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11 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
openeuler-ci-bot
ad740d5fb2
!97 [sync] PR-94: fix CVE-2025-27516
From: @openeuler-sync-bot 
Reviewed-by: @yangyuan32 
Signed-off-by: @yangyuan32
2025-05-12 06:50:54 +00:00
毛焱平
976ca4187a fix CVE-2025-27516
Signed-off-by: 毛焱平 <maoyanping@xfusion.com>
(cherry picked from commit dd652e71027432b20aff41c45539f52bacd16260)
2025-05-12 14:30:33 +08:00
毛焱平
211bb982ae fix CVE-2025-27516
Signed-off-by: 毛焱平 <maoyanping@xfusion.com>
(cherry picked from commit 697c068d944fef4857a410a76e40dab98bd08fe6)
2025-05-12 14:30:33 +08:00
openeuler-ci-bot
077beb6857
!82 fix CVE-2024-56201
From: @jack0240 
Reviewed-by: @yangyuan32 
Signed-off-by: @yangyuan32
2024-12-26 06:35:19 +00:00
JackWei
f5a073ff6c fix CVE-2024-56201 2024-12-26 14:20:11 +08:00
openeuler-ci-bot
dc5e5c2b95
!76 fix CVE-2024-56326
Merge pull request !76 from changtao/openEuler-24.03-LTS
2024-12-26 05:41:05 +00:00
changtao
d3b014d1e0 fix CVE-2024-56326 2024-12-15 08:05:52 +08:00
openeuler-ci-bot
bf97ca7b4d
!47 fix CVE-2024-34064
From: @xuchenc 
Reviewed-by: @dillon_chen 
Signed-off-by: @dillon_chen
2024-05-07 08:32:51 +00:00
xuchenchen
6d3a072dad fix CVE-2024-34064 2024-05-07 10:34:58 +08:00
openeuler-ci-bot
058d08c490
!41 Upgrade package to 3.1.3
From: @tong_1001 
Reviewed-by: @gaoruoshu 
Signed-off-by: @gaoruoshu
2024-01-30 01:45:29 +00:00
shixuantong
68db6bec83 Upgrade package to 3.1.3 2024-01-25 15:42:21 +08:00
9 changed files with 512 additions and 131 deletions

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@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
From d655030770081e2dfe46f90e27620472a502289d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Lord <davidism@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 7 May 2024 10:19:28 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] disallow invalid characters in keys to xmlattr filter
---
Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst | 6 ++++++
Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/filters.py | 21 ++++++++++++++++-----
Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_filters.py | 11 ++++++-----
3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst b/Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst
index 08a1785..f70cacb 100644
--- a/Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst
+++ b/Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst
@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@
.. currentmodule:: jinja2
+- The ``xmlattr`` filter does not allow keys with ``/`` solidus, ``>``
+ greater-than sign, or ``=`` equals sign, in addition to disallowing spaces.
+ Regardless of any validation done by Jinja, user input should never be used
+ as keys to this filter, or must be separately validated first.
+ GHSA-h75v-3vvj-5mfj
+
Version 3.1.3
-------------
diff --git a/Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/filters.py b/Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/filters.py
index c7ecc9b..c73dd89 100644
--- a/Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/filters.py
+++ b/Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/filters.py
@@ -248,7 +248,9 @@ def do_items(value: t.Union[t.Mapping[K, V], Undefined]) -> t.Iterator[t.Tuple[K
yield from value.items()
-_space_re = re.compile(r"\s", flags=re.ASCII)
+# Check for characters that would move the parser state from key to value.
+# https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#attribute-name-state
+_attr_key_re = re.compile(r"[\s/>=]", flags=re.ASCII)
@pass_eval_context
@@ -257,8 +259,13 @@ def do_xmlattr(
) -> str:
"""Create an SGML/XML attribute string based on the items in a dict.
- If any key contains a space, this fails with a ``ValueError``. Values that
- are neither ``none`` nor ``undefined`` are automatically escaped.
+ **Values** that are neither ``none`` nor ``undefined`` are automatically
+ escaped, safely allowing untrusted user input.
+ User input should not be used as **keys** to this filter. If any key
+ contains a space, ``/`` solidus, ``>`` greater-than sign, or ``=`` equals
+ sign, this fails with a ``ValueError``. Regardless of this, user input
+ should never be used as keys to this filter, or must be separately validated
+ first.
.. sourcecode:: html+jinja
@@ -278,6 +285,10 @@ def do_xmlattr(
As you can see it automatically prepends a space in front of the item
if the filter returned something unless the second parameter is false.
+ .. versionchanged:: 3.1.4
+ Keys with ``/`` solidus, ``>`` greater-than sign, or ``=`` equals sign
+ are not allowed.
+
.. versionchanged:: 3.1.3
Keys with spaces are not allowed.
"""
@@ -287,8 +298,8 @@ def do_xmlattr(
if value is None or isinstance(value, Undefined):
continue
- if _space_re.search(key) is not None:
- raise ValueError(f"Spaces are not allowed in attributes: '{key}'")
+ if _attr_key_re.search(key) is not None:
+ raise ValueError(f"Invalid character in attribute name: {key!r}")
items.append(f'{escape(key)}="{escape(value)}"')
diff --git a/Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_filters.py b/Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_filters.py
index f50ed13..d8e9114 100644
--- a/Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_filters.py
+++ b/Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_filters.py
@@ -474,11 +474,12 @@ class TestFilter:
assert 'bar="23"' in out
assert 'blub:blub="&lt;?&gt;"' in out
- def test_xmlattr_key_with_spaces(self, env):
- with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Spaces are not allowed"):
- env.from_string(
- "{{ {'src=1 onerror=alert(1)': 'my_class'}|xmlattr }}"
- ).render()
+ @pytest.mark.parametrize("sep", ("\t", "\n", "\f", " ", "/", ">", "="))
+ def test_xmlattr_key_invalid(self, env: Environment, sep: str) -> None:
+ with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Invalid character"):
+ env.from_string("{{ {key: 'my_class'}|xmlattr }}").render(
+ key=f"class{sep}onclick=alert(1)"
+ )
def test_sort1(self, env):
tmpl = env.from_string("{{ [2, 3, 1]|sort }}|{{ [2, 3, 1]|sort(true) }}")
--
2.27.0

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@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
From 7dd3680e6eea0d77fde024763657aa4d884ddb23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Calum Hutton <calum.hutton@snyk.io>
Date: Thu, 26 Oct 2023 12:08:53 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] xmlattr filter disallows keys with spaces
Reference:https://github.com/pallets/jinja/commit/7dd3680e6eea0d77fde024763657aa4d884ddb23
Conflict:remove CHANGES.rst
---
Jinja2-3.1.2/src/jinja2/filters.py | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++-------
Jinja2-3.1.2/tests/test_filters.py | 6 ++++++
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Jinja2-3.1.2/src/jinja2/filters.py b/Jinja2-3.1.2/src/jinja2/filters.py
index ed07c4c..c7ecc9b 100644
--- a/Jinja2-3.1.2/src/jinja2/filters.py
+++ b/Jinja2-3.1.2/src/jinja2/filters.py
@@ -248,13 +248,17 @@ def do_items(value: t.Union[t.Mapping[K, V], Undefined]) -> t.Iterator[t.Tuple[K
yield from value.items()
+_space_re = re.compile(r"\s", flags=re.ASCII)
+
+
@pass_eval_context
def do_xmlattr(
eval_ctx: "EvalContext", d: t.Mapping[str, t.Any], autospace: bool = True
) -> str:
"""Create an SGML/XML attribute string based on the items in a dict.
- All values that are neither `none` nor `undefined` are automatically
- escaped:
+
+ If any key contains a space, this fails with a ``ValueError``. Values that
+ are neither ``none`` nor ``undefined`` are automatically escaped.
.. sourcecode:: html+jinja
@@ -273,12 +277,22 @@ def do_xmlattr(
As you can see it automatically prepends a space in front of the item
if the filter returned something unless the second parameter is false.
+
+ .. versionchanged:: 3.1.3
+ Keys with spaces are not allowed.
"""
- rv = " ".join(
- f'{escape(key)}="{escape(value)}"'
- for key, value in d.items()
- if value is not None and not isinstance(value, Undefined)
- )
+ items = []
+
+ for key, value in d.items():
+ if value is None or isinstance(value, Undefined):
+ continue
+
+ if _space_re.search(key) is not None:
+ raise ValueError(f"Spaces are not allowed in attributes: '{key}'")
+
+ items.append(f'{escape(key)}="{escape(value)}"')
+
+ rv = " ".join(items)
if autospace and rv:
rv = " " + rv
diff --git a/Jinja2-3.1.2/tests/test_filters.py b/Jinja2-3.1.2/tests/test_filters.py
index 73f0f0b..a184649 100644
--- a/Jinja2-3.1.2/tests/test_filters.py
+++ b/Jinja2-3.1.2/tests/test_filters.py
@@ -474,6 +474,12 @@ class TestFilter:
assert 'bar="23"' in out
assert 'blub:blub="&lt;?&gt;"' in out
+ def test_xmlattr_key_with_spaces(self, env):
+ with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Spaces are not allowed"):
+ env.from_string(
+ "{{ {'src=1 onerror=alert(1)': 'my_class'}|xmlattr }}"
+ ).render()
+
def test_sort1(self, env):
tmpl = env.from_string("{{ [2, 3, 1]|sort }}|{{ [2, 3, 1]|sort(true) }}")
assert tmpl.render() == "[1, 2, 3]|[3, 2, 1]"
--
2.33.0

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@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
From 56a724644b1ad9cb03745c10cca732715cdc79e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sigurd Spieckermann <sigurd.spieckermann@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 26 May 2023 14:32:36 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] fix f-string syntax error in code generation
Reference:https://github.com/pallets/jinja/commit/56a724644b1ad9cb03745c10cca732715cdc79e9
---
Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst | 3 +++
Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/compiler.py | 7 ++++++-
Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_compile.py | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst b/Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst
index f70cacb..b0e9a77 100644
--- a/Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst
+++ b/Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst
@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
.. currentmodule:: jinja2
+- Escape template name before formatting it into error messages, to avoid
+ issues with names that contain f-string syntax.
+ :issue:`1792`, :ghsa:`gmj6-6f8f-6699`
- The ``xmlattr`` filter does not allow keys with ``/`` solidus, ``>``
greater-than sign, or ``=`` equals sign, in addition to disallowing spaces.
Regardless of any validation done by Jinja, user input should never be used
diff --git a/Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/compiler.py b/Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/compiler.py
index ff95c80..1ebdcd9 100644
--- a/Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/compiler.py
+++ b/Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/compiler.py
@@ -1121,9 +1121,14 @@ class CodeGenerator(NodeVisitor):
)
self.writeline(f"if {frame.symbols.ref(alias)} is missing:")
self.indent()
+ # The position will contain the template name, and will be formatted
+ # into a string that will be compiled into an f-string. Curly braces
+ # in the name must be replaced with escapes so that they will not be
+ # executed as part of the f-string.
+ position = self.position(node).replace("{", "{{").replace("}", "}}")
message = (
"the template {included_template.__name__!r}"
- f" (imported on {self.position(node)})"
+ f" (imported on {position})"
f" does not export the requested name {name!r}"
)
self.writeline(
diff --git a/Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_compile.py b/Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_compile.py
index 42a773f..b33a877 100644
--- a/Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_compile.py
+++ b/Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_compile.py
@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
import os
import re
+import pytest
+
+from jinja2 import UndefinedError
from jinja2.environment import Environment
from jinja2.loaders import DictLoader
@@ -26,3 +29,19 @@ def test_import_as_with_context_deterministic(tmp_path):
expect = [f"'bar{i}': " for i in range(10)]
found = re.findall(r"'bar\d': ", content)[:10]
assert found == expect
+
+
+def test_undefined_import_curly_name():
+ env = Environment(
+ loader=DictLoader(
+ {
+ "{bad}": "{% from 'macro' import m %}{{ m() }}",
+ "macro": "",
+ }
+ )
+ )
+
+ # Must not raise `NameError: 'bad' is not defined`, as that would indicate
+ # that `{bad}` is being interpreted as an f-string. It must be escaped.
+ with pytest.raises(UndefinedError):
+ env.get_template("{bad}").render()
--
2.33.0

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@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
From 91a972f5808973cd441f4dc06873b2f8378f30c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lydxn <hlyndon20@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2024 15:09:10 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] sandbox indirect calls to str.format
---
Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst | 3 ++
Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/sandbox.py | 81 +++++++++++++++--------------
Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_security.py | 18 +++++++
3 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst b/Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst
index f70cacb..e043649 100644
--- a/Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst
+++ b/Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst
@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ Released 2024-01-10
- ``xmlattr`` filter does not allow keys with spaces. GHSA-h5c8-rqwp-cp95
- Make error messages stemming from invalid nesting of ``{% trans %}`` blocks
more helpful. :pr:`1916`
+- The sandboxed environment handles indirect calls to ``str.format``, such as
+ by passing a stored reference to a filter that calls its argument.
+ :ghsa:`q2x7-8rv6-6q7h`
Version 3.1.2
diff --git a/Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/sandbox.py b/Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
index 06d7414..dae5a48 100644
--- a/Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
+++ b/Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import typing as t
from _string import formatter_field_name_split # type: ignore
from collections import abc
from collections import deque
+from functools import update_wrapper
from string import Formatter
from markupsafe import EscapeFormatter
@@ -80,20 +81,6 @@ _mutable_spec: t.Tuple[t.Tuple[t.Type, t.FrozenSet[str]], ...] = (
)
-def inspect_format_method(callable: t.Callable) -> t.Optional[str]:
- if not isinstance(
- callable, (types.MethodType, types.BuiltinMethodType)
- ) or callable.__name__ not in ("format", "format_map"):
- return None
-
- obj = callable.__self__
-
- if isinstance(obj, str):
- return obj
-
- return None
-
-
def safe_range(*args: int) -> range:
"""A range that can't generate ranges with a length of more than
MAX_RANGE items.
@@ -313,6 +300,9 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
except AttributeError:
pass
else:
+ fmt = self.wrap_str_format(value)
+ if fmt is not None:
+ return fmt
if self.is_safe_attribute(obj, argument, value):
return value
return self.unsafe_undefined(obj, argument)
@@ -330,6 +320,9 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
except (TypeError, LookupError):
pass
else:
+ fmt = self.wrap_str_format(value)
+ if fmt is not None:
+ return fmt
if self.is_safe_attribute(obj, attribute, value):
return value
return self.unsafe_undefined(obj, attribute)
@@ -345,34 +338,49 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
exc=SecurityError,
)
- def format_string(
- self,
- s: str,
- args: t.Tuple[t.Any, ...],
- kwargs: t.Dict[str, t.Any],
- format_func: t.Optional[t.Callable] = None,
- ) -> str:
- """If a format call is detected, then this is routed through this
- method so that our safety sandbox can be used for it.
+ def wrap_str_format(self, value: t.Any) -> t.Optional[t.Callable[..., str]]:
+ """If the given value is a ``str.format`` or ``str.format_map`` method,
+ return a new function than handles sandboxing. This is done at access
+ rather than in :meth:`call`, so that calls made without ``call`` are
+ also sandboxed.
"""
+ if not isinstance(
+ value, (types.MethodType, types.BuiltinMethodType)
+ ) or value.__name__ not in ("format", "format_map"):
+ return None
+
+ f_self: t.Any = value.__self__
+
+ if not isinstance(f_self, str):
+ return None
+
+ str_type: t.Type[str] = type(f_self)
+ is_format_map = value.__name__ == "format_map"
formatter: SandboxedFormatter
- if isinstance(s, Markup):
- formatter = SandboxedEscapeFormatter(self, escape=s.escape)
+
+ if isinstance(f_self, Markup):
+ formatter = SandboxedEscapeFormatter(self, escape=f_self.escape)
else:
formatter = SandboxedFormatter(self)
- if format_func is not None and format_func.__name__ == "format_map":
- if len(args) != 1 or kwargs:
- raise TypeError(
- "format_map() takes exactly one argument"
- f" {len(args) + (kwargs is not None)} given"
- )
+ vformat = formatter.vformat
+
+ def wrapper(*args: t.Any, **kwargs: t.Any) -> str:
+ if is_format_map:
+ if kwargs:
+ raise TypeError("format_map() takes no keyword arguments")
+
+ if len(args) != 1:
+ raise TypeError(
+ f"format_map() takes exactly one argument ({len(args)} given)"
+ )
+
+ kwargs = args[0]
+ args = ()
- kwargs = args[0]
- args = ()
+ return str_type(vformat(f_self, args, kwargs))
- rv = formatter.vformat(s, args, kwargs)
- return type(s)(rv)
+ return update_wrapper(wrapper, value)
def call(
__self, # noqa: B902
@@ -382,9 +390,6 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
**kwargs: t.Any,
) -> t.Any:
"""Call an object from sandboxed code."""
- fmt = inspect_format_method(__obj)
- if fmt is not None:
- return __self.format_string(fmt, args, kwargs, __obj)
# the double prefixes are to avoid double keyword argument
# errors when proxying the call.
diff --git a/Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_security.py b/Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_security.py
index 0e8dc5c..9c8bad6 100644
--- a/Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_security.py
+++ b/Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_security.py
@@ -171,3 +171,21 @@ class TestStringFormatMap:
'{{ ("a{x.foo}b{y}"|safe).format_map({"x":{"foo": 42}, "y":"<foo>"}) }}'
)
assert t.render() == "a42b&lt;foo&gt;"
+
+
+ def test_indirect_call(self):
+ def run(value, arg):
+ return value.run(arg)
+
+ env = SandboxedEnvironment()
+ env.filters["run"] = run
+ t = env.from_string(
+ """{% set
+ ns = namespace(run="{0.__call__.__builtins__[__import__]}".format)
+ %}
+ {{ ns | run(not_here) }}
+ """
+ )
+
+ with pytest.raises(SecurityError):
+ t.render()
--
2.43.0

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@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
From b428dd9593a26e7191708572f294b24ddd1d156f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: maoyanping <maoyanping@xfusion.com>
Date: Fri, 18 Apr 2025 16:58:20 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] backport-CVE-2025-27516
---
Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst | 3 +++
Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/filters.py | 35 +++++++++++++++--------------------
Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_security.py | 10 ++++++++++
3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst b/Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst
index 2001e3c..af86746 100644
--- a/Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst
+++ b/Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst
@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
.. currentmodule:: jinja2
+- The ``|attr`` filter does not bypass the environment's attribute lookup,
+ allowing the sandbox to apply its checks. :ghsa:`cpwx-vrp4-4pq7`
+
- Escape template name before formatting it into error messages, to avoid
issues with names that contain f-string syntax.
:issue:`1792`, :ghsa:`gmj6-6f8f-6699`
diff --git a/Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/filters.py b/Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/filters.py
index c73dd89..aacb30d 100644
--- a/Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/filters.py
+++ b/Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/filters.py
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import re
import typing
import typing as t
from collections import abc
+from inspect import getattr_static
from itertools import chain
from itertools import groupby
@@ -1399,30 +1400,24 @@ def do_attr(
environment: "Environment", obj: t.Any, name: str
) -> t.Union[Undefined, t.Any]:
"""Get an attribute of an object. ``foo|attr("bar")`` works like
- ``foo.bar`` just that always an attribute is returned and items are not
- looked up.
+ ``foo.bar``, but returns undefined instead of falling back to ``foo["bar"]``
+ if the attribute doesn't exist.
See :ref:`Notes on subscriptions <notes-on-subscriptions>` for more details.
"""
+ # Environment.getattr will fall back to obj[name] if obj.name doesn't exist.
+ # But we want to call env.getattr to get behavior such as sandboxing.
+ # Determine if the attr exists first, so we know the fallback won't trigger.
try:
- name = str(name)
- except UnicodeError:
- pass
- else:
- try:
- value = getattr(obj, name)
- except AttributeError:
- pass
- else:
- if environment.sandboxed:
- environment = t.cast("SandboxedEnvironment", environment)
-
- if not environment.is_safe_attribute(obj, name, value):
- return environment.unsafe_undefined(obj, name)
-
- return value
-
- return environment.undefined(obj=obj, name=name)
+ # This avoids executing properties/descriptors, but misses __getattr__
+ # and __getattribute__ dynamic attrs.
+ getattr_static(obj, name)
+ except AttributeError:
+ # This finds dynamic attrs, and we know it's not a descriptor at this point.
+ if not hasattr(obj, name):
+ return environment.undefined(obj=obj, name=name)
+
+ return environment.getattr(obj, name)
@typing.overload
diff --git a/Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_security.py b/Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_security.py
index 9c8bad6..0a0fddf 100644
--- a/Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_security.py
+++ b/Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_security.py
@@ -189,3 +189,13 @@ class TestStringFormatMap:
with pytest.raises(SecurityError):
t.render()
+
+ def test_attr_filter(self) -> None:
+ env = SandboxedEnvironment()
+ t = env.from_string(
+ """{{ "{0.__call__.__builtins__[__import__]}"
+ | attr("format")(not_here) }}"""
+ )
+
+ with pytest.raises(SecurityError):
+ t.render()
\ No newline at end of file
--
2.33.0

View File

@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
From 3fadee01b712580d811bdd2cb06cd8a1b5ee0821 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Lord <davidism@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Dec 2022 10:39:00 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] update dependencies
---
Jinja2-3.1.2/tests/test_loader.py | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Jinja2-3.1.2/tests/test_loader.py b/Jinja2-3.1.2/tests/test_loader.py
index 04c921d..77d686e 100644
--- a/Jinja2-3.1.2/tests/test_loader.py
+++ b/Jinja2-3.1.2/tests/test_loader.py
@@ -183,6 +183,7 @@ class TestFileSystemLoader:
class TestModuleLoader:
archive = None
+ mod_env = None
def compile_down(self, prefix_loader, zip="deflated"):
log = []
@@ -196,13 +197,14 @@ class TestModuleLoader:
self.mod_env = Environment(loader=loaders.ModuleLoader(self.archive))
return "".join(log)
- def teardown(self):
- if hasattr(self, "mod_env"):
+ def teardown_method(self):
+ if self.archive is not None:
if os.path.isfile(self.archive):
os.remove(self.archive)
else:
shutil.rmtree(self.archive)
self.archive = None
+ self.mod_env = None
def test_log(self, prefix_loader):
log = self.compile_down(prefix_loader)
--
2.33.0

View File

@ -1,18 +1,20 @@
%global _name Jinja2
Name: python-jinja2
Version: 3.1.2
Release: 3
Version: 3.1.3
Release: 5
Summary: A full-featured template engine for Python
License: BSD-3-Clause
URL: http://jinja.pocoo.org/
Source0: https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/source/J/Jinja2/Jinja2-%{version}.tar.gz
Patch1: backport-update-dependencies.patch
Patch2: backport-CVE-2024-22195.patch
BuildArch: noarch
Patch0001: 0001-disallow-invalid-characters-in-keys-to-xmlattr-filte.patch
Patch0002: backport-CVE-2024-56326.patch
Patch0003: backport-CVE-2024-56201.patch
Patch0004: backport-CVE-2025-27516.patch
%description
Jinja2 is one of the most used template engines for Python. It is inspired by Django's
templating system but extends it with an expressive language that gives template authors
@ -65,6 +67,33 @@ popd
%doc Jinja2-%{version}/examples
%changelog
* Fri Apr 18 2025 maoyanping <maoyanping@xfusion.com> - 3.1.3-5
- Type: CVE
- CVE: CVE-2025-27516
- SUG: NA
- DESC: fix CVE-2025-27516
* Thu Dec 26 2024 weihaohao <weihaohao2@huawei.com> - 3.1.3-4
- Type: CVE
- CVE: CVE-2024-56201
- SUG: NA
- DESC: fix CVE-2024-56201
* Thu Dec 26 2024 changtao <changtao@kylinos.cn> - 3.1.3-3
- Type: CVE
- CVE: CVE-2024-56326
- SUG: NA
- DESC: fix CVE-2024-56326
* Tue May 7 2024 xuchenchen <xuchenchen@kylinos.cn> - 3.1.3-2
- Type: CVE
- CVE: CVE-2024-34064
- SUG: NA
- DESC: fix disallow invalid characters in keys to xmlattr filter
* Thu Jan 25 2024 shixuantong <shixuantong1@huawei.com> - 3.1.3-1
- Upgrade package to 3.1.3
* Thu Jan 18 2024 weihaohao <weihaohao2@huawei.com> - 3.1.2-3
- Type:CVE
- CVE:CVE-2024-22195