fix CVE-2023-2975 CVE-2023-3446 CVE-2023-3817

This commit is contained in:
zhujianwei 2023-08-08 21:13:53 +08:00 committed by hzero1996
parent f876017322
commit 3e094a3618
8 changed files with 424 additions and 1 deletions

View File

@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
From 8a62fd996cb1c22383ec75b4155d54dec4a1b0ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 7 Jul 2023 14:39:48 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Add a test for CVE-2023-3446
Confirm that the only errors DH_check() finds with DH parameters with an
excessively long modulus is that the modulus is too large. We should not
be performing time consuming checks using that modulus.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21451)
(cherry picked from commit ede782b4c8868d1f09c9cd237f82b6f35b7dba8b)
---
test/dhtest.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/test/dhtest.c b/test/dhtest.c
index 7b587f3cfa..f8dd8f3aa7 100644
--- a/test/dhtest.c
+++ b/test/dhtest.c
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static int dh_test(void)
goto err1;
/* check fails, because p is way too small */
- if (!DH_check(dh, &i))
+ if (!TEST_true(DH_check(dh, &i)))
goto err2;
i ^= DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL;
if (!TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME)
@@ -124,6 +124,17 @@ static int dh_test(void)
/* We'll have a stale error on the queue from the above test so clear it */
ERR_clear_error();
+ /* Modulus of size: dh check max modulus bits + 1 */
+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 1))
+ || !TEST_true(BN_lshift(p, p, OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)))
+ goto err3;
+
+ /*
+ * We expect no checks at all for an excessively large modulus
+ */
+ if (!TEST_false(DH_check(dh, &i)))
+ goto err3;
+
/*
* II) key generation
*/
@@ -138,7 +149,7 @@ static int dh_test(void)
goto err3;
/* ... and check whether it is valid */
- if (!DH_check(a, &i))
+ if (!TEST_true(DH_check(a, &i)))
goto err3;
if (!TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME)
|| !TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME)
--
2.27.0

View File

@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
From 96318a8d21bed334d78797eca5b32790775d5f05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Date: Tue, 4 Jul 2023 17:50:37 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Add testcases for empty associated data entries with AES-SIV
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21384)
(cherry picked from commit 3993bb0c0c87e3ed0ab4274e4688aa814e164cfc)
---
.../30-test_evp_data/evpciph_aes_siv.txt | 31 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 31 insertions(+)
diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph_aes_siv.txt b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph_aes_siv.txt
index a78a49158d..e434f13f41 100644
--- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph_aes_siv.txt
+++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph_aes_siv.txt
@@ -20,6 +20,19 @@ Tag = 85632d07c6e8f37f950acd320a2ecc93
Plaintext = 112233445566778899aabbccddee
Ciphertext = 40c02b9690c4dc04daef7f6afe5c
+Cipher = aes-128-siv
+Key = fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff
+Tag = f1c5fdeac1f15a26779c1501f9fb7588
+Plaintext = 112233445566778899aabbccddee
+Ciphertext = 27e946c669088ab06da58c5c831c
+
+Cipher = aes-128-siv
+Key = fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff
+AAD =
+Tag = d1022f5b3664e5a4dfaf90f85be6f28a
+Plaintext = 112233445566778899aabbccddee
+Ciphertext = b66cff6b8eca0b79f083b39a0901
+
Cipher = aes-128-siv
Key = 7f7e7d7c7b7a79787776757473727170404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f
AAD = 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeffdeaddadadeaddadaffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100
@@ -29,6 +42,24 @@ Tag = 7bdb6e3b432667eb06f4d14bff2fbd0f
Plaintext = 7468697320697320736f6d6520706c61696e7465787420746f20656e6372797074207573696e67205349562d414553
Ciphertext = cb900f2fddbe404326601965c889bf17dba77ceb094fa663b7a3f748ba8af829ea64ad544a272e9c485b62a3fd5c0d
+Cipher = aes-128-siv
+Key = 7f7e7d7c7b7a79787776757473727170404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f
+AAD = 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeffdeaddadadeaddadaffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100
+AAD =
+AAD = 09f911029d74e35bd84156c5635688c0
+Tag = 83ce6593a8fa67eb6fcd2819cedfc011
+Plaintext = 7468697320697320736f6d6520706c61696e7465787420746f20656e6372797074207573696e67205349562d414553
+Ciphertext = 30d937b42f71f71f93fc2d8d702d3eac8dc7651eefcd81120081ff29d626f97f3de17f2969b691c91b69b652bf3a6d
+
+Cipher = aes-128-siv
+Key = 7f7e7d7c7b7a79787776757473727170404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f
+AAD =
+AAD = 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeffdeaddadadeaddadaffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100
+AAD = 09f911029d74e35bd84156c5635688c0
+Tag = 77dd4a44f5a6b41302121ee7f378de25
+Plaintext = 7468697320697320736f6d6520706c61696e7465787420746f20656e6372797074207573696e67205349562d414553
+Ciphertext = 0fcd664c922464c88939d71fad7aefb864e501b0848a07d39201c1067a7288f3dadf0131a823a0bc3d588e8564a5fe
+
Cipher = aes-192-siv
Key = fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfefffffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0
AAD = 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f2021222324252627
--
2.27.0

View File

@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
From 9002fd07327a91f35ba6c1307e71fa6fd4409b7f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2023 15:22:48 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] DH_check(): Do not try checking q properties if it is
obviously invalid
If |q| >= |p| then the q value is obviously wrong as q
is supposed to be a prime divisor of p-1.
We check if p is overly large so this added test implies that
q is not large either when performing subsequent tests using that
q value.
Otherwise if it is too large these additional checks of the q value
such as the primality test can then trigger DoS by doing overly long
computations.
Fixes CVE-2023-3817
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21550)
(cherry picked from commit 1c16253f3c3a8d1e25918c3f404aae6a5b0893de)
(cherry picked from commit 6a1eb62c29db6cb5eec707f9338aee00f44e26f5)
---
crypto/dh/dh_check.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
index aef6f9b1b7..fbe2797569 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
return DH_check_params(dh, ret);
#else
- int ok = 0, r;
+ int ok = 0, r, q_good = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL;
int nid = DH_get_nid((DH *)dh);
@@ -172,6 +172,13 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
goto err;
if (dh->params.q != NULL) {
+ if (BN_ucmp(dh->params.p, dh->params.q) > 0)
+ q_good = 1;
+ else
+ *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE;
+ }
+
+ if (q_good) {
if (BN_cmp(dh->params.g, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
*ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
else if (BN_cmp(dh->params.g, dh->params.p) >= 0)
--
2.27.0

View File

@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
From 00e2f5eea29994d19293ec4e8c8775ba73678598 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Date: Tue, 4 Jul 2023 17:30:35 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Do not ignore empty associated data with AES-SIV mode
The AES-SIV mode allows for multiple associated data items
authenticated separately with any of these being 0 length.
The provided implementation ignores such empty associated data
which is incorrect in regards to the RFC 5297 and is also
a security issue because such empty associated data then become
unauthenticated if an application expects to authenticate them.
Fixes CVE-2023-2975
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21384)
(cherry picked from commit c426c281cfc23ab182f7d7d7a35229e7db1494d9)
---
.../implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c | 18 +++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c b/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
index 45010b90db..b396c8651a 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
@@ -120,14 +120,18 @@ static int siv_cipher(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
return 0;
- if (inl == 0) {
- *outl = 0;
- return 1;
- }
+ /* Ignore just empty encryption/decryption call and not AAD. */
+ if (out != NULL) {
+ if (inl == 0) {
+ if (outl != NULL)
+ *outl = 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
- if (outsize < inl) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
- return 0;
+ if (outsize < inl) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
+ }
}
if (ctx->hw->cipher(ctx, out, in, inl) <= 0)
--
2.27.0

View File

@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
From 1fa20cf2f506113c761777127a38bce5068740eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 16:36:35 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Fix DH_check() excessive time with over sized modulus
The DH_check() function checks numerous aspects of the key or parameters
that have been supplied. Some of those checks use the supplied modulus
value even if it is excessively large.
There is already a maximum DH modulus size (10,000 bits) over which
OpenSSL will not generate or derive keys. DH_check() will however still
perform various tests for validity on such a large modulus. We introduce a
new maximum (32,768) over which DH_check() will just fail.
An application that calls DH_check() and supplies a key or parameters
obtained from an untrusted source could be vulnerable to a Denial of
Service attack.
The function DH_check() is itself called by a number of other OpenSSL
functions. An application calling any of those other functions may
similarly be affected. The other functions affected by this are
DH_check_ex() and EVP_PKEY_param_check().
CVE-2023-3446
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21451)
(cherry picked from commit 9e0094e2aa1b3428a12d5095132f133c078d3c3d)
---
crypto/dh/dh_check.c | 6 ++++++
include/openssl/dh.h | 6 +++++-
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
index 0b391910d6..84a926998e 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
@@ -152,6 +152,12 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
if (nid != NID_undef)
return 1;
+ /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
+ if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (!DH_check_params(dh, ret))
return 0;
diff --git a/include/openssl/dh.h b/include/openssl/dh.h
index b97871eca7..36420f51d8 100644
--- a/include/openssl/dh.h
+++ b/include/openssl/dh.h
@@ -89,7 +89,11 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_dh_kdf_ukm(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **ukm);
# include <openssl/dherr.h>
# ifndef OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
-# define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
+# define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
+# define OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 32768
# endif
# define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024
--
2.27.0

View File

@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
From e648db50d9a63f71cab5cb78424c2932d019a744 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Date: Sun, 23 Jul 2023 14:27:54 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Make DH_check set some error bits in recently added error
The pre-existing error cases where DH_check returned zero
are not related to the dh params in any way, but are only
triggered by out-of-memory errors, therefore having *ret
set to zero feels right, but since the new error case is
triggered by too large p values that is something different.
On the other hand some callers of this function might not
be prepared to handle the return value correctly but only
rely on *ret. Therefore we set some error bits in *ret as
additional safety measure.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21524)
(cherry picked from commit 81d10e61a4b7d5394d08a718bf7d6bae20e818fc)
---
crypto/dh/dh_check.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
index 84a926998e..aef6f9b1b7 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
@@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
/* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ *ret = DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE | DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME;
return 0;
}
--
2.27.0

View File

@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
From 2255f6c74e6c8b702adcf352b04c5d3e6c759745 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2023 15:23:43 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] dhtest.c: Add test of DH_check() with q = p + 1
This must fail with DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE and
with DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME unset.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21550)
(cherry picked from commit ad5d35572695d7b5748b2bd4fb1afaa189b29e28)
(cherry picked from commit 1478ffad3f123550ec1014642d5c880dfbe270ef)
---
test/dhtest.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/test/dhtest.c b/test/dhtest.c
index f8dd8f3aa7..d02b3b7c58 100644
--- a/test/dhtest.c
+++ b/test/dhtest.c
@@ -124,6 +124,15 @@ static int dh_test(void)
/* We'll have a stale error on the queue from the above test so clear it */
ERR_clear_error();
+ if (!TEST_ptr(BN_copy(q, p)) || !TEST_true(BN_add(q, q, BN_value_one())))
+ goto err3;
+
+ if (!TEST_true(DH_check(dh, &i)))
+ goto err3;
+ if (!TEST_true(i & DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE)
+ || !TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME))
+ goto err3;
+
/* Modulus of size: dh check max modulus bits + 1 */
if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 1))
|| !TEST_true(BN_lshift(p, p, OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)))
@@ -135,6 +144,9 @@ static int dh_test(void)
if (!TEST_false(DH_check(dh, &i)))
goto err3;
+ /* We'll have a stale error on the queue from the above test so clear it */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
/*
* II) key generation
*/
--
2.27.0

View File

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
Name: openssl
Epoch: 1
Version: 3.0.9
Release: 1
Release: 2
Summary: Cryptography and SSL/TLS Toolkit
License: OpenSSL and SSLeay
URL: https://www.openssl.org/
@ -23,6 +23,13 @@ Patch11: Backport-Fix-SM4-test-failures-on-big-endian-ARM-processors.patch
Patch12: Backport-Apply-SM4-optimization-patch-to-Kunpeng-920.patch
Patch13: Backport-SM4-AESE-optimization-for-ARMv8.patch
Patch14: Backport-Fix-SM4-XTS-build-failure-on-Mac-mini-M1.patch
Patch15: backport-Add-testcases-for-empty-associated-data-entries-with.patch
Patch16: backport-Do-not-ignore-empty-associated-data-with-AES-SIV-mod.patch
Patch17: backport-Add-a-test-for-CVE-2023-3446.patch
Patch18: backport-Fix-DH_check-excessive-time-with-over-sized-modulus.patch
Patch19: backport-Make-DH_check-set-some-error-bits-in-recently-added-.patch
Patch20: backport-DH_check-Do-not-try-checking-q-properties-if-it-is-o.patch
Patch21: backport-dhtest.c-Add-test-of-DH_check-with-q-p-1.patch
BuildRequires: gcc gcc-c++ perl make lksctp-tools-devel coreutils util-linux zlib-devel
Requires: coreutils %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{epoch}:%{version}-%{release}
@ -223,6 +230,9 @@ make test || :
%ldconfig_scriptlets libs
%changelog
* Tue Aug 08 2023 zhujianwei <zhujianwei7@huawei.com> - 1:3.0.9-2
- fix CVE-2023-2975 CVE-2023-3446 CVE-2023-3816
* Sat Jul 22 2023 wangcheng <wangcheng156@huawei.com> - 1:3.0.9-1
- upgrade to 3.0.9