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backport upstream patches

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This commit is contained in:
Steven.YGui 2021-12-25 18:00:50 +08:00
parent 19aef3bb0e
commit 36a31cca2d
10 changed files with 619 additions and 1 deletions
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31
backport-Avoid-using-undefined-value-in-generate_stateless_co.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
From cf2b1d6f11aa7ec4aa909ff1ecb9bee6892285d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 2021 11:11:29 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Avoid using undefined value in
generate_stateless_cookie_callback
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16381)
---
apps/s_cb.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/apps/s_cb.c b/apps/s_cb.c
index dee1b2e5b4..d066a423de 100644
--- a/apps/s_cb.c
+++ b/apps/s_cb.c
@@ -819,7 +819,9 @@ int generate_stateless_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie,
{
unsigned int temp;
int res = generate_cookie_callback(ssl, cookie, &temp);
- *cookie_len = temp;
+
+ if (res != 0)
+ *cookie_len = temp;
return res;
}
--

31
backport-Fix-NETSCAPE_SPKI_print-function-to-not-assume-NUL-t.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
From 2d0e5d4a4a5d4332325b5e5cea492fad2be633e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Thu, 19 Aug 2021 12:23:38 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Fix NETSCAPE_SPKI_print function to not assume NUL terminated
strings
ASN.1 strings may not be NUL terminated. Don't assume they are.
CVE-2021-3712
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
---
crypto/asn1/t_spki.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/t_spki.c b/crypto/asn1/t_spki.c
index 51b56d0aa9..64ee77eeec 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/t_spki.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/t_spki.c
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ int NETSCAPE_SPKI_print(BIO *out, NETSCAPE_SPKI *spki)
}
chal = spki->spkac->challenge;
if (chal->length)
- BIO_printf(out, " Challenge String: %s\n", chal->data);
+ BIO_printf(out, " Challenge String: %.*s\n", chal->length, chal->data);
i = OBJ_obj2nid(spki->sig_algor.algorithm);
BIO_printf(out, " Signature Algorithm: %s",
(i == NID_undef) ? "UNKNOWN" : OBJ_nid2ln(i));
--

51
backport-Fix-POLICYINFO-printing-to-not-assume-NUL-terminated.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
From 5f54e57406ca17731b9ade3afd561d3c652e07f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 2021 12:31:38 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Fix POLICYINFO printing to not assume NUL terminated strings
ASN.1 strings may not be NUL terminated. Don't assume they are.
CVE-2021-3712
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
---
crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c | 9 ++++++---
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c
index 1d12c89912..861e8455dd 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c
@@ -422,7 +422,8 @@ static void print_qualifiers(BIO *out, STACK_OF(POLICYQUALINFO) *quals,
qualinfo = sk_POLICYQUALINFO_value(quals, i);
switch (OBJ_obj2nid(qualinfo->pqualid)) {
case NID_id_qt_cps:
- BIO_printf(out, "%*sCPS: %s\n", indent, "",
+ BIO_printf(out, "%*sCPS: %.*s\n", indent, "",
+ qualinfo->d.cpsuri->length,
qualinfo->d.cpsuri->data);
break;
@@ -447,7 +448,8 @@ static void print_notice(BIO *out, USERNOTICE *notice, int indent)
if (notice->noticeref) {
NOTICEREF *ref;
ref = notice->noticeref;
- BIO_printf(out, "%*sOrganization: %s\n", indent, "",
+ BIO_printf(out, "%*sOrganization: %.*s\n", indent, "",
+ ref->organization->length,
ref->organization->data);
BIO_printf(out, "%*sNumber%s: ", indent, "",
sk_ASN1_INTEGER_num(ref->noticenos) > 1 ? "s" : "");
@@ -470,7 +472,8 @@ static void print_notice(BIO *out, USERNOTICE *notice, int indent)
BIO_puts(out, "\n");
}
if (notice->exptext)
- BIO_printf(out, "%*sExplicit Text: %s\n", indent, "",
+ BIO_printf(out, "%*sExplicit Text: %.*s\n", indent, "",
+ notice->exptext->length,
notice->exptext->data);
}
--

53
backport-Fix-append_ia5-function-to-not-assume-NUL-terminated.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
From bb4d2ed4091408404e18b3326e3df67848ef63d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 2021 17:58:23 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Fix append_ia5 function to not assume NUL terminated strings
ASN.1 strings may not be NUL terminated. Don't assume they are.
CVE-2021-3712
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
---
crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c | 18 +++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c
index 004ef55df9..513dc68b08 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c
@@ -528,18 +528,26 @@ static int append_ia5(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) **sk, const ASN1_IA5STRING *email
/* First some sanity checks */
if (email->type != V_ASN1_IA5STRING)
return 1;
- if (!email->data || !email->length)
+ if (email->data == NULL || email->length == 0)
+ return 1;
+ if (memchr(email->data, 0, email->length) != NULL)
return 1;
if (*sk == NULL)
*sk = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new(sk_strcmp);
if (*sk == NULL)
return 0;
+
+ emtmp = OPENSSL_strndup((char *)email->data, email->length);
+ if (emtmp == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
/* Don't add duplicates */
- if (sk_OPENSSL_STRING_find(*sk, (char *)email->data) != -1)
+ if (sk_OPENSSL_STRING_find(*sk, emtmp) != -1) {
+ OPENSSL_free(emtmp);
return 1;
- emtmp = OPENSSL_strdup((char *)email->data);
- if (emtmp == NULL || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(*sk, emtmp)) {
- OPENSSL_free(emtmp); /* free on push failure */
+ }
+ if (!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(*sk, emtmp)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(emtmp); /* free on push failure */
X509_email_free(*sk);
*sk = NULL;
return 0;
--

147
backport-Fix-i2v_GENERAL_NAME-to-not-assume-NUL-terminated-st.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
From 174ba8048a7f2f5e1fca31cfb93b1730d9db8300 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 2021 12:24:22 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Fix i2v_GENERAL_NAME to not assume NUL terminated strings
ASN.1 strings may not be NUL terminated. Don't assume they are.
CVE-2021-3712
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
---
crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c | 10 +++++++---
crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
include/crypto/x509.h | 5 +++++
3 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c
index 4dce004101..6e5f9f8b0e 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_alt.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "crypto/x509.h"
#include <openssl/conf.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include "ext_dat.h"
@@ -99,17 +100,20 @@ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_GENERAL_NAME(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
break;
case GEN_EMAIL:
- if (!X509V3_add_value_uchar("email", gen->d.ia5->data, &ret))
+ if (!x509v3_add_len_value_uchar("email", gen->d.ia5->data,
+ gen->d.ia5->length, &ret))
return NULL;
break;
case GEN_DNS:
- if (!X509V3_add_value_uchar("DNS", gen->d.ia5->data, &ret))
+ if (!x509v3_add_len_value_uchar("DNS", gen->d.ia5->data,
+ gen->d.ia5->length, &ret))
return NULL;
break;
case GEN_URI:
- if (!X509V3_add_value_uchar("URI", gen->d.ia5->data, &ret))
+ if (!x509v3_add_len_value_uchar("URI", gen->d.ia5->data,
+ gen->d.ia5->length, &ret))
return NULL;
break;
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c
index 7281a7b917..004ef55df9 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include "e_os.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
#include "crypto/ctype.h"
#include <openssl/conf.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
@@ -34,17 +35,26 @@ static int ipv6_hex(unsigned char *out, const char *in, int inlen);
/* Add a CONF_VALUE name value pair to stack */
-int X509V3_add_value(const char *name, const char *value,
- STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist)
+static int x509v3_add_len_value(const char *name, const char *value,
+ size_t vallen, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist)
{
CONF_VALUE *vtmp = NULL;
char *tname = NULL, *tvalue = NULL;
int sk_allocated = (*extlist == NULL);
- if (name && (tname = OPENSSL_strdup(name)) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (value && (tvalue = OPENSSL_strdup(value)) == NULL)
+ if (name != NULL && (tname = OPENSSL_strdup(name)) == NULL)
goto err;
+ if (value != NULL && vallen > 0) {
+ /*
+ * We tolerate a single trailing NUL character, but otherwise no
+ * embedded NULs
+ */
+ if (memchr(value, 0, vallen - 1) != NULL)
+ goto err;
+ tvalue = OPENSSL_strndup(value, vallen);
+ if (tvalue == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
if ((vtmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*vtmp))) == NULL)
goto err;
if (sk_allocated && (*extlist = sk_CONF_VALUE_new_null()) == NULL)
@@ -67,10 +77,26 @@ int X509V3_add_value(const char *name, const char *value,
return 0;
}
+int X509V3_add_value(const char *name, const char *value,
+ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist)
+{
+ return x509v3_add_len_value(name, value,
+ value != NULL ? strlen((const char *)value) : 0,
+ extlist);
+}
+
int X509V3_add_value_uchar(const char *name, const unsigned char *value,
STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist)
{
- return X509V3_add_value(name, (const char *)value, extlist);
+ return x509v3_add_len_value(name, (const char *)value,
+ value != NULL ? strlen((const char *)value) : 0,
+ extlist);
+}
+
+int x509v3_add_len_value_uchar(const char *name, const unsigned char *value,
+ size_t vallen, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist)
+{
+ return x509v3_add_len_value(name, (const char *)value, vallen, extlist);
}
/* Free function for STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) */
diff --git a/include/crypto/x509.h b/include/crypto/x509.h
index b53c2b03c3..7ffb8abfe7 100644
--- a/include/crypto/x509.h
+++ b/include/crypto/x509.h
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@
*/
#include "internal/refcount.h"
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
/* Internal X509 structures and functions: not for application use */
@@ -284,3 +286,6 @@ int a2i_ipadd(unsigned char *ipout, const char *ipasc);
int x509_set1_time(ASN1_TIME **ptm, const ASN1_TIME *tm);
void x509_init_sig_info(X509 *x);
+
+int x509v3_add_len_value_uchar(const char *name, const unsigned char *value,
+ size_t vallen, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist);
--

42
backport-Fix-potential-double-free.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
From 75a4f263ba9d3ec1e9d55ca5024aee62aec70475 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Todd Short <tshort@akamai.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 2021 09:59:59 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Fix potential double-free
The `sk` variable is assigned to `s->session->peer_chain`.
If `ssl3_digest_cached_records()` were to fail, then `sk` would still be
non-NULL, and subsequently freed on the error return. When the session
is freed, it will then attempt to free `s->session->peer_chain`,
resulting in a double-free (of `sk`).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16309)
(cherry picked from commit 0449702abc95a3af24c049cb02c01ca6a8015cef)
---
ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
index 30d20f1297..d701c46b43 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
@@ -3753,6 +3753,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
s->session->peer_chain = sk;
+ sk = NULL;
/*
* Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
@@ -3767,7 +3768,6 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
* certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
*/
- sk = NULL;
/* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
--

32
backport-Fix-printing-of-PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION-to-not-ass.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
From 23446958685a593d4d9434475734b99138902ed2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 2021 14:02:40 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Fix printing of PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION to not assume NUL
terminated strings
ASN.1 strings may not be NUL terminated. Don't assume they are.
CVE-2021-3712
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
---
crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c
index 3d124fa6d9..98b6ef25e2 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c
@@ -77,7 +77,8 @@ static int i2r_pci(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci,
i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(out, pci->proxyPolicy->policyLanguage);
BIO_puts(out, "\n");
if (pci->proxyPolicy->policy && pci->proxyPolicy->policy->data)
- BIO_printf(out, "%*sPolicy Text: %s\n", indent, "",
+ BIO_printf(out, "%*sPolicy Text: %.*s\n", indent, "",
+ pci->proxyPolicy->policy->length,
pci->proxyPolicy->policy->data);
return 1;
}
--

189
backport-Fix-the-name-constraints-code-to-not-assume-NUL-term.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
From 8393de42498f8be75cf0353f5c9f906a43a748d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 2021 17:08:58 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Fix the name constraints code to not assume NUL terminated
strings
ASN.1 strings may not be NUL terminated. Don't assume they are.
CVE-2021-3712
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
---
crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c
index 2a7b4f0992..cb701c4d84 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c
@@ -63,8 +63,31 @@ ASN1_SEQUENCE(NAME_CONSTRAINTS) = {
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(GENERAL_SUBTREE)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(NAME_CONSTRAINTS)
+
+#define IA5_OFFSET_LEN(ia5base, offset) \
+ ((ia5base)->length - ((unsigned char *)(offset) - (ia5base)->data))
+
+/* Like memchr but for ASN1_IA5STRING. Additionally you can specify the
+ * starting point to search from
+ */
+# define ia5memchr(str, start, c) memchr(start, c, IA5_OFFSET_LEN(str, start))
+
+/* Like memrrchr but for ASN1_IA5STRING */
+static char *ia5memrchr(ASN1_IA5STRING *str, int c)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = str->length; i > 0 && str->data[i - 1] != c; i--);
+
+ if (i == 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return (char *)&str->data[i - 1];
+}
+
/*
- * We cannot use strncasecmp here because that applies locale specific rules.
+ * We cannot use strncasecmp here because that applies locale specific rules. It
+ * also doesn't work with ASN1_STRINGs that may have embedded NUL characters.
* For example in Turkish 'I' is not the uppercase character for 'i'. We need to
* do a simple ASCII case comparison ignoring the locale (that is why we use
* numeric constants below).
@@ -89,20 +112,12 @@ static int ia5ncasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n)
/* c1 > c2 */
return 1;
- } else if (*s1 == 0) {
- /* If we get here we know that *s2 == 0 too */
- return 0;
}
}
return 0;
}
-static int ia5casecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2)
-{
- return ia5ncasecmp(s1, s2, SIZE_MAX);
-}
-
static void *v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval)
{
@@ -337,7 +352,7 @@ static int cn2dnsid(ASN1_STRING *cn, unsigned char **dnsid, size_t *idlen)
--utf8_length;
/* Reject *embedded* NULs */
- if ((size_t)utf8_length != strlen((char *)utf8_value)) {
+ if (memchr(utf8_value, 0, utf8_length) != NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(utf8_value);
return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
}
@@ -536,9 +551,14 @@ static int nc_dns(ASN1_IA5STRING *dns, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
{
char *baseptr = (char *)base->data;
char *dnsptr = (char *)dns->data;
+
/* Empty matches everything */
- if (!*baseptr)
+ if (base->length == 0)
return X509_V_OK;
+
+ if (dns->length < base->length)
+ return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
+
/*
* Otherwise can add zero or more components on the left so compare RHS
* and if dns is longer and expect '.' as preceding character.
@@ -549,7 +569,7 @@ static int nc_dns(ASN1_IA5STRING *dns, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
}
- if (ia5casecmp(baseptr, dnsptr))
+ if (ia5ncasecmp(baseptr, dnsptr, base->length))
return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
return X509_V_OK;
@@ -560,16 +580,17 @@ static int nc_email(ASN1_IA5STRING *eml, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
{
const char *baseptr = (char *)base->data;
const char *emlptr = (char *)eml->data;
+ const char *baseat = ia5memrchr(base, '@');
+ const char *emlat = ia5memrchr(eml, '@');
+ size_t basehostlen, emlhostlen;
- const char *baseat = strchr(baseptr, '@');
- const char *emlat = strchr(emlptr, '@');
if (!emlat)
return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
/* Special case: initial '.' is RHS match */
- if (!baseat && (*baseptr == '.')) {
+ if (!baseat && base->length > 0 && (*baseptr == '.')) {
if (eml->length > base->length) {
emlptr += eml->length - base->length;
- if (ia5casecmp(baseptr, emlptr) == 0)
+ if (ia5ncasecmp(baseptr, emlptr, base->length) == 0)
return X509_V_OK;
}
return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
@@ -589,8 +610,10 @@ static int nc_email(ASN1_IA5STRING *eml, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
baseptr = baseat + 1;
}
emlptr = emlat + 1;
+ basehostlen = IA5_OFFSET_LEN(base, baseptr);
+ emlhostlen = IA5_OFFSET_LEN(eml, emlptr);
/* Just have hostname left to match: case insensitive */
- if (ia5casecmp(baseptr, emlptr))
+ if (basehostlen != emlhostlen || ia5ncasecmp(baseptr, emlptr, emlhostlen))
return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION;
return X509_V_OK;
@@ -601,10 +624,14 @@ static int nc_uri(ASN1_IA5STRING *uri, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
{
const char *baseptr = (char *)base->data;
const char *hostptr = (char *)uri->data;
- const char *p = strchr(hostptr, ':');
+ const char *p = ia5memchr(uri, (char *)uri->data, ':');
int hostlen;
+
/* Check for foo:// and skip past it */
- if (!p || (p[1] != '/') || (p[2] != '/'))
+ if (p == NULL
+ || IA5_OFFSET_LEN(uri, p) < 3
+ || p[1] != '/'
+ || p[2] != '/')
return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
hostptr = p + 3;
@@ -612,13 +639,13 @@ static int nc_uri(ASN1_IA5STRING *uri, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
/* Look for a port indicator as end of hostname first */
- p = strchr(hostptr, ':');
+ p = ia5memchr(uri, hostptr, ':');
/* Otherwise look for trailing slash */
- if (!p)
- p = strchr(hostptr, '/');
+ if (p == NULL)
+ p = ia5memchr(uri, hostptr, '/');
- if (!p)
- hostlen = strlen(hostptr);
+ if (p == NULL)
+ hostlen = IA5_OFFSET_LEN(uri, hostptr);
else
hostlen = p - hostptr;
@@ -626,7 +653,7 @@ static int nc_uri(ASN1_IA5STRING *uri, ASN1_IA5STRING *base)
return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX;
/* Special case: initial '.' is RHS match */
- if (*baseptr == '.') {
+ if (base->length > 0 && *baseptr == '.') {
if (hostlen > base->length) {
p = hostptr + hostlen - base->length;
if (ia5ncasecmp(p, baseptr, base->length) == 0)
--

30
backport-pkcs12-check-for-zero-length-digest-to-avoid-divisio.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
From 9d868840b821fddf895e3bf6b589ecf6be7b1b13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pauli <pauli@openssl.org>
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 2021 13:19:32 +1000
Subject: [PATCH] pkcs12: check for zero length digest to avoid division by
zero
Fixes #16331
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16333)
---
crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c
index ab31a61295..b814f79216 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ int PKCS12_key_gen_uni(unsigned char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt,
#endif
v = EVP_MD_block_size(md_type);
u = EVP_MD_size(md_type);
- if (u < 0 || v <= 0)
+ if (u <= 0 || v <= 0)
goto err;
D = OPENSSL_malloc(v);
Ai = OPENSSL_malloc(u);
--

14
openssl.spec
View File

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
Name: openssl Name: openssl
Epoch: 1 Epoch: 1
Version: 1.1.1f Version: 1.1.1f
Release: 8 Release: 9
Summary: Cryptography and SSL/TLS Toolkit Summary: Cryptography and SSL/TLS Toolkit
License: OpenSSL and SSLeay License: OpenSSL and SSLeay
URL: https://www.openssl.org/ URL: https://www.openssl.org/
@ -26,6 +26,15 @@ Patch15: CVE-2021-3711-0003-Extend-tests-for-SM2-decryption.patch
Patch16: CVE-2021-3712-0001-Fix-a-read-buffer-overrun-in-X509_aux_print.patch Patch16: CVE-2021-3712-0001-Fix-a-read-buffer-overrun-in-X509_aux_print.patch
Patch17: CVE-2021-3712-0002-Fix-EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters-to-check-the-base.patch Patch17: CVE-2021-3712-0002-Fix-EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters-to-check-the-base.patch
Patch18: bugfix-Don-t-Overflow-when-printing-Thawte-Strong-Extranet-.patch Patch18: bugfix-Don-t-Overflow-when-printing-Thawte-Strong-Extranet-.patch
Patch19: backport-Avoid-using-undefined-value-in-generate_stateless_co.patch
Patch20: backport-Fix-append_ia5-function-to-not-assume-NUL-terminated.patch
Patch21: backport-Fix-i2v_GENERAL_NAME-to-not-assume-NUL-terminated-st.patch
Patch22: backport-Fix-NETSCAPE_SPKI_print-function-to-not-assume-NUL-t.patch
Patch23: backport-Fix-POLICYINFO-printing-to-not-assume-NUL-terminated.patch
Patch24: backport-Fix-potential-double-free.patch
Patch25: backport-Fix-printing-of-PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION-to-not-ass.patch
Patch26: backport-Fix-the-name-constraints-code-to-not-assume-NUL-term.patch
Patch27: backport-pkcs12-check-for-zero-length-digest-to-avoid-divisio.patch
BuildRequires: gcc perl make lksctp-tools-devel coreutils util-linux zlib-devel BuildRequires: gcc perl make lksctp-tools-devel coreutils util-linux zlib-devel
@ -202,6 +211,9 @@ make test || :
%{_pkgdocdir}/html/ %{_pkgdocdir}/html/
%changelog %changelog
* Sat Dec 25 2021 steven_ygui <steven_ygui@163.com> - 1:1.1.1f-9
- backport upstream patches
* Fri Sep 24 2021 openEuler Buildteam <buildteam@openeuler.org> - 1:1.1.1f-8 * Fri Sep 24 2021 openEuler Buildteam <buildteam@openeuler.org> - 1:1.1.1f-8
- bugfix Overflow when printing Thawte Strong Extranet - bugfix Overflow when printing Thawte Strong Extranet