!147 fix CVE-2023-3446 CVE-2023-0465 CVE-2023-2650 CVE-2024-0727
From: @zhengxiaoxiaoGitee Reviewed-by: @HuaxinLuGitee Signed-off-by: @HuaxinLuGitee
This commit is contained in:
openeuler-ci-bot
Gitee
commit
3accad21a8
56
backport-CVE-2023-0465.patch
Normal file
56
backport-CVE-2023-0465.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
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|||||||
|
From b013765abfa80036dc779dd0e50602c57bb3bf95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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|
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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|
Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2023 16:52:55 +0000
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|
Subject: [PATCH] Ensure that EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY is checked even in
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|
leaf
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|
certs
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|
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|
Even though we check the leaf cert to confirm it is valid, we
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|
later ignored the invalid flag and did not notice that the leaf
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|
cert was bad.
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|
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|
Fixes: CVE-2023-0465
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|
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|
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
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|
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
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|
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20588)
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|
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|
Reference:https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=b013765abfa80036dc779dd0e50602c57bb3bf95
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|
Conflict: Context conflict
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|
---
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|
Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 11 +++++++++--
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|
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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|
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|
diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
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|
index 96f306b..a6878fe 100644
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|
--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
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|
+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
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|
@@ -1768,16 +1768,23 @@ static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
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|
* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
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|
*/
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|
X509 *x;
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|
- int i;
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|
- for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
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|
+ int i, cbcalled = 0;
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|
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
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|
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
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|
if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
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|
continue;
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|
+ cbcalled = 1;
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|
ctx->current_cert = x;
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|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
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|
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
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|
return 0;
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|
}
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|
+ if (!cbcalled) {
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|
+ /* Should not be able to get here */
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|
+ X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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|
+ return 0;
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|
+ }
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|
+ /* The callback ignored the error so we return success */
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|
return 1;
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|
}
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|
if (ret == -2) {
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|
--
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|
2.33.0
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|
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67
backport-CVE-2023-2650.patch
Normal file
67
backport-CVE-2023-2650.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
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|
From 423a2bc737a908ad0c77bda470b2b59dc879936b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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|
From: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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|
Date: Fri, 12 May 2023 10:00:13 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] Restrict the size of OBJECT IDENTIFIERs that OBJ_obj2txt will
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|
translate
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|
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|
Reference:https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=423a2bc737a908ad0c77bda470b2b59dc879936b
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|
Conflict:NA
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|
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|
OBJ_obj2txt() would translate any size OBJECT IDENTIFIER to canonical
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|
numeric text form. For gigantic sub-identifiers, this would take a very
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|
long time, the time complexity being O(n^2) where n is the size of that
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|
sub-identifier.
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|
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|
To mitigate this, a restriction on the size that OBJ_obj2txt() will
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|
translate to canonical numeric text form is added, based on RFC 2578
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|
(STD 58), which says this:
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|
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|
> 3.5. OBJECT IDENTIFIER values
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|
>
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|
> An OBJECT IDENTIFIER value is an ordered list of non-negative numbers.
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|
> For the SMIv2, each number in the list is referred to as a sub-identifier,
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|
> there are at most 128 sub-identifiers in a value, and each sub-identifier
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|
> has a maximum value of 2^32-1 (4294967295 decimal).
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|
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|
Fixes otc/security#96
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|
Fixes CVE-2023-2650
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|
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|
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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|
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
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|
---
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|
crypto/objects/obj_dat.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
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|
1 files changed, 50 insertions(+)
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|
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|
diff --git a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
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|
index 01cde00e98..c0e55197a0 100644
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|
--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
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|
+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
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|
@@ -443,6 +443,25 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name)
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|
first = 1;
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|
bl = NULL;
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|
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|
+ /*
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|
+ * RFC 2578 (STD 58) says this about OBJECT IDENTIFIERs:
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|
+ *
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|
+ * > 3.5. OBJECT IDENTIFIER values
|
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|
+ * >
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|
+ * > An OBJECT IDENTIFIER value is an ordered list of non-negative
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|
+ * > numbers. For the SMIv2, each number in the list is referred to as a
|
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|
+ * > sub-identifier, there are at most 128 sub-identifiers in a value,
|
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|
+ * > and each sub-identifier has a maximum value of 2^32-1 (4294967295
|
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|
+ * > decimal).
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|
+ *
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|
+ * So a legitimate OID according to this RFC is at most (32 * 128 / 7),
|
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|
+ * i.e. 586 bytes long.
|
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|
+ *
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|
+ * Ref: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2578#section-3.5
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|
+ */
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|
+ if (len > 586)
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|
+ goto err;
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|
+
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|
while (len > 0) {
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|
l = 0;
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|
use_bn = 0;
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|
--
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|
2.34.1
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|
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77
backport-CVE-2023-3446.patch
Normal file
77
backport-CVE-2023-3446.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
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|
From 8780a896543a654e757db1b9396383f9d8095528 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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|
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
|
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|
Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 16:36:35 +0100
|
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|
Subject: [PATCH] Fix DH_check() excessive time with over sized modulus
|
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|
|
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|
The DH_check() function checks numerous aspects of the key or parameters
|
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|
that have been supplied. Some of those checks use the supplied modulus
|
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|
value even if it is excessively large.
|
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|
|
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|
There is already a maximum DH modulus size (10,000 bits) over which
|
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|
OpenSSL will not generate or derive keys. DH_check() will however still
|
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|
perform various tests for validity on such a large modulus. We introduce
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|
a
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|
new maximum (32,768) over which DH_check() will just fail.
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|
|
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|
An application that calls DH_check() and supplies a key or parameters
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|
obtained from an untrusted source could be vulnerable to a Denial of
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|
Service attack.
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|
|
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|
The function DH_check() is itself called by a number of other OpenSSL
|
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|
functions. An application calling any of those other functions may
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|
similarly be affected. The other functions affected by this are
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|
DH_check_ex() and EVP_PKEY_param_check().
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|
|
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|
CVE-2023-3446
|
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|
|
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|
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
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|
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
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|
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
|
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|
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
|
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|
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21452)
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|
---
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|
Cryptlib/Include/openssl/dh.h | 5 +++++
|
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|
Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/dh/dh_check.c | 4 ++++
|
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|
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+)
|
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|
|
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|
diff --git a/Cryptlib/Include/openssl/dh.h b/Cryptlib/Include/openssl/dh.h
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|
index 6488879..06142df 100644
|
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|
--- a/Cryptlib/Include/openssl/dh.h
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|
+++ b/Cryptlib/Include/openssl/dh.h
|
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|
@@ -77,6 +77,10 @@
|
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|
# define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
|
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|
# endif
|
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|
|
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|
+# ifndef OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
|
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|
+# define OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 32768
|
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|
+# endif
|
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|
+
|
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|
# define DH_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P 0x01
|
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|
|
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|
/*
|
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|
@@ -356,6 +360,7 @@ void ERR_load_DH_strings(void);
|
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|
# define DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY 102
|
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|
# define DH_F_DHPARAMS_PRINT_FP 101
|
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|
# define DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS 106
|
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|
+# define DH_F_DH_CHECK 126
|
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|
# define DH_F_DH_CMS_DECRYPT 117
|
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|
# define DH_F_DH_CMS_SET_PEERKEY 118
|
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|
# define DH_F_DH_CMS_SET_SHARED_INFO 119
|
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|
diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
|
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|
index 9f3b174..9c62da4 100644
|
||||||
|
--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
|
||||||
|
+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
|
||||||
|
@@ -78,6 +78,10 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
|
||||||
|
BN_ULONG l;
|
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|
BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
+ /* Don't do any check at all with an excessively large modulus */
|
||||||
|
+ if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
|
||||||
|
+ return 0;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
*ret = 0;
|
||||||
|
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
|
||||||
|
if (ctx == NULL)
|
||||||
|
--
|
||||||
|
2.27.0
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
111
backport-CVE-2024-0727.patch
Normal file
111
backport-CVE-2024-0727.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
|
|||||||
|
From f77095c2543ffc1eda06556092de7badac343883 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||||
|
From: j30031148 <jinlun@huawei.com>
|
||||||
|
Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2024 14:47:30 +0800
|
||||||
|
Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2024-0727
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Reference:https://gitee.com/openeuler/openssl/commit/09015a582baa980dc04f635504b16fe95dc3790b
|
||||||
|
Conflict:NA
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
|
||||||
|
Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c | 5 +++++
|
||||||
|
Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c | 5 +++--
|
||||||
|
Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c | 8 ++++++--
|
||||||
|
4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
|
||||||
|
index d9f03a3..42a73e0 100644
|
||||||
|
--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
|
||||||
|
+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
|
||||||
|
@@ -171,6 +171,12 @@ STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7data(PKCS7 *p7)
|
||||||
|
PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
|
||||||
|
return NULL;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ if (p7->d.data == NULL) {
|
||||||
|
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_UNPACK_P7DATA, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
|
||||||
|
+ return NULL;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
return ASN1_item_unpack(p7->d.data, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS));
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
@@ -226,6 +232,11 @@ STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(PKCS7 *p7, const char *pass,
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
if (!PKCS7_type_is_encrypted(p7))
|
||||||
|
return NULL;
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ if (p7->d.encrypted == NULL) {
|
||||||
|
+ return NULL;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
return PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
|
||||||
|
ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS),
|
||||||
|
pass, passlen,
|
||||||
|
@@ -253,6 +264,11 @@ STACK_OF(PKCS7) *PKCS12_unpack_authsafes(PKCS12 *p12)
|
||||||
|
PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
|
||||||
|
return NULL;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
+ if (p12->authsafes->d.data == NULL) {
|
||||||
|
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_UNPACK_AUTHSAFES, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
|
||||||
|
+ return NULL;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
return ASN1_item_unpack(p12->authsafes->d.data,
|
||||||
|
ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_AUTHSAFES));
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
|
||||||
|
index cbf34da..bda3c28 100644
|
||||||
|
--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
|
||||||
|
+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
|
||||||
|
@@ -80,6 +80,11 @@ int PKCS12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
|
||||||
|
return 0;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
+ if (p12->authsafes->d.data == NULL) {
|
||||||
|
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
|
||||||
|
+ return 0;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
salt = p12->mac->salt->data;
|
||||||
|
saltlen = p12->mac->salt->length;
|
||||||
|
if (!p12->mac->iter)
|
||||||
|
diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c
|
||||||
|
index 9e8ebb2..19a855b 100644
|
||||||
|
--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c
|
||||||
|
+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c
|
||||||
|
@@ -126,8 +126,9 @@ static int newpass_p12(PKCS12 *p12, const char *oldpass, const char *newpass)
|
||||||
|
bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7);
|
||||||
|
} else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
|
||||||
|
bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, oldpass, -1);
|
||||||
|
- if (!alg_get(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
|
||||||
|
- &pbe_nid, &pbe_iter, &pbe_saltlen))
|
||||||
|
+ if (p7->d.encrypted == NULL
|
||||||
|
+ || !alg_get(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
|
||||||
|
+ &pbe_nid, &pbe_iter, &pbe_saltlen))
|
||||||
|
goto err;
|
||||||
|
} else {
|
||||||
|
continue;
|
||||||
|
diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c
|
||||||
|
index 62fb299..e895deb 100644
|
||||||
|
--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c
|
||||||
|
+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c
|
||||||
|
@@ -78,10 +78,14 @@ int SMIME_write_PKCS7(BIO *bio, PKCS7 *p7, BIO *data, int flags)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *mdalgs;
|
||||||
|
int ctype_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
|
||||||
|
- if (ctype_nid == NID_pkcs7_signed)
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
+ if (ctype_nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) {
|
||||||
|
+ if (p7->d.sign == NULL)
|
||||||
|
+ return 0;
|
||||||
|
mdalgs = p7->d.sign->md_algs;
|
||||||
|
- else
|
||||||
|
+ } else {
|
||||||
|
mdalgs = NULL;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
flags ^= SMIME_OLDMIME;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
--
|
||||||
|
2.27.0
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
Name: shim
|
Name: shim
|
||||||
Version: 15.7
|
Version: 15.7
|
||||||
Release: 5
|
Release: 6
|
||||||
Summary: First-stage UEFI bootloader
|
Summary: First-stage UEFI bootloader
|
||||||
ExclusiveArch: x86_64 aarch64
|
ExclusiveArch: x86_64 aarch64
|
||||||
License: BSD
|
License: BSD
|
||||||
@ -45,6 +45,10 @@ Patch8:backport-CVE-2023-40547-avoid-incorrectly-trusting-HTTP-heade.patch
|
|||||||
Patch9:backport-Further-mitigations-against-CVE-2023-40546-as-a-clas.patch
|
Patch9:backport-Further-mitigations-against-CVE-2023-40546-as-a-clas.patch
|
||||||
Patch10:backport-CVE-2023-40549-Authenticode-verify-that-the-signatur.patch
|
Patch10:backport-CVE-2023-40549-Authenticode-verify-that-the-signatur.patch
|
||||||
Patch11:backport-CVE-2023-0464.patch
|
Patch11:backport-CVE-2023-0464.patch
|
||||||
|
Patch12:backport-CVE-2023-3446.patch
|
||||||
|
Patch13:backport-CVE-2023-0465.patch
|
||||||
|
Patch14:backport-CVE-2023-2650.patch
|
||||||
|
Patch15:backport-CVE-2024-0727.patch
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Feature for shim SMx support
|
# Feature for shim SMx support
|
||||||
Patch9000:Feature-shim-openssl-add-ec-support.patch
|
Patch9000:Feature-shim-openssl-add-ec-support.patch
|
||||||
@ -168,6 +172,9 @@ make test
|
|||||||
/usr/src/debug/%{name}-%{version}-%{release}/*
|
/usr/src/debug/%{name}-%{version}-%{release}/*
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
%changelog
|
%changelog
|
||||||
|
* Wed Feb 28 2024 zhengxiaoxiao <zhengxiaoxiao2@huawei.com> - 15.7-6
|
||||||
|
- fix CVE-2023-3446 CVE-2023-0465 CVE-2023-2650 CVE-2024-0727
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
* Mon Feb 19 2024 jinlun <jinlun@huawei.com> -15.7-5
|
* Mon Feb 19 2024 jinlun <jinlun@huawei.com> -15.7-5
|
||||||
- fix CVE-2023-0464
|
- fix CVE-2023-0464
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|||||||
Loading…
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user