qemu/virtio-snd-add-max-size-bounds-check-in-input-cb-CVE.patch
Jiabo Feng 841956ecbc QEMU update to version 8.2.0-21:
- tests: bump QOS_PATH_MAX_ELEMENT_SIZE again
- softmmu/physmem: fix memory leak in dirty_memory_extend()
- crypto: run qcrypto_pbkdf2_count_iters in a new thread
- hw/audio/virtio-sound: fix heap buffer overflow
- hw/intc/arm_gic: fix spurious level triggered interrupts
- ui/sdl2: set swap interval explicitly when OpenGL is enabled
- target/riscv/kvm: tolerate KVM disable ext errors
- virtio: remove virtio_tswap16s() call in vring_packed_event_read()
- block: fix -Werror=maybe-uninitialized false-positive
- hw/remote/vfio-user: Fix config space access byte order
- hw/loongarch/virt: Fix memory leak
- hw/intc/riscv_aplic: APLICs should add child earlier than realize
- stdvga: fix screen blanking
- ui/gtk: Draw guest frame at refresh cycle
- target/i386: fix size of EBP writeback in gen_enter()
- virtio-net: drop too short packets early
- target/ppc: Fix lxv/stxv MSR facility check
- target/ppc: Fix lxvx/stxvx facility check
- virtio-snd: add max size bounds check in input cb(CVE-2024-7730)

Signed-off-by: Jiabo Feng <fengjiabo1@huawei.com>
(cherry picked from commit e2eb79f1867bb8d8d870e758f06d2a32b3a4fc8a)
2024-11-07 09:49:22 +08:00

62 lines
2.4 KiB
Diff

From 56a588dad8d085a89b24fe2103bd623d4260e02d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Manos Pitsidianakis <manos.pitsidianakis@linaro.org>
Date: Mon, 8 Jul 2024 10:09:49 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] virtio-snd: add max size bounds check in input
cb(CVE-2024-7730)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
cherry-pick from 98e77e3dd8dd6e7aa9a7dffa60f49c8c8a49d4e3
When reading input audio in the virtio-snd input callback,
virtio_snd_pcm_in_cb(), we do not check whether the iov can actually fit
the data buffer. This is because we use the buffer->size field as a
total-so-far accumulator instead of byte-size-left like in TX buffers.
This triggers an out of bounds write if the size of the virtio queue
element is equal to virtio_snd_pcm_status, which makes the available
space for audio data zero. This commit adds a check for reaching the
maximum buffer size before attempting any writes.
Reported-by: Zheyu Ma <zheyuma97@gmail.com>
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2427
Signed-off-by: Manos Pitsidianakis <manos.pitsidianakis@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <virtio-snd-fuzz-2427-fix-v1-manos.pitsidianakis@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
---
hw/audio/virtio-snd.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/hw/audio/virtio-snd.c b/hw/audio/virtio-snd.c
index 137fa77a01..15986af41e 100644
--- a/hw/audio/virtio-snd.c
+++ b/hw/audio/virtio-snd.c
@@ -1274,7 +1274,7 @@ static void virtio_snd_pcm_in_cb(void *data, int available)
{
VirtIOSoundPCMStream *stream = data;
VirtIOSoundPCMBuffer *buffer;
- size_t size;
+ size_t size, max_size;
WITH_QEMU_LOCK_GUARD(&stream->queue_mutex) {
while (!QSIMPLEQ_EMPTY(&stream->queue)) {
@@ -1288,7 +1288,12 @@ static void virtio_snd_pcm_in_cb(void *data, int available)
continue;
}
+ max_size = iov_size(buffer->elem->in_sg, buffer->elem->in_num);
for (;;) {
+ if (buffer->size >= max_size) {
+ return_rx_buffer(stream, buffer);
+ break;
+ }
size = AUD_read(stream->voice.in,
buffer->data + buffer->size,
MIN(available, (stream->params.period_bytes -
--
2.41.0.windows.1