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openssl/backport-02-Improve-FIPS-RSA-keygen-performance.patch

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From d2f6e66d2837bff1f5f7636bb2118e3a45c9df61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: slontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Nov 2022 13:20:55 +1000
Subject: [PATCH] Improve FIPS RSA keygen performance.
Reduce the Miller Rabin counts to the values specified by FIPS 186-5.
The old code was using a fixed value of 64.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19579)
---
crypto/bn/bn_prime.c | 11 ++++++++
crypto/bn/bn_rsa_fips186_4.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
include/crypto/bn.h | 2 ++
3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c b/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c
index 560855542f..96eb1b3c34 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c
@@ -250,6 +250,17 @@ int ossl_bn_check_prime(const BIGNUM *w, int checks, BN_CTX *ctx,
return bn_is_prime_int(w, checks, ctx, do_trial_division, cb);
}
+/*
+ * Use this only for key generation.
+ * It always uses trial division. The number of checks
+ * (MR rounds) passed in is used without being clamped to a minimum value.
+ */
+int ossl_bn_check_generated_prime(const BIGNUM *w, int checks, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+ return bn_is_prime_int(w, checks, ctx, 1, cb);
+}
+
int BN_check_prime(const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb)
{
return ossl_bn_check_prime(p, 0, ctx, 1, cb);
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_rsa_fips186_4.c b/crypto/bn/bn_rsa_fips186_4.c
index e3a2ad76af..765ee250e7 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_rsa_fips186_4.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_rsa_fips186_4.c
@@ -48,6 +48,34 @@ const BIGNUM ossl_bn_inv_sqrt_2 = {
BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
};
+/*
+ * Refer to FIPS 186-5 Table B.1 for minimum rounds of Miller Rabin
+ * required for generation of RSA aux primes (p1, p2, q1 and q2).
+ */
+static int bn_rsa_fips186_5_aux_prime_MR_rounds(int nbits)
+{
+ if (nbits >= 4096)
+ return 44;
+ if (nbits >= 3072)
+ return 41;
+ if (nbits >= 2048)
+ return 38;
+ return 0; /* Error */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Refer to FIPS 186-5 Table B.1 for minimum rounds of Miller Rabin
+ * required for generation of RSA primes (p and q)
+ */
+static int bn_rsa_fips186_5_prime_MR_rounds(int nbits)
+{
+ if (nbits >= 3072)
+ return 4;
+ if (nbits >= 2048)
+ return 5;
+ return 0; /* Error */
+}
+
/*
* FIPS 186-5 Table A.1. "Min length of auxiliary primes p1, p2, q1, q2".
* (FIPS 186-5 has an entry for >= 4096 bits).
@@ -97,11 +125,13 @@ static int bn_rsa_fips186_5_aux_prime_max_sum_size_for_prob_primes(int nbits)
* Xp1 The passed in starting point to find a probably prime.
* p1 The returned probable prime (first odd integer >= Xp1)
* ctx A BN_CTX object.
+ * rounds The number of Miller Rabin rounds
* cb An optional BIGNUM callback.
* Returns: 1 on success otherwise it returns 0.
*/
static int bn_rsa_fips186_4_find_aux_prob_prime(const BIGNUM *Xp1,
BIGNUM *p1, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ int rounds,
BN_GENCB *cb)
{
int ret = 0;
@@ -117,7 +147,7 @@ static int bn_rsa_fips186_4_find_aux_prob_prime(const BIGNUM *Xp1,
i++;
BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, i);
/* MR test with trial division */
- tmp = BN_check_prime(p1, ctx, cb);
+ tmp = ossl_bn_check_generated_prime(p1, rounds, ctx, cb);
if (tmp > 0)
break;
if (tmp < 0)
@@ -160,7 +190,7 @@ int ossl_bn_rsa_fips186_4_gen_prob_primes(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *Xpout,
{
int ret = 0;
BIGNUM *p1i = NULL, *p2i = NULL, *Xp1i = NULL, *Xp2i = NULL;
- int bitlen;
+ int bitlen, rounds;
if (p == NULL || Xpout == NULL)
return 0;
@@ -177,6 +207,7 @@ int ossl_bn_rsa_fips186_4_gen_prob_primes(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *Xpout,
bitlen = bn_rsa_fips186_5_aux_prime_min_size(nlen);
if (bitlen == 0)
goto err;
+ rounds = bn_rsa_fips186_5_aux_prime_MR_rounds(nlen);
/* (Steps 4.1/5.1): Randomly generate Xp1 if it is not passed in */
if (Xp1 == NULL) {
@@ -194,8 +225,8 @@ int ossl_bn_rsa_fips186_4_gen_prob_primes(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *Xpout,
}
/* (Steps 4.2/5.2) - find first auxiliary probable primes */
- if (!bn_rsa_fips186_4_find_aux_prob_prime(Xp1i, p1i, ctx, cb)
- || !bn_rsa_fips186_4_find_aux_prob_prime(Xp2i, p2i, ctx, cb))
+ if (!bn_rsa_fips186_4_find_aux_prob_prime(Xp1i, p1i, ctx, rounds, cb)
+ || !bn_rsa_fips186_4_find_aux_prob_prime(Xp2i, p2i, ctx, rounds, cb))
goto err;
/* (Table B.1) auxiliary prime Max length check */
if ((BN_num_bits(p1i) + BN_num_bits(p2i)) >=
@@ -243,11 +274,11 @@ err:
*/
int ossl_bn_rsa_fips186_4_derive_prime(BIGNUM *Y, BIGNUM *X, const BIGNUM *Xin,
const BIGNUM *r1, const BIGNUM *r2,
- int nlen, const BIGNUM *e, BN_CTX *ctx,
- BN_GENCB *cb)
+ int nlen, const BIGNUM *e,
+ BN_CTX *ctx, BN_GENCB *cb)
{
int ret = 0;
- int i, imax;
+ int i, imax, rounds;
int bits = nlen >> 1;
BIGNUM *tmp, *R, *r1r2x2, *y1, *r1x2;
BIGNUM *base, *range;
@@ -317,6 +348,7 @@ int ossl_bn_rsa_fips186_4_derive_prime(BIGNUM *Y, BIGNUM *X, const BIGNUM *Xin,
* The number has been updated to 20 * nlen/2 as used in
* FIPS186-5 Appendix B.9 Step 9.
*/
+ rounds = bn_rsa_fips186_5_prime_MR_rounds(nlen);
imax = 20 * bits; /* max = 20/2 * nbits */
for (;;) {
if (Xin == NULL) {
@@ -346,8 +378,9 @@ int ossl_bn_rsa_fips186_4_derive_prime(BIGNUM *Y, BIGNUM *X, const BIGNUM *Xin,
if (BN_copy(y1, Y) == NULL
|| !BN_sub_word(y1, 1))
goto err;
+
if (BN_are_coprime(y1, e, ctx)) {
- int rv = BN_check_prime(Y, ctx, cb);
+ int rv = ossl_bn_check_generated_prime(Y, rounds, ctx, cb);
if (rv > 0)
goto end;
diff --git a/include/crypto/bn.h b/include/crypto/bn.h
index cf69bea848..4d11e0e4b1 100644
--- a/include/crypto/bn.h
+++ b/include/crypto/bn.h
@@ -95,6 +95,8 @@ int bn_div_fixed_top(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m,
int ossl_bn_miller_rabin_is_prime(const BIGNUM *w, int iterations, BN_CTX *ctx,
BN_GENCB *cb, int enhanced, int *status);
+int ossl_bn_check_generated_prime(const BIGNUM *w, int checks, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ BN_GENCB *cb);
const BIGNUM *ossl_bn_get0_small_factors(void);
--
2.33.0
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