!171 update upstream patches

From: @lujie42 
Reviewed-by: @HuaxinLuGitee 
Signed-off-by: @HuaxinLuGitee
This commit is contained in:
openeuler-ci-bot 2022-09-14 09:10:09 +00:00 committed by Gitee
commit 62ad05ce61
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GPG Key ID: 173E9B9CA92EEF8F
24 changed files with 1070 additions and 18 deletions

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From 34264caf221fc43e17aefeeda0d1115eb89655e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2022 18:27:52 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Add the map permission to common_anon_inode_perm permission
set
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/34264caf221fc43e17aefeeda0d1115eb89655e0
Conflict: NA
Resolves: rhbz#2025714
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/support/obj_perm_sets.spt | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/policy/support/obj_perm_sets.spt b/policy/support/obj_perm_sets.spt
index 1a2108a..2b84320 100644
--- a/policy/support/obj_perm_sets.spt
+++ b/policy/support/obj_perm_sets.spt
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ define(`userfaultfd_anon_inode_perms',`
#
# Anonymous inode files (anon_inode)
#
-define(`userfaultfd_anon_inode_perms',`{ create getattr ioctl read write }')
+define(`userfaultfd_anon_inode_perms',`{ create getattr ioctl map read write }')
########################################
#
--
1.8.3.1

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From 51422c4a4277924046514a18b67a38b896d698f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 28 Jan 2022 17:40:25 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow ModemManager connect to the unconfined user domain
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/51422c4a4277924046514a18b67a38b896d698f0
Conflict: NA
The modemmanager_t domain was allowed to connect to unconfined_t
over a unix domain stream socket.
Resolves: rhbz#1961571
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/contrib/modemmanager.te | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/contrib/modemmanager.te b/policy/modules/contrib/modemmanager.te
index 857ed6b..9a132b2 100644
--- a/policy/modules/contrib/modemmanager.te
+++ b/policy/modules/contrib/modemmanager.te
@@ -82,3 +82,7 @@ optional_policy(`
udev_read_db(modemmanager_t)
udev_manage_pid_files(modemmanager_t)
')
+
+optional_policy(`
+ unconfined_stream_connect(modemmanager_t)
+')
--
1.8.3.1

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@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
From f0cb46186be7437cd78c96271938b3902cec10b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 26 Jan 2022 10:54:36 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow NetworkManager talk with unconfined user over unix
domain dgram socket
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/f0cb46186be7437cd78c96271938b3902cec10b7
Conflict: NA
This permission is required for wpa_cli be able to communicate with the
wpa_supplicant service in CLI. The wpa control interface socket file is
open in /run/wpa_supplicant, the client socket in /tmp.
This issue possibly started to appear after unconfined_t was removed from the
unpriv_user_domain attribute with the 4b4eec49a55 ("Removed adding to
attribute unpriv_userdomain from userdom_unpriv_type template") commit.
Addresses the following AVC denial:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(01/24/2022 02:56:04.040:501) : proctitle=/usr/sbin/wpa_supplicant -g /run/wpa_supplicant/global -c /etc/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf -u -s
type=PATH msg=audit(01/24/2022 02:56:04.040:501) : item=0 name=/tmp/wpa_ctrl_26793-1 inode=730142 dev=fd:01 mode=socket,755 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0
type=CWD msg=audit(01/24/2022 02:56:04.040:501) : cwd=/
type=SOCKADDR msg=audit(01/24/2022 02:56:04.040:501) : saddr={ saddr_fam=local path=/tmp/wpa_ctrl_26793-1 }
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(01/24/2022 02:56:04.040:501) : arch=x86_64 syscall=sendto success=yes exit=5 a0=0x5 a1=0x5556370a4860 a2=0x5 a3=0x0 items=1 ppid=1 pid=26219 auid=unset uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=(none) ses=unset comm=wpa_supplicant exe=/usr/sbin/wpa_supplicant subj=system_u:system_r:NetworkManager_t:s0 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(01/24/2022 02:56:04.040:501) : avc: denied { sendto } for pid=26219 comm=wpa_supplicant path=/tmp/wpa_ctrl_26793-1 scontext=system_u:system_r:NetworkManager_t:s0 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=unix_dgram_socket permissive=1
Resolves: rhbz#2044048
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/contrib/networkmanager.te | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/contrib/networkmanager.te b/policy/modules/contrib/networkmanager.te
index 8230910..1a53f51 100644
--- a/policy/modules/contrib/networkmanager.te
+++ b/policy/modules/contrib/networkmanager.te
@@ -498,6 +498,11 @@ optional_policy(`
openvswitch_stream_connect(NetworkManager_t)
')
+optional_policy(`
+ unconfined_dgram_send(NetworkManager_t)
+')
+
+
tunable_policy(`use_ecryptfs_home_dirs',`
fs_manage_ecryptfs_files(NetworkManager_t)
')
--
1.8.3.1

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From 435388f6b50495a6615b811b129ca6d3020f7355 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2022 11:38:56 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow alsa bind mixer controls to led triggers
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/435388f6b50495a6615b811b129ca6d3020f7355
Conflict: NA
Since v5.13, the kernel has support to bind certain alsa mixer controls
to LED triggers from userspace to control the mute-LEDS found on some
devices (typically embedded inside the keyboard's mute keys).
To allow that, alsa needs to be able to execute "modprobe snd_ctl_led"
and write to /sys/class/sound/ctl-led/speaker/ and .../mic.
Resolves: rhbz#1958210
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/contrib/alsa.te | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/policy/modules/contrib/alsa.te b/policy/modules/contrib/alsa.te
index aee9fe8..3f1a7b0 100644
--- a/policy/modules/contrib/alsa.te
+++ b/policy/modules/contrib/alsa.te
@@ -82,12 +82,14 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(alsa_t)
dev_getattr_fs(alsa_t)
dev_read_sound(alsa_t)
-dev_read_sysfs(alsa_t)
+dev_rw_sysfs(alsa_t)
dev_read_urand(alsa_t)
dev_write_sound(alsa_t)
files_search_var_lib(alsa_t)
+modutils_domtrans_kmod(alsa_t)
+
term_dontaudit_use_console(alsa_t)
term_dontaudit_use_generic_ptys(alsa_t)
term_dontaudit_use_all_ptys(alsa_t)
--
1.8.3.1

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From d5b75d954771da98c36fb7af90e24a14fb01c184 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2022 12:47:23 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow alsactl set group Process ID of a process
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/d5b75d954771da98c36fb7af90e24a14fb01c184
Conflict: NA
Addresses the following AVC denial:
type=AVC msg=audit(1624169904.74:1152): avc: denied { setpgid } for pid=115535 comm="alsactl" scontext=system_u:system_r:alsa_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:alsa_t:s0 tclass=process permissive=0
Resolves: rhbz#1974051
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/contrib/alsa.te | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/policy/modules/contrib/alsa.te b/policy/modules/contrib/alsa.te
index 97f3815..aee9fe8 100644
--- a/policy/modules/contrib/alsa.te
+++ b/policy/modules/contrib/alsa.te
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ systemd_unit_file(alsa_unit_file_t)
allow alsa_t self:capability { dac_read_search setgid setuid ipc_owner sys_nice };
dontaudit alsa_t self:capability { sys_tty_config sys_admin };
-allow alsa_t self:process { getsched setsched signal_perms };
+allow alsa_t self:process { getsched setpgid setsched signal_perms };
allow alsa_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
allow alsa_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
allow alsa_t self:unix_stream_socket { accept listen };
--
1.8.3.1

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From 9eec9eea6b6b74d8835928c32467f6edd749ff0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Patrik Koncity <pkoncity@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2022 12:04:16 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow confined sysadmin to use tool vipw
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/9eec9eea6b6b74d8835928c32467f6edd749ff0e
Conflict: NA
Allow confined sysadmin to use vipw and vigr, which edits passwd,
shadow, group, gshadow.. Dontaudit manage files and dir labeled
with admin_home_t. Also vipw need to use sss_cache tool.
Allow domain transition from sysadm_passwd_t to sssd_exec_t.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2049018
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/admin/usermanage.te | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.te b/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.te
index a67fcc4..8fdbfbc 100644
--- a/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.te
+++ b/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.te
@@ -501,6 +501,8 @@ init_dontaudit_rw_utmp(sysadm_passwd_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(sysadm_passwd_t)
userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(sysadm_passwd_t)
+userdom_dontaudit_manage_admin_dir(sysadm_passwd_t)
+userdom_dontaudit_manage_admin_files(sysadm_passwd_t)
# user generally runs this from their home directory, so do not audit a search
# on user home dir
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_content(sysadm_passwd_t)
@@ -509,6 +511,10 @@ optional_policy(`
nscd_run(sysadm_passwd_t, sysadm_passwd_roles)
')
+optional_policy(`
+ sssd_domtrans(sysadm_passwd_t)
+')
+
########################################
#
# Useradd local policy
--
1.8.3.1

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@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
From da5328319db49846fb698d262c13f06230091bfb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 28 Jan 2022 19:01:45 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow init delete generic tmp named pipes
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/da5328319db49846fb698d262c13f06230091bfb
Conflict: NA
The files_delete_tmp_pipes() interface was added.
Addresses the following AVC denial:
type=AVC msg=audit(1628676879.222:1003): avc: denied { unlink } for pid=1 comm="systemd" name="controller_log_37116" dev="tmpfs" ino=1235 scontext=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 tclass=fifo_file permissive=0
Resolves: rhbz#1992562
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/kernel/files.if | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
policy/modules/system/init.te | 1 +
2 files changed, 19 insertions(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/files.if b/policy/modules/kernel/files.if
index bca6f15..53e463c 100644
--- a/policy/modules/kernel/files.if
+++ b/policy/modules/kernel/files.if
@@ -6153,6 +6153,24 @@ interface(`files_delete_tmp_sockets',`
########################################
## <summary>
+## Delete generic tmp named pipes
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`files_delete_tmp_pipes',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type tmp_t;
+ ')
+
+ delete_fifo_files_pattern($1, tmp_t, tmp_t)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
## Remove entries from the tmp directory.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/init.te b/policy/modules/system/init.te
index a81f5da..09a6925 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/init.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/init.te
@@ -648,6 +648,7 @@ files_read_kernel_modules(init_t)
files_map_kernel_modules(init_t)
files_dontaudit_mounton_isid(init_t)
files_delete_tmp_files(init_t)
+files_delete_tmp_pipes(init_t)
files_delete_tmp_sockets(init_t)
fs_getattr_all_fs(init_t)
fs_manage_cgroup_dirs(init_t)
--
1.8.3.1

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From a27476b303259a43324be8533ddba68e7a6dd37e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2022 16:21:01 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow init read stratis data symlinks
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/a27476b303259a43324be8533ddba68e7a6dd37e
Conflict: NA
Addresses the following AVC denial:
type=AVC msg=audit(02/02/22 09:39:31.790:2813) : avc: denied { read } for pid=1 comm=systemd name=fs1 dev="devtmpfs" ino=363096 scontext=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:stratisd_data_t:s0 tclass=lnk_file permissive=1
Resolves: rhbz#2048514
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/contrib/stratisd.if | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
policy/modules/system/init.te | 4 ++++
2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/contrib/stratisd.if b/policy/modules/contrib/stratisd.if
index de2427e..32e7e66 100644
--- a/policy/modules/contrib/stratisd.if
+++ b/policy/modules/contrib/stratisd.if
@@ -115,3 +115,21 @@ interface(`stratisd_admin',`
systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1)
')
')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
+## Read stratisd data symlinks
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`stratisd_data_read_lnk_files',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type stratisd_data_t;
+ ')
+
+ allow $1 stratisd_data_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
+')
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/init.te b/policy/modules/system/init.te
index 09a6925..033f189 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/init.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/init.te
@@ -839,6 +839,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
+ stratisd_data_read_lnk_files(init_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
systemd_filetrans_named_content(init_t)
systemd_write_inhibit_pipes(init_t)
')
--
1.8.3.1

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From 72f789dd7c218919a18dd7130d37e92e7a92b994 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2022 17:40:40 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow iptables list cgroup directories
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/72f789dd7c218919a18dd7130d37e92e7a92b994
Conflict: NA
Addresses the following AVC denial:
[ 1591.423033] audit: type=1400 audit(1632734301.322:867): avc: denied { ioctl } for pid=11021 comm="iptables" path="/sys/fs/cgroup" dev="tmpfs" ino=1 scontext=system_u:system_r:iptables_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0
Resolves: rhbz#2008097
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/system/iptables.te | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/iptables.te b/policy/modules/system/iptables.te
index 495ee29..3374bff 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/iptables.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/iptables.te
@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ files_manage_system_conf_files(iptables_t)
files_etc_filetrans_system_conf(iptables_t)
files_etc_filetrans(iptables_t, system_conf_t, dir)
+fs_list_cgroup_dirs(iptables_t)
+
manage_files_pattern(iptables_t, iptables_var_run_t, iptables_var_run_t)
files_pid_filetrans(iptables_t, iptables_var_run_t, file)
--
1.8.3.1

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From 2a15cfd1d0705acd84d18f3cdc669cc24ed7492f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 21:59:23 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow login_userdomain map /var/lib/directories
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/2a15cfd1d0705acd84d18f3cdc669cc24ed7492f
Conflict: NA
Addresses the following AVC denial:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(02/09/22 21:26:39.579:1065) : proctitle=/usr/bin/gnome-software --gapplication-service
type=MMAP msg=audit(02/09/22 21:26:39.579:1065) : fd=57 flags=MAP_PRIVATE
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(02/09/22 21:26:39.579:1065) : arch=x86_64 syscall=mmap success=no exit=EACCES(Permission denied) a0=0x0 a1=0x16630 a2=PROT_READ a3=MAP_PRIVATE items=0 ppid=1560 pid=2148 auid=staff uid=staff gid=staff euid=staff suid=staff fsuid=staff egid=staff sgid=staff fsgid=staff tty=(none) ses=5 comm=pool-org.gnome. exe=/usr/bin/gnome-software subj=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(02/09/22 21:26:39.579:1065) : avc: denied { map } for pid=2148 comm=pool-org.gnome. path=/var/lib/flatpak/repo/objects/2f/e0503898de4e28a3382ba6d7ecdc0376cabaea9e838991464eb821c46b7ff3.dirtree dev="vda2" ino=387029 scontext=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:var_lib_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/system/userdomain.te | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
index 32d69b4..69b460f 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
@@ -386,6 +386,7 @@ tunable_policy(`deny_bluetooth',`',`
dev_watch_generic_dirs(login_userdomain)
+files_map_var_lib_files(login_userdomain)
files_watch_etc_dirs(login_userdomain)
files_watch_etc_files(login_userdomain)
files_watch_system_conf_dirs(login_userdomain)
--
1.8.3.1

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@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From 63ada8c2bf2277a228524228f5ffcac8e0aed86a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 21:30:24 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow login_userdomain read systemd runtime files
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/63ada8c2bf2277a228524228f5ffcac8e0aed86a
Conflict: NA
Addresses the following AVC denial:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(02/09/22 21:25:30.080:274) : proctitle=/usr/lib/systemd/systemd --user
type=PATH msg=audit(02/09/22 21:25:30.080:274) : item=0 name=/run/systemd/user/session.slice.d/99-uresourced.conf inode=1336 dev=00:1a mode=file,644 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:init_var_run_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0
type=CWD msg=audit(02/09/22 21:25:30.080:274) : cwd=/
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(02/09/22 21:25:30.080:274) : arch=x86_64 syscall=openat success=no exit=EACCES(Permission denied) a0=AT_FDCWD a1=0x55d1df498fa0 a2=O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC a3=0x0 items=1 ppid=1 pid=1465 auid=staff uid=staff gid=staff euid=staff suid=staff fsuid=staff egid=staff sgid=staff fsgid=staff tty=(none) ses=5 comm=systemd exe=/usr/lib/systemd/systemd subj=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(02/09/22 21:25:30.080:274) : avc: denied { read } for pid=1465 comm=systemd name=99-uresourced.conf dev="tmpfs" ino=1336 scontext=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:init_var_run_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/system/userdomain.te | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
index bcb3043..f1f68f7 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
@@ -406,6 +406,7 @@ mount_watch_reads_pid_files(login_userdomain)
optional_policy(`
init_mmap_read_var_lib_files(login_userdomain)
+ init_read_pid_files(login_userdomain)
')
optional_policy(`
--
1.8.3.1

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@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
From 6d6afe09b0fd44f074e545d9642b0cc66264486e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 21:54:36 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow login_userdomain watch library and fonts dirs
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/6d6afe09b0fd44f074e545d9642b0cc66264486e
Conflict: NA
Addresses the following AVC denial:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(02/09/22 21:48:51.576:15952) : proctitle=/usr/bin/gnome-software --gapplication-service
type=PATH msg=audit(02/09/22 21:48:51.576:15952) : item=0 name=/usr/lib64/gnome-software/plugins-16 inode=31777 dev=00:20 mode=dir,755 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:lib_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0
type=CWD msg=audit(02/09/22 21:48:51.576:15952) : cwd=/home/staff
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(02/09/22 21:48:51.576:15952) : arch=x86_64 syscall=inotify_add_watch success=no exit=EACCES(Permission denied) a0=0x3 a1=0x560c414dd770 a2=0x1002fce a3=0x7ffd82509080 items=1 ppid=1560 pid=2148 auid=staff uid=staff gid=staff euid=staff suid=staff fsuid=staff egid=staff sgid=staff fsgid=staff tty=(none) ses=5 comm=gmain exe=/usr/bin/gnome-software subj=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(02/09/22 21:48:51.576:15952) : avc: denied { watch } for pid=2148 comm=gmain path=/usr/lib64/gnome-software/plugins-16 dev="vda2" ino=31777 scontext=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:lib_t:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/system/userdomain.te | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
index a833ada..32d69b4 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
@@ -398,6 +398,9 @@ files_watch_generic_tmp_dirs(login_userdomain)
fs_create_cgroup_files(login_userdomain)
fs_watch_cgroup_files(login_userdomain)
+libs_watch_lib_dirs(login_userdomain)
+
+miscfiles_watch_fonts_dirs(login_userdomain)
miscfiles_watch_localization_dirs(login_userdomain)
miscfiles_watch_localization_symlinks(login_userdomain)
--
1.8.3.1

View File

@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
From bf059ebda558a7735cfdcfb874ecc8bfc2622cb1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 21:52:01 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow login_userdomain watch system configuration dirs
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/bf059ebda558a7735cfdcfb874ecc8bfc2622cb1
Conflict: NA
The files_watch_system_conf_dirs() interface was added.
Addresses the following AVC denial:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(02/09/22 21:28:19.577:2173) : proctitle=/usr/bin/gnome-software --gapplication-service
type=PATH msg=audit(02/09/22 21:28:19.577:2173) : item=0 name=/etc/yum.repos.d inode=432 dev=00:20 mode=dir,755 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:system_conf_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0
type=CWD msg=audit(02/09/22 21:28:19.577:2173) : cwd=/home/staff
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(02/09/22 21:28:19.577:2173) : arch=x86_64 syscall=inotify_add_watch success=no exit=EACCES(Permission denied) a0=0x3 a1=0x560c414ea860 a2=0x1002fce a3=0x7ffd82509080 items=1 ppid=1560 pid=2148 auid=staff uid=staff gid=staff euid=staff suid=staff fsuid=staff egid=staff sgid=staff fsgid=staff tty=(none) ses=5 comm=gmain exe=/usr/bin/gnome-software subj=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(02/09/22 21:28:19.577:2173) : avc: denied { watch } for pid=2148 comm=gmain path=/etc/yum.repos.d dev="vda2" ino=432 scontext=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:system_conf_t:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/kernel/files.if | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
policy/modules/system/userdomain.te | 1 +
2 files changed, 20 insertions(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/files.if b/policy/modules/kernel/files.if
index 53e463c..b375a7e 100644
--- a/policy/modules/kernel/files.if
+++ b/policy/modules/kernel/files.if
@@ -5720,6 +5720,25 @@ interface(`files_read_system_conf_files',`
read_lnk_files_pattern($1, etc_t, system_conf_t)
')
+#######################################
+## <summary>
+## Watch manageable system configuration dirs in /etc
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`files_watch_system_conf_dirs',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type etc_t, system_conf_t;
+ ')
+
+ files_search_etc($1)
+ watch_dirs_pattern($1, system_conf_t, system_conf_t)
+')
+
######################################
## <summary>
## Manage manageable system configuration files in /etc.
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
index f1f68f7..a833ada 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
@@ -388,6 +388,7 @@ dev_watch_generic_dirs(login_userdomain)
files_watch_etc_dirs(login_userdomain)
files_watch_etc_files(login_userdomain)
+files_watch_system_conf_dirs(login_userdomain)
files_watch_usr_dirs(login_userdomain)
files_watch_usr_files(login_userdomain)
files_watch_var_lib_dirs(login_userdomain)
--
1.8.3.1

View File

@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From b909895c58d7709343e59e24f115d5ede1f46944 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Jan 2022 17:16:43 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow login_userdomain watch systemd-machined PID directories
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/b909895c58d7709343e59e24f115d5ede1f46944
Conflict: NA
Addresses the following AVC denial:
-
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(3.1.2022 08:48:02.005:393) : proctitle=/usr/bin/wireplumber
type=PATH msg=audit(3.1.2022 08:48:02.005:393) : item=0 name=/run/systemd/machines/ inode=75 dev=00:1a mode=dir,755 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:systemd_machined_var_run_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(3.1.2022 08:48:02.005:393) : arch=x86_64 syscall=inotify_add_watch success=yes exit=4 a0=0x11 a1=0x7f214c69d052 a2=0x280 a3=0x0 items=1 ppid=1775 pid=2305 auid=username uid=username gid=username euid=username suid=username fsuid=username egid=username sgid=username fsgid=username tty=(none) ses=3 comm=wireplumber exe=/usr/bin/wireplumber subj=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(3.1.2022 08:48:02.005:393) : avc: denied { watch } for pid=2305 comm=wireplumber path=/run/systemd/machines dev="tmpfs" ino=75 scontext=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:systemd_machined_var_run_t:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/system/userdomain.te | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
index 5643687..573ad14 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
@@ -434,6 +434,7 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
systemd_login_watch_pid_dirs(login_userdomain)
systemd_login_watch_session_dirs(login_userdomain)
+ systemd_machined_watch_pid_dirs(login_userdomain)
')
############################################################
--
1.8.3.1

View File

@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
From d0f957291c4282f74b675e476ccd64d074178e7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2022 08:54:45 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow login_userdomain write to session_dbusd tmp socket
files
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/d0f957291c4282f74b675e476ccd64d074178e7b
Conflict: NA
Addresses the following AVC denial:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(01/17/2022 18:06:43.240:4086) : proctitle=/usr/lib/systemd/systemd --user
type=PATH msg=audit(01/17/2022 18:06:43.240:4086) : item=0 name=/proc/self/fd/27 inode=15 dev=00:34 mode=socket,666 ouid=user31979 ogid=user31979 rdev=00:00 obj=staff_u:object_r:session_dbusd_tmp_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0
type=CWD msg=audit(01/17/2022 18:06:43.240:4086) : cwd=/
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(01/17/2022 18:06:43.240:4086) : arch=x86_64 syscall=utimensat success=no exit=EACCES(Permission denied) a0=0xffffff9c a1=0x7ffd627865d0 a2=0x0 a3=0x0 items=1 ppid=1 pid=97102 auid=user31979 uid=user31979 gid=user31979 euid=user31979 suid=user31979 fsuid=user31979 egid=user31979 sgid=user31979 fsgid=user31979 tty=(none) ses=19 comm=systemd exe=/usr/lib/systemd/systemd subj=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(01/17/2022 18:06:43.240:4086) : avc: denied { write } for pid=97102 comm=systemd name=bus dev="tmpfs" ino=15 scontext=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=staff_u:object_r:session_dbusd_tmp_t:s0 tclass=sock_file permissive=0
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/system/userdomain.te | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
index 573ad14..33557e4 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
@@ -414,6 +414,7 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
dbus_create_session_tmp_sock_files(login_userdomain)
+ dbus_write_session_tmp_sock_files(login_userdomain)
')
optional_policy(`
--
1.8.3.1

View File

@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From 5269978ad17fff8988f94a2327fa750e5d70c14d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2022 11:29:39 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow sanlock get attributes of filesystems with extended
attributes
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/5269978ad17fff8988f94a2327fa750e5d70c14d
Conflict: NA
Addresses the following AVC denial:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(01/28/2022 09:41:01.094:1832) : proctitle=/usr/sbin/sanlock daemon
type=AVC msg=audit(01/28/2022 09:41:01.094:1832) : avc: denied { getattr } for pid=37165 comm=sanlock name=/ dev="dm-3" ino=128 scontext=system_u:system_r:sanlock_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:fs_t:s0 tclass=filesystem permissive=0
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(01/28/2022 09:41:01.094:1832) : arch=x86_64 syscall=statfs success=no exit=EACCES(Permission denied) a0=0x7fdade30b49d a1=0x7ffeeeb41a70 a2=0x49 a3=0x1000 items=0 ppid=1 pid=37165 auid=unset uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=(none) ses=unset comm=sanlock exe=/usr/sbin/sanlock subj=system_u:system_r:sanlock_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
Resolves: rhbz#2047811
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/contrib/sanlock.te | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/contrib/sanlock.te b/policy/modules/contrib/sanlock.te
index 04bd655..914062b 100644
--- a/policy/modules/contrib/sanlock.te
+++ b/policy/modules/contrib/sanlock.te
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(sanlock_t)
files_read_mnt_symlinks(sanlock_t)
fs_getattr_cgroup(sanlock_t)
+fs_getattr_xattr_fs(sanlock_t)
fs_rw_cephfs_files(sanlock_t)
storage_raw_rw_fixed_disk(sanlock_t)
--
1.8.3.1

View File

@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
From 369f900039cff9443e86fdf7254ba8b11dc6adb5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Patrik Koncity <pkoncity@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2022 11:46:13 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow sysadm_passwd_t to relabel passwd and group files
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/369f900039cff9443e86fdf7254ba8b11dc6adb5
Conflict: NA
Vigr mechanism of editing group and passwd
files work on principle of recreating the current
file with new changes. Due to this mechanism is
need to again relabel file with selinux label.
Creating interface allowing relabel to the passwd_file_t
type. Allow relabeling for sysadm_passwd_t domain.
Allow dac_override permission for sysadm_passwd_t type.
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/admin/usermanage.te | 3 ++-
policy/modules/system/authlogin.if | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.te b/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.te
index 8fdbfbc..155fb68 100644
--- a/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.te
+++ b/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.te
@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ optional_policy(`
# Password admin local policy
#
-allow sysadm_passwd_t self:capability { chown dac_read_search fsetid setuid setgid sys_resource };
+allow sysadm_passwd_t self:capability { chown dac_override dac_read_search fsetid setuid setgid sys_resource };
allow sysadm_passwd_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execstack execheap };
allow sysadm_passwd_t self:process { setrlimit setfscreate };
allow sysadm_passwd_t self:fd use;
@@ -478,6 +478,7 @@ term_getattr_all_ptys(sysadm_passwd_t)
auth_manage_passwd(sysadm_passwd_t)
auth_manage_shadow(sysadm_passwd_t)
auth_relabel_shadow(sysadm_passwd_t)
+auth_relabelto_passwd_files(sysadm_passwd_t)
auth_etc_filetrans_shadow(sysadm_passwd_t)
auth_use_nsswitch(sysadm_passwd_t)
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/authlogin.if b/policy/modules/system/authlogin.if
index ad55205..b5b3702 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/authlogin.if
+++ b/policy/modules/system/authlogin.if
@@ -851,6 +851,26 @@ interface(`auth_relabel_shadow',`
#######################################
## <summary>
+## Relabel to the
+## password file type.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`auth_relabelto_passwd_files',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type passwd_file_t;
+ ')
+
+ files_search_etc($1)
+ allow $1 passwd_file_t:file relabelto;
+')
+
+#######################################
+## <summary>
## Append to the login failure log.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
--
1.8.3.1

View File

@ -10,27 +10,57 @@ The dbus_delete_session_tmp_sock_files() interface was added.
Addresses the following AVC denial:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(13.1.2022 18:57:09.055:9086) : proctitle=/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-user-runtime-dir stop 1001
type=PATH msg=audit(13.1.2022 18:57:09.055:9086) : item=1 name=bus inode=40 dev=00:3f mode=socket,666 ouid=staff ogid=staff rdev=00:00 obj=staff_u:object_r:session_dbusd_tmp_t:s0 nametype=DELETE cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0
type=PATH msg=audit(13.1.2022 18:57:09.055:9086) : item=0 name=/ inode=1 dev=00:3f mode=dir,700 ouid=staff ogid=staff rdev=00:00 obj=staff_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=PARENT cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(13.1.2022 18:57:09.055:9086) : arch=x86_64 syscall=unlinkat success=yes exit=0 a0=0x3 a1=0x560b86610d9b a2=0x0 a3=0x78 items=2 ppid=1 pid=26510 auid=unset uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=(none) ses=unset comm=systemd-user-ru exe=/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-user-runtime-dir subj=system_u:system_r:systemd_logind_t:s0 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(13.1.2022 18:57:09.055:9086) : avc: denied { unlink } for pid=26510 comm=systemd-user-ru name=bus dev="tmpfs" ino=40 scontext=system_u:system_r:systemd_logind_t:s0 tcontext=staff_u:object_r:session_dbusd_tmp_t:s0 tclass=sock_file permissive=1
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(13.1.2022 18:57:09.055:9086) : proctitle=/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-user-runtime-dir stop 100
1
type=PATH msg=audit(13.1.2022 18:57:09.055:9086) : item=1 name=bus inode=40 dev=00:3f mode=socket,666 ouid=staff ogi
d=staff rdev=00:00 obj=staff_u:object_r:session_dbusd_tmp_t:s0 nametype=DELETE cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_
fver=0 cap_frootid=0
type=PATH msg=audit(13.1.2022 18:57:09.055:9086) : item=0 name=/ inode=1 dev=00:3f mode=dir,700 ouid=staff ogid=staf
f rdev=00:00 obj=staff_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=PARENT cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_froo
tid=0
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(13.1.2022 18:57:09.055:9086) : arch=x86_64 syscall=unlinkat success=yes exit=0 a0=0x3 a1=0x56
0b86610d9b a2=0x0 a3=0x78 items=2 ppid=1 pid=26510 auid=unset uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=
root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=(none) ses=unset comm=systemd-user-ru exe=/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-user-runtime-dir su
bj=system_u:system_r:systemd_logind_t:s0 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(13.1.2022 18:57:09.055:9086) : avc: denied { unlink } for pid=26510 comm=systemd-user-ru name=
bus dev="tmpfs" ino=40 scontext=system_u:system_r:systemd_logind_t:s0 tcontext=staff_u:object_r:session_dbusd_tmp_t:
s0 tclass=sock_file permissive=1
Resolves: rhbz#2039671
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/contrib/dbus.if | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
policy/modules/contrib/dbus.if | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
policy/modules/system/systemd.te | 1 +
2 files changed, 19 insertions(+)
2 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/contrib/dbus.if b/policy/modules/contrib/dbus.if
index 71c77a0..e04af61 100644
index 6f923ad..70e7bcd 100644
--- a/policy/modules/contrib/dbus.if
+++ b/policy/modules/contrib/dbus.if
@@ -883,6 +883,24 @@ interface(`dbus_write_session_tmp_sock_files',`
@@ -863,6 +863,42 @@ interface(`dbus_manage_session_tmp_dirs',`
manage_dirs_pattern($1, session_dbusd_tmp_t, session_dbusd_tmp_t)
')
########################################
## <summary>
+######################################
+## <summary>
+## Write to session_dbusd tmp socket files.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`dbus_write_session_tmp_sock_files',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type session_dbusd_tmp_t;
+ ')
+
+ write_sock_files_pattern($1, session_dbusd_tmp_t, session_dbusd_tmp_t)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
+## Delete session_dbusd tmp socket files.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
@ -47,16 +77,14 @@ index 71c77a0..e04af61 100644
+ delete_sock_files_pattern($1, session_dbusd_tmp_t, session_dbusd_tmp_t)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
########################################
## <summary>
## Allow systemctl dbus services
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/systemd.te b/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
index 43fffdc..edd4354 100644
index a62f1fe..2b54d0b 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
@@ -364,6 +364,7 @@ optional_policy(`
@@ -363,6 +363,7 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
dbus_connect_system_bus(systemd_logind_t)
dbus_system_bus_client(systemd_logind_t)

View File

@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
From 2bd78f27bb7a806bf89070c31e4f813b61f1155e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 10:51:06 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow systemd-networkd create and use netlink netfilter
socket
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/2bd78f27bb7a806bf89070c31e4f813b61f1155e
Conflict: NA
Resolves: rhbz#2054006
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/system/systemd.te | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/systemd.te b/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
index 2d8db7e..476e2d3 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
@@ -490,6 +490,7 @@ allow systemd_networkd_t self:process { getcap setcap };
allow systemd_networkd_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms;
allow systemd_networkd_t self:netlink_generic_socket create_socket_perms;
+allow systemd_networkd_t self:netlink_netfilter_socket create_socket_perms;
allow systemd_networkd_t self:netlink_route_socket { create_socket_perms nlmsg_read nlmsg_write };
allow systemd_networkd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
allow systemd_networkd_t self:packet_socket create_socket_perms;
--
1.8.3.1

View File

@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
From 569208d534e1a53d75b187ec44ecda856ee6139c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 26 Jan 2022 14:41:59 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow systemd services watch dbusd pid directory and its
parents
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/569208d534e1a53d75b187ec44ecda856ee6139c
Conflict: NA
The following services were allowed to watch /run/dbus and all its
parents:
- systemd-hostnamed
- systemd-machined
- systemd-networkd
- systemd-resolved
- systemd-timesyncd and systemd-timedated
These permissions are required when the services start earlier than
dbus-broker manages to establish the socket communication, e. g. after
$ systemctl disable NetworkManager && systemctl enable systemd-networkd
The dbus_watch_pid_dir_path() interface was added. The redundant
dbus_watch_pid_dirs() calls were removed.
Resolves: rhbz#2031668
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/contrib/dbus.if | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
policy/modules/system/systemd.te | 7 +++++--
2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/policy/modules/contrib/dbus.if b/policy/modules/contrib/dbus.if
index deb6f10..7ec03b1 100644
--- a/policy/modules/contrib/dbus.if
+++ b/policy/modules/contrib/dbus.if
@@ -606,6 +606,27 @@ interface(`dbus_watch_pid_dirs',`
########################################
## <summary>
+## Watch system dbusd pid directory and all its parents
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`dbus_watch_pid_dir_path',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type system_dbusd_var_run_t;
+ ')
+
+ files_watch_root_dirs($1)
+ files_watch_var_run_dirs($1)
+ files_search_pids($1)
+ allow $1 system_dbusd_var_run_t:dir watch_dir_perms;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
## Read and write system dbus tmp socket files.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/systemd.te b/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
index ea2b27e..2d8db7e 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
@@ -458,6 +458,7 @@ getty_start_services(systemd_machined_t)
optional_policy(`
dbus_connect_system_bus(systemd_machined_t)
dbus_system_bus_client(systemd_machined_t)
+ dbus_watch_pid_dir_path(systemd_machined_t)
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -536,6 +537,7 @@ init_named_pid_filetrans(systemd_logind_t, systemd_networkd_var_run_t, dir, "net
optional_policy(`
dbus_system_bus_client(systemd_networkd_t)
dbus_connect_system_bus(systemd_networkd_t)
+ dbus_watch_pid_dir_path(systemd_networkd_t)
dbus_read_pid_files(systemd_networkd_t)
dbus_read_pid_sock_files(systemd_networkd_t)
systemd_dbus_chat_logind(systemd_networkd_t)
@@ -862,6 +864,7 @@ userdom_dbus_send_all_users(systemd_hostnamed_t)
optional_policy(`
dbus_system_bus_client(systemd_hostnamed_t)
dbus_connect_system_bus(systemd_hostnamed_t)
+ dbus_watch_pid_dir_path(systemd_hostnamed_t)
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -978,7 +981,7 @@ optional_policy(`
dbus_system_bus_client(systemd_timedated_t)
dbus_connect_system_bus(systemd_timedated_t)
dbus_read_pid_sock_files(systemd_timedated_t)
- dbus_watch_pid_dirs(systemd_timedated_t)
+ dbus_watch_pid_dir_path(systemd_timedated_t)
dbus_watch_pid_sock_files(systemd_timedated_t)
')
@@ -1168,8 +1171,8 @@ optional_policy(`
dbus_connect_system_bus(systemd_resolved_t)
dbus_read_pid_files(systemd_resolved_t)
dbus_read_pid_sock_files(systemd_resolved_t)
+ dbus_watch_pid_dir_path(systemd_resolved_t)
dbus_watch_pid_sock_files(systemd_resolved_t)
- dbus_watch_pid_dirs(systemd_resolved_t)
systemd_dbus_chat_logind(systemd_resolved_t)
')
--
1.8.3.1

View File

@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
From 40a8223b142eb3ed9d63869b5dc447b0ede4ebf3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 28 Jan 2022 17:04:07 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow timedatex dbus chat with xdm
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/40a8223b142eb3ed9d63869b5dc447b0ede4ebf3
Conflict: NA
Addresses the following USER_AVC denial:
type=USER_AVC msg=audit(1642064568.655:164): pid=942 uid=81 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 subj=system_u:system_r:system_dbusd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 msg='avc: denied { send_msg } for msgtype=method_call interface=org.freedesktop.timedate1 member=SetTimezone dest=:1.201 spid=6469 tpid=6505 scontext=system_u:system_r:xdm_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:system_r:timedatex_t:s0 tclass=dbus permissive=0 exe="/usr/bin/dbus-daemon" sauid=81 hostname=? addr=? terminal=?'^]UID="dbus" AUID="unset" SAUID="dbus"
Resolves: rhbz#2040214
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/contrib/timedatex.te | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/contrib/timedatex.te b/policy/modules/contrib/timedatex.te
index 003c4c3..3a2e4db 100644
--- a/policy/modules/contrib/timedatex.te
+++ b/policy/modules/contrib/timedatex.te
@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ optional_policy(`
init_dbus_chat(timedatex_t)
policykit_dbus_chat(timedatex_t)
+
+ optional_policy(`
+ xserver_dbus_chat_xdm(timedatex_t)
+ ')
')
optional_policy(`
--
1.8.3.1

View File

@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
From d9bf0729b58d4e3c0c66015961013c1cb64c4a24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2022 17:15:18 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow tumblerd write to session_dbusd tmp socket files
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/d9bf0729b58d4e3c0c66015961013c1cb64c4a24
Conflict: NA
Addresses the following AVC denial:
type=AVC msg=audit(1642635456.954:3314): avc: denied { write } for pid=104519 comm="tumblerd" name="bus" dev="tmpfs" ino=40 scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:thumb_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:session_dbusd_tmp_t:s0 tclass=sock_file permissive=0
Resolves: rhbz#2042696
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/contrib/thumb.te | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/contrib/thumb.te b/policy/modules/contrib/thumb.te
index 0444a36..27eb72c 100644
--- a/policy/modules/contrib/thumb.te
+++ b/policy/modules/contrib/thumb.te
@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ optional_policy(`
dbus_stream_connect_session_bus(thumb_t)
dbus_chat_session_bus(thumb_t)
dbus_system_bus_client(thumb_t)
+ dbus_write_session_tmp_sock_files(thumb_t)
')
optional_policy(`
--
1.8.3.1

View File

@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
From d251c0553ecc432f0aa8a6769e76795902b9ebcd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 18:33:51 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Update chronyd_pid_filetrans() to allow create dirs
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/d251c0553ecc432f0aa8a6769e76795902b9ebcd
Conflict: NA
The chronyd_pid_filetrans() interface was updated so that the caller
domain is now allowed to create the /run/chrony-dhcp directory.
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/contrib/chronyd.if | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/contrib/chronyd.if b/policy/modules/contrib/chronyd.if
index 3d47264..cad4d31 100644
--- a/policy/modules/contrib/chronyd.if
+++ b/policy/modules/contrib/chronyd.if
@@ -252,6 +252,7 @@ interface(`chronyd_pid_filetrans',`
type chronyd_var_run_t;
')
+ create_dirs_pattern($1, chronyd_var_run_t, chronyd_var_run_t)
files_pid_filetrans($1, chronyd_var_run_t, dir, "chrony-dhcp")
')
--
1.8.3.1

View File

@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
Summary: SELinux policy configuration
Name: selinux-policy
Version: 35.5
Release: 9
Release: 10
License: GPLv2+
URL: https://github.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/
@ -112,6 +112,28 @@ Patch6044: backport-Allow-login_userdomain-watch-various-files-and-dirs.patch
Patch6045: backport-Allow-login_userdomain-watch-localization-directorie.patch
Patch6046: backport-Allow-login_userdomain-watch-accountsd-lib-directori.patch
Patch6047: backport-Allow-login_userdomain-watch-systemd-logind-PID-dire.patch
Patch6048: backport-Allow-login_userdomain-watch-systemd-machined-PID-di.patch
Patch6049: backport-Allow-login_userdomain-write-to-session_dbusd-tmp-so.patch
Patch6050: backport-Allow-tumblerd-write-to-session_dbusd-tmp-socket-fil.patch
Patch6051: backport-Allow-NetworkManager-talk-with-unconfined-user-over-.patch
Patch6052: backport-Allow-timedatex-dbus-chat-with-xdm.patch
Patch6053: backport-Allow-init-delete-generic-tmp-named-pipes.patch
Patch6054: backport-Allow-alsa-bind-mixer-controls-to-led-triggers.patch
Patch6055: backport-Allow-ModemManager-connect-to-the-unconfined-user-do.patch
Patch6056: backport-Allow-systemd-services-watch-dbusd-pid-directory-and.patch
Patch6057: backport-Allow-init-read-stratis-data-symlinks.patch
Patch6058: backport-Allow-sanlock-get-attributes-of-filesystems-with-ext.patch
Patch6059: backport-Add-the-map-permission-to-common_anon_inode_perm-per.patch
Patch6060: backport-Update-chronyd_pid_filetrans-to-allow-create-dirs.patch
Patch6061: backport-Allow-alsactl-set-group-Process-ID-of-a-process.patch
Patch6062: backport-Allow-login_userdomain-read-systemd-runtime-files.patch
Patch6063: backport-Allow-login_userdomain-watch-system-configuration-di.patch
Patch6064: backport-Allow-login_userdomain-watch-library-and-fonts-dirs.patch
Patch6065: backport-Allow-login_userdomain-map-var-lib-directories.patch
Patch6066: backport-Allow-confined-sysadmin-to-use-tool-vipw.patch
Patch6067: backport-Allow-sysadm_passwd_t-to-relabel-passwd-and-group-fi.patch
Patch6068: backport-Allow-systemd-networkd-create-and-use-netlink-netfil.patch
Patch6069: backport-Allow-iptables-list-cgroup-directories.patch
Patch9000: add-qemu_exec_t-for-stratovirt.patch
Patch9001: fix-context-of-usr-bin-rpmdb.patch
@ -782,6 +804,9 @@ exit 0
%endif
%changelog
* Tue Sep 13 2022 lujie <lujie54@huawei.com> - 35.5-10
- backport upstream patches
* Tue Sep 13 2022 lujie <lujie54@huawei.com> - 35.5-9
- backport upstream patches