-bool
-ConnStateData::clientParseRequests()
+/// Attempt to parse one or more requests from the input buffer.
+/// May close the connection.
+void
+ConnStateData::parseRequests()
{
- bool parsed_req = false;
-
debugs(33, 5, clientConnection << ": attempting to parse");
// Loop while we have read bytes that are not needed for producing the body
@@ -1936,8 +1915,6 @@ ConnStateData::clientParseRequests()
processParsedRequest(context);
- parsed_req = true; // XXX: do we really need to parse everything right NOW ?
-
if (context->mayUseConnection()) {
debugs(33, 3, "Not parsing new requests, as this request may need the connection");
break;
@@ -1950,8 +1927,19 @@ ConnStateData::clientParseRequests()
}
}
- /* XXX where to 'finish' the parsing pass? */
- return parsed_req;
+ debugs(33, 7, "buffered leftovers: " << inBuf.length());
+
+ if (isOpen() && commIsHalfClosed(clientConnection->fd)) {
+ if (pipeline.empty()) {
+ // we processed what we could parse, and no more data is coming
+ debugs(33, 5, "closing half-closed without parsed requests: " << clientConnection);
+ clientConnection->close();
+ } else {
+ // we parsed what we could, and no more data is coming
+ debugs(33, 5, "monitoring half-closed while processing parsed requests: " << clientConnection);
+ flags.readMore = false; // may already be false
+ }
+ }
}
void
@@ -1968,18 +1956,7 @@ ConnStateData::afterClientRead()
if (pipeline.empty())
fd_note(clientConnection->fd, "Reading next request");
- if (!clientParseRequests()) {
- if (!isOpen())
- return;
- // We may get here if the client half-closed after sending a partial
- // request. See doClientRead() and shouldCloseOnEof().
- // XXX: This partially duplicates ConnStateData::kick().
- if (pipeline.empty() && commIsHalfClosed(clientConnection->fd)) {
- debugs(33, 5, clientConnection << ": half-closed connection, no completed request parsed, connection closing.");
- clientConnection->close();
- return;
- }
- }
+ parseRequests();
if (!isOpen())
return;
@@ -3767,7 +3744,7 @@ ConnStateData::notePinnedConnectionBecameIdle(PinnedIdleContext pic)
startPinnedConnectionMonitoring();
if (pipeline.empty())
- kick(); // in case clientParseRequests() was blocked by a busy pic.connection
+ kick(); // in case parseRequests() was blocked by a busy pic.connection
}
/// Forward future client requests using the given server connection.
diff --git a/src/client_side.h b/src/client_side.h
index e37ab27da1a..9f36d864c2c 100644
--- a/src/client_side.h
+++ b/src/client_side.h
@@ -98,7 +98,6 @@ class ConnStateData:
void doneWithControlMsg() override;
/// Traffic parsing
- bool clientParseRequests();
void readNextRequest();
/// try to make progress on a transaction or read more I/O
@@ -443,6 +442,7 @@ class ConnStateData:
void checkLogging();
+ void parseRequests();
void clientAfterReadingRequests();
bool concurrentRequestQueueFilled() const;
diff --git a/src/tests/stub_client_side.cc b/src/tests/stub_client_side.cc
index 8c160e56340..f49d5dceeed 100644
--- a/src/tests/stub_client_side.cc
+++ b/src/tests/stub_client_side.cc
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
#include "tests/STUB.h"
#include "client_side.h"
-bool ConnStateData::clientParseRequests() STUB_RETVAL(false)
+void ConnStateData::parseRequests() STUB
void ConnStateData::readNextRequest() STUB
bool ConnStateData::isOpen() const STUB_RETVAL(false)
void ConnStateData::kick() STUB

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Date: Thu 06 Jul 2023 05:42:59 UTC
Size: 2546668
MD5 : 64841841e06ea487b0305070c33b04dd
SHA1: 4a3711e42ca9acbba580fd0c306cc2f6f84db1f8
Key : CD6DBF8EF3B17D3E <squid3@treenet.co.nz>
B068 84ED B779 C89B 044E 64E3 CD6D BF8E F3B1 7D3E
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Size: 2554824
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SHA1: f05e06a9dd3bf7501d2844e43d9ae1bd00e9edcc
Key : CD6DBF8EF3B17D3E <squid3@treenet.co.nz>
B068 84ED B779 C89B 044E 64E3 CD6D BF8E F3B1 7D3E
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20
squid.spec
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@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
%define __perl_requires %{SOURCE8} %define __perl_requires %{SOURCE8}
Name: squid Name: squid
Version: 6.1 Version: 6.6
Release: 5 Release: 1
Summary: The Squid proxy caching server Summary: The Squid proxy caching server
Epoch: 7 Epoch: 7
License: GPLv2+ and (LGPLv2+ and MIT and BSD and Public Domain) License: GPLv2+ and (LGPLv2+ and MIT and BSD and Public Domain)
@ -21,15 +21,7 @@ Patch0: squid-4.0.11-config.patch
Patch1: squid-3.1.0.9-location.patch Patch1: squid-3.1.0.9-location.patch
Patch2: squid-3.0.STABLE1-perlpath.patch Patch2: squid-3.0.STABLE1-perlpath.patch
Patch3: backport-squid-6.1-symlink-lang-err.patch Patch3: backport-squid-6.1-symlink-lang-err.patch
Patch4: backport-0001-CVE-2023-5824.patch Patch4: backport-squid-crash-half-closed.patch
Patch5: backport-0002-CVE-2023-5824.patch
Patch6: backport-CVE-2023-46846.patch
Patch7: backport-CVE-2023-46847.patch
Patch8: backport-CVE-2023-46848.patch
Patch9: backport-CVE-2023-46724.patch
Patch10: backport-CVE-2023-49285.patch
Patch11: backport-CVE-2023-49286.patch
Patch12: backport-CVE-2023-50269.patch
Requires: bash Requires: bash
Requires: httpd-filesystem Requires: httpd-filesystem
@ -252,6 +244,12 @@ fi
chgrp squid /var/cache/samba/winbindd_privileged >/dev/null 2>&1 || : chgrp squid /var/cache/samba/winbindd_privileged >/dev/null 2>&1 || :
%changelog %changelog
* Tue Dec 26 2023 xinghe <xinghe2@h-partners.com> - 7:6.6-1
- Type:requirements
- ID:NA
- SUG:NA
- DESC:upgrade to 6.6
* Fri Dec 15 2023 xinghe <xinghe2@h-partners.com> - 7:6.1-5 * Fri Dec 15 2023 xinghe <xinghe2@h-partners.com> - 7:6.1-5
- Type:cves - Type:cves
- ID:CVE-2023-50269 - ID:CVE-2023-50269