4f059b938c
- hw/loongarch/virt: Fix FDT memory node address width - hw/loongarch: Fix fdt memory node wrong 'reg' - load_elf: fix iterator's type for elf file processing - migration/colo: Fix bdrv_graph_rdlock_main_loop: Assertion `!qemu_in_… - target/i386: no single-step exception after MOV or POP SS - char-stdio: Restore blocking mode of stdout on exit - backends/cryptodev-builtin: Fix local_error leaks - target/loongarch: fix a wrong print in cpu dump - virtio-pci: fix use of a released vector - target/arm: Disable SVE extensions when SVE is disabled - hw/misc/bcm2835_property: Fix handling of FRAMEBUFFER_SET_PALETTE - target/i386: Introduce SapphireRapids-v3 to add missing features - virtio-net: Ensure queue index fits with RSS (CVE-2024-6505) - nbd/server: CVE-2024-7409: Avoid use-after-free when closing server - update io/trace-events. Parameters should remain consistent. - update docs/tools/virtfs-proxy-helper.rst. This place is spelled wrong. - kvm: Add support for CSV2 reboot - target/i386/kvm: Fix the resettable info when emulate Hygon CSV2 guest - target/i386: get/set/migrate GHCB state - target/i386: csv: Add support for migrate VMSA for CSV2 guest - migration/ram: Accelerate the loading of CSV guest's encrypted pages - migration/ram: Accelerate the transmission of CSV guest's encrypted pages - target/i386: csv: add support to load incoming encrypted pages queued in the CMD list - target/i386: csv: add support to queue the incoming page into a list - target/i386: csv: add support to encrypt the outgoing pages in the list queued before. - target/i386: csv: add support to queue the outgoing page into a list - target/i386: csv: Read cert chain from file when prepared for CSV live migration - target/i386: Introduce header file csv.h - migration/ram: Fix calculation of gfn correpond to a page in ramblock - target/i386: sev: Clear shared_regions_list when reboot CSV Guest - migration/ram: Force encrypted status for VGA vram - target/i386: sev: Return 0 if sev_send_get_packet_len() fails - kvm: Add support for userspace MSR filtering and handling of MSR_KVM_MIGRATION_CONTROL. - migration/ram: Force encrypted status for flash0 & flash1 devices. - migration/ram: add support to send encrypted pages - migration: add support to migrate shared regions list - kvm: Add support for SEV shared regions list and KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL. - target/i386: sev: add support to load incoming encrypted page - target/i386: sev: add support to encrypt the outgoing page - target/i386: sev: do not create launch context for an incoming guest - target/i386: sev: provide callback to setup outgoing context - confidential guest support: introduce ConfidentialGuestMemoryEncryptionOps for encrypted VMs - migration.json: add AMD SEV specific migration parameters - doc: update AMD SEV to include Live migration flow - crypto/tlscredspsk: Free username on finalize - hw/nvme: fix leak of uninitialized memory in io_mgmt_recv - hw/display/vhost-user-gpu.c: fix vhost_user_gpu_chr_read() - cvm : Implement command blacklist for cvm security enhancement - crypto: Introduce SM3 hash hmac pbkdf algorithm - virtio-net: Use virtual time for RSC timers - vvfat: Fix bug in writing to middle of file - hw/core/ptimer: fix timer zero period condition for freq > 1GHz - hw/misc: support vpsp Signed-off-by: Jiabo Feng <fengjiabo1@huawei.com>
70 lines
3.0 KiB
Diff
70 lines
3.0 KiB
Diff
From 2da2e7ebea456360cc41881ff2e4a81a03b6d10c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
|
From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
|
|
Date: Thu, 7 May 2020 22:26:17 +0000
|
|
Subject: [PATCH] doc: update AMD SEV to include Live migration flow
|
|
|
|
cherry-picked from https://github.com/AMDESE/qemu/commit/0e2b3d80e3.
|
|
|
|
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: hanliyang <hanliyang@hygon.cn>
|
|
---
|
|
docs/system/i386/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++-
|
|
1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
|
|
|
diff --git a/docs/system/i386/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/docs/system/i386/amd-memory-encryption.rst
|
|
index e9bc142bc1..b7e3f46ff6 100644
|
|
--- a/docs/system/i386/amd-memory-encryption.rst
|
|
+++ b/docs/system/i386/amd-memory-encryption.rst
|
|
@@ -177,7 +177,45 @@ TODO
|
|
Live Migration
|
|
---------------
|
|
|
|
-TODO
|
|
+AMD SEV encrypts the memory of VMs and because a different key is used
|
|
+in each VM, the hypervisor will be unable to simply copy the
|
|
+ciphertext from one VM to another to migrate the VM. Instead the AMD SEV Key
|
|
+Management API provides sets of function which the hypervisor can use
|
|
+to package a guest page for migration, while maintaining the confidentiality
|
|
+provided by AMD SEV.
|
|
+
|
|
+SEV guest VMs have the concept of private and shared memory. The private
|
|
+memory is encrypted with the guest-specific key, while shared memory may
|
|
+be encrypted with the hypervisor key. The migration APIs provided by the
|
|
+SEV API spec should be used for migrating the private pages. The
|
|
+KVM_GET_PAGE_ENC_BITMAP ioctl can be used to get the guest page encryption
|
|
+bitmap. The bitmap can be used to check if the given guest page is
|
|
+private or shared.
|
|
+
|
|
+Before initiating the migration, we need to know the targets machine's public
|
|
+Diffie-Hellman key (PDH) and certificate chain. It can be retrieved
|
|
+with the 'query-sev-capabilities' QMP command or using the sev-tool. The
|
|
+migrate-set-parameter can be used to pass the target machine's PDH and
|
|
+certificate chain.
|
|
+
|
|
+During the migration flow, the SEND_START is called on the source hypervisor
|
|
+to create an outgoing encryption context. The SEV guest policy dictates whether
|
|
+the certificate passed through the migrate-sev-set-info command will be
|
|
+validated. SEND_UPDATE_DATA is called to encrypt the guest private pages.
|
|
+After migration is completed, SEND_FINISH is called to destroy the encryption
|
|
+context and make the VM non-runnable to protect it against cloning.
|
|
+
|
|
+On the target machine, RECEIVE_START is called first to create an
|
|
+incoming encryption context. The RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA is called to copy
|
|
+the received encrypted page into guest memory. After migration has
|
|
+completed, RECEIVE_FINISH is called to make the VM runnable.
|
|
+
|
|
+For more information about the migration see SEV API Appendix A
|
|
+Usage flow (Live migration section).
|
|
+
|
|
+NOTE:
|
|
+To protect against the memory clone SEV APIs are designed to make the VM
|
|
+unrunnable in case of the migration failure.
|
|
|
|
References
|
|
----------
|
|
--
|
|
2.41.0.windows.1
|
|
|