fix CVE-2023-48795 andCVE-2023-51385

backport-CVE-2023-48795-upstream-implement-strict-key-exchange-in-ssh-and-ss.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,499 @@
+From 1edb00c58f8a6875fad6a497aa2bacf37f9e6cd5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 14:45:17 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: implement "strict key exchange" in ssh and sshd
+
+This adds a protocol extension to improve the integrity of the SSH
+transport protocol, particular in and around the initial key exchange
+(KEX) phase.
+
+Full details of the extension are in the PROTOCOL file.
+
+with markus@
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2a66ac962f0a630d7945fee54004ed9e9c439f14
+
+Reference:https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/1edb00c58f8a6875fad6a497aa2bacf37f9e6cd5
+---
+ PROTOCOL      |  28 +++++++++++++-
+ kex.c         |  84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
+ kex.h         |   3 +-
+ packet.c      | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
+ packet.h      |   3 +-
+ sshconnect2.c |  12 ++----
+ 6 files changed, 148 insertions(+), 85 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/PROTOCOL b/PROTOCOL
+index d453c779b..ded935eb6 100644
+--- a/PROTOCOL
++++ b/PROTOCOL
+@@ -137,6 +137,32 @@ than as a named global or channel request to allow pings with very
+ 
+ This is identical to curve25519-sha256 as later published in RFC8731.
+ 
++1.9 transport: strict key exchange extension
++
++OpenSSH supports a number of transport-layer hardening measures under
++a "strict KEX" feature. This feature is signalled similarly to the
++RFC8308 ext-info feature: by including a additional algorithm in the
++initiial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT kex_algorithms field. The client may append
++"kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com" to its kex_algorithms and the server
++may append "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com". These pseudo-algorithms
++are only valid in the initial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT and MUST be ignored
++if they are present in subsequent SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT packets.
++
++When an endpoint that supports this extension observes this algorithm
++name in a peer's KEXINIT packet, it MUST make the following changes to
++the the protocol:
++
++a) During initial KEX, terminate the connection if any unexpected or
++   out-of-sequence packet is received. This includes terminating the
++   connection if the first packet received is not SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT.
++   Unexpected packets for the purpose of strict KEX include messages
++   that are otherwise valid at any time during the connection such as
++   SSH2_MSG_DEBUG and SSH2_MSG_IGNORE.
++b) After sending or receiving a SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS message, reset the
++   packet sequence number to zero. This behaviour persists for the
++   duration of the connection (i.e. not just the first
++   SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS).
++
+ 2. Connection protocol changes
+ 
+ 2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com"
+@@ -745,4 +771,4 @@ master instance and later clients.
+ OpenSSH extends the usual agent protocol. These changes are documented
+ in the PROTOCOL.agent file.
+ 
+-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.48 2022/11/07 01:53:01 dtucker Exp $
++$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.50 2023/12/18 14:45:17 djm Exp $
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index aa5e792dd..d478ff6e7 100644
+--- a/kex.c
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.178 2023/03/12 10:40:39 dtucker Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.183 2023/12/18 14:45:17 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+  *
+@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
+ #endif
+
+ /* prototype */
+-static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *);
++static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *, uint32_t seq);
+ static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ 
+ static const char * const proposal_names[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {
+@@ -177,6 +177,18 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
++/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
++static int
++has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
++{
++	char *cp;
++
++	if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
++		return 0;
++	free(cp);
++	return 1;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Concatenate algorithm names, avoiding duplicates in the process.
+  * Caller must free returned string.
+@@ -184,7 +196,7 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ char *
+ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
+ {
+-	char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p, *m;
++	char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p;
+ 	size_t len;
+ 
+ 	if (a == NULL || *a == '\0')
+@@ -201,10 +213,8 @@ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
+ 	}
+ 	strlcpy(ret, a, len);
+ 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+-		if ((m = match_list(ret, p, NULL)) != NULL) {
+-			free(m);
++		if (has_any_alg(ret, p))
+ 			continue; /* Algorithm already present */
+-		}
+ 		if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len ||
+ 		    strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) {
+ 			free(tmp);
+@@ -334,15 +344,23 @@ kex_proposal_populate_entries(struct ssh *ssh, char *prop[PROPOSAL_MAX],
+ 	const char *defpropclient[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
+ 	const char **defprop = ssh->kex->server ? defpropserver : defpropclient;
+ 	u_int i;
++	char *cp;
+ 
+ 	if (prop == NULL)
+ 		fatal_f("proposal missing");
+ 
++	/* Append EXT_INFO signalling to KexAlgorithms */
++	if (kexalgos == NULL)
++		kexalgos = defprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
++	if ((cp = kex_names_cat(kexalgos, ssh->kex->server ?
++	    "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com" :
++	    "ext-info-c,kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
++		fatal_f("kex_names_cat");
++
+ 	for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) {
+ 		switch(i) {
+ 		case PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS:
+-			prop[i] = compat_kex_proposal(ssh,
+-			    kexalgos ? kexalgos : defprop[i]);
++			prop[i] = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, cp);
+ 			break;
+ 		case PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS:
+ 		case PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC:
+@@ -363,6 +381,7 @@ kex_proposal_populate_entries(struct ssh *ssh, char *prop[PROPOSAL_MAX],
+ 			prop[i] = xstrdup(defprop[i]);
+ 		}
+ 	}
++	free(cp);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+@@ -466,7 +485,12 @@ kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+ 	int r;
+ 
+-	error("kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
++	/* If in strict mode, any unexpected message is an error */
++	if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
++		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "strict KEX violation: "
++		    "unexpected packet type %u (seqnr %u)", type, seq);
++	}
++	error_f("type %u seq %u", type, seq);
+ 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+@@ -563,7 +587,7 @@ kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	if (ninfo >= 1024) {
+ 		error("SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO with too many entries, expected "
+ 		    "<=1024, received %u", ninfo);
+-		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
++		return dispatch_protocol_error(type, seq, ssh);
+ 	}
+ 	for (i = 0; i < ninfo; i++) {
+ 		if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0)
+@@ -681,7 +705,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		error_f("no kex");
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 	}
+-	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_protocol_error);
+ 	ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen);
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
+@@ -717,7 +741,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT))
+ 		if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0)
+ 			return r;
+-	if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0)
++	if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh, seq)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
+ 
+ 	if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL)
+@@ -981,20 +1005,14 @@ proposals_match(char *my[PROPOSAL_MAX], char *peer[PROPOSAL_MAX])
+ 	return (1);
+ }
+ 
+-/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
+ static int
+-has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
++kexalgs_contains(char **peer, const char *ext)
+ {
+-	char *cp;
+-
+-	if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
+-		return 0;
+-	free(cp);
+-	return 1;
++	return has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], ext);
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
++kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq)
+ {
+ 	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ 	struct newkeys *newkeys;
+@@ -1019,13 +1037,23 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		sprop=peer;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	/* Check whether client supports ext_info_c */
+-	if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) {
+-		char *ext;
+-
+-		ext = match_list("ext-info-c", peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL);
+-		kex->ext_info_c = (ext != NULL);
+-		free(ext);
++	/* Check whether peer supports ext_info/kex_strict */
++	if ((kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
++		if (kex->server) {
++			kex->ext_info_c = kexalgs_contains(peer, "ext-info-c");
++			kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer,
++			    "kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com");
++		} else {
++			kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer,
++			    "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com");
++		}
++		if (kex->kex_strict) {
++			debug3_f("will use strict KEX ordering");
++			if (seq != 0)
++				ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
++				    "strict KEX violation: "
++				    "KEXINIT was not the first packet");
++		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Check whether client supports rsa-sha2 algorithms */
+diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
+index 5f7ef784e..272ebb43d 100644
+--- a/kex.h
++++ b/kex.h
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.118 2023/03/06 12:14:48 dtucker Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.120 2023/12/18 14:45:17 djm Exp $ */
+ 
+ /*
+  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ struct kex {
+ 	u_int	kex_type;
+ 	char	*server_sig_algs;
+ 	int	ext_info_c;
++	int	kex_strict;
+ 	struct sshbuf *my;
+ 	struct sshbuf *peer;
+ 	struct sshbuf *client_version;
+diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
+index 52017defb..beb214f99 100644
+--- a/packet.c
++++ b/packet.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.309 2023/03/03 10:23:42 dtucker Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.313 2023/12/18 14:45:17 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+@@ -1207,8 +1207,13 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr);
+ #endif
+ 	/* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */
+-	if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0)
++	if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0) {
++		if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
++			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "outgoing sequence number "
++			    "wrapped during initial key exchange");
++		}
+ 		logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around");
++	}
+ 	if (++state->p_send.packets == 0)
+ 		if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
+ 			return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
+@@ -1216,6 +1221,11 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	state->p_send.bytes += len;
+ 	sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
+ 
++	if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
++		debug_f("resetting send seqnr %u", state->p_send.seqnr);
++		state->p_send.seqnr = 0;
++	}
++
+ 	if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
+ 		r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT);
+ 	else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && state->server_side)
+@@ -1344,8 +1354,7 @@ ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ 	/* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */
+ 	for (;;) {
+ 		/* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */
+-		r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
+-		if (r != 0)
++		if ((r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p)) != 0)
+ 			break;
+ 		/* If we got a packet, return it. */
+ 		if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE)
+@@ -1629,10 +1615,16 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, mac->mac_len)) != 0)
+ 			goto out;
+ 	}
++
+ 	if (seqnr_p != NULL)
+ 		*seqnr_p = state->p_read.seqnr;
+-	if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0)
++	if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0) {
++		if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
++			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "incoming sequence number "
++			    "wrapped during initial key exchange");
++		}
+ 		logit("incoming seqnr wraps around");
++	}
+ 	if (++state->p_read.packets == 0)
+ 		if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
+ 			return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
+@@ -1698,6 +1690,10 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ #endif
+ 	/* reset for next packet */
+ 	state->packlen = 0;
++	if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
++		debug_f("resetting read seqnr %u", state->p_read.seqnr);
++		state->p_read.seqnr = 0;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if ((r = ssh_packet_check_rekey(ssh)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
+@@ -1720,10 +1716,39 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ 		r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
+ 		if (r != 0)
+ 			return r;
+-		if (*typep) {
+-			state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
+-			DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
++		if (*typep == 0) {
++			/* no message ready */
++			return 0;
+ 		}
++		state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
++		DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
++
++		/* Always process disconnect messages */
++		if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT) {
++			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
++				return r;
++			/* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
++			do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
++			    reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
++			    SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
++			    "Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
++			    "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
++			    ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
++			free(msg);
++			return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
++		}
++
++		/*
++		 * Do not implicitly handle any messages here during initial
++		 * KEX when in strict mode. They will be need to be allowed
++		 * explicitly by the KEX dispatch table or they will generate
++		 * protocol errors.
++		 */
++		if (ssh->kex != NULL &&
++		    (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict)
++			return 0;
++		/* Implicitly handle transport-level messages */
+ 		switch (*typep) {
+ 		case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE:
+ 			debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE");
+@@ -1738,19 +1763,6 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ 			debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
+ 			free(msg);
+ 			break;
+-		case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT:
+-			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
+-			    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
+-				return r;
+-			/* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
+-			do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
+-			    reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
+-			    SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
+-			    "Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
+-			    "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+-			    ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
+-			free(msg);
+-			return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
+ 		case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED:
+ 			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &seqnr)) != 0)
+ 				return r;
+@@ -2242,6 +2254,7 @@ kex_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex *kex)
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_strict)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
+@@ -2404,6 +2417,7 @@ kex_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex **kexp)
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_strict)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
+@@ -2732,6 +2746,7 @@ sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
+ 	vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
+ 	va_end(args);
+ 
++	debug2_f("sending SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT: %s", buf);
+ 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
+diff --git a/packet.h b/packet.h
+index 11925a27d..b2bc3215d 100644
+--- a/packet.h
++++ b/packet.h
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.94 2022/01/22 00:49:34 djm Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.96 2023/12/18 14:45:17 djm Exp $ */
+ 
+ /*
+  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index df6caf817..0cccbcc43 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.366 2023/03/09 07:11:05 dtucker Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.370 2023/12/18 14:45:17 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+  * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+@@ -358,7 +358,6 @@ struct cauthmethod {
+ };
+ 
+ static int input_userauth_service_accept(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+-static int input_userauth_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ static int input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ static int input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ static int input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+@@ -472,7 +471,7 @@ ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user,
+ 
+ 	ssh->authctxt = &authctxt;
+ 	ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &input_userauth_error);
+-	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_ext_info);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, kex_input_ext_info);
+ 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT, &input_userauth_service_accept);
+ 	ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success);	/* loop until success */
+ 	pubkey_cleanup(ssh);
+@@ -531,12 +530,6 @@ input_userauth_service_accept(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
+-static int
+-input_userauth_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh)
+-{
+-	return kex_input_ext_info(type, seqnr, ssh);
+-}
+-
+ void
+ userauth(struct ssh *ssh, char *authlist)
+ {
+@@ -615,6 +608,7 @@ input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	free(authctxt->methoddata);
+ 	authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
+ 	authctxt->success = 1;			/* break out */
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, dispatch_protocol_error);
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.23.0
+

backport-CVE-2023-51385-upstream-ban-user-hostnames-with-most-shell-metachar.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+From 7ef3787c84b6b524501211b11a26c742f829af1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 14:47:44 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: ban user/hostnames with most shell metacharacters
+
+This makes ssh(1) refuse user or host names provided on the
+commandline that contain most shell metacharacters.
+
+Some programs that invoke ssh(1) using untrusted data do not filter
+metacharacters in arguments they supply. This could create
+interactions with user-specified ProxyCommand and other directives
+that allow shell injection attacks to occur.
+
+It's a mistake to invoke ssh(1) with arbitrary untrusted arguments,
+but getting this stuff right can be tricky, so this should prevent
+most obvious ways of creating risky situations. It however is not
+and cannot be perfect: ssh(1) has no practical way of interpreting
+what shell quoting rules are in use and how they interact with the
+user's specified ProxyCommand.
+
+To allow configurations that use strange user or hostnames to
+continue to work, this strictness is applied only to names coming
+from the commandline. Names specified using User or Hostname
+directives in ssh_config(5) are not affected.
+
+feedback/ok millert@ markus@ dtucker@ deraadt@
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3b487348b5964f3e77b6b4d3da4c3b439e94b2d9
+
+Reference:https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit?id=7ef3787c84b6b524501211b11a26c742f829af1a
+---
+ ssh.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+index 35c48e62d..48d93ddf2 100644
+--- a/ssh.c
++++ b/ssh.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.585 2023/02/10 04:40:28 djm Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.599 2023/12/18 14:47:44 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+@@ -626,6 +626,41 @@ ssh_conn_info_free(struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+ 	free(cinfo);
+ }
+ 
++static int
++valid_hostname(const char *s)
++{
++	size_t i;
++
++	if (*s == '-')
++		return 0;
++	for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
++		if (strchr("'`\"$\\;&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL ||
++		    isspace((u_char)s[i]) || iscntrl((u_char)s[i]))
++			return 0;
++	}
++	return 1;
++}
++
++static int
++valid_ruser(const char *s)
++{
++	size_t i;
++
++	if (*s == '-')
++		return 0;
++	for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
++		if (strchr("'`\";&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL)
++			return 0;
++		/* Disallow '-' after whitespace */
++		if (isspace((u_char)s[i]) && s[i + 1] == '-')
++			return 0;
++		/* Disallow \ in last position */
++		if (s[i] == '\\' && s[i + 1] == '\0')
++			return 0;
++	}
++	return 1;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Main program for the ssh client.
+  */
+@@ -1118,6 +1153,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	if (!host)
+ 		usage();
+ 
++	if (!valid_hostname(host))
++		fatal("hostname contains invalid characters");
++	if (options.user != NULL && !valid_ruser(options.user))
++		fatal("remote username contains invalid characters");
+ 	options.host_arg = xstrdup(host);
+ 
+ 	/* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */
+-- 
+2.23.0
+

openssh.spec

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 %{?no_gtk2:%global gtk2 0}
 
 %global sshd_uid    74
-%global openssh_release 2
+%global openssh_release 3
 
 Name:           openssh
 Version:        9.3p1
@@ -98,6 +98,8 @@ Patch73:        openssh-Add-sw64-architecture.patch
 Patch74:        add-strict-scp-check-for-CVE-2020-15778.patch
 Patch75:        skip-scp-test-if-there-is-no-scp-on-remote-path-as-s.patch
 Patch77:        set-ssh-config.patch
+Patch78:        backport-CVE-2023-48795-upstream-implement-strict-key-exchange-in-ssh-and-ss.patch
+Patch79:        backport-CVE-2023-51385-upstream-ban-user-hostnames-with-most-shell-metachar.patch
 
 Requires:       /sbin/nologin
 Requires:       libselinux >= 2.3-5 audit-libs >= 1.0.8
@@ -245,6 +247,8 @@ popd
 %patch74 -p1
 %patch75 -p1
 %patch77 -p1
+%patch78 -p1
+%patch79 -p1
 
 autoreconf
 pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4
@@ -451,6 +455,12 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8*
 
 %changelog
+* Tue Dec 26 2023 renmingshuai<renmingshuai@huawei.com> - 9.3p1-3
+- Type:CVE
+- CVE:CVE-2023-48795,CVE-2023-51385
+- SUG:NA
+- DESC:fix CVE-2023-48795 and CVE-2023-51385
+
 * Fri Aug 25 2023 renmingshuai<renmingshuai@huawei.com> - 9.3p1-2
 - Type:bugfix
 - CVE:NA