!668 fix CVE-2022-3165 by ui/vnc-clipboard: fix integer underflow in vnc_client_cut_text_ext
From: @bobychen Reviewed-by: @yezengruan Signed-off-by: @yezengruan
This commit is contained in:
commit
17274867fb
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
Name: qemu
|
||||
Version: 6.2.0
|
||||
Release: 52
|
||||
Release: 53
|
||||
Epoch: 10
|
||||
Summary: QEMU is a generic and open source machine emulator and virtualizer
|
||||
License: GPLv2 and BSD and MIT and CC-BY-SA-4.0
|
||||
@ -316,6 +316,7 @@ Patch0303: qom-assert-integer-does-not-overflow.patch
|
||||
Patch0304: pci-expose-TYPE_XIO3130_DOWNSTREAM-name.patch
|
||||
Patch0305: acpi-pcihp-pcie-set-power-on-cap-on-parent-slot.patch
|
||||
Patch0306: hw-display-ati_2d-Fix-buffer-overflow-in-ati_2d_blt-.patch
|
||||
Patch0307: ui-vnc-clipboard-fix-integer-underflow-in-vnc_client.patch
|
||||
|
||||
BuildRequires: flex
|
||||
BuildRequires: gcc
|
||||
@ -828,6 +829,9 @@ getent passwd qemu >/dev/null || \
|
||||
%endif
|
||||
|
||||
%changelog
|
||||
* Fri Oct 21 2022 yezengruan <yezengruan@huawei.com> - 10:6.2.0-53
|
||||
- ui/vnc-clipboard: fix integer underflow in vnc_client_cut_text_ext (CVE-2022-3165)
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Sep 30 2022 wanbo <wanbo13@huawei.com> - 10:6.2.0-52
|
||||
- job.c: add missing notifier initialization
|
||||
- uas: add missing return
|
||||
|
||||
55
ui-vnc-clipboard-fix-integer-underflow-in-vnc_client.patch
Normal file
55
ui-vnc-clipboard-fix-integer-underflow-in-vnc_client.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
|
||||
From d307040b18bfcb1393b910f1bae753d5c12a4dc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Sun, 25 Sep 2022 22:45:11 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] ui/vnc-clipboard: fix integer underflow in
|
||||
vnc_client_cut_text_ext
|
||||
|
||||
Extended ClientCutText messages start with a 4-byte header. If len < 4,
|
||||
an integer underflow occurs in vnc_client_cut_text_ext. The result is
|
||||
used to decompress data in a while loop in inflate_buffer, leading to
|
||||
CPU consumption and denial of service. Prevent this by checking dlen in
|
||||
protocol_client_msg.
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: CVE-2022-3165
|
||||
Fixes: 0bf41cab93e5 ("ui/vnc: clipboard support")
|
||||
Reported-by: TangPeng <tangpeng@qianxin.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell@redhat.com>
|
||||
Message-Id: <20220925204511.1103214-1-mcascell@redhat.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
ui/vnc.c | 11 ++++++++---
|
||||
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/ui/vnc.c b/ui/vnc.c
|
||||
index 6a05d06147..acb3629cd8 100644
|
||||
--- a/ui/vnc.c
|
||||
+++ b/ui/vnc.c
|
||||
@@ -2442,8 +2442,8 @@ static int protocol_client_msg(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len)
|
||||
if (len == 1) {
|
||||
return 8;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ uint32_t dlen = abs(read_s32(data, 4));
|
||||
if (len == 8) {
|
||||
- uint32_t dlen = abs(read_s32(data, 4));
|
||||
if (dlen > (1 << 20)) {
|
||||
error_report("vnc: client_cut_text msg payload has %u bytes"
|
||||
" which exceeds our limit of 1MB.", dlen);
|
||||
@@ -2456,8 +2456,13 @@ static int protocol_client_msg(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (read_s32(data, 4) < 0) {
|
||||
- vnc_client_cut_text_ext(vs, abs(read_s32(data, 4)),
|
||||
- read_u32(data, 8), data + 12);
|
||||
+ if (dlen < 4) {
|
||||
+ error_report("vnc: malformed payload (header less than 4 bytes)"
|
||||
+ " in extended clipboard pseudo-encoding.");
|
||||
+ vnc_client_error(vs);
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ vnc_client_cut_text_ext(vs, dlen, read_u32(data, 8), data + 12);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
vnc_client_cut_text(vs, read_u32(data, 4), data + 8);
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.27.0
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user