backport-CVE-2021-36368-added-option-to-disable-trivial-auth.patch

@@ -1,220 +0,0 @@
-Conflict:NA
-Reference:https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/258/files
-
----
- readconf.c    | 11 ++++++++++-
- readconf.h    |  2 ++
- scp.1         |  1 +
- sftp.1        |  1 +
- ssh.1         |  1 +
- ssh_config    |  1 +
- ssh_config.5  |  7 +++++++
- sshconnect2.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
- 8 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
-index d25f983..45c1c22 100644
---- a/readconf.c
-+++ b/readconf.c
-@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	oLogFacility, oLogLevel, oLogVerbose, oCiphers, oMacs,
- 	oPubkeyAuthentication,
- 	oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveDevices, oHostKeyAlias,
--	oDynamicForward, oPreferredAuthentications, oHostbasedAuthentication,
-+	oDynamicForward, oPreferredAuthentications, oHostbasedAuthentication, oDisableTrivialAuth,
- 	oHostKeyAlgorithms, oBindAddress, oBindInterface, oPKCS11Provider,
- 	oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
- 	oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
-@@ -250,6 +250,7 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "pubkeyauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication },
- 	{ "dsaauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication },		    /* alias */
- 	{ "hostbasedauthentication", oHostbasedAuthentication },
-+	{ "disabletrivialauth", oDisableTrivialAuth},
- 	{ "identityfile", oIdentityFile },
- 	{ "identityfile2", oIdentityFile },			/* obsolete */
- 	{ "identitiesonly", oIdentitiesOnly },
-@@ -1124,6 +1125,10 @@ parse_time:
- 		intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication;
- 		goto parse_flag;
- 
-+	case oDisableTrivialAuth:
-+		intptr = &options->disable_trivial_auth;
-+		goto parse_flag;
-+
- 	case oGssAuthentication:
- 		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
- 		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -2392,6 +2397,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
- 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- 	options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
- 	options->hostbased_authentication = -1;
-+	options->disable_trivial_auth = -1;
- 	options->batch_mode = -1;
- 	options->check_host_ip = -1;
- 	options->strict_host_key_checking = -1;
-@@ -2562,6 +2568,8 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
- 		options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
- 	if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1)
- 		options->hostbased_authentication = 0;
-+	if (options->disable_trivial_auth == -1)
-+		options->disable_trivial_auth = 0;
- 	if (options->batch_mode == -1)
- 		options->batch_mode = 0;
- 	if (options->check_host_ip == -1)
-@@ -3362,6 +3370,7 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host)
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oHashKnownHosts, o->hash_known_hosts);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication);
-+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oDisableTrivialAuth, o->disable_trivial_auth);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oIdentitiesOnly, o->identities_only);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, o->kbd_interactive_authentication);
- 	dump_cfg_fmtint(oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, o->no_host_authentication_for_localhost);
-diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
-index 00895ad..b391bd6 100644
---- a/readconf.h
-+++ b/readconf.h
-@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ typedef struct {
- 	struct ForwardOptions fwd_opts;	/* forwarding options */
- 	int     pubkey_authentication;	/* Try ssh2 pubkey authentication. */
- 	int     hostbased_authentication;	/* ssh2's rhosts_rsa */
-+
-+	int 	disable_trivial_auth; /* disable trivial authentications */
- 	int     gss_authentication;	/* Try GSS authentication */
- 	int     gss_keyex;		/* Try GSS key exchange */
- 	int     gss_deleg_creds;	/* Delegate GSS credentials */
-diff --git a/scp.1 b/scp.1
-index 874c5c2..e1f8191 100644
---- a/scp.1
-+++ b/scp.1
-@@ -187,6 +187,7 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
- .It Host
- .It HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
- .It HostbasedAuthentication
-+.It DisableTrivialAuth
- .It HostKeyAlgorithms
- .It HostKeyAlias
- .It Hostname
-diff --git a/sftp.1 b/sftp.1
-index 7eebeea..89b6773 100644
---- a/sftp.1
-+++ b/sftp.1
-@@ -247,6 +247,7 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
- .It Host
- .It HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
- .It HostbasedAuthentication
-+.It DisableTrivialAuth
- .It HostKeyAlgorithms
- .It HostKeyAlias
- .It Hostname
-diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
-index 975ab39..1cb8d5c 100644
---- a/ssh.1
-+++ b/ssh.1
-@@ -541,6 +541,7 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
- .It Host
- .It HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
- .It HostbasedAuthentication
-+.It DisableTrivialAuth
- .It HostKeyAlgorithms
- .It HostKeyAlias
- .It Hostname
-diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
-index b3a4922..169f30c 100644
---- a/ssh_config
-+++ b/ssh_config
-@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
- #   ForwardX11 no
- #   PasswordAuthentication yes
- #   HostbasedAuthentication no
-+#   DisableTrivialAuth no
- #   GSSAPIAuthentication no
- #   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
- #   GSSAPIKeyExchange no
-diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
-index 6735401..fd82e05 100644
---- a/ssh_config.5
-+++ b/ssh_config.5
-@@ -955,6 +955,13 @@ The argument must be
- or
- .Cm no
- (the default).
-+.It Cm DisableTrivialAuth
-+Disables trivial or incomplete authentications.
-+The argument must be
-+.Cm yes
-+or
-+.Cm no
-+(the default).
- .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
- Specifies the host key signature algorithms
- that the client wants to use in order of preference.
-diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
-index e90eb89..150d419 100644
---- a/sshconnect2.c
-+++ b/sshconnect2.c
-@@ -403,6 +403,7 @@ struct identity {
- TAILQ_HEAD(idlist, identity);
- 
- struct cauthctxt {
-+	int is_trivial_auth;
- 	const char *server_user;
- 	const char *local_user;
- 	const char *host;
-@@ -531,6 +532,7 @@ ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user,
- 	/* setup authentication context */
- 	memset(&authctxt, 0, sizeof(authctxt));
- 	authctxt.server_user = server_user;
-+	authctxt.is_trivial_auth = 1;
- 	authctxt.local_user = local_user;
- 	authctxt.host = host;
- 	authctxt.service = "ssh-connection";		/* service name */
-@@ -570,6 +572,10 @@ ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user,
- 
- 	if (!authctxt.success)
- 		fatal("Authentication failed.");
-+	if (authctxt.is_trivial_auth == 1 && options.disable_trivial_auth == 1) {
-+		fatal("Trivial authentication disabled.");
-+	}
-+	debug("Authentication succeeded (%s).", authctxt.method->name);
- 	if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
- 		verbose("Authenticated to %s ([%s]:%d) using \"%s\".", host,
- 		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
-@@ -968,6 +974,7 @@ process_gssapi_token(struct ssh *ssh, gss_buffer_t recv_tok)
- 			fatal_fr(r, "send %u packet", type);
- 
- 		gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok);
-+		authctxt->is_trivial_auth = 0;
- 	}
- 
- 	if (status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
-@@ -1213,6 +1220,7 @@ static int
- userauth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh)
- {
- 	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
-+	authctxt->is_trivial_auth = 0;
- 	char *password, *prompt = NULL;
- 	const char *host = options.host_key_alias ?  options.host_key_alias :
- 	    authctxt->host;
-@@ -2023,8 +2031,10 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
- 				id->isprivate = 0;
- 			}
- 		}
--		if (sent)
-+		if (sent) {
-+			authctxt->is_trivial_auth = 0;
- 			return (sent);
-+		}
- 	}
- 	return (0);
- }
-@@ -2105,6 +2115,7 @@ input_userauth_info_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
- 
- 	debug2_f("num_prompts %d", num_prompts);
- 	for (i = 0; i < num_prompts; i++) {
-+		authctxt->is_trivial_auth = 0;
- 		if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &prompt, NULL)) != 0 ||
- 		    (r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &echo)) != 0)
- 			goto out;
--- 
-2.27.0
-

backport-CVE-2023-51384-upstream-apply-destination-constraints-to-all-p11-ke.patch

@@ -1,174 +0,0 @@
-From 881d9c6af9da4257c69c327c4e2f1508b2fa754b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 14:46:12 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] upstream: apply destination constraints to all p11 keys
-
-Previously applied only to the first key returned from each token.
-
-ok markus@
-
-OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 36df3afb8eb94eec6b2541f063d0d164ef8b488d
-
-Reference:https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/881d9c6af9da4257c69c327c4e2f1508b2fa754b
----
- ssh-agent.c | 105 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
- 1 file changed, 100 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
-index f52861163..1d4c321eb 100644
---- a/ssh-agent.c
-+++ b/ssh-agent.c
-@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
--/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.297 2023/03/09 21:06:24 jcs Exp $ */
-+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.301 2023/12/18 14:46:12 djm Exp $ */
- /*
-  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
-  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
-@@ -247,6 +247,91 @@ free_dest_constraints(struct dest_constraint *dcs, size_t ndcs)
- 	free(dcs);
- }
- 
-+static void
-+dup_dest_constraint_hop(const struct dest_constraint_hop *dch,
-+    struct dest_constraint_hop *out)
-+{
-+	u_int i;
-+	int r;
-+
-+	out->user = dch->user == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(dch->user);
-+	out->hostname = dch->hostname == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(dch->hostname);
-+	out->is_ca = dch->is_ca;
-+	out->nkeys = dch->nkeys;
-+	out->keys = out->nkeys == 0 ? NULL :
-+	    xcalloc(out->nkeys, sizeof(*out->keys));
-+	out->key_is_ca = out->nkeys == 0 ? NULL :
-+	    xcalloc(out->nkeys, sizeof(*out->key_is_ca));
-+	for (i = 0; i < dch->nkeys; i++) {
-+		if (dch->keys[i] != NULL &&
-+		    (r = sshkey_from_private(dch->keys[i],
-+		    &(out->keys[i]))) != 0)
-+			fatal_fr(r, "copy key");
-+		out->key_is_ca[i] = dch->key_is_ca[i];
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+static struct dest_constraint *
-+dup_dest_constraints(const struct dest_constraint *dcs, size_t ndcs)
-+{
-+	size_t i;
-+	struct dest_constraint *ret;
-+
-+	if (ndcs == 0)
-+		return NULL;
-+	ret = xcalloc(ndcs, sizeof(*ret));
-+	for (i = 0; i < ndcs; i++) {
-+		dup_dest_constraint_hop(&dcs[i].from, &ret[i].from);
-+		dup_dest_constraint_hop(&dcs[i].to, &ret[i].to);
-+	}
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG_CONSTRAINTS
-+static void
-+dump_dest_constraint_hop(const struct dest_constraint_hop *dch)
-+{
-+	u_int i;
-+	char *fp;
-+
-+	debug_f("user %s hostname %s is_ca %d nkeys %u",
-+	    dch->user == NULL ? "(null)" : dch->user,
-+	    dch->hostname == NULL ? "(null)" : dch->hostname,
-+	    dch->is_ca, dch->nkeys);
-+	for (i = 0; i < dch->nkeys; i++) {
-+		fp = NULL;
-+		if (dch->keys[i] != NULL &&
-+		    (fp = sshkey_fingerprint(dch->keys[i],
-+		    SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
-+			fatal_f("fingerprint failed");
-+		debug_f("key %u/%u: %s%s%s key_is_ca %d", i, dch->nkeys,
-+		    dch->keys[i] == NULL ? "" : sshkey_ssh_name(dch->keys[i]),
-+		    dch->keys[i] == NULL ? "" : " ",
-+		    dch->keys[i] == NULL ? "none" : fp,
-+		    dch->key_is_ca[i]);
-+		free(fp);
-+	}
-+}
-+#endif /* DEBUG_CONSTRAINTS */
-+
-+static void
-+dump_dest_constraints(const char *context,
-+    const struct dest_constraint *dcs, size_t ndcs)
-+{
-+#ifdef DEBUG_CONSTRAINTS
-+	size_t i;
-+
-+	debug_f("%s: %zu constraints", context, ndcs);
-+	for (i = 0; i < ndcs; i++) {
-+		debug_f("constraint %zu / %zu: from: ", i, ndcs);
-+		dump_dest_constraint_hop(&dcs[i].from);
-+		debug_f("constraint %zu / %zu: to: ", i, ndcs);
-+		dump_dest_constraint_hop(&dcs[i].to);
-+	}
-+	debug_f("done for %s", context);
-+#endif /* DEBUG_CONSTRAINTS */
-+}
-+
- static void
- free_identity(Identity *id)
- {
-@@ -518,13 +603,22 @@ process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e)
- 	Identity *id;
- 	struct sshbuf *msg, *keys;
- 	int r;
--	u_int nentries = 0;
-+	u_int i = 0, nentries = 0;
-+	char *fp;
- 
- 	debug2_f("entering");
- 
- 	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (keys = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
- 	TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &idtab->idlist, next) {
-+		if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
-+		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
-+			fatal_f("fingerprint failed");
-+		debug_f("key %u / %u: %s %s", i++, idtab->nentries,
-+		    sshkey_ssh_name(id->key), fp);
-+		dump_dest_constraints(__func__,
-+		    id->dest_constraints, id->ndest_constraints);
-+		free(fp);
- 		/* identity not visible, don't include in response */
- 		if (identity_permitted(id, e, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 0)
- 			continue;
-@@ -1224,6 +1318,7 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e)
- 		sshbuf_reset(e->request);
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+	dump_dest_constraints(__func__, dest_constraints, ndest_constraints);
- 
- 	if (sk_provider != NULL) {
- 		if (!sshkey_is_sk(k)) {
-@@ -1403,6 +1498,7 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
- 		error_f("failed to parse constraints");
- 		goto send;
- 	}
-+	dump_dest_constraints(__func__, dest_constraints, ndest_constraints);
- 	if (e->nsession_ids != 0 && !remote_add_provider) {
- 		verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": remote addition of "
- 		    "providers is disabled", provider);
-@@ -1438,10 +1534,9 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
- 			}
- 			id->death = death;
- 			id->confirm = confirm;
--			id->dest_constraints = dest_constraints;
-+			id->dest_constraints = dup_dest_constraints(
-+			    dest_constraints, ndest_constraints);
- 			id->ndest_constraints = ndest_constraints;
--			dest_constraints = NULL; /* transferred */
--			ndest_constraints = 0;
- 			TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
- 			idtab->nentries++;
- 			success = 1;
--- 
-2.33.0
-

backport-fix-CVE-2024-6387.patch

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-Reference:https://www.qualys.com/2024/07/01/cve-2024-6387/regresshion.txt
-Conflict:NA
----
- log.c | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/log.c b/log.c
-index dca08e4..5ca403a 100644
---- a/log.c
-+++ b/log.c
-@@ -458,12 +458,14 @@ void
- sshsigdie(const char *file, const char *func, int line, int showfunc,
-     LogLevel level, const char *suffix, const char *fmt, ...)
- {
-+#if 0
- 	va_list args;
- 
- 	va_start(args, fmt);
- 	sshlogv(file, func, line, showfunc, SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL,
- 	    suffix, fmt, args);
- 	va_end(args);
-+#endif
- 	_exit(1);
- }
- 
--- 
-2.33.0
-

backport-fix-CVE-2025-26465.patch

@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
-From 0832aac79517611dd4de93ad0a83577994d9c907 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2025 08:02:48 +0000
-Subject: upstream: Fix cases where error codes were not correctly set
-
-Reported by the Qualys Security Advisory team. ok markus@
-
-OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7bcd4ffe0fa1e27ff98d451fb9c22f5fae6e610d
-Conflict:NA
-Reference:https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=0832aac79517611dd4de93ad0a83577994d9c907
----
- krl.c           | 2 ++
- ssh-agent.c     | 3 +++
- ssh-sk-client.c | 2 ++
- sshconnect2.c   | 5 ++++-
- sshsig.c        | 1 +
- 5 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c
-index 8d6dec2..ce640b5 100644
---- a/krl.c
-+++ b/krl.c
-@@ -675,6 +675,7 @@ revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, struct sshbuf *buf)
- 			break;
- 		case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
- 			if (rs->lo - bitmap_start > INT_MAX) {
-+				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
- 				error_f("insane bitmap gap");
- 				goto out;
- 			}
-@@ -1009,6 +1010,7 @@ ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp,
- 		goto out;
- 
- 	if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		error_f("alloc failed");
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
-index ccc61cd..c25bed0 100644
---- a/ssh-agent.c
-+++ b/ssh-agent.c
-@@ -1188,6 +1188,7 @@ parse_key_constraint_extension(struct sshbuf *m, char **sk_providerp,
- 	    "restrict-destination-v00@openssh.com") == 0) {
- 		if (*dcsp != NULL) {
- 			error_f("%s already set", ext_name);
-+			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
- 			goto out;
- 		}
- 		if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0) {
-@@ -1197,6 +1198,7 @@ parse_key_constraint_extension(struct sshbuf *m, char **sk_providerp,
- 		while (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
- 			if (*ndcsp >= AGENT_MAX_DEST_CONSTRAINTS) {
- 				error_f("too many %s constraints", ext_name);
-+				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
- 				goto out;
- 			}
- 			*dcsp = xrecallocarray(*dcsp, *ndcsp, *ndcsp + 1,
-@@ -1715,6 +1717,7 @@ process_ext_session_bind(SocketEntry *e)
- 	/* record new key/sid */
- 	if (e->nsession_ids >= AGENT_MAX_SESSION_IDS) {
- 		error_f("too many session IDs recorded");
-+		r = -1;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 	e->session_ids = xrecallocarray(e->session_ids, e->nsession_ids,
-diff --git a/ssh-sk-client.c b/ssh-sk-client.c
-index 321fe53..750accb 100644
---- a/ssh-sk-client.c
-+++ b/ssh-sk-client.c
-@@ -439,6 +439,7 @@ sshsk_load_resident(const char *provider_path, const char *device,
- 		}
- 		if ((srk = calloc(1, sizeof(*srk))) == NULL) {
- 			error_f("calloc failed");
-+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 			goto out;
- 		}
- 		srk->key = key;
-@@ -450,6 +451,7 @@ sshsk_load_resident(const char *provider_path, const char *device,
- 		if ((tmp = recallocarray(srks, nsrks, nsrks + 1,
- 		    sizeof(*srks))) == NULL) {
- 			error_f("recallocarray keys failed");
-+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 			goto out;
- 		}
- 		debug_f("srks[%zu]: %s %s uidlen %zu", nsrks,
-diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
-index 3e6202b..e6d8905 100644
---- a/sshconnect2.c
-+++ b/sshconnect2.c
-@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh)
- 	    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0)
- 		fatal_r(r, "Bad server host key");
- 	if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey,
--	    xxx_conn_info) == -1)
-+	    xxx_conn_info) != 0)
- 		fatal("Host key verification failed.");
- 	return 0;
- }
-@@ -803,6 +803,7 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
- 
- 	if ((pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) {
- 		debug_f("server sent unknown pkalg %s", pkalg);
-+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
- 		goto done;
- 	}
- 	if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
-@@ -813,6 +814,7 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
- 		error("input_userauth_pk_ok: type mismatch "
- 		    "for decoded key (received %d, expected %d)",
- 		    key->type, pktype);
-+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
- 		goto done;
- 	}
- 
-@@ -832,6 +834,7 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
- 		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
- 		error_f("server replied with unknown key: %s %s",
- 		    sshkey_type(key), fp == NULL ? "<ERROR>" : fp);
-+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
- 		goto done;
- 	}
- 	ident = format_identity(id);
-diff --git a/sshsig.c b/sshsig.c
-index eb2a931..e476aa1 100644
---- a/sshsig.c
-+++ b/sshsig.c
-@@ -863,6 +863,7 @@ cert_filter_principals(const char *path, u_long linenum,
- 	}
- 	if ((principals = sshbuf_dup_string(nprincipals)) == NULL) {
- 		error_f("buffer error");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 	/* success */
--- 
-2.43.0
-

backport-fix-CVE-2025-32728.patch

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-From fc86875e6acb36401dfc1dfb6b628a9d1460f367 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed, 9 Apr 2025 07:00:03 +0000
-Subject: upstream: Fix logic error in DisableForwarding option. This option
-
-was documented as disabling X11 and agent forwarding but it failed to do so.
-Spotted by Tim Rice.
-
-OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fffc89195968f7eedd2fc57f0b1f1ef3193f5ed1
-Conflict:NA
-Reference:https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=fc86875e6acb36401dfc1dfb6b628a9d1460f367
----
- session.c | 5 +++--
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
-index be6a31a..80adc60 100644
---- a/session.c
-+++ b/session.c
-@@ -2351,7 +2351,8 @@ session_auth_agent_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
- 	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
- 		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
- 	if (!auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag ||
--	    !options.allow_agent_forwarding) {
-+	    !options.allow_agent_forwarding ||
-+	    options.disable_forwarding) {
- 		debug_f("agent forwarding disabled");
- 		return 0;
- 	}
-@@ -2769,7 +2770,7 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
- 		ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "X11 forwarding disabled by key options.");
- 		return 0;
- 	}
--	if (!options.x11_forwarding) {
-+	if (!options.x11_forwarding || options.disable_forwarding) {
- 		debug("X11 forwarding disabled in server configuration file.");
- 		return 0;
- 	}
--- 
-2.43.0
-

backport-openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c.keyperm openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c
---- openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c.keyperm	2020-02-14 01:40:54.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c	2020-02-17 11:55:12.841729758 +0100
-Reference:https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/blob/rawhide/f/backport-openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch
-Conflict:NA
-@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
- 
- #include <errno.h>
- #include <fcntl.h>
-+#include <grp.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
-@@ -101,7 +102,19 @@ sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filen
- #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
- 	if (check_ntsec(filename))
- #endif
-+
- 	if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
-+		if (st.st_mode & 040) {
-+			struct group *gr;
-+
-+			if ((gr = getgrnam("ssh_keys")) && (st.st_gid == gr->gr_gid)) {
-+				/* The only additional bit is read
-+				 * for ssh_keys group, which is fine */
-+				if ((st.st_mode & 077) == 040 ) {
-+					return 0;
-+				}
-+			}
-+		}
- 		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
- 		error("@         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @");
- 		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");

backport-openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch

@@ -1,537 +0,0 @@
-From 94f3898f43a7ef0c53dd50c60ce6d6f884de28e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2024 20:17:01 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] backport-openssh-7.7p1-fips
-
-Reference:https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/openssh/blob/rawhide/f/backport-openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
-Conflict:NA
----
- cipher-aes.c             |  3 +-
- dh.c                     | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- dh.h                     |  1 +
- kex.c                    |  6 +++-
- kexgexc.c                |  5 ++++
- myproposal.h             | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++
- readconf.c               | 16 +++++++----
- sandbox-seccomp-filter.c |  3 ++
- servconf.c               | 16 +++++++----
- ssh-keygen.c             | 17 ++++++++++-
- ssh-rsa.c                |  3 ++
- ssh.c                    |  5 ++++
- sshconnect2.c            | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
- sshd.c                   | 19 ++++++++++---
- sshkey.c                 |  1 +
- 15 files changed, 186 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/cipher-aes.c b/cipher-aes.c
-index 8b10172..1a07697 100644
---- a/cipher-aes.c
-+++ b/cipher-aes.c
-@@ -154,7 +154,8 @@ evp_rijndael(void)
- 	rijndal_cbc.do_cipher = ssh_rijndael_cbc;
- #ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
- 	rijndal_cbc.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH |
--	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV;
-+	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV |
-+	    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS;
- #endif
- 	return (&rijndal_cbc);
- }
-diff --git a/dh.c b/dh.c
-index ce2eb47..166cb02 100644
---- a/dh.c
-+++ b/dh.c
-@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
- 
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- 
- #include "dh.h"
- #include "pathnames.h"
-@@ -164,6 +165,12 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max)
- 	int best, bestcount, which, linenum;
- 	struct dhgroup dhg;
- 
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		logit("Using arbitrary primes is not allowed in FIPS mode."
-+		    " Falling back to known groups.");
-+		return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
-+	}
-+
- 	if ((f = fopen(get_moduli_filename(), "r")) == NULL) {
- 		logit("WARNING: could not open %s (%s), using fixed modulus",
- 		    get_moduli_filename(), strerror(errno));
-@@ -502,4 +509,38 @@ dh_estimate(int bits)
- 	return 8192;
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * Compares the received DH parameters with known-good groups,
-+ * which might be either from group14, group16 or group18.
-+ */
-+int
-+dh_is_known_group(const DH *dh)
-+{
-+	const BIGNUM *p, *g;
-+	const BIGNUM *known_p, *known_g;
-+	DH *known = NULL;
-+	int bits = 0, rv = 0;
-+
-+	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, &g);
-+	bits = BN_num_bits(p);
-+
-+	if (bits <= 3072) {
-+		known = dh_new_group14();
-+	} else if (bits <= 6144) {
-+		known = dh_new_group16();
-+	} else {
-+		known = dh_new_group18();
-+	}
-+
-+	DH_get0_pqg(known, &known_p, NULL, &known_g);
-+
-+	if (BN_cmp(g, known_g) == 0 &&
-+	    BN_cmp(p, known_p) == 0) {
-+		rv = 1;
-+	}
-+
-+	DH_free(known);
-+	return rv;
-+}
-+
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-diff --git a/dh.h b/dh.h
-index c6326a3..e51e292 100644
---- a/dh.h
-+++ b/dh.h
-@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ DH	*dh_new_group_fallback(int);
- 
- int	 dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
- int	 dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *, const BIGNUM *);
-+int	 dh_is_known_group(const DH *);
- 
- u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
- void	 dh_set_moduli_file(const char *);
-diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
-index 36ae36c..1636f25 100644
---- a/kex.c
-+++ b/kex.c
-@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- #include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- # ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID
- # include <openssl/kdf.h>
- # endif
-@@ -205,7 +206,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
- 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
- 	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
- 		if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
--			error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
-+			if (FIPS_mode())
-+				error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p);
-+			else
-+				error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
- 			free(s);
- 			return 0;
- 		}
-diff --git a/kexgexc.c b/kexgexc.c
-index e99e0cf..4c3feae 100644
---- a/kexgexc.c
-+++ b/kexgexc.c
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
- 
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- 
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- #include <sys/types.h>
- 
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
-@@ -115,6 +116,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
- 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+	if (FIPS_mode() && dh_is_known_group(kex->dh) == 0) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
- 	p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
- 
- 	/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
-diff --git a/myproposal.h b/myproposal.h
-index ee6e9f7..ff8dfa8 100644
---- a/myproposal.h
-+++ b/myproposal.h
-@@ -56,6 +56,18 @@
- 	"rsa-sha2-512," \
- 	"rsa-sha2-256"
- 
-+#define	KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG	\
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \
-+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521," \
-+	"rsa-sha2-512," \
-+	"rsa-sha2-256," \
-+
- #define	KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
- 	"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
- 	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
-@@ -77,6 +89,27 @@
- 
- #define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
- 
-+#define	KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \
-+	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
-+	"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \
-+	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se," \
-+	"aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
-+#define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS		\
-+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
-+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \
-+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp521," \
-+	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," \
-+	"diffie-hellman-group16-sha512," \
-+	"diffie-hellman-group18-sha512," \
-+	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha256"
-+#define KEX_FIPS_MAC \
-+	"hmac-sha1," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-256," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-512," \
-+	"hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
-+
- /* Not a KEX value, but here so all the algorithm defaults are together */
- #define	SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS	\
- 	"ssh-ed25519," \
-diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
-index bd8627c..dd22c3c 100644
---- a/readconf.c
-+++ b/readconf.c
-@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
- #include <netinet/in_systm.h>
- #include <netinet/ip.h>
- #include <arpa/inet.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- 
- #include <ctype.h>
- #include <errno.h>
-@@ -2711,11 +2712,16 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
- 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
- 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
- 	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
--	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
--	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_MAC, all_mac);
--	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_KEX, all_kex);
--	def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
--	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
-+	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT), all_cipher);
-+	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_CLIENT_MAC), all_mac);
-+	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_CLIENT_KEX), all_kex);
-+	def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key);
-+	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig);
- #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
- 	do { \
- 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \
-diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-index 139b6fb..5376800 100644
---- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -230,6 +230,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- #ifdef __NR_open
- 	SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_socket
-+	SC_DENY(__NR_socket, EACCES),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_openat
- 	SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES),
- #endif
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index 0dbf90c..24db0cc 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
- #ifdef HAVE_NET_ROUTE_H
- #include <net/route.h>
- #endif
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- 
- #include <ctype.h>
- #include <netdb.h>
-@@ -230,11 +231,16 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
- 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
- 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
- 	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
--	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
--	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac);
--	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex);
--	def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
--	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
-+	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT), all_cipher);
-+	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_SERVER_MAC), all_mac);
-+	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_SERVER_KEX), all_kex);
-+	def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key);
-+	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig);
- #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
- 	do { \
- 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \
-diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
-index 46f4998..5c48ee0 100644
---- a/ssh-keygen.c
-+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
-@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
- #include <openssl/pem.h>
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- #endif
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- 
- #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
- # include <stdint.h>
-@@ -207,6 +208,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *name, u_int32_t *bitsp)
- #endif
- 	}
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		if (type == KEY_DSA)
-+			fatal("DSA keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		if (type == KEY_ED25519)
-+			fatal("ED25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+	}
- 	switch (type) {
- 	case KEY_DSA:
- 		if (*bitsp != 1024)
-@@ -1113,9 +1120,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
- 			first = 1;
- 			printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
- 		}
-+		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
-+
-+		/* Skip the keys that are not supported in FIPS mode */
-+		if (FIPS_mode() && (type == KEY_DSA || type == KEY_ED25519)) {
-+			logit("Skipping %s key in FIPS mode",
-+			    key_types[i].key_type_display);
-+			goto next;
-+		}
-+
- 		printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display);
- 		fflush(stdout);
--		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
- 		if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
- 			error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s",
- 			    prv_tmp, strerror(errno));
-diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
-index 88a98fd..17662be 100644
---- a/ssh-rsa.c
-+++ b/ssh-rsa.c
-@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #include <openssl/core_names.h>
- #include <openssl/param_build.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- 
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <string.h>
-@@ -162,6 +163,8 @@ ssh_rsa_generate(struct sshkey *k, int bits)
- 		goto out;
- 
- 	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0) {
-+		if (FIPS_mode())
-+			logit_f("the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method");
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
-index 4caa6e1..d144a25 100644
---- a/ssh.c
-+++ b/ssh.c
-@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #endif
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- 
-@@ -1564,6 +1565,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		exit(0);
- 	}
- 
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
-+	}
-+
- 	/* Expand SecurityKeyProvider if it refers to an environment variable */
- 	if (options.sk_provider != NULL && *options.sk_provider == '$' &&
- 	    strlen(options.sk_provider) > 1) {
-diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
-index 1e217e4..1d72a91 100644
---- a/sshconnect2.c
-+++ b/sshconnect2.c
-@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@
- #include <vis.h>
- #endif
- 
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
-+
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- 
- #include "xmalloc.h"
-@@ -276,36 +278,41 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
- 
- #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
- 	if (options.gss_keyex) {
--		/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
--		 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
--		orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
--
--		if (options.gss_server_identity) {
--			gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
--		} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
--			gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
--			/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
--			 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
--			if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
--				free(gss_host);
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
-+			options.gss_keyex = 0;
-+		} else {
-+			/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
-+			 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
-+			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
-+
-+			if (options.gss_server_identity) {
-+				gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
-+			} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
-+				gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
-+				/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
-+				 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
-+				if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
-+					free(gss_host);
-+					gss_host = xstrdup(host);
-+				}
-+			} else {
- 				gss_host = xstrdup(host);
- 			}
--		} else {
--			gss_host = xstrdup(host);
--		}
- 
--		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
--		    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
--		if (gss) {
--			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
--			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
--			    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
--
--			/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
--			 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
--			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
--			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
--			    "%s,null", orig);
-+			gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
-+			    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
-+			if (gss) {
-+				debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
-+				xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
-+				    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-+
-+				/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
-+				 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
-+				orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
-+				xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
-+				    "%s,null", orig);
-+			}
- 		}
- 	}
- #endif
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index 595e44a..f49e2e5 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
- #endif
- #include <pwd.h>
- #include <signal.h>
-+#include <syslog.h>
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
-@@ -80,6 +81,7 @@
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- #endif
- 
-@@ -1665,6 +1667,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	sigemptyset(&sigmask);
- 	sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &sigmask, NULL);
- 
-+	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
- 	/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
- 	saved_argc = ac;
- 	rexec_argc = ac;
-@@ -2160,6 +2163,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	/* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
- 	log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
- 
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
-+	}
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
- 	 * unmounted if desired.
-@@ -2535,10 +2542,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
- 		orig = NULL;
- 
--	if (options.gss_keyex)
--		gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
--	else
--		gss = NULL;
-+	if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
-+			options.gss_keyex = 0;
-+		} else {
-+			gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
-+		}
-+	}
- 
- 	if (gss && orig)
- 		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
-index 1aee244..be2c399 100644
---- a/sshkey.c
-+++ b/sshkey.c
-@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #include <openssl/pem.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #include <openssl/core_names.h>
- #include <openssl/param_build.h>
- #endif
--- 
-2.33.0
-

backport-upstream-Do-not-apply-authorized_keys-options-when-signature.patch

@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-From 62bbf8f825cc390ecb0523752ddac1435006f206 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun, 15 Sep 2024 00:41:18 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] upstream: Do not apply authorized_keys options when signature
- verification fails. Prevents restrictive key options being incorrectly
- applied to subsequent keys in authorized_keys.
-
-Conflict:NA
-Reference:https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/62bbf8f825cc390ecb0523752ddac1435006f206
----
- monitor.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
-index ceeb035..a2647fd 100644
---- a/monitor.c
-+++ b/monitor.c
-@@ -1564,7 +1564,7 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
- 	}
- 	auth2_record_key(authctxt, ret == 0, key);
- 
--	if (key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY)
-+	if (key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY && ret == 0)
- 		auth_activate_options(ssh, key_opts);
- 	monitor_reset_key_state();
- 
--- 
-2.43.0
-

backport-upstream-Fix-proxy-multiplexing-O-proxy-bug.patch

@@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
-From 29fb6f6d46b67770084b4f12bcf8a01bd535041b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2024 22:40:08 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] upstream: Fix proxy multiplexing (-O proxy) bug
- 
- If a mux started with ControlPersist then later has a forwarding added using
- mux proxy connection and the forwarding was used, then when the mux proxy
- session terminates, the mux master process will send a channel close to the
- server with a bad channel ID and crash the connection.
- 
- This was caused by my stupidly reusing c->remote_id for mux channel
- associations when I should have just added another member to struct channel.
-
-OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c9f474e0124e3fe456c5e43749b97d75e65b82b2
-Reference:https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/29fb6f6d46b67770084b4f12bcf8a01bd535041b
-Conflict:NA
----
- channels.c |  6 ++++--
- channels.h |  2 ++
- mux.c      | 26 +++++++++++++-------------
- nchan.c    |  4 +++-
- 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
-index 2c0aa65..02f5441 100644
---- a/channels.c
-+++ b/channels.c
-@@ -964,14 +964,16 @@ channel_format_status(const Channel *c)
- {
- 	char *ret = NULL;
- 
--	xasprintf(&ret, "t%d [%s] %s%u i%u/%zu o%u/%zu e[%s]/%zu "
--	    "fd %d/%d/%d sock %d cc %d io 0x%02x/0x%02x",
-+	xasprintf(&ret, "t%d [%s] %s%u %s%u i%u/%zu o%u/%zu e[%s]/%zu "
-+	    "fd %d/%d/%d sock %d cc %d %s%u io 0x%02x/0x%02x",
- 	    c->type, c->xctype != NULL ? c->xctype : c->ctype,
- 	    c->have_remote_id ? "r" : "nr", c->remote_id,
-+	    c->mux_ctx != NULL ? "m" : "nm", c->mux_downstream_id,
- 	    c->istate, sshbuf_len(c->input),
- 	    c->ostate, sshbuf_len(c->output),
- 	    channel_format_extended_usage(c), sshbuf_len(c->extended),
- 	    c->rfd, c->wfd, c->efd, c->sock, c->ctl_chan,
-+	    c->have_ctl_child_id ? "c" : "nc", c->ctl_child_id,
- 	    c->io_want, c->io_ready);
- 	return ret;
- }
-diff --git a/channels.h b/channels.h
-index 7e59914..f3dd87d 100644
---- a/channels.h
-+++ b/channels.h
-@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ struct Channel {
- 	u_int	io_ready;	/* bitmask of SSH_CHAN_IO_* */
- 	int	pfds[4];	/* pollfd entries for rfd/wfd/efd/sock */
- 	int     ctl_chan;	/* control channel (multiplexed connections) */
-+	uint32_t ctl_child_id;	/* child session for mux controllers */
-+	int	have_ctl_child_id;	/* non-zero if ctl_child_id is valid */
- 	int     isatty;		/* rfd is a tty */
- #ifdef _AIX
- 	int     wfd_isatty;	/* wfd is a tty */
-diff --git a/mux.c b/mux.c
-index b3ffde9..f391892 100644
---- a/mux.c
-+++ b/mux.c
-@@ -199,8 +199,8 @@ mux_master_session_cleanup_cb(struct ssh *ssh, int cid, int force, void *unused)
- 			fatal_f("channel %d missing control channel %d",
- 			    c->self, c->ctl_chan);
- 		c->ctl_chan = -1;
--		cc->remote_id = 0;
--		cc->have_remote_id = 0;
-+		cc->ctl_child_id = 0;
-+		cc->have_ctl_child_id = 0;
- 		chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, cc);
- 	}
- 	channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, c->self);
-@@ -215,12 +215,12 @@ mux_master_control_cleanup_cb(struct ssh *ssh, int cid, int force, void *unused)
- 	debug3_f("entering for channel %d", cid);
- 	if (c == NULL)
- 		fatal_f("channel_by_id(%i) == NULL", cid);
--	if (c->have_remote_id) {
--		if ((sc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->remote_id)) == NULL)
-+	if (c->have_ctl_child_id) {
-+		if ((sc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_child_id)) == NULL)
- 			fatal_f("channel %d missing session channel %u",
--			    c->self, c->remote_id);
--		c->remote_id = 0;
--		c->have_remote_id = 0;
-+			    c->self, c->ctl_child_id);
-+		c->ctl_child_id = 0;
-+		c->have_ctl_child_id = 0;
- 		sc->ctl_chan = -1;
- 		if (sc->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
- 		    sc->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING) {
-@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ mux_master_process_new_session(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
- 	    new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2]);
- 
- 	/* XXX support multiple child sessions in future */
--	if (c->have_remote_id) {
-+	if (c->have_ctl_child_id) {
- 		debug2_f("session already open");
- 		reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid,
- 		    "Multiple sessions not supported");
-@@ -461,8 +461,8 @@ mux_master_process_new_session(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
- 	    CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO);
- 
- 	nc->ctl_chan = c->self;		/* link session -> control channel */
--	c->remote_id = nc->self;	/* link control -> session channel */
--	c->have_remote_id = 1;
-+	c->ctl_child_id = nc->self;	/* link control -> session channel */
-+	c->have_ctl_child_id = 1;
- 
- 	if (cctx->want_tty && escape_char != 0xffffffff) {
- 		channel_register_filter(ssh, nc->self,
-@@ -992,7 +992,7 @@ mux_master_process_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
- 	debug3_f("got fds stdin %d, stdout %d", new_fd[0], new_fd[1]);
- 
- 	/* XXX support multiple child sessions in future */
--	if (c->have_remote_id) {
-+	if (c->have_ctl_child_id) {
- 		debug2_f("session already open");
- 		reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid,
- 		    "Multiple sessions not supported");
-@@ -1019,8 +1019,8 @@ mux_master_process_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
- 	free(chost);
- 
- 	nc->ctl_chan = c->self;		/* link session -> control channel */
--	c->remote_id = nc->self;	/* link control -> session channel */
--	c->have_remote_id = 1;
-+	c->ctl_child_id = nc->self;	/* link control -> session channel */
-+	c->have_ctl_child_id = 1;
- 
- 	debug2_f("channel_new: %d control %d", nc->self, nc->ctl_chan);
- 
-diff --git a/nchan.c b/nchan.c
-index d33426f..715feeb 100644
---- a/nchan.c
-+++ b/nchan.c
-@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ chan_send_close2(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
- {
- 	int r;
- 
--	debug2("channel %d: send close", c->self);
-+	debug2("channel %d: send close2", c->self);
- 	if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED ||
- 	    c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED) {
- 		error("channel %d: cannot send close for istate/ostate %d/%d",
-@@ -218,6 +218,8 @@ chan_send_close2(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
- 	} else {
- 		if (!c->have_remote_id)
- 			fatal_f("channel %d: no remote_id", c->self);
-+		debug2("channel %d: send close for remote id %u", c->self,
-+		    c->remote_id);
- 		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE)) != 0 ||
- 		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
- 		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
--- 
-2.43.0
-

backport-upstream-Make-sure-sftp_get_limits-only-returns-0-if.patch

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-From 676377ce67807a24e08a54cd60ec832946cc6cae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "tobhe@openbsd.org" <tobhe@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon, 13 Nov 2023 09:18:19 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] upstream: Make sure sftp_get_limits() only returns 0 if
- 'limits'
-
-was initialized. This fixes a potential uninitialized use of 'limits' in
-sftp_init() if sftp_get_limits() returned early because of an unexpected
-message type.
-
-ok djm@
-
-OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1c177d7c3becc1d71bc8763eecf61873a1d3884c
-
-Reference:https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/676377ce67807a24e08a54cd60ec832946cc6cae
-Conflict:2de990142(Rename do_limits to sftp_get_limits)
----
- sftp-client.c | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/sftp-client.c b/sftp-client.c
-index 2598029f7..5cc8bb539 100644
---- a/sftp-client.c
-+++ b/sftp-client.c
-@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
--/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.169 2023/03/08 04:43:12 guenther Exp $ */
-+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.175 2023/11/13 09:18:19 tobhe Exp $ */
- /*
-  * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
-  *
-@@ -656,7 +656,7 @@ do_limits(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sftp_limits *limits)
- 		/* Disable the limits extension */
- 		conn->exts &= ~SFTP_EXT_LIMITS;
- 		sshbuf_free(msg);
--		return 0;
-+		return -1;
- 	}
- 
- 	memset(limits, 0, sizeof(*limits));
--- 
-2.33.0
-

backport-upstream-ensure-key_fd-is-filled-when-DSA-is-disable.patch

@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-From f9311e8921d92c5efca767227a497ab63280ac39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2024 01:51:16 +0000
-Subject: upstream: ensure key_fd is filled when DSA is disabled; spotted by
-
-tb@
-
-OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9dd417b6eec3cf67e870f147464a8d93f076dce7
-
-Reference:https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/patch/?id=f9311e8921d92c5efca767227a497ab63280ac39
-Conflict:4e838120a759(upstream: make DSA key support compile-time optional)
----
- ssh-keysign.c     |  5 ++++-
- 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
- create mode 100644 ssh-keysign.c.rej
-
-diff --git a/ssh-keysign.c b/ssh-keysign.c
-index 8b3c9a2..d4f9fd9 100644
---- a/ssh-keysign.c
-+++ b/ssh-keysign.c
-@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
--/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.71 2022/08/01 11:09:26 djm Exp $ */
-+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.73 2024/01/11 01:51:16 djm Exp $ */
- /*
-  * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
-  *
-@@ -186,6 +186,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 	if (fd > 2)
- 		close(fd);
- 
-+	for (i = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++)
-+		key_fd[i] = -1;
-+
- 	i = 0;
- 	/* XXX This really needs to read sshd_config for the paths */
- 	key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
--- 
-2.33.0
-

backport-upstream-fix-memory-leak-in-mux-proxy-mode-when-requ.patch

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-From c47e1c9c7911f38b2fc2fb01b1f6ae3a3121a838 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2024 02:59:59 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] upstream: fix memory leak in mux proxy mode when requesting
- forwarding.
-
-found by RASU JSC, reported by Maks Mishin in GHPR#467
-
-OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 97d96a166b1ad4b8d229864a553e3e56d3116860
-
-Reference:https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/c47e1c9c7911f38b2fc2fb01b1f6ae3a3121a838
-Conflict:NA
----
- channels.c | 7 +++----
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
-index 6862556be..ece8d30d6 100644
---- a/channels.c
-+++ b/channels.c
-@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
--/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.430 2023/03/10 03:01:51 dtucker Exp $ */
-+/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.437 2024/03/06 02:59:59 djm Exp $ */
- /*
-  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
-  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
-@@ -3245,9 +3245,8 @@ channel_proxy_downstream(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *downstream)
- 			goto out;
- 		}
- 		/* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */
--		permission_set_add(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL, "<mux>", -1,
--		    listen_host, NULL, (int)listen_port, downstream);
--		listen_host = NULL;
-+		permission_set_add(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL, "<mux>",
-+		    -1, listen_host, NULL, (int)listen_port, downstream);
- 		break;
- 	case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE:
- 		if (have < 4)
--- 
-2.33.0
-

backport-upstream-make-parsing-user-host-consistently-look-for-the-last-in.patch

@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-From a8ad7a2952111c6ce32949a775df94286550af6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2024 02:30:44 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] upstream: make parsing user@host consistently look for the
-  last '@' in the string rather than the first. This makes it possible to
-  use usernames that contain '@' characters.
-
-Conflict:NA
-Reference:https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/a8ad7a2952111c6ce32949a775df94286550af6b
-
----
- match.c   | 6 +++---
- ssh-add.c | 2 +-
- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/match.c b/match.c
-index 3ac854d..b9a8225 100644
---- a/match.c
-+++ b/match.c
-@@ -241,17 +241,17 @@ match_user(const char *user, const char *host, const char *ipaddr,
- 
- 	/* test mode */
- 	if (user == NULL && host == NULL && ipaddr == NULL) {
--		if ((p = strchr(pattern, '@')) != NULL &&
-+		if ((p = strrchr(pattern, '@')) != NULL &&
- 		    match_host_and_ip(NULL, NULL, p + 1) < 0)
- 			return -1;
- 		return 0;
- 	}
- 
--	if ((p = strchr(pattern, '@')) == NULL)
-+	if (strrchr(pattern, '@') == NULL)
- 		return match_pattern(user, pattern);
- 
- 	pat = xstrdup(pattern);
--	p = strchr(pat, '@');
-+	p = strrchr(pat, '@');
- 	*p++ = '\0';
- 
- 	if ((ret = match_pattern(user, pat)) == 1)
-diff --git a/ssh-add.c b/ssh-add.c
-index 8cba0a7..2b081d6 100644
---- a/ssh-add.c
-+++ b/ssh-add.c
-@@ -712,7 +712,7 @@ parse_dest_constraint_hop(const char *s, struct dest_constraint_hop *dch,
- 
- 	memset(dch, '\0', sizeof(*dch));
- 	os = xstrdup(s);
--	if ((host = strchr(os, '@')) == NULL)
-+	if ((host = strrchr(os, '@')) == NULL)
- 		host = os;
- 	else {
- 		*host++ = '\0';
--- 
-2.43.0
-

backport-upstream-set-errno-EAFNOSUPPORT-when-filtering-addre.patch

@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-From c52db0114826d73eff6cdbf205e9c1fa4f7ca6c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2023 02:50:00 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] upstream: set errno=EAFNOSUPPORT when filtering addresses
- that don't
-
-match AddressFamily; yields slightly better error message if no address
-matches. bz#3526
-
-OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 29cea900ddd8b04a4d1968da5c4a893be2ebd9e6
-
-Reference:https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/c52db0114826d73eff6cdbf205e9c1fa4f7ca6c6
-Conflict:NA
----
- sshconnect.c | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
-index ff3d3501f..bd077c75c 100644
---- a/sshconnect.c
-+++ b/sshconnect.c
-@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
--/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.364 2023/11/15 23:03:38 djm Exp $ */
-+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.365 2023/11/20 02:50:00 djm Exp $ */
- /*
-  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
-  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
-@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ ssh_connect_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, struct addrinfo *aitop,
- 			    ai->ai_family != options.address_family) {
- 				debug2_f("skipping address [%s]:%s: "
- 				    "wrong address family", ntop, strport);
--				errno = 0;
-+				errno = EAFNOSUPPORT;
- 				continue;
- 			}
- 
--- 
-2.33.0
-

backport-upstream-some-extra-paranoia.patch

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-From 9517cc58577f85a0ba5f8bb46778dff625f0688f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2024 02:28:17 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] upstream: some extra paranoia, reminded by jsg@
- 
-Conflict:NA
-Reference:https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/9517cc58577f85a0ba5f8bb46778dff625f0688f
-
----
- ssh-agent.c | 4 ++++
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
-index cc58e6e..3d685e9 100644
---- a/ssh-agent.c
-+++ b/ssh-agent.c
-@@ -1578,6 +1578,10 @@ process_ext_session_bind(SocketEntry *e)
- 		error_fr(r, "parse");
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+	if (sshbuf_len(sid) > AGENT_MAX_SID_LEN) {
-+		error_f("session ID too long");
-+		goto out;
-+	}
- 	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
- 	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
- 		fatal_f("fingerprint failed");
--- 
-2.43.0
-

backport-upstream-when-connecting-via-socket-the-default-case.patch

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-From 26f3f3bbc69196d908cad6558c8c7dc5beb8d74a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed, 15 Nov 2023 23:03:38 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] upstream: when connecting via socket (the default case),
- filter
-
-addresses by AddressFamily if one was specified. Fixes the case where, if
-CanonicalizeHostname is enabled, ssh may ignore AddressFamily. bz5326; ok
-dtucker
-
-OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6c7d7751f6cd055126b2b268a7b64dcafa447439
-
-Reference:https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/26f3f3bbc69196d908cad6558c8c7dc5beb8d74a
-Conflict:NA
----
- sshconnect.c | 10 +++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
-index e6012f01e..ff3d3501f 100644
---- a/sshconnect.c
-+++ b/sshconnect.c
-@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
--/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.363 2023/03/10 07:17:08 dtucker Exp $ */
-+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.364 2023/11/15 23:03:38 djm Exp $ */
- /*
-  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
-  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
-@@ -481,6 +481,14 @@ ssh_connect_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, struct addrinfo *aitop,
- 				errno = oerrno;
- 				continue;
- 			}
-+			if (options.address_family != AF_UNSPEC &&
-+			    ai->ai_family != options.address_family) {
-+				debug2_f("skipping address [%s]:%s: "
-+				    "wrong address family", ntop, strport);
-+				errno = 0;
-+				continue;
-+			}
-+
- 			debug("Connecting to %.200s [%.100s] port %s.",
- 				host, ntop, strport);
- 
--- 
-2.33.0
-

backport-upstream-when-invoking-KnownHostsCommand-to-determin.patch

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-From aa7b21708511a6d4aed3839fc9f6e82e849dd4a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2023 03:28:19 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] upstream: when invoking KnownHostsCommand to determine the
- order of
-
-host key algorithms to request, ensure that the hostname passed to the
-command is decorated with the port number for ports other than 22.
-
-This matches the behaviour of KnownHostsCommand when invoked to look
-up the actual host key.
-
-bz3643, ok dtucker@
-
-OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5cfabc0b7c6c7ab473666df314f377b1f15420b1
-
-Reference:https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/aa7b21708511a6d4aed3839fc9f6e82e849dd4a1
-Conflict:NA
----
- sshconnect2.c | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
-index 5831a00c6..df6caf817 100644
---- a/sshconnect2.c
-+++ b/sshconnect2.c
-@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
--/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.370 2023/12/18 14:45:17 djm Exp $ */
-+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.369 2023/12/13 03:28:19 djm Exp $ */
- /*
-  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
-  * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
-@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
- 	}
- 	if (options.known_hosts_command != NULL) {
- 		load_hostkeys_command(hostkeys, options.known_hosts_command,
--		    "ORDER", cinfo, NULL, host);
-+		    "ORDER", cinfo, NULL, hostname);
- 	}
- 	/*
- 	 * If a plain public key exists that matches the type of the best
--- 
-2.33.0
-

openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch

@@ -221,13 +221,12 @@ index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644
  	else
  		logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
  
-@@ -326,6 +370,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -326,6 +370,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
  	return 0;
  }
  
 +Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
 +	"gssapi-keyex",
-+	NULL,
 +	userauth_gsskeyex,
 +	&options.gss_authentication
 +};

openssh.spec

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 %{?no_gtk2:%global gtk2 0}
 
 %global sshd_uid    74
-%global openssh_release 8
+%global openssh_release 3
 
 Name:           openssh
 Version:        9.3p2
@@ -99,23 +99,6 @@ Patch75:        skip-scp-test-if-there-is-no-scp-on-remote-path-as-s.patch
 Patch77:        set-ssh-config.patch
 Patch78:        backport-CVE-2023-48795-upstream-implement-strict-key-exchange-in-ssh-and-ss.patch
 Patch79:        backport-CVE-2023-51385-upstream-ban-user-hostnames-with-most-shell-metachar.patch
-Patch80:        backport-fix-CVE-2024-6387.patch
-Patch81:        backport-CVE-2023-51384-upstream-apply-destination-constraints-to-all-p11-ke.patch
-Patch82:        backport-upstream-Make-sure-sftp_get_limits-only-returns-0-if.patch
-Patch83:        backport-upstream-when-connecting-via-socket-the-default-case.patch
-Patch84:        backport-upstream-set-errno-EAFNOSUPPORT-when-filtering-addre.patch
-Patch85:        backport-upstream-when-invoking-KnownHostsCommand-to-determin.patch
-Patch86:        backport-upstream-ensure-key_fd-is-filled-when-DSA-is-disable.patch
-Patch87:        backport-upstream-fix-memory-leak-in-mux-proxy-mode-when-requ.patch
-Patch88:        backport-openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
-Patch89:        backport-CVE-2021-36368-added-option-to-disable-trivial-auth.patch
-Patch90:        backport-upstream-Fix-proxy-multiplexing-O-proxy-bug.patch
-Patch91:        backport-openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch
-Patch92:        backport-upstream-make-parsing-user-host-consistently-look-for-the-last-in.patch
-Patch93:        backport-upstream-Do-not-apply-authorized_keys-options-when-signature.patch
-Patch94:        backport-upstream-some-extra-paranoia.patch
-Patch95:        backport-fix-CVE-2025-26465.patch
-Patch96:        backport-fix-CVE-2025-32728.patch
 
 Requires:       /sbin/nologin
 Requires:       libselinux >= 2.3-5 audit-libs >= 1.0.8
@@ -264,23 +247,6 @@ popd
 %patch77 -p1
 %patch78 -p1
 %patch79 -p1
-%patch80 -p1
-%patch81 -p1
-%patch82 -p1
-%patch83 -p1
-%patch84 -p1
-%patch85 -p1
-%patch86 -p1
-%patch87 -p1
-%patch88 -p1
-%patch89 -p1
-%patch90 -p1
-%patch91 -p1
-%patch92 -p1
-%patch93 -p1
-%patch94 -p1
-%patch95 -p1
-%patch96 -p1
 
 autoreconf
 pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4
@@ -497,36 +463,6 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8*
 
 %changelog
-* Fri Apr 11 2025 bitianyuan<bitianyuan@huawei.com> - 9.3p2-8
-- Type:CVE
-- CVE:CVE-2025-26465 CVE-2025-32728
-- SUG:NA
-- DESC:fix CVE-2025-26465 CVE-2025-32728
-
-* Tue Jan 14 2025 bitianyuan <bitianyuan@huawei.com> - 9.3p2-7
-- Type:bugfix
-- ID:NA
-- SUG:NA
-- DESC:fix the missing member of the struct Authmethod method_gsskeyex
-
-* Tue Oct 29 2024 bitianyuan <bitianyuan@huawei.com> - 9.3p2-6
-- Type:bugfix
-- ID:NA
-- SUG:NA
-- DESC:backport some upstream patches
-
-* Fri Jul 12 2024 renmingshuai <renmingshuai@huawei.com> - 9.3p2-5
-- Type:CVE
-- CVE:CVE-2023-51384
-- SUG:NA
-- DESC:Fix CVE-2023-51384
-
-* Tue Jul 2 2024 renmingshuai <renmingshuai@huawei.com> - 9.3p2-4
-- Type:CVE
-- CVE:CVE-2024-6387
-- SUG:NA
-- DESC:Fix CVE-2024-6387
-
 * Mon Apr 29 2024 renmingshuai <renmingshuai@huawei.com> - 9.3p2-3
 - Type:bugfix
 - CVE: