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fix CVE-2024-5594

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(cherry picked from commit 383821b950b988c4d3cb236b3fb89d891f8806e9)
This commit is contained in:
Funda Wang 2024-07-20 11:27:43 +08:00 committed by openeuler-sync-bot
parent 30bef67c00
commit 486b1533a0
2 changed files with 368 additions and 1 deletions
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363
CVE-2024-5594.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,363 @@
From 90e7a858e5594d9a019ad2b4ac6154124986291a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org>
Date: Mon, 27 May 2024 15:02:41 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Properly handle null bytes and invalid characters in control
messages
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
This makes OpenVPN more picky in accepting control message in two aspects:
- Characters are checked in the whole buffer and not until the first
NUL byte
- if the message contains invalid characters, we no longer continue
evaluating a fixed up version of the message but rather stop
processing it completely.
Previously it was possible to get invalid characters to end up in log
files or on a terminal.
This also prepares the logic a bit in the direction of having a proper
framing of control messages separated by null bytes instead of relying
on the TLS framing for that. All OpenVPN implementations write the 0
bytes between control commands.
This patch also include several improvement suggestion from Reynir
(thanks!).
CVE: 2024-5594
Reported-By: Reynir Björnsson <reynir@reynir.dk>
Change-Id: I0d926f910637dabc89bf5fa919dc6beef1eb46d9
Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org>
Acked-by: Antonio Quartulli <a@unstable.cc>
Message-Id: <20240619103004.56460-1-gert@greenie.muc.de>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg28791.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
(cherry picked from commit 414f428fa29694090ec4c46b10a8aba419c85659)
---
src/openvpn/buffer.c | 17 ++++
src/openvpn/buffer.h | 11 +++
src/openvpn/forward.c | 121 ++++++++++++++++---------
tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_buffer.c | 109 ++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 215 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/openvpn/buffer.c b/src/openvpn/buffer.c
index 2fab9e43ff4..78a13ef81bd 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/buffer.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/buffer.c
@@ -1113,6 +1113,23 @@ string_mod(char *str, const unsigned int inclusive, const unsigned int exclusive
return ret;
}
+bool
+string_check_buf(struct buffer *buf, const unsigned int inclusive, const unsigned int exclusive)
+{
+ ASSERT(buf);
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < BLEN(buf); i++)
+ {
+ char c = BSTR(buf)[i];
+
+ if (!char_inc_exc(c, inclusive, exclusive))
+ {
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+ return true;
+}
+
const char *
string_mod_const(const char *str,
const unsigned int inclusive,
diff --git a/src/openvpn/buffer.h b/src/openvpn/buffer.h
index cea4af6b398..d988ef256aa 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/buffer.h
+++ b/src/openvpn/buffer.h
@@ -945,6 +945,17 @@ bool string_class(const char *str, const unsigned int inclusive, const unsigned
bool string_mod(char *str, const unsigned int inclusive, const unsigned int exclusive, const char replace);
+/**
+ * Check a buffer if it only consists of allowed characters.
+ *
+ * @param buf The buffer to be checked.
+ * @param inclusive The character classes that are allowed.
+ * @param exclusive Character classes that are not allowed even if they are also in inclusive.
+ * @return True if the string consists only of allowed characters, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool
+string_check_buf(struct buffer *buf, const unsigned int inclusive, const unsigned int exclusive);
+
const char *string_mod_const(const char *str,
const unsigned int inclusive,
const unsigned int exclusive,
diff --git a/src/openvpn/forward.c b/src/openvpn/forward.c
index 29e812ffd17..ce71752469f 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/forward.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/forward.c
@@ -230,6 +230,51 @@ check_tls(struct context *c)
}
}
+static void
+parse_incoming_control_channel_command(struct context *c, struct buffer *buf)
+{
+ if (buf_string_match_head_str(buf, "AUTH_FAILED"))
+ {
+ receive_auth_failed(c, buf);
+ }
+ else if (buf_string_match_head_str(buf, "PUSH_"))
+ {
+ incoming_push_message(c, buf);
+ }
+ else if (buf_string_match_head_str(buf, "RESTART"))
+ {
+ server_pushed_signal(c, buf, true, 7);
+ }
+ else if (buf_string_match_head_str(buf, "HALT"))
+ {
+ server_pushed_signal(c, buf, false, 4);
+ }
+ else if (buf_string_match_head_str(buf, "INFO_PRE"))
+ {
+ server_pushed_info(c, buf, 8);
+ }
+ else if (buf_string_match_head_str(buf, "INFO"))
+ {
+ server_pushed_info(c, buf, 4);
+ }
+ else if (buf_string_match_head_str(buf, "CR_RESPONSE"))
+ {
+ receive_cr_response(c, buf);
+ }
+ else if (buf_string_match_head_str(buf, "AUTH_PENDING"))
+ {
+ receive_auth_pending(c, buf);
+ }
+ else if (buf_string_match_head_str(buf, "EXIT"))
+ {
+ receive_exit_message(c);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ msg(D_PUSH_ERRORS, "WARNING: Received unknown control message: %s", BSTR(buf));
+ }
+}
+
/*
* Handle incoming configuration
* messages on the control channel.
@@ -245,51 +290,41 @@ check_incoming_control_channel(struct context *c)
struct buffer buf = alloc_buf_gc(len, &gc);
if (tls_rec_payload(c->c2.tls_multi, &buf))
{
- /* force null termination of message */
- buf_null_terminate(&buf);
-
- /* enforce character class restrictions */
- string_mod(BSTR(&buf), CC_PRINT, CC_CRLF, 0);
- if (buf_string_match_head_str(&buf, "AUTH_FAILED"))
+ while (BLEN(&buf) > 1)
{
- receive_auth_failed(c, &buf);
- }
- else if (buf_string_match_head_str(&buf, "PUSH_"))
- {
- incoming_push_message(c, &buf);
- }
- else if (buf_string_match_head_str(&buf, "RESTART"))
- {
- server_pushed_signal(c, &buf, true, 7);
- }
- else if (buf_string_match_head_str(&buf, "HALT"))
- {
- server_pushed_signal(c, &buf, false, 4);
- }
- else if (buf_string_match_head_str(&buf, "INFO_PRE"))
- {
- server_pushed_info(c, &buf, 8);
- }
- else if (buf_string_match_head_str(&buf, "INFO"))
- {
- server_pushed_info(c, &buf, 4);
- }
- else if (buf_string_match_head_str(&buf, "CR_RESPONSE"))
- {
- receive_cr_response(c, &buf);
- }
- else if (buf_string_match_head_str(&buf, "AUTH_PENDING"))
- {
- receive_auth_pending(c, &buf);
- }
- else if (buf_string_match_head_str(&buf, "EXIT"))
- {
- receive_exit_message(c);
- }
- else
- {
- msg(D_PUSH_ERRORS, "WARNING: Received unknown control message: %s", BSTR(&buf));
+ /* commands on the control channel are seperated by 0x00 bytes.
+ * cmdlen does not include the 0 byte of the string */
+ int cmdlen = (int)strnlen(BSTR(&buf), BLEN(&buf));
+
+ if (cmdlen < BLEN(&buf))
+ {
+ /* include the NUL byte and ensure NUL termination */
+ int cmdlen = (int)strlen(BSTR(&buf)) + 1;
+
+ /* Construct a buffer that only holds the current command and
+ * its closing NUL byte */
+ struct buffer cmdbuf = alloc_buf_gc(cmdlen, &gc);
+ buf_write(&cmdbuf, BPTR(&buf), cmdlen);
+
+ /* check we have only printable characters or null byte in the
+ * command string and no newlines */
+ if (!string_check_buf(&buf, CC_PRINT | CC_NULL, CC_CRLF))
+ {
+ msg(D_PUSH_ERRORS, "WARNING: Received control with invalid characters: %s",
+ format_hex(BPTR(&buf), BLEN(&buf), 256, &gc));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ parse_incoming_control_channel_command(c, &cmdbuf);
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ msg(D_PUSH_ERRORS, "WARNING: Ignoring control channel "
+ "message command without NUL termination");
+ }
+ buf_advance(&buf, cmdlen);
}
}
else
diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_buffer.c b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_buffer.c
index 92ac77a7879..df1fdcb15ec 100644
--- a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_buffer.c
+++ b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_buffer.c
@@ -259,6 +259,112 @@ test_buffer_gc_realloc(void **state)
gc_free(&gc);
}
+static void
+test_character_class(void **state)
+{
+ char buf[256];
+ strcpy(buf, "There is \x01 a nice 1234 year old tr\x7f ee!");
+ assert_false(string_mod(buf, CC_PRINT, 0, '@'));
+ assert_string_equal(buf, "There is @ a nice 1234 year old tr@ ee!");
+
+ strcpy(buf, "There is \x01 a nice 1234 year old tr\x7f ee!");
+ assert_true(string_mod(buf, CC_ANY, 0, '@'));
+ assert_string_equal(buf, "There is \x01 a nice 1234 year old tr\x7f ee!");
+
+ /* 0 as replace removes characters */
+ strcpy(buf, "There is \x01 a nice 1234 year old tr\x7f ee!");
+ assert_false(string_mod(buf, CC_PRINT, 0, '\0'));
+ assert_string_equal(buf, "There is a nice 1234 year old tr ee!");
+
+ strcpy(buf, "There is \x01 a nice 1234 year old tr\x7f ee!");
+ assert_false(string_mod(buf, CC_PRINT, CC_DIGIT, '@'));
+ assert_string_equal(buf, "There is @ a nice @@@@ year old tr@ ee!");
+
+ strcpy(buf, "There is \x01 a nice 1234 year old tr\x7f ee!");
+ assert_false(string_mod(buf, CC_ALPHA, CC_DIGIT, '.'));
+ assert_string_equal(buf, "There.is...a.nice......year.old.tr..ee.");
+
+ strcpy(buf, "There is \x01 a 'nice' \"1234\"\n year old \ntr\x7f ee!");
+ assert_false(string_mod(buf, CC_ALPHA|CC_DIGIT|CC_NEWLINE|CC_SINGLE_QUOTE, CC_DOUBLE_QUOTE|CC_BLANK, '.'));
+ assert_string_equal(buf, "There.is...a.'nice'..1234.\n.year.old.\ntr..ee.");
+
+ strcpy(buf, "There is a \\'nice\\' \"1234\" [*] year old \ntree!");
+ assert_false(string_mod(buf, CC_PRINT, CC_BACKSLASH|CC_ASTERISK, '.'));
+ assert_string_equal(buf, "There is a .'nice.' \"1234\" [.] year old .tree!");
+}
+
+
+static void
+test_character_string_mod_buf(void **state)
+{
+ struct gc_arena gc = gc_new();
+
+ struct buffer buf = alloc_buf_gc(1024, &gc);
+
+ const char test1[] = "There is a nice 1234\x00 year old tree!";
+ buf_write(&buf, test1, sizeof(test1));
+
+ /* allow the null bytes and string but not the ! */
+ assert_false(string_check_buf(&buf, CC_ALNUM | CC_SPACE | CC_NULL, 0));
+
+ /* remove final ! and null byte to pass */
+ buf_inc_len(&buf, -2);
+ assert_true(string_check_buf(&buf, CC_ALNUM | CC_SPACE | CC_NULL, 0));
+
+ /* Check excluding digits works */
+ assert_false(string_check_buf(&buf, CC_ALNUM | CC_SPACE | CC_NULL, CC_DIGIT));
+ gc_free(&gc);
+}
+
+static void
+test_snprintf(void **state)
+{
+ /* we used to have a custom openvpn_snprintf function because some
+ * OS (the comment did not specify which) did not always put the
+ * null byte there. So we unit test this to be sure.
+ *
+ * This probably refers to the MSVC behaviour, see also
+ * https://stackoverflow.com/questions/7706936/is-snprintf-always-null-terminating
+ */
+
+ /* Instead of trying to trick the compiler here, disable the warnings
+ * for this unit test. We know that the results will be truncated
+ * and we want to test that */
+#if defined(__GNUC__)
+/* some clang version do not understand -Wformat-truncation, so ignore the
+ * warning to avoid warnings/errors (-Werror) about unknown pragma/option */
+#if defined(__clang__)
+#pragma clang diagnostic push
+#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wunknown-warning-option"
+#endif
+#pragma GCC diagnostic push
+#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wformat-truncation"
+#endif
+
+ char buf[10] = { 'a' };
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ ret = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "0123456789abcde");
+ assert_int_equal(ret, 15);
+ assert_int_equal(buf[9], '\0');
+
+ memset(buf, 'b', sizeof(buf));
+ ret = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "- %d - %d -", 77, 88);
+ assert_int_equal(ret, 11);
+ assert_int_equal(buf[9], '\0');
+
+ memset(buf, 'c', sizeof(buf));
+ ret = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "- %8.2f", 77.8899);
+ assert_int_equal(ret, 10);
+ assert_int_equal(buf[9], '\0');
+
+#if defined(__GNUC__)
+#pragma GCC diagnostic pop
+#if defined(__clang__)
+#pragma clang diagnostic pop
+#endif
+#endif
+}
int
main(void)
@@ -289,6 +395,9 @@ main(void)
cmocka_unit_test(test_buffer_free_gc_one),
cmocka_unit_test(test_buffer_free_gc_two),
cmocka_unit_test(test_buffer_gc_realloc),
+ cmocka_unit_test(test_character_class),
+ cmocka_unit_test(test_character_string_mod_buf),
+ cmocka_unit_test(test_snprintf)
};
return cmocka_run_group_tests_name("buffer", tests, NULL, NULL);

6
openvpn.spec
View File

@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
Name: openvpn
Version: 2.6.9
Release: 2
Release: 3
Summary: A full-featured open source SSL VPN solution
License: GPL-2.0-or-later and OpenSSL and SSLeay
URL: https://community.openvpn.net/openvpn
Source0: https://build.openvpn.net/downloads/releases/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
Patch0: openvpn-2.4-change-tmpfiles-permissions.patch
Patch1: CVE-2024-28882.patch
Patch2: CVE-2024-5594.patch
BuildRequires: openssl-devel lz4-devel systemd-devel lzo-devel gcc
BuildRequires: iproute pam-devel pkcs11-helper-devel >= 1.11
BuildRequires: libselinux-devel
@ -125,6 +126,9 @@ fi
%{_mandir}/man5/openvpn-examples.5.gz
%changelog
* Sat Jul 20 2024 Funda Wang <fundawang@yeah.net> - 2.6.9-3
- fix CVE-2024-5594
* Tue Jul 09 2024 zhangxianting <zhangxianting@uninontech.com> - 2.6.9-2
- Fix CVE-2024-28882