fix CVE-2024-56326

backport-CVE-2024-56326.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+From 91a972f5808973cd441f4dc06873b2f8378f30c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lydxn <hlyndon20@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2024 15:09:10 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] sandbox indirect calls to str.format
+---
+ Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst            |  3 ++
+ Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/sandbox.py  | 81 +++++++++++++++--------------
+ Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_security.py | 18 +++++++
+ 3 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst b/Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst
+index f70cacb..e043649 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst
++++ b/Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst
+@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ Released 2024-01-10
+ -   ``xmlattr`` filter does not allow keys with spaces. GHSA-h5c8-rqwp-cp95
+ -   Make error messages stemming from invalid nesting of ``{% trans %}`` blocks
+     more helpful. :pr:`1916`
++-   The sandboxed environment handles indirect calls to ``str.format``, such as
++    by passing a stored reference to a filter that calls its argument.
++    :ghsa:`q2x7-8rv6-6q7h`
+ 
+ 
+ Version 3.1.2
+diff --git a/Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/sandbox.py b/Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
+index 06d7414..dae5a48 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
++++ b/Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
+@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import typing as t
+ from _string import formatter_field_name_split  # type: ignore
+ from collections import abc
+ from collections import deque
++from functools import update_wrapper
+ from string import Formatter
+ 
+ from markupsafe import EscapeFormatter
+@@ -80,20 +81,6 @@ _mutable_spec: t.Tuple[t.Tuple[t.Type, t.FrozenSet[str]], ...] = (
+ )
+ 
+ 
+-def inspect_format_method(callable: t.Callable) -> t.Optional[str]:
+-    if not isinstance(
+-        callable, (types.MethodType, types.BuiltinMethodType)
+-    ) or callable.__name__ not in ("format", "format_map"):
+-        return None
+-
+-    obj = callable.__self__
+-
+-    if isinstance(obj, str):
+-        return obj
+-
+-    return None
+-
+-
+ def safe_range(*args: int) -> range:
+     """A range that can't generate ranges with a length of more than
+     MAX_RANGE items.
+@@ -313,6 +300,9 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
+                     except AttributeError:
+                         pass
+                     else:
++                        fmt = self.wrap_str_format(value)
++                        if fmt is not None:
++                            return fmt
+                         if self.is_safe_attribute(obj, argument, value):
+                             return value
+                         return self.unsafe_undefined(obj, argument)
+@@ -330,6 +320,9 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
+             except (TypeError, LookupError):
+                 pass
+         else:
++            fmt = self.wrap_str_format(value)
++            if fmt is not None:
++                return fmt
+             if self.is_safe_attribute(obj, attribute, value):
+                 return value
+             return self.unsafe_undefined(obj, attribute)
+@@ -345,34 +338,49 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
+             exc=SecurityError,
+         )
+ 
+-    def format_string(
+-        self,
+-        s: str,
+-        args: t.Tuple[t.Any, ...],
+-        kwargs: t.Dict[str, t.Any],
+-        format_func: t.Optional[t.Callable] = None,
+-    ) -> str:
+-        """If a format call is detected, then this is routed through this
+-        method so that our safety sandbox can be used for it.
++    def wrap_str_format(self, value: t.Any) -> t.Optional[t.Callable[..., str]]:
++        """If the given value is a ``str.format`` or ``str.format_map`` method,
++        return a new function than handles sandboxing. This is done at access
++        rather than in :meth:`call`, so that calls made without ``call`` are
++        also sandboxed.
+         """
++        if not isinstance(
++            value, (types.MethodType, types.BuiltinMethodType)
++        ) or value.__name__ not in ("format", "format_map"):
++            return None
++
++        f_self: t.Any = value.__self__
++
++        if not isinstance(f_self, str):
++            return None
++
++        str_type: t.Type[str] = type(f_self)
++        is_format_map = value.__name__ == "format_map"
+         formatter: SandboxedFormatter
+-        if isinstance(s, Markup):
+-            formatter = SandboxedEscapeFormatter(self, escape=s.escape)
++
++        if isinstance(f_self, Markup):
++            formatter = SandboxedEscapeFormatter(self, escape=f_self.escape)
+         else:
+             formatter = SandboxedFormatter(self)
+ 
+-        if format_func is not None and format_func.__name__ == "format_map":
+-            if len(args) != 1 or kwargs:
+-                raise TypeError(
+-                    "format_map() takes exactly one argument"
+-                    f" {len(args) + (kwargs is not None)} given"
+-                )
++        vformat = formatter.vformat
++
++        def wrapper(*args: t.Any, **kwargs: t.Any) -> str:
++            if is_format_map:
++                if kwargs:
++                    raise TypeError("format_map() takes no keyword arguments")
++
++                if len(args) != 1:
++                    raise TypeError(
++                        f"format_map() takes exactly one argument ({len(args)} given)"
++                    )
++
++                kwargs = args[0]
++                args = ()
+ 
+-            kwargs = args[0]
+-            args = ()
++            return str_type(vformat(f_self, args, kwargs))
+ 
+-        rv = formatter.vformat(s, args, kwargs)
+-        return type(s)(rv)
++        return update_wrapper(wrapper, value)
+ 
+     def call(
+         __self,  # noqa: B902
+@@ -382,9 +390,6 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
+         **kwargs: t.Any,
+     ) -> t.Any:
+         """Call an object from sandboxed code."""
+-        fmt = inspect_format_method(__obj)
+-        if fmt is not None:
+-            return __self.format_string(fmt, args, kwargs, __obj)
+ 
+         # the double prefixes are to avoid double keyword argument
+         # errors when proxying the call.
+diff --git a/Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_security.py b/Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_security.py
+index 0e8dc5c..9c8bad6 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_security.py
++++ b/Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_security.py
+@@ -171,3 +171,21 @@ class TestStringFormatMap:
+             '{{ ("a{x.foo}b{y}"|safe).format_map({"x":{"foo": 42}, "y":"<foo>"}) }}'
+         )
+         assert t.render() == "a42b&lt;foo&gt;"
++
++
++    def test_indirect_call(self):
++        def run(value, arg):
++            return value.run(arg)
++
++        env = SandboxedEnvironment()
++        env.filters["run"] = run
++        t = env.from_string(
++            """{% set
++                ns = namespace(run="{0.__call__.__builtins__[__import__]}".format)
++            %}
++            {{ ns | run(not_here) }}
++            """
++        )
++
++        with pytest.raises(SecurityError):
++            t.render()
+-- 
+2.43.0
+

python-jinja2.spec

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 Name:           python-jinja2
 Version:        3.1.3
-Release:        2
+Release:        3
 Summary:        A full-featured template engine for Python
 License:        BSD-3-Clause
 URL:            http://jinja.pocoo.org/
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Source0:        https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/source/J/Jinja2/Jinja2-%
 BuildArch:      noarch
 
 Patch0001:      0001-disallow-invalid-characters-in-keys-to-xmlattr-filte.patch 
+Patch0002:      backport-CVE-2024-56326.patch
 
 %description
 Jinja2 is one of the most used template engines for Python. It is inspired by Django's
@@ -64,6 +65,12 @@ popd
 %doc Jinja2-%{version}/examples
 
 %changelog
+* Thu Dec 26 2024 changtao <changtao@kylinos.cn> - 3.1.3-3
+- Type: CVE
+- CVE: CVE-2024-56326
+- SUG: NA
+- DESC: fix CVE-2024-56326
+
 * Tue May 7 2024 xuchenchen <xuchenchen@kylinos.cn> - 3.1.3-2
 - Type: CVE
 - CVE: CVE-2024-34064