!373 fix CVE-2024-5535
From: @hugel Reviewed-by: @jinlun123123, @zcfsite Signed-off-by: @zcfsite
This commit is contained in:
openeuler-ci-bot
Gitee
commit
bf5ab7245d
1848
Backport-CVE-2024-5535-Add-a-test-for-ALPN-and-NPN.patch
Normal file
1848
Backport-CVE-2024-5535-Add-a-test-for-ALPN-and-NPN.patch
Normal file
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
112
Backport-CVE-2024-5535-Fix-SSL_select_next_proto.patch
Normal file
112
Backport-CVE-2024-5535-Fix-SSL_select_next_proto.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
|
||||
From e86ac436f0bd54d4517745483e2315650fae7b2c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 11:14:33 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] Fix SSL_select_next_proto
|
||||
|
||||
Ensure that the provided client list is non-NULL and starts with a valid
|
||||
entry. When called from the ALPN callback the client list should already
|
||||
have been validated by OpenSSL so this should not cause a problem. When
|
||||
called from the NPN callback the client list is locally configured and
|
||||
will not have already been validated. Therefore SSL_select_next_proto
|
||||
should not assume that it is correctly formatted.
|
||||
|
||||
We implement stricter checking of the client protocol list. We also do the
|
||||
same for the server list while we are about it.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2024-5535
|
||||
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
|
||||
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24716)
|
||||
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 2ebbe2d7ca8551c4cb5fbb391ab9af411708090e)
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
ssl/ssl_lib.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
|
||||
1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
|
||||
index 846c55a..316556c 100644
|
||||
--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
|
||||
+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
|
||||
@@ -2933,37 +2933,54 @@ int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
|
||||
unsigned int server_len,
|
||||
const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- unsigned int i, j;
|
||||
- const unsigned char *result;
|
||||
- int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
|
||||
+ PACKET cpkt, csubpkt, spkt, ssubpkt;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)
|
||||
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)
|
||||
+ || PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt) == 0) {
|
||||
+ *out = NULL;
|
||||
+ *outlen = 0;
|
||||
+ return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * Set the default opportunistic protocol. Will be overwritten if we find
|
||||
+ * a match.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&csubpkt);
|
||||
+ *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
- for (i = 0; i < server_len;) {
|
||||
- for (j = 0; j < client_len;) {
|
||||
- if (server[i] == client[j] &&
|
||||
- memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) {
|
||||
- /* We found a match */
|
||||
- result = &server[i];
|
||||
- status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
|
||||
- goto found;
|
||||
+ if (PACKET_buf_init(&spkt, server, server_len)) {
|
||||
+ while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&spkt, &ssubpkt)) {
|
||||
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) == 0)
|
||||
+ continue; /* Invalid - ignore it */
|
||||
+ if (PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)) {
|
||||
+ while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)) {
|
||||
+ if (PACKET_equal(&csubpkt, PACKET_data(&ssubpkt),
|
||||
+ PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt))) {
|
||||
+ /* We found a match */
|
||||
+ *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&ssubpkt);
|
||||
+ *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt);
|
||||
+ return OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the client list */
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
+ /* This should never happen */
|
||||
+ return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- j += client[j];
|
||||
- j++;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- i += server[i];
|
||||
- i++;
|
||||
+ /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the server list */
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
|
||||
- result = client;
|
||||
- status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
|
||||
-
|
||||
- found:
|
||||
- *out = (unsigned char *)result + 1;
|
||||
- *outlen = result[0];
|
||||
- return status;
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. We use
|
||||
+ * the default opportunistic protocol selected earlier
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.41.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
Name: openssl
|
||||
Epoch: 1
|
||||
Version: 3.0.12
|
||||
Release: 8
|
||||
Release: 9
|
||||
Summary: Cryptography and SSL/TLS Toolkit
|
||||
License: OpenSSL and SSLeay
|
||||
URL: https://www.openssl.org/
|
||||
@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ Patch35: Backport-CVE-2024-4741-Move-the-ability-to-load-the-dasync-engine-i
|
||||
Patch36: Backport-CVE-2024-4741-Further-extend-the-SSL_free_buffers-testing.patch
|
||||
Patch37: Backport-bn-Properly-error-out-if-aliasing-return-value-with-.patch
|
||||
Patch38: Fix-build-error-for-ppc64le.patch
|
||||
Patch39: Backport-CVE-2024-5535-Fix-SSL_select_next_proto.patch
|
||||
Patch40: Backport-CVE-2024-5535-Add-a-test-for-ALPN-and-NPN.patch
|
||||
|
||||
BuildRequires: gcc gcc-c++ perl make lksctp-tools-devel coreutils util-linux zlib-devel
|
||||
Requires: coreutils %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{epoch}:%{version}-%{release}
|
||||
@ -247,6 +249,9 @@ make test || :
|
||||
%ldconfig_scriptlets libs
|
||||
|
||||
%changelog
|
||||
* Wed Jul 3 2024 gengqihu <gengqihu2@h-partners.com> - 1:3.0.12-9
|
||||
- fix CVE-2024-5535
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Jun 25 2024 peng.zou <peng.zou@shingroup.cn> - 1:3.0.12-8
|
||||
- Fix build error for ppc64le
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user