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update upstream patches

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This commit is contained in:
lujie54 2022-09-13 19:52:03 +08:00
parent 3c7c076926
commit 45421a28ba
23 changed files with 1026 additions and 1 deletions
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38
backport-Allow-administrative-users-the-bpf-capability.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
From 0fa3cc8988c28c5da8b6844cdac0d052ec48dc3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2022 17:39:33 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow administrative users the bpf capability
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/0fa3cc8988c28c5da8b6844cdac0d052ec48dc3b
Conflict: NA
The userdom_admin_user_template() template for creating an
administrative user was updated with the bpf capability so that
e. g. users in the sysadm_r role can run perf.
Addresses the following AVC denial:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(01/12/2022 10:45:01.065:855) : proctitle=perf record -o /dev/null echo test
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(01/12/2022 10:45:01.065:855) : arch=x86_64 syscall=bpf success=no exit=ENOENT(No such file or directory) a0=BPF_PROG_GET_NEXT_ID a1=0x7fffd756dba0 a2=0x78 a3=0x3b items=0 ppid=9065 pid=9066 auid=root uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=pts2 ses=7 comm=perf exe=/usr/bin/perf subj=sysadm_u:sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(01/12/2022 10:45:01.065:855) : avc: denied { bpf } for pid=9066 comm=perf capability=unknown-capability(39) scontext=sysadm_u:sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=sysadm_u:sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=capability2 permissive=0
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/system/userdomain.if | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
index cb56d28..eea0894 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
+++ b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if
@@ -1640,6 +1640,8 @@ template(`userdom_admin_user_template',`
# $1_t local policy
#
+ allow $1_t self:capability2 bpf;
+
# Manipulate other users crontab.
allow $1_t self:passwd crontab;
--
1.8.3.1

35
backport-Allow-fcoemon-request-the-kernel-to-load-a-module.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From ed80bcd8541d224ec18de995fb7dbb3c1bd5732c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 7 Jan 2022 17:35:22 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow fcoemon request the kernel to load a module
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/ed80bcd8541d224ec18de995fb7dbb3c1bd5732c
Conflict: NA
Addresses the following AVC denial:
type=AVC msg=audit(1641434692.558:116): avc: denied { module_request } for pid=2995 comm="fcoemon" kmod="8021q" scontext=system_u:system_r:fcoemon_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tclass=system permissive=0
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1641434692.558:116): arch=x86_64 syscall=ioctl success=no exit=ENOPKG a0=8 a1=8982 a2=7ffdd90301c0 a3=7fec871ae3e0 items=0 ppid=1 pid=2995 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) ses=4294967295 comm=fcoemon exe=/usr/sbin/fcoemon subj=s
Resolves: rhbz#2034463
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/contrib/fcoe.te | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/contrib/fcoe.te b/policy/modules/contrib/fcoe.te
index d46768a..18a30e7 100644
--- a/policy/modules/contrib/fcoe.te
+++ b/policy/modules/contrib/fcoe.te
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ manage_files_pattern(fcoemon_t, fcoemon_var_run_t, fcoemon_var_run_t)
manage_sock_files_pattern(fcoemon_t, fcoemon_var_run_t, fcoemon_var_run_t)
files_pid_filetrans(fcoemon_t, fcoemon_var_run_t, { dir file })
+kernel_request_load_module(fcoemon_t)
+
dev_rw_sysfs(fcoemon_t)
dev_create_sysfs_files(fcoemon_t)
--
1.8.3.1

44
backport-Allow-gssproxy-access-to-various-system-files.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
From 02d90bb3e2fc39d67a7d07cec5ca113bd0a53421 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 10 Jan 2022 17:36:15 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow gssproxy access to various system files.
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/02d90bb3e2fc39d67a7d07cec5ca113bd0a53421
Conflict: NA
gssproxy was allowed to:
- read system state information in /proc
- read from random number generator devices (e.g., /dev/random)
- read hardware state information
Resolves: rhbz#2026974
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/contrib/gssproxy.te | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/contrib/gssproxy.te b/policy/modules/contrib/gssproxy.te
index f48457c..aa53de0 100644
--- a/policy/modules/contrib/gssproxy.te
+++ b/policy/modules/contrib/gssproxy.te
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ files_pid_filetrans(gssproxy_t, gssproxy_var_run_t, { dir file lnk_file sock_fil
kernel_rw_rpc_sysctls(gssproxy_t)
kernel_read_network_state(gssproxy_t)
+kernel_read_system_state(gssproxy_t)
domain_use_interactive_fds(gssproxy_t)
domain_read_all_domains_state(gssproxy_t)
@@ -51,7 +52,9 @@ fs_getattr_all_fs(gssproxy_t)
auth_use_nsswitch(gssproxy_t)
+dev_read_rand(gssproxy_t)
dev_read_urand(gssproxy_t)
+dev_read_sysfs(gssproxy_t)
dev_rw_crypto(gssproxy_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(gssproxy_t)
--
1.8.3.1

42
backport-Allow-gssproxy-read-and-write-z90crypt-device.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
From d0fcb462896c8fb00eaa8f8b3580fffcbefcdf8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 10 Jan 2022 17:18:30 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow gssproxy read and write z90crypt device
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/d0fcb462896c8fb00eaa8f8b3580fffcbefcdf8b
Conflict: NA
This permission is required on s390x systems with the Crypto Express
adapter card. The z90crypt device driver acts as the interface to the
PCI cryptography hardware and performs asynchronous encryption
operations (RSA) as used during the SSL handshake.
Addresses the following AVC denial:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(26.11.2021 17:43:04.211:26) : proctitle=/usr/sbin/gssproxy -D
type=AVC msg=audit(26.11.2021 17:43:04.211:26) : avc: denied { read write } for pid=859 comm=gssproxy name=icastats_0 dev="tmpfs" ino=2 scontext=system_u:system_r:gssproxy_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:ica_tmpfs_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(26.11.2021 17:43:04.211:26) : arch=s390x syscall=openat success=no exit=EACCES(Operace zamítnuta) a0=0xffffffffffffff9c a1=0x3ffdec7c2fb a2=O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC a3=0x180 items=0 ppid=1 pid=859 auid=unset uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=(none) ses=unset comm=gssproxy exe=/usr/sbin/gssproxy subj=system_u:system_r:gssproxy_t:s0 key=(null)
Resolves: rhbz#2026974
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/contrib/gssproxy.te | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/contrib/gssproxy.te b/policy/modules/contrib/gssproxy.te
index 18d08d1..872079f 100644
--- a/policy/modules/contrib/gssproxy.te
+++ b/policy/modules/contrib/gssproxy.te
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ fs_getattr_all_fs(gssproxy_t)
auth_use_nsswitch(gssproxy_t)
dev_read_urand(gssproxy_t)
+dev_rw_crypto(gssproxy_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg(gssproxy_t)
--
1.8.3.1

35
backport-Allow-gssproxy-read-write-and-map-ica-tmpfs-files.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From dc1a9f92b95e7adb963383681b8cab44f1e2a044 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 10 Jan 2022 17:25:03 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow gssproxy read, write, and map ica tmpfs files
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/dc1a9f92b95e7adb963383681b8cab44f1e2a044
Conflict: NA
These permissions are necessary for domains working
with the ICA crypto accelerator.
Resolves: rhbz#2026974
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/contrib/gssproxy.te | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/contrib/gssproxy.te b/policy/modules/contrib/gssproxy.te
index 872079f..f48457c 100644
--- a/policy/modules/contrib/gssproxy.te
+++ b/policy/modules/contrib/gssproxy.te
@@ -68,6 +68,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
+ ica_rw_map_tmpfs_files(gssproxy_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
ipa_read_lib(gssproxy_t)
')
--
1.8.3.1

36
backport-Allow-kpropd-get-attributes-of-cgroup-filesystems.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
From 747521e0f639f1aec372e87cd2e0cbed13d9416b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2022 10:15:43 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow kpropd get attributes of cgroup filesystems
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/747521e0f639f1aec372e87cd2e0cbed13d9416b
Conflict: NA
Addresses the following AVC denial:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(01/12/2022 17:58:09.626:7104) : proctitle=/usr/sbin/kpropd
type=PATH msg=audit(01/12/2022 17:58:09.626:7104) : item=0 name=/sys/fs/cgroup/ inode=1 dev=00:1b mode=dir,555 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(01/12/2022 17:58:09.626:7104) : arch=x86_64 syscall=statfs success=no exit=EACCES(Permission denied) a0=0x7f78a1e413ae a1=0x7ffd080f54c0 a2=0x7f78a2137260 a3=0x0 items=1 ppid=1 pid=132239 auid=unset uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=(none) ses=unset comm=kpropd exe=/usr/sbin/kpropd subj=system_u:system_r:kpropd_t:s0 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(01/12/2022 17:58:09.626:7104) : avc: denied { getattr } for pid=132239 comm=kpropd name=/ dev="cgroup2" ino=1 scontext=system_u:system_r:kpropd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 tclass=filesystem permissive=0
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/contrib/kerberos.te | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/contrib/kerberos.te b/policy/modules/contrib/kerberos.te
index 4289d79..b4d3c3e 100644
--- a/policy/modules/contrib/kerberos.te
+++ b/policy/modules/contrib/kerberos.te
@@ -385,6 +385,8 @@ dev_read_urand(kpropd_t)
files_search_tmp(kpropd_t)
+fs_getattr_cgroup(kpropd_t)
+
selinux_validate_context(kpropd_t)
auth_use_nsswitch(kpropd_t)
--
1.8.3.1

72
backport-Allow-login_userdomain-create-session_dbusd-tmp-sock.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
From 7c18d0afc7f6b93319902dc1e5305fe66a060019 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2022 19:17:31 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow login_userdomain create session_dbusd tmp socket files
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/7c18d0afc7f6b93319902dc1e5305fe66a060019
Conflict: NA
The dbus_create_session_tmp_sock_files() interface was added.
Addresses the following AVC denial:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(13.1.2022 18:56:38.180:8372) : proctitle=(systemd)
type=PATH msg=audit(13.1.2022 18:56:38.180:8372) : item=1 name=/run/user/1001/bus inode=40 dev=00:3f mode=socket,666 ouid=staff ogid=staff rdev=00:00 obj=staff_u:object_r:session_dbusd_tmp_t:s0 nametype=CREATE cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0
type=PATH msg=audit(13.1.2022 18:56:38.180:8372) : item=0 name=/run/user/1001/ inode=1 dev=00:3f mode=dir,700 ouid=staff ogid=staff rdev=00:00 obj=staff_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=PARENT cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0
type=SOCKADDR msg=audit(13.1.2022 18:56:38.180:8372) : saddr={ saddr_fam=local path=/run/user/1001/bus }
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(13.1.2022 18:56:38.180:8372) : arch=x86_64 syscall=bind success=yes exit=0 a0=0xc a1=0x562410fef860 a2=0x15 a3=0x0 items=2 ppid=1 pid=24940 auid=staff uid=staff gid=staff euid=staff suid=staff fsuid=staff egid=staff sgid=staff fsgid=staff tty=(none) ses=23 comm=systemd exe=/usr/lib/systemd/systemd subj=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(13.1.2022 18:56:38.180:8372) : avc: denied { create } for pid=24940 comm=systemd name=bus scontext=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=staff_u:object_r:session_dbusd_tmp_t:s0 tclass=sock_file permissive=1
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/contrib/dbus.if | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
policy/modules/system/userdomain.te | 4 ++++
2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/contrib/dbus.if b/policy/modules/contrib/dbus.if
index e04af61..deb6f10 100644
--- a/policy/modules/contrib/dbus.if
+++ b/policy/modules/contrib/dbus.if
@@ -901,6 +901,24 @@ interface(`dbus_delete_session_tmp_sock_files',`
########################################
## <summary>
+## Create session_dbusd tmp socket files.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`dbus_create_session_tmp_sock_files',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type session_dbusd_tmp_t;
+ ')
+
+ create_sock_files_pattern($1, session_dbusd_tmp_t, session_dbusd_tmp_t)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
## Allow systemctl dbus services
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
index b936a81..9f778ee 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
@@ -404,6 +404,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
+ dbus_create_session_tmp_sock_files(login_userdomain)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
gnome_watch_generic_data_home_dirs(login_userdomain)
gnome_watch_home_config_dirs(login_userdomain)
gnome_watch_home_config_files(login_userdomain)
--
1.8.3.1

38
backport-Allow-login_userdomain-watch-accountsd-lib-directori.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
From 0ed8e5127011aa4a75f57c250b5cc89b71949179 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2022 22:57:07 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow login_userdomain watch accountsd lib directories
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/0ed8e5127011aa4a75f57c250b5cc89b71949179
Conflict: NA
Addresses the following AVC denial:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(3.1.2022 08:48:10.041:403) : proctitle=/usr/bin/plasmashell --no-respawn
type=PATH msg=audit(3.1.2022 08:48:10.041:403) : item=0 name=/var/lib/AccountsService/icons inode=102167247 dev=fd:00 mode=dir,775 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:accountsd_var_lib_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(3.1.2022 08:48:10.041:403) : arch=x86_64 syscall=inotify_add_watch success=yes exit=16 a0=0xd a1=0x556d0da251b8 a2=0x2000fc6 a3=0x7f74d2859329 items=1 ppid=1775 pid=1944 auid=username uid=username gid=username euid=username suid=username fsuid=username egid=username sgid=username fsgid=username tty=(none) ses=3 comm=plasmashell exe=/usr/bin/plasmashell subj=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(3.1.2022 08:48:10.041:403) : avc: denied { watch } for pid=1944 comm=plasmashell path=/var/lib/AccountsService/icons dev="dm-0" ino=102167247 scontext=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:accountsd_var_lib_t:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/system/userdomain.te | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
index 86617c3..465e0a3 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
@@ -409,6 +409,10 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
+ accountsd_watch_lib(login_userdomain)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
dbus_create_session_tmp_sock_files(login_userdomain)
')
--
1.8.3.1

35
backport-Allow-login_userdomain-watch-generic-directories-in-.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From 7821ccab9e2f62f5d4ac8f2ea8ef45d12f4bb7a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2022 22:38:29 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow login_userdomain watch generic directories in /tmp
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/7821ccab9e2f62f5d4ac8f2ea8ef45d12f4bb7a2
Conflict: NA
Addresses the following AVC denial:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(13.1.2022 21:50:49.647:21417) : proctitle=/usr/lib64/firefox/firefox --sm-client-id 10cddccc67000160673165200000017210015
type=PATH msg=audit(13.1.2022 21:50:49.647:21417) : item=0 name=/tmp inode=1 dev=00:25 mode=dir,sticky,777 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(13.1.2022 21:50:49.647:21417) : arch=x86_64 syscall=inotify_add_watch success=yes exit=21 a0=0x50 a1=0x7fee2f76f1d0 a2=0x1002fce a3=0xdaddb2ff3800000 items=1 ppid=1775 pid=1088343 auid=username uid=username gid=username euid=username suid=username fsuid=username egid=username sgid=username fsgid=username tty=(none) ses=3 comm=GeckoMain exe=/usr/lib64/firefox/firefox subj=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(13.1.2022 21:50:49.647:21417) : avc: denied { watch } for pid=1088343 comm=GeckoMain path=/tmp dev="tmpfs" ino=1 scontext=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/system/userdomain.te | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
index 9f778ee..cc2d309 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
@@ -389,6 +389,7 @@ dev_watch_generic_dirs(login_userdomain)
files_watch_etc_dirs(login_userdomain)
files_watch_usr_dirs(login_userdomain)
files_watch_var_lib_dirs(login_userdomain)
+files_watch_generic_tmp_dirs(login_userdomain)
fs_create_cgroup_files(login_userdomain)
fs_watch_cgroup_files(login_userdomain)
--
1.8.3.1

74
backport-Allow-login_userdomain-watch-localization-directorie.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
From 04abf1566f6fbd1b87f3d55fa9c09ec59a982b4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2022 22:53:08 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow login_userdomain watch localization directories
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/04abf1566f6fbd1b87f3d55fa9c09ec59a982b4a
Conflict: NA
The miscfiles_watch_localization_dirs() interface was added.
Addresses the following AVC denial:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(3.1.2022 08:51:36.215:442) : proctitle=/opt/google/chrome/chrome --enable-crashpad
type=PATH msg=audit(3.1.2022 08:51:36.215:442) : item=0 name=/etc/../usr/share/zoneinfo inode=67574433 dev=fd:00 mode=dir,755 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:locale_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0
type=CWD msg=audit(3.1.2022 08:51:36.215:442) : cwd=/home/username
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(3.1.2022 08:51:36.215:442) : arch=x86_64 syscall=inotify_add_watch success=yes exit=10 a0=0x18 a1=0xd0a02b08b20 a2=0x10003cc a3=0x0 items=1 ppid=1944 pid=4906 auid=username uid=username gid=username euid=username suid=username fsuid=username egid=username sgid=username fsgid=username tty=(none) ses=3 comm=ThreadPoolSingl exe=/opt/google/chrome/chrome subj=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(3.1.2022 08:51:36.215:442) : avc: denied { watch } for pid=4906 comm=ThreadPoolSingl path=/usr/share/zoneinfo dev="dm-0" ino=67574433 scontext=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:locale_t:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/system/miscfiles.if | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
policy/modules/system/userdomain.te | 1 +
2 files changed, 25 insertions(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.if b/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.if
index b63a391..e7f73d8 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.if
+++ b/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.if
@@ -557,6 +557,30 @@ interface(`miscfiles_read_localization',`
########################################
## <summary>
+## Allow process to watch localization directories.
+## </summary>
+## <desc>
+## <p>
+## Allow the specified domain to watch localization directories
+## (e.g. /usr/share/zoneinfo/) for changes.
+## </p>
+## </desc>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`miscfiles_watch_localization_dirs',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type locale_t;
+ ')
+
+ watch_dirs_pattern($1, locale_t, locale_t)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
## Allow process to watch localization files.
## </summary>
## <desc>
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
index 824af18..86617c3 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
@@ -397,6 +397,7 @@ files_watch_generic_tmp_dirs(login_userdomain)
fs_create_cgroup_files(login_userdomain)
fs_watch_cgroup_files(login_userdomain)
+miscfiles_watch_localization_dirs(login_userdomain)
miscfiles_watch_localization_symlinks(login_userdomain)
mount_watch_pid_dirs(login_userdomain)
--
1.8.3.1

35
backport-Allow-login_userdomain-watch-systemd-logind-PID-dire.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From f519626b841561d71f7ef751b446a598871477bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Jan 2022 17:13:08 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow login_userdomain watch systemd-logind PID directories
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/f519626b841561d71f7ef751b446a598871477bf
Conflict: NA
Addresses the following AVC denial:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(3.1.2022 08:48:02.005:392) : proctitle=/usr/bin/wireplumber
type=PATH msg=audit(3.1.2022 08:48:02.005:392) : item=0 name=/run/systemd/seats/ inode=72 dev=00:1a mode=dir,755 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:systemd_logind_var_run_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(3.1.2022 08:48:02.005:392) : arch=x86_64 syscall=inotify_add_watch success=yes exit=1 a0=0x11 a1=0x7f214c69d027 a2=0x280 a3=0x0 items=1 ppid=1775 pid=2305 auid=username uid=username gid=username euid=username suid=username fsuid=username egid=username sgid=username fsgid=username tty=(none) ses=3 comm=wireplumber exe=/usr/bin/wireplumber subj=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(3.1.2022 08:48:02.005:392) : avc: denied { watch } for pid=2305 comm=wireplumber path=/run/systemd/seats dev="tmpfs" ino=72 scontext=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:systemd_logind_var_run_t:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/system/userdomain.te | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
index 465e0a3..5643687 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
@@ -432,6 +432,7 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
+ systemd_login_watch_pid_dirs(login_userdomain)
systemd_login_watch_session_dirs(login_userdomain)
')
--
1.8.3.1

49
backport-Allow-login_userdomain-watch-various-files-and-dirs.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
From 0675ab63c83c96dd65d9793c5ff2835253329bba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2022 22:43:33 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow login_userdomain watch various files and dirs
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/0675ab63c83c96dd65d9793c5ff2835253329bba
Conflict: NA
Addresses the following AVC denials:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(3.1.2022 14:44:22.064:986) : proctitle=/usr/libexec/kscreenlocker_greet --graceTime 75000 --ksldfd 46
type=PATH msg=audit(3.1.2022 14:44:22.064:986) : item=0 name=/etc/fstab inode=100663543 dev=fd:00 mode=file,664 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:etc_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(3.1.2022 14:44:22.064:986) : arch=x86_64 syscall=inotify_add_watch success=yes exit=2 a0=0x18 a1=0x56518e638958 a2=0xcc6 a3=0x56518e6392d0 items=1 ppid=1881 pid=45075 auid=username uid=username gid=username euid=username suid=username fsuid=username egid=username sgid=username fsgid=username tty=(none) ses=3 comm=kscreenlocker_g exe=/usr/libexec/kscreenlocker_greet subj=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(3.1.2022 14:44:22.064:986) : avc: denied { watch } for pid=45075 comm=kscreenlocker_g path=/etc/fstab dev="dm-0" ino=100663543 scontext=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:etc_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(3.1.2022 14:44:22.064:987) : proctitle=/usr/libexec/kscreenlocker_greet --graceTime 75000 --ksldfd 46
type=PATH msg=audit(3.1.2022 14:44:22.064:987) : item=0 name=/var/run inode=1 dev=00:1a mode=dir,755 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:var_run_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(3.1.2022 14:44:22.064:987) : arch=x86_64 syscall=inotify_add_watch success=yes exit=1 a0=0x1a a1=0x7f74ecdfae35 a2=0x100 a3=0x0 items=1 ppid=1881 pid=45075 auid=username uid=username gid=username euid=username suid=username fsuid=username egid=username sgid=username fsgid=username tty=(none) ses=3 comm=kscreenlocker_g exe=/usr/libexec/kscreenlocker_greet subj=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(3.1.2022 14:44:22.064:987) : avc: denied { watch } for pid=45075 comm=kscreenlocker_g path=/run dev="tmpfs" ino=1 scontext=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:var_run_t:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(3.1.2022 14:44:22.213:989) : proctitle=/usr/libexec/kscreenlocker_greet --graceTime 75000 --ksldfd 46
type=PATH msg=audit(3.1.2022 14:44:22.213:989) : item=0 name=/usr/share/plasma/desktoptheme/breeze-dark/metadata.desktop inode=1684078 dev=fd:00 mode=file,644 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:usr_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(3.1.2022 14:44:22.213:989) : arch=x86_64 syscall=inotify_add_watch success=yes exit=5 a0=0xf a1=0x7f74d8001438 a2=0x2000fc6 a3=0x7f74f2f73329 items=1 ppid=1881 pid=45075 auid=username uid=username gid=username euid=username suid=username fsuid=username egid=username sgid=username fsgid=username tty=(none) ses=3 comm=kscreenlocker_g exe=/usr/libexec/kscreenlocker_greet subj=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(3.1.2022 14:44:22.213:989) : avc: denied { watch } for pid=45075 comm=kscreenlocker_g path=/usr/share/plasma/desktoptheme/breeze-dark/metadata.desktop dev="dm-0" ino=1684078 scontext=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:usr_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/system/userdomain.te | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
index cc2d309..824af18 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te
@@ -387,8 +387,11 @@ tunable_policy(`deny_bluetooth',`',`
dev_watch_generic_dirs(login_userdomain)
files_watch_etc_dirs(login_userdomain)
+files_watch_etc_files(login_userdomain)
files_watch_usr_dirs(login_userdomain)
+files_watch_usr_files(login_userdomain)
files_watch_var_lib_dirs(login_userdomain)
+files_watch_var_run_dirs(login_userdomain)
files_watch_generic_tmp_dirs(login_userdomain)
fs_create_cgroup_files(login_userdomain)
--
1.8.3.1

36
backport-Allow-smbcontrol-read-the-network-state-information.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
From 72bf03e76b3dd93ee4d29b573574cc394c74220b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 7 Jan 2022 18:24:37 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow smbcontrol read the network state information
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/72bf03e76b3dd93ee4d29b573574cc394c74220b
Conflict: NA
Addresses the following AVC denial:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(12/15/2021 14:56:51.308:2289) : proctitle=smbcontrol winbind ping
type=AVC msg=audit(12/15/2021 14:56:51.308:2289) : avc: denied { read } for pid=39355 comm=smbcontrol name=unix dev="proc" ino=4026532055 scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:smbcontrol_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:proc_net_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(12/15/2021 14:56:51.308:2289) : arch=x86_64 syscall=access success=no exit=EACCES(Permission denied) a0=0x7fffd5d76250 a1=R_OK a2=0x8 a3=0x562d2bf87764 items=0 ppid=36929 pid=39355 auid=root uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=(none) ses=9 comm=smbcontrol exe=/usr/bin/smbcontrol subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:smbcontrol_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
Resolves: rhbz#2038157
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/contrib/samba.te | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/contrib/samba.te b/policy/modules/contrib/samba.te
index cb89bcf..daf5349 100644
--- a/policy/modules/contrib/samba.te
+++ b/policy/modules/contrib/samba.te
@@ -743,6 +743,8 @@ samba_read_config(smbcontrol_t)
samba_search_var(smbcontrol_t)
samba_read_winbind_pid(smbcontrol_t)
+kernel_read_network_state(smbcontrol_t)
+
domain_use_interactive_fds(smbcontrol_t)
dev_read_urand(smbcontrol_t)
--
1.8.3.1

34
backport-Allow-sshd-read-filesystem-sysctl-files.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
From 84dd4309ad6d644edea2c3cf448f516f4e008c04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Jan 2022 15:17:27 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow sshd read filesystem sysctl files
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/84dd4309ad6d644edea2c3cf448f516f4e008c04
Conflict: NA
This permissions is required when "nofile unlimited" is configured
in the system resources limits for a user.
echo "testuser hard nofile unlimited" >> /etc/security/limits.d/testuser.conf
Resolves: rhbz#2036585
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/services/ssh.te | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ssh.te b/policy/modules/services/ssh.te
index 10126e7..bf988b7 100644
--- a/policy/modules/services/ssh.te
+++ b/policy/modules/services/ssh.te
@@ -303,6 +303,7 @@ allow sshd_t sshd_keytab_t:file read_file_perms;
kernel_search_key(sshd_t)
kernel_link_key(sshd_t)
+kernel_read_fs_sysctls(sshd_t)
kernel_read_net_sysctls(sshd_t)
files_search_all(sshd_t)
--
1.8.3.1

42
backport-Allow-sssd_kcm-read-and-write-z90crypt-device.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
From 80e7516c09c41c989176947265df41e39e94a31a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 10 Jan 2022 17:15:56 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow sssd_kcm read and write z90crypt device
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/80e7516c09c41c989176947265df41e39e94a31a
Conflict: NA
This permission is required on s390x systems with the Crypto Express
adapter card. The z90crypt device driver acts as the interface to the
PCI cryptography hardware and performs asynchronous encryption
operations (RSA) as used during the SSL handshake.
Addresses the following AVC denial:
PROCTITLE msg=audit(26.11.2021 17:43:18.641:78) : proctitle=/usr/libexec/sssd/sssd_kcm --uid 0 --gid 0 --logger=files
type=AVC msg=audit(26.11.2021 17:43:18.641:78) : avc: denied { read write } for pid=1724 comm=sssd_kcm name=z90crypt dev="devtmpfs" ino=111 scontext=system_u:system_r:sssd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:crypt_device_t:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=0
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(26.11.2021 17:43:18.641:78) : arch=s390x syscall=openat success=no exit=EACCES(Operace zamítnuta) a0=0xffffffffffffff9c a1=0x3ffa56906e6 a2=O_RDWR a3=0x0 items=0 ppid=1 pid=1724 auid=unset uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=(none) ses=unset comm=sssd_kcm exe=/usr/libexec/sssd/sssd_kcm subj=system_u:system_r:sssd_t:s0 key=(null)
Resolves: rhbz#2026974
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/contrib/sssd.te | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/contrib/sssd.te b/policy/modules/contrib/sssd.te
index b510dca..e5c8673 100644
--- a/policy/modules/contrib/sssd.te
+++ b/policy/modules/contrib/sssd.te
@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(sssd_t)
dev_read_urand(sssd_t)
dev_read_sysfs(sssd_t)
+dev_rw_crypto(sssd_t)
domain_read_all_domains_state(sssd_t)
domain_obj_id_change_exemption(sssd_t)
--
1.8.3.1

34
backport-Allow-sysadm_t-start-and-stop-transient-services.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
From 489674d8ad8253a18cf88425f2fe3dbf265d03a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 17 Jan 2022 12:44:10 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow sysadm_t start and stop transient services
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/489674d8ad8253a18cf88425f2fe3dbf265d03a1
Conflict: NA
Addresses the following AVC denial:
type=USER_AVC msg=audit(01/07/2022 03:27:48.362:345) : pid=1 uid=root auid=unset ses=unset subj=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 msg='avc: denied { start } for auid=unset uid=root gid=root cmdline="" scontext=sysadm_u:sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 tclass=system permissive=1 exe=/usr/lib/systemd/systemd sauid=root hostname=? addr=? terminal=?' # Date: Mon Jan 17 12:44:10 2022 +0100
Resolves: rhbz#2031065
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te b/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te
index fae8028..d9e11b6 100644
--- a/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te
+++ b/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te
@@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ init_exec(sysadm_t)
init_exec_script_files(sysadm_t)
init_dbus_chat(sysadm_t)
init_script_role_transition(sysadm_r)
+init_start(sysadm_t)
+init_stop(sysadm_t)
init_status(sysadm_t)
init_reboot(sysadm_t)
init_halt(sysadm_t)
--
1.8.3.1

39
backport-Allow-systemd-coredump-read-and-write-usermodehelper.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
From 9ca08c39af36079809e9247957d86e86009a3e6a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2022 19:23:19 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow systemd-coredump read and write usermodehelper state
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/9ca08c39af36079809e9247957d86e86009a3e6a
Conflict: NA
When systemd (PID1) crashes, it freezes and systemd services cannot be
started, so coredump handling with systemd-coredump will not work
either. As frozen systemd does not collect zombies any longer, it looks
reasonable to avoid spawning further processes as much as possible.
Therefore systemd-coredump will write "|/bin/false" to the
kernel.core_pattern kernel tunable when it detects that it was PID 1
that had crashed to disable coredumping.
Resolves: rhbz#1982961
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/system/systemd.te | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/systemd.te b/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
index edd4354..5a78a8c 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
@@ -1055,6 +1055,8 @@ manage_files_pattern(systemd_coredump_t, systemd_coredump_var_lib_t, systemd_cor
mmap_files_pattern(systemd_coredump_t, systemd_coredump_var_lib_t, systemd_coredump_var_lib_t)
init_var_lib_filetrans(systemd_coredump_t, systemd_coredump_var_lib_t, dir, "coredump")
+kernel_rw_usermodehelper_state(systemd_coredump_t)
+
dev_write_kmsg(systemd_coredump_t)
# To read info about the crashed process from /proc
--
1.8.3.1

46
backport-Allow-systemd-coredump-userns-capabilities-and-root-.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
From 4ed22744f5a99c1f2b997b915b340de7abe8d15d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2022 21:08:14 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow systemd-coredump userns capabilities and root mounton
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/4ed22744f5a99c1f2b997b915b340de7abe8d15d
Conflict: NA
systemd-coredump forks a child process to perform core file analysis
(comm=(sd-parse-elf)), and before doing the actual analysis, it sets
up a sandbox using mount and user namespaces.
Refer to https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/61aea456c1
for the systemd upstream change.
Resolves: rhbz#2031356
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/system/systemd.te | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/systemd.te b/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
index 5a78a8c..ea2b27e 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
@@ -1040,7 +1040,7 @@ systemd_read_efivarfs(systemd_sysctl_t)
# setgid setuid - to set own credentials to match the dumped process credentials
# setpcap - to drop capabilities
allow systemd_coredump_t self:capability { dac_read_search net_admin setgid setpcap setuid sys_ptrace };
-allow systemd_coredump_t self:cap_userns sys_ptrace;
+allow systemd_coredump_t self:cap_userns { dac_read_search dac_override sys_admin sys_ptrace };
# To set its capability set
allow systemd_coredump_t self:process setcap;
@@ -1067,6 +1067,8 @@ domain_read_all_domains_state(systemd_coredump_t)
files_read_non_security_files(systemd_coredump_t)
files_map_non_security_files(systemd_coredump_t)
+files_mounton_rootfs(systemd_coredump_t)
+
fs_getattr_nsfs_files(systemd_coredump_t)
optional_policy(`
--
1.8.3.1

68
backport-Allow-systemd-io-bridge-ioctl-rpm_script_t.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
From 3ecf12ffdad26ee5c6361a7c1e82ba507abdc04f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2022 22:12:03 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow systemd-io-bridge ioctl rpm_script_t
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/3ecf12ffdad26ee5c6361a7c1e82ba507abdc04f
Conflict: NA
The permission to allow systemd-io-bridge ioctl rpm_script_t
with a unix domain stream socket was added to the policy.
It may be required when rpm packages are updated.
Addresses the following AVC denial:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(3.1.2022 01:17:50.921:486) : proctitle=(o-bridge)
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(3.1.2022 01:17:50.921:486) : arch=x86_64 syscall=ioctl success=no exit=ENOTTY(Pro toto zařízení nevhodné ioctl) a0=0x0 a1=TCGETS a2=0x7ffe8195d1e0 a3=0x7f9ea8a35ca0 items=0 ppid=1 pid=2846 auid=sddm uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=(none) ses=4 comm=(o-bridge) exe=/usr/lib/systemd/systemd subj=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(3.1.2022 01:17:50.921:486) : avc: denied { ioctl } for pid=2846 comm=(o-bridge) path=socket:[43260] dev="sockfs" ino=43260 ioctlcmd=TCGETS scontext=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:rpm_script_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=unix_stream_socket permissive=1
Resolves: rhbz#2024489
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/contrib/rpm.if | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
policy/modules/system/init.te | 1 +
2 files changed, 19 insertions(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/contrib/rpm.if b/policy/modules/contrib/rpm.if
index db809c6..190f3e2 100644
--- a/policy/modules/contrib/rpm.if
+++ b/policy/modules/contrib/rpm.if
@@ -957,3 +957,21 @@ interface(`rpm_admin',`
rpm_run($1, $2)
')
+
+## <summary>
+## Allow the specified domain to ioctl rpm_script_t
+## with a unix domain stream socket.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`rpm_script_ioctl_stream_sockets',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type rpm_script_t;
+ ')
+
+ allow $1 rpm_script_t:unix_stream_socket ioctl;
+')
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/init.te b/policy/modules/system/init.te
index 0de5f4a..a81f5da 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/init.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/init.te
@@ -516,6 +516,7 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
rpm_read_db(init_t)
+ rpm_script_ioctl_stream_sockets(init_t)
')
optional_policy(`
--
1.8.3.1

69
backport-Allow-systemd-logind-delete-session_dbusd-tmp-socket.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
From 13c9a34e3e717785cf37706a964294733f6c5b00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2022 19:09:13 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow systemd-logind delete session_dbusd tmp socket files
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/13c9a34e3e717785cf37706a964294733f6c5b00
Conflict: NA
The dbus_delete_session_tmp_sock_files() interface was added.
Addresses the following AVC denial:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(13.1.2022 18:57:09.055:9086) : proctitle=/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-user-runtime-dir stop 1001
type=PATH msg=audit(13.1.2022 18:57:09.055:9086) : item=1 name=bus inode=40 dev=00:3f mode=socket,666 ouid=staff ogid=staff rdev=00:00 obj=staff_u:object_r:session_dbusd_tmp_t:s0 nametype=DELETE cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0
type=PATH msg=audit(13.1.2022 18:57:09.055:9086) : item=0 name=/ inode=1 dev=00:3f mode=dir,700 ouid=staff ogid=staff rdev=00:00 obj=staff_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=PARENT cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(13.1.2022 18:57:09.055:9086) : arch=x86_64 syscall=unlinkat success=yes exit=0 a0=0x3 a1=0x560b86610d9b a2=0x0 a3=0x78 items=2 ppid=1 pid=26510 auid=unset uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=(none) ses=unset comm=systemd-user-ru exe=/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-user-runtime-dir subj=system_u:system_r:systemd_logind_t:s0 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(13.1.2022 18:57:09.055:9086) : avc: denied { unlink } for pid=26510 comm=systemd-user-ru name=bus dev="tmpfs" ino=40 scontext=system_u:system_r:systemd_logind_t:s0 tcontext=staff_u:object_r:session_dbusd_tmp_t:s0 tclass=sock_file permissive=1
Resolves: rhbz#2039671
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/contrib/dbus.if | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
policy/modules/system/systemd.te | 1 +
2 files changed, 19 insertions(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/contrib/dbus.if b/policy/modules/contrib/dbus.if
index 71c77a0..e04af61 100644
--- a/policy/modules/contrib/dbus.if
+++ b/policy/modules/contrib/dbus.if
@@ -883,6 +883,24 @@ interface(`dbus_write_session_tmp_sock_files',`
########################################
## <summary>
+## Delete session_dbusd tmp socket files.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`dbus_delete_session_tmp_sock_files',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type session_dbusd_tmp_t;
+ ')
+
+ delete_sock_files_pattern($1, session_dbusd_tmp_t, session_dbusd_tmp_t)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
## Allow systemctl dbus services
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
diff --git a/policy/modules/system/systemd.te b/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
index 43fffdc..edd4354 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
@@ -364,6 +364,7 @@ optional_policy(`
optional_policy(`
dbus_connect_system_bus(systemd_logind_t)
dbus_system_bus_client(systemd_logind_t)
+ dbus_delete_session_tmp_sock_files(systemd_logind_t)
dbus_manage_session_tmp_dirs(systemd_logind_t)
')
--
1.8.3.1

32
backport-Allow-tlp-read-its-systemd-unit.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
From 6f8f2fbdaa248e9d8967456b79888b4484ca9ad7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 10 Jan 2022 21:51:47 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow tlp read its systemd unit
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/6f8f2fbdaa248e9d8967456b79888b4484ca9ad7
Conflict: NA
A tlp script executes systemctl to get status of the tlp service unit.
Resolves: rhbz#2013451
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/contrib/tlp.te | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/contrib/tlp.te b/policy/modules/contrib/tlp.te
index b9491ee..e2de3b2 100644
--- a/policy/modules/contrib/tlp.te
+++ b/policy/modules/contrib/tlp.te
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ allow tlp_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
allow tlp_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
allow tlp_t self:netlink_generic_socket create_socket_perms;
+allow tlp_t tlp_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms;
+
manage_dirs_pattern(tlp_t, tlp_var_run_t, tlp_var_run_t)
manage_files_pattern(tlp_t, tlp_var_run_t, tlp_var_run_t)
files_pid_filetrans(tlp_t, tlp_var_run_t, { dir file })
--
1.8.3.1

67
backport-Allow-virt_domain-map-vhost-devices.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
From 7a512a8dcaa5b522c6bf3f558fa251b6a77bccf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 7 Jan 2022 18:17:12 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allow virt_domain map vhost devices
Reference: https://gitbub.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/commit/7a512a8dcaa5b522c6bf3f558fa251b6a77bccf0
Conflict: NA
The dev_map_vhost() interface was added.
This commit addresses the following AVC denial:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(12/26/2021 22:21:14.465:1513) : proctitle=/usr/libexec/qemu-kvm -name guest=r9,debug-threads=on -S -object {"qom-type":"secret","id":"masterKey0","format":"raw","file":"/
type=AVC msg=audit(12/26/2021 22:21:14.465:1513) : avc: denied { map } for pid=31328 comm=CPU 0/KVM path=/dev/vhost-vdpa-0 dev="devtmpfs" ino=876 scontext=system_u:system_r:svirt_t:s0:c135,c969 tcontext=system_u:object_r:vhost_device_t:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=0
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(12/26/2021 22:21:14.465:1513) : arch=x86_64 syscall=mmap success=no exit=EACCES(Permission denied) a0=0x0 a1=0x1000 a2=PROT_WRITE a3=MAP_SHARED items=0 ppid=1 pid=31328 auid=unset uid=unknown(107) gid=unknown(107) euid=unknown(107) suid=unknown(107) fsuid=unknown(107) egid=unknown(107) sgid=unknown(107) fsgid=unknown(107) tty=(none) ses=unset comm=CPU 0/KVM exe=/usr/libexec/qemu-kvm subj=system_u:system_r:svirt_t:s0:c135,c969 key=(null)
Resolves: rhbz#2035702
Signed-off-by: lujie54 <lujie54@huawei.com>
---
policy/modules/contrib/virt.te | 1 +
policy/modules/kernel/devices.if | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 19 insertions(+)
diff --git a/policy/modules/contrib/virt.te b/policy/modules/contrib/virt.te
index b14222b..340056b 100644
--- a/policy/modules/contrib/virt.te
+++ b/policy/modules/contrib/virt.te
@@ -969,6 +969,7 @@ dev_rw_infiniband_dev(virt_domain)
dev_rw_dri(virt_domain)
dev_rw_tpm(virt_domain)
dev_rw_xserver_misc(virt_domain)
+dev_map_vhost(virt_domain)
domain_use_interactive_fds(virt_domain)
diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/devices.if b/policy/modules/kernel/devices.if
index f7f8e98..51d9ab4 100644
--- a/policy/modules/kernel/devices.if
+++ b/policy/modules/kernel/devices.if
@@ -5964,6 +5964,24 @@ interface(`dev_rw_inherited_vhost',`
########################################
## <summary>
+## Allow map the vhost devices
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Domain allowed access.
+## </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`dev_map_vhost',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type device_t, vhost_device_t;
+ ')
+
+ allow $1 vhost_device_t:chr_file map;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
## Read and write VMWare devices.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
--
1.8.3.1

27
selinux-policy.spec
View File

@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
Summary: SELinux policy configuration
Name: selinux-policy
Version: 35.5
Release: 8
Release: 9
License: GPLv2+
URL: https://github.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/
@ -90,6 +90,28 @@ Patch6022: backport-Allow-haproxy-get-attributes-of-filesystems-with-ext.patch
Patch6023: backport-Allow-lldpd-connect-to-snmpd-with-a-unix-domain-stre.patch
Patch6024: backport-Allow-admin-userdomains-use-socketpair.patch
Patch6025: backport-Ensure-that-run-systemd-are-properly-labeled.patch
Patch6026: backport-Allow-fcoemon-request-the-kernel-to-load-a-module.patch
Patch6027: backport-Allow-virt_domain-map-vhost-devices.patch
Patch6028: backport-Allow-smbcontrol-read-the-network-state-information.patch
Patch6029: backport-Allow-sssd_kcm-read-and-write-z90crypt-device.patch
Patch6030: backport-Allow-gssproxy-read-and-write-z90crypt-device.patch
Patch6031: backport-Allow-gssproxy-read-write-and-map-ica-tmpfs-files.patch
Patch6032: backport-Allow-gssproxy-access-to-various-system-files.patch
Patch6033: backport-Allow-tlp-read-its-systemd-unit.patch
Patch6034: backport-Allow-sshd-read-filesystem-sysctl-files.patch
Patch6035: backport-Allow-sysadm_t-start-and-stop-transient-services.patch
Patch6036: backport-Allow-administrative-users-the-bpf-capability.patch
Patch6037: backport-Allow-kpropd-get-attributes-of-cgroup-filesystems.patch
Patch6038: backport-Allow-systemd-logind-delete-session_dbusd-tmp-socket.patch
Patch6039: backport-Allow-login_userdomain-create-session_dbusd-tmp-sock.patch
Patch6040: backport-Allow-systemd-coredump-read-and-write-usermodehelper.patch
Patch6041: backport-Allow-systemd-coredump-userns-capabilities-and-root-.patch
Patch6042: backport-Allow-systemd-io-bridge-ioctl-rpm_script_t.patch
Patch6043: backport-Allow-login_userdomain-watch-generic-directories-in-.patch
Patch6044: backport-Allow-login_userdomain-watch-various-files-and-dirs.patch
Patch6045: backport-Allow-login_userdomain-watch-localization-directorie.patch
Patch6046: backport-Allow-login_userdomain-watch-accountsd-lib-directori.patch
Patch6047: backport-Allow-login_userdomain-watch-systemd-logind-PID-dire.patch
Patch9000: add-qemu_exec_t-for-stratovirt.patch
Patch9001: fix-context-of-usr-bin-rpmdb.patch
@ -760,6 +782,9 @@ exit 0
%endif
%changelog
* Tue Sep 13 2022 lujie <lujie54@huawei.com> - 35.5-9
- backport upstream patches
* Fri Sep 2 2022 lujie <lujie54@huawei.com> - 35.5-8
- backport upstream patches