diff --git a/0000-nettle-3.3-remove-ecc-testsuite.patch b/0000-nettle-3.3-remove-ecc-testsuite.patch index 5320b87..782fcb4 100644 --- a/0000-nettle-3.3-remove-ecc-testsuite.patch +++ b/0000-nettle-3.3-remove-ecc-testsuite.patch @@ -1,14 +1,98 @@ -Subject: [PATCH] changes +From b519b23a141752043c9cc9182048c26d80d22af2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daiki Ueno +Date: Sun, 21 Mar 2021 11:09:51 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Remove secp192r1 and secp224r1 support + --- - nettle-3.4.1/examples/ecc-benchmark.c | 2 -- - nettle-3.4.1/examples/hogweed-benchmark.c | 32 ----------------------- - nettle-3.4.1/testsuite/ecdh-test.c | 20 -------------- - nettle-3.4.1/testsuite/ecdsa-sign-test.c | 32 ----------------------- - nettle-3.4.1/testsuite/testutils.c | 16 ------------ - 5 files changed, 102 deletions(-) - + eccdata.c | 67 +---------------------------------- + examples/ecc-benchmark.c | 2 -- + examples/hogweed-benchmark.c | 17 --------- + testsuite/ecdh-test.c | 40 --------------------- + testsuite/ecdsa-sign-test.c | 47 ------------------------ + testsuite/ecdsa-verify-test.c | 28 --------------- + testsuite/testutils.c | 20 ----------- + 7 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 220 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/eccdata.c b/eccdata.c +index 1b4cb0b5..dc2be5f9 100644 +--- a/eccdata.c ++++ b/eccdata.c +@@ -434,72 +434,7 @@ ecc_curve_init_str (struct ecc_curve *ecc, enum ecc_type type, + static void + ecc_curve_init (struct ecc_curve *ecc, const char *curve) + { +- if (!strcmp (curve, "secp192r1")) +- { +- ecc_curve_init_str (ecc, ECC_TYPE_WEIERSTRASS, +- /* p = 2^{192} - 2^{64} - 1 */ +- "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE" +- "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF", +- +- "64210519e59c80e70fa7e9ab72243049" +- "feb8deecc146b9b1", +- +- "ffffffffffffffffffffffff99def836" +- "146bc9b1b4d22831", +- +- "188da80eb03090f67cbf20eb43a18800" +- "f4ff0afd82ff1012", +- +- "07192b95ffc8da78631011ed6b24cdd5" +- "73f977a11e794811"); +- ecc->ref = ecc_alloc (3); +- ecc_set_str (&ecc->ref[0], /* 2 g */ +- "dafebf5828783f2ad35534631588a3f629a70fb16982a888", +- "dd6bda0d993da0fa46b27bbc141b868f59331afa5c7e93ab"); +- +- ecc_set_str (&ecc->ref[1], /* 3 g */ +- "76e32a2557599e6edcd283201fb2b9aadfd0d359cbb263da", +- "782c37e372ba4520aa62e0fed121d49ef3b543660cfd05fd"); +- +- ecc_set_str (&ecc->ref[2], /* 4 g */ +- "35433907297cc378b0015703374729d7a4fe46647084e4ba", +- "a2649984f2135c301ea3acb0776cd4f125389b311db3be32"); +- +- } +- else if (!strcmp (curve, "secp224r1")) +- { +- ecc_curve_init_str (ecc, ECC_TYPE_WEIERSTRASS, +- /* p = 2^{224} - 2^{96} + 1 */ +- "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff" +- "000000000000000000000001", +- +- "b4050a850c04b3abf54132565044b0b7" +- "d7bfd8ba270b39432355ffb4", +- +- "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffff16a2" +- "e0b8f03e13dd29455c5c2a3d", +- +- "b70e0cbd6bb4bf7f321390b94a03c1d3" +- "56c21122343280d6115c1d21", +- +- "bd376388b5f723fb4c22dfe6cd4375a0" +- "5a07476444d5819985007e34"); +- +- ecc->ref = ecc_alloc (3); +- ecc_set_str (&ecc->ref[0], /* 2 g */ +- "706a46dc76dcb76798e60e6d89474788d16dc18032d268fd1a704fa6", +- "1c2b76a7bc25e7702a704fa986892849fca629487acf3709d2e4e8bb"); +- +- ecc_set_str (&ecc->ref[1], /* 3 g */ +- "df1b1d66a551d0d31eff822558b9d2cc75c2180279fe0d08fd896d04", +- "a3f7f03cadd0be444c0aa56830130ddf77d317344e1af3591981a925"); +- +- ecc_set_str (&ecc->ref[2], /* 4 g */ +- "ae99feebb5d26945b54892092a8aee02912930fa41cd114e40447301", +- "482580a0ec5bc47e88bc8c378632cd196cb3fa058a7114eb03054c9"); +- +- } +- else if (!strcmp (curve, "secp256r1")) ++ if (!strcmp (curve, "secp256r1")) + { + ecc_curve_init_str (ecc, ECC_TYPE_WEIERSTRASS, + /* p = 2^{256} - 2^{224} + 2^{192} + 2^{96} - 1 */ diff --git a/examples/ecc-benchmark.c b/examples/ecc-benchmark.c -index 8e5e095..720d483 100644 +index 3ab269c7..402744a0 100644 --- a/examples/ecc-benchmark.c +++ b/examples/ecc-benchmark.c @@ -307,8 +307,6 @@ bench_curve (const struct ecc_curve *ecc) @@ -21,10 +105,10 @@ index 8e5e095..720d483 100644 &_nettle_secp_256r1, &_nettle_secp_384r1, diff --git a/examples/hogweed-benchmark.c b/examples/hogweed-benchmark.c -index ebce903..f13ea18 100644 +index 3d008021..b8cf902c 100644 --- a/examples/hogweed-benchmark.c +++ b/examples/hogweed-benchmark.c -@@ -412,24 +412,6 @@ bench_ecdsa_init (unsigned size) +@@ -412,23 +412,6 @@ bench_ecdsa_init (unsigned size) switch (size) { @@ -45,50 +129,37 @@ index ebce903..f13ea18 100644 - ctx->digest_size = 28; - break; - -- /* From RFC 4754 */ + /* From RFC 4754 */ case 256: ecc = &_nettle_secp_256r1; - xs = "2442A5CC 0ECD015F A3CA31DC 8E2BBC70 BF42D60C BCA20085 E0822CB0 4235E970"; -@@ -783,16 +765,6 @@ bench_openssl_ecdsa_init (unsigned size) - - switch (size) - { -- case 192: -- ctx->key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name (NID_X9_62_prime192v1); -- ctx->digest_length = 24; /* truncated */ -- ctx->digest = hash_string (&nettle_sha224, "abc"); -- break; -- case 224: -- ctx->key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name (NID_secp224r1); -- ctx->digest_length = SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE; -- ctx->digest = hash_string (&nettle_sha224, "abc"); -- break; - case 256: - ctx->key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name (NID_X9_62_prime256v1); - ctx->digest_length = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; -@@ -924,14 +896,10 @@ struct alg alg_list[] = { - #if 0 - { "dsa",2048, bench_dsa_init, bench_dsa_sign, bench_dsa_verify, bench_dsa_clear }, - #endif -- { "ecdsa", 192, bench_ecdsa_init, bench_ecdsa_sign, bench_ecdsa_verify, bench_ecdsa_clear }, -- { "ecdsa", 224, bench_ecdsa_init, bench_ecdsa_sign, bench_ecdsa_verify, bench_ecdsa_clear }, - { "ecdsa", 256, bench_ecdsa_init, bench_ecdsa_sign, bench_ecdsa_verify, bench_ecdsa_clear }, - { "ecdsa", 384, bench_ecdsa_init, bench_ecdsa_sign, bench_ecdsa_verify, bench_ecdsa_clear }, - { "ecdsa", 521, bench_ecdsa_init, bench_ecdsa_sign, bench_ecdsa_verify, bench_ecdsa_clear }, - #if WITH_OPENSSL -- { "ecdsa (openssl)", 192, bench_openssl_ecdsa_init, bench_openssl_ecdsa_sign, bench_openssl_ecdsa_verify, bench_openssl_ecdsa_clear }, -- { "ecdsa (openssl)", 224, bench_openssl_ecdsa_init, bench_openssl_ecdsa_sign, bench_openssl_ecdsa_verify, bench_openssl_ecdsa_clear }, - { "ecdsa (openssl)", 256, bench_openssl_ecdsa_init, bench_openssl_ecdsa_sign, bench_openssl_ecdsa_verify, bench_openssl_ecdsa_clear }, - { "ecdsa (openssl)", 384, bench_openssl_ecdsa_init, bench_openssl_ecdsa_sign, bench_openssl_ecdsa_verify, bench_openssl_ecdsa_clear }, - { "ecdsa (openssl)", 521, bench_openssl_ecdsa_init, bench_openssl_ecdsa_sign, bench_openssl_ecdsa_verify, bench_openssl_ecdsa_clear }, diff --git a/testsuite/ecdh-test.c b/testsuite/ecdh-test.c -index 5a2b39d..08870b1 100644 +index ff4f7233..2be26b19 100644 --- a/testsuite/ecdh-test.c +++ b/testsuite/ecdh-test.c -@@ -179,26 +179,6 @@ test_dh (const char *name, const struct ecc_curve *ecc, - "5298249600854377235107392014200406283816103564916230704184", - 1); - +@@ -159,46 +159,6 @@ test_public_key (const char *label, const struct ecc_curve *ecc, + void + test_main(void) + { +- test_public_key ("(0,0) with secp-192r1", &_nettle_secp_192r1, "0", "0", 0); +- test_public_key ( +- "(P,0) with secp-192r1", &_nettle_secp_192r1, +- "6277101735386680763835789423207666416083908700390324961279", +- "0", 0); +- test_public_key ( +- "(0,P) with secp-192r1", &_nettle_secp_192r1, "0", +- "6277101735386680763835789423207666416083908700390324961279", +- 0); +- test_public_key ( +- "(P,P) with secp-192r1", &_nettle_secp_192r1, +- "6277101735386680763835789423207666416083908700390324961279", +- "6277101735386680763835789423207666416083908700390324961279", +- 0); +- test_public_key ("(1,2) with secp-192r1", &_nettle_secp_192r1, "1", "2", 0); +- test_public_key ("(X,Y) with secp-192r1", &_nettle_secp_192r1, +- "1050363442265225480786760666329560655512990381040021438562", +- "5298249600854377235107392014200406283816103564916230704184", +- 1); +- - test_dh ("secp-192r1", &_nettle_secp_192r1, - "3406157206141798348095184987208239421004566462391397236532", - "1050363442265225480786760666329560655512990381040021438562", @@ -113,13 +184,28 @@ index 5a2b39d..08870b1 100644 "94731533361265297353914491124013058635674217345912524033267198103710636378786", "22441589863306126152768848344973918725077248391248404659242620344938484650846", diff --git a/testsuite/ecdsa-sign-test.c b/testsuite/ecdsa-sign-test.c -index 559de8e..2e84ed7 100644 +index 08a10a1d..0acd4e5c 100644 --- a/testsuite/ecdsa-sign-test.c +++ b/testsuite/ecdsa-sign-test.c -@@ -60,38 +60,6 @@ test_main (void) +@@ -58,53 +58,6 @@ test_ecdsa (const struct ecc_curve *ecc, + void + test_main (void) { - /* Test cases for the smaller groups, verified with a - proof-of-concept implementation done for Yubico AB. */ +- /* Producing the signature for corresponding test in +- ecdsa-verify-test.c, with special u1 and u2. */ +- test_ecdsa (&_nettle_secp_224r1, +- "99b5b787484def12894ca507058b3bf5" +- "43d72d82fa7721d2e805e5e6", +- "2", +- SHEX("cdb887ac805a3b42e22d224c85482053" +- "16c755d4a736bb2032c92553"), +- "706a46dc76dcb76798e60e6d89474788" +- "d16dc18032d268fd1a704fa6", /* r */ +- "3a41e1423b1853e8aa89747b1f987364" +- "44705d6d6d8371ea1f578f2e"); /* s */ +- +- /* Test cases for the smaller groups, verified with a +- proof-of-concept implementation done for Yubico AB. */ - test_ecdsa (&_nettle_secp_192r1, - "DC51D3866A15BACDE33D96F992FCA99D" - "A7E6EF0934E70975", /* z */ @@ -155,8 +241,47 @@ index 559de8e..2e84ed7 100644 /* From RFC 4754 */ test_ecdsa (&_nettle_secp_256r1, "DC51D386 6A15BACD E33D96F9 92FCA99D" +diff --git a/testsuite/ecdsa-verify-test.c b/testsuite/ecdsa-verify-test.c +index 8110c64d..71c0b5c0 100644 +--- a/testsuite/ecdsa-verify-test.c ++++ b/testsuite/ecdsa-verify-test.c +@@ -81,34 +81,6 @@ test_ecdsa (const struct ecc_curve *ecc, + void + test_main (void) + { +- /* Corresponds to nonce k = 2 and private key z = +- 0x99b5b787484def12894ca507058b3bf543d72d82fa7721d2e805e5e6. z and +- hash are chosen so that intermediate scalars in the verify +- equations are u1 = 0x6b245680e700, u2 = +- 259da6542d4ba7d21ad916c3bd57f811. These values require canonical +- reduction of the scalars. Bug caused by missing canonical +- reduction reported by Guido Vranken. */ +- test_ecdsa (&_nettle_secp_224r1, +- "9e7e6cc6b1bdfa8ee039b66ad85e5490" +- "7be706a900a3cba1c8fdd014", /* x */ +- "74855db3f7c1b4097ae095745fc915e3" +- "8a79d2a1de28f282eafb22ba", /* y */ +- +- SHEX("cdb887ac805a3b42e22d224c85482053" +- "16c755d4a736bb2032c92553"), +- "706a46dc76dcb76798e60e6d89474788" +- "d16dc18032d268fd1a704fa6", /* r */ +- "3a41e1423b1853e8aa89747b1f987364" +- "44705d6d6d8371ea1f578f2e"); /* s */ +- +- /* Test case provided by Guido Vranken, from oss-fuzz */ +- test_ecdsa (&_nettle_secp_192r1, +- "14683086 f1734c6d e68743a6 48181b54 a74d4c5b 383eb6a8", /* x */ +- " 1e2584 2ab8b2b0 4017f655 1b5e4058 a2aa0612 2dae9344", /* y */ +- SHEX("00"), /* h == 0 corner case*/ +- "952800792ed19341fdeeec047f2514f3b0f150d6066151fb", /* r */ +- "ec5971222014878b50d7a19d8954bc871e7e65b00b860ffb"); /* s */ +- + /* From RFC 4754 */ + test_ecdsa (&_nettle_secp_256r1, + "2442A5CC 0ECD015F A3CA31DC 8E2BBC70" diff --git a/testsuite/testutils.c b/testsuite/testutils.c -index c965618..7f6745a 100644 +index 2c6cac40..fbf4974c 100644 --- a/testsuite/testutils.c +++ b/testsuite/testutils.c @@ -1656,8 +1656,6 @@ test_dsa_key(const struct dsa_params *params, @@ -168,7 +293,7 @@ index c965618..7f6745a 100644 &_nettle_secp_256r1, &_nettle_secp_384r1, &_nettle_secp_521r1, -@@ -1714,24 +1712,6 @@ test_ecc_mul_a (unsigned curve, unsigned n, const mp_limb_t *p) +@@ -1714,24 +1712,6 @@ test_ecc_point (const struct ecc_curve *ecc, /* For each curve, the points g, 2 g, 3 g and 4 g */ static const struct ecc_ref_point ecc_ref[9][4] = { @@ -194,5 +319,4 @@ index c965618..7f6745a 100644 "4fe342e2fe1a7f9b8ee7eb4a7c0f9e162bce33576b315ececbb6406837bf51f5" }, { "7cf27b188d034f7e8a52380304b51ac3c08969e277f21b35a60b48fc47669978", -- -2.19.1 - +2.30.2 \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/backport-0001-CVE-2021-20305.patch b/backport-0001-CVE-2021-20305.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 606328e..0000000 --- a/backport-0001-CVE-2021-20305.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,220 +0,0 @@ -From a63893791280d441c713293491da97c79c0950fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: =?UTF-8?q?Niels=20M=C3=B6ller?= -Date: Thu, 11 Mar 2021 19:37:41 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] New functions ecc_mod_mul_canonical and - ecc_mod_sqr_canonical. - -* ecc-mod-arith.c (ecc_mod_mul_canonical, ecc_mod_sqr_canonical): -New functions. -* ecc-internal.h: Declare and document new functions. -* curve448-eh-to-x.c (curve448_eh_to_x): Use ecc_mod_sqr_canonical. -* curve25519-eh-to-x.c (curve25519_eh_to_x): Use ecc_mod_mul_canonical. -* ecc-eh-to-a.c (ecc_eh_to_a): Likewise. -* ecc-j-to-a.c (ecc_j_to_a): Likewise. -* ecc-mul-m.c (ecc_mul_m): Likewise. - -(cherry picked from commit 2bf497ba4d6acc6f352bca015837fad33008565c) ---- - ChangeLog | 11 +++++++++++ - curve25519-eh-to-x.c | 6 +----- - curve448-eh-to-x.c | 5 +---- - ecc-eh-to-a.c | 12 ++---------- - ecc-internal.h | 15 +++++++++++++++ - ecc-j-to-a.c | 15 +++------------ - ecc-mod-arith.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ - ecc-mul-m.c | 6 ++---- - 8 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) - -#diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog -#index fd138d82..5cc5c188 100644 -#--- a/ChangeLog -#+++ b/ChangeLog -#@@ -1,3 +1,14 @@ -#+2021-03-11 Niels Möller -#+ -#+ * ecc-mod-arith.c (ecc_mod_mul_canonical, ecc_mod_sqr_canonical): -#+ New functions. -#+ * ecc-internal.h: Declare and document new functions. -#+ * curve448-eh-to-x.c (curve448_eh_to_x): Use ecc_mod_sqr_canonical. -#+ * curve25519-eh-to-x.c (curve25519_eh_to_x): Use ecc_mod_mul_canonical. -#+ * ecc-eh-to-a.c (ecc_eh_to_a): Likewise. -#+ * ecc-j-to-a.c (ecc_j_to_a): Likewise. -#+ * ecc-mul-m.c (ecc_mul_m): Likewise. -#+ -# 2021-02-17 Niels Möller -# -# * Released Nettle-3.7.1. ---- a/curve25519-eh-to-x.c -+++ b/curve25519-eh-to-x.c -@@ -53,7 +53,6 @@ curve25519_eh_to_x (mp_limb_t *xp, const - #define t2 (scratch + 2*ecc->p.size) - - const struct ecc_curve *ecc = &_nettle_curve25519; -- mp_limb_t cy; - - /* If u = U/W and v = V/W are the coordiantes of the point on the - Edwards curve we get the curve25519 x coordinate as -@@ -69,10 +68,7 @@ curve25519_eh_to_x (mp_limb_t *xp, const - ecc->p.invert (&ecc->p, t1, t0, t2 + ecc->p.size); - - ecc_mod_add (&ecc->p, t0, wp, vp); -- ecc_mod_mul (&ecc->p, t2, t0, t1); -- -- cy = mpn_sub_n (xp, t2, ecc->p.m, ecc->p.size); -- cnd_copy (cy, xp, t2, ecc->p.size); -+ ecc_mod_mul_canonical (&ecc->p, xp, t0, t1, t2); - #undef vp - #undef wp - #undef t0 ---- a/curve448-eh-to-x.c -+++ b/curve448-eh-to-x.c -@@ -52,7 +52,6 @@ curve448_eh_to_x (mp_limb_t *xp, const m - #define t2 (scratch + 2*ecc->p.size) - - const struct ecc_curve *ecc = &_nettle_curve448; -- mp_limb_t cy; - - /* If u = U/W and v = V/W are the coordinates of the point on - edwards448 we get the curve448 x coordinate as -@@ -62,10 +61,8 @@ curve448_eh_to_x (mp_limb_t *xp, const m - /* Needs a total of 9*size storage. */ - ecc->p.invert (&ecc->p, t0, p, t1 + ecc->p.size); - ecc_mod_mul (&ecc->p, t1, t0, vp); -- ecc_mod_mul (&ecc->p, t2, t1, t1); -+ ecc_mod_mul_canonical (&ecc->p, xp, t1, t1, t2); - -- cy = mpn_sub_n (xp, t2, ecc->p.m, ecc->p.size); -- cnd_copy (cy, xp, t2, ecc->p.size); - #undef vp - #undef t0 - #undef t1 ---- a/ecc-eh-to-a.c -+++ b/ecc-eh-to-a.c -@@ -54,18 +54,11 @@ ecc_eh_to_a (const struct ecc_curve *ecc - #define yp (p + ecc->p.size) - #define zp (p + 2*ecc->p.size) - -- mp_limb_t cy; -- - assert(op == 0); - - /* Needs 2*size + scratch for the invert call. */ - ecc->p.invert (&ecc->p, izp, zp, tp + ecc->p.size); - -- ecc_mod_mul (&ecc->p, tp, xp, izp); -- cy = mpn_sub_n (r, tp, ecc->p.m, ecc->p.size); -- cnd_copy (cy, r, tp, ecc->p.size); -- -- ecc_mod_mul (&ecc->p, tp, yp, izp); -- cy = mpn_sub_n (r + ecc->p.size, tp, ecc->p.m, ecc->p.size); -- cnd_copy (cy, r + ecc->p.size, tp, ecc->p.size); -+ ecc_mod_mul_canonical (&ecc->p, r, xp, izp, tp); -+ ecc_mod_mul_canonical (&ecc->p, r + ecc->p.size, yp, izp, tp); - } ---- a/ecc-internal.h -+++ b/ecc-internal.h -@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@ - #define ecc_mod_submul_1 _nettle_ecc_mod_submul_1 - #define ecc_mod_mul _nettle_ecc_mod_mul - #define ecc_mod_sqr _nettle_ecc_mod_sqr -+#define ecc_mod_mul_canonical _nettle_ecc_mod_mul_canonical -+#define ecc_mod_sqr_canonical _nettle_ecc_mod_sqr_canonical - #define ecc_mod_random _nettle_ecc_mod_random - #define ecc_mod _nettle_ecc_mod - #define ecc_mod_inv _nettle_ecc_mod_inv -@@ -256,6 +258,19 @@ void - ecc_mod_sqr (const struct ecc_modulo *m, mp_limb_t *rp, - const mp_limb_t *ap); - -+/* These mul and sqr functions produce a canonical result, 0 <= R < M. -+ Requirements on input and output areas are similar to the above -+ functions, except that it is *not* allowed to pass rp = rp + -+ m->size. -+ */ -+void -+ecc_mod_mul_canonical (const struct ecc_modulo *m, mp_limb_t *rp, -+ const mp_limb_t *ap, const mp_limb_t *bp, mp_limb_t *tp); -+ -+void -+ecc_mod_sqr_canonical (const struct ecc_modulo *m, mp_limb_t *rp, -+ const mp_limb_t *ap, mp_limb_t *tp); -+ - /* mod q operations. */ - void - ecc_mod_random (const struct ecc_modulo *m, mp_limb_t *xp, ---- a/ecc-j-to-a.c -+++ b/ecc-j-to-a.c -@@ -51,8 +51,6 @@ ecc_j_to_a (const struct ecc_curve *ecc, - #define izBp (scratch + 3*ecc->p.size) - #define tp scratch - -- mp_limb_t cy; -- - if (ecc->use_redc) - { - /* Set v = (r_z / B^2)^-1, -@@ -86,17 +84,13 @@ ecc_j_to_a (const struct ecc_curve *ecc, - ecc_mod_sqr (&ecc->p, iz2p, izp); - } - -- ecc_mod_mul (&ecc->p, iz3p, iz2p, p); -- /* ecc_mod (and ecc_mod_mul) may return a value up to 2p - 1, so -- do a conditional subtraction. */ -- cy = mpn_sub_n (r, iz3p, ecc->p.m, ecc->p.size); -- cnd_copy (cy, r, iz3p, ecc->p.size); -- -+ ecc_mod_mul_canonical (&ecc->p, r, iz2p, p, iz3p); - if (op) - { - /* Skip y coordinate */ - if (op > 1) - { -+ mp_limb_t cy; - /* Also reduce the x coordinate mod ecc->q. It should - already be < 2*ecc->q, so one subtraction should - suffice. */ -@@ -106,10 +100,7 @@ ecc_j_to_a (const struct ecc_curve *ecc, - return; - } - ecc_mod_mul (&ecc->p, iz3p, iz2p, izp); -- ecc_mod_mul (&ecc->p, tp, iz3p, p + ecc->p.size); -- /* And a similar subtraction. */ -- cy = mpn_sub_n (r + ecc->p.size, tp, ecc->p.m, ecc->p.size); -- cnd_copy (cy, r + ecc->p.size, tp, ecc->p.size); -+ ecc_mod_mul_canonical (&ecc->p, r + ecc->p.size, iz3p, p + ecc->p.size, iz3p); - - #undef izp - #undef up ---- a/ecc-mod-arith.c -+++ b/ecc-mod-arith.c -@@ -119,6 +119,30 @@ ecc_mod_mul (const struct ecc_modulo *m, - } - - void -+ecc_mod_mul_canonical (const struct ecc_modulo *m, mp_limb_t *rp, -+ const mp_limb_t *ap, const mp_limb_t *bp, mp_limb_t *tp) -+{ -+ mp_limb_t cy; -+ mpn_mul_n (tp + m->size, ap, bp, m->size); -+ m->reduce (m, tp + m->size); -+ -+ cy = mpn_sub_n (rp, tp + m->size, m->m, m->size); -+ cnd_copy (cy, rp, tp + m->size, m->size); -+} -+ -+void -+ecc_mod_sqr_canonical (const struct ecc_modulo *m, mp_limb_t *rp, -+ const mp_limb_t *ap, mp_limb_t *tp) -+{ -+ mp_limb_t cy; -+ mpn_sqr (tp + m->size, ap, m->size); -+ m->reduce (m, tp + m->size); -+ -+ cy = mpn_sub_n (rp, tp + m->size, m->m, m->size); -+ cnd_copy (cy, rp, tp + m->size, m->size); -+} -+ -+void - ecc_mod_sqr (const struct ecc_modulo *m, mp_limb_t *rp, - const mp_limb_t *ap) - { diff --git a/backport-0002-CVE-2021-20305.patch b/backport-0002-CVE-2021-20305.patch deleted file mode 100644 index f0e1373..0000000 --- a/backport-0002-CVE-2021-20305.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,43 +0,0 @@ -From 971bed6ab4b27014eb23085e8176917e1a096fd5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: =?UTF-8?q?Niels=20M=C3=B6ller?= -Date: Sat, 13 Mar 2021 17:26:37 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] Use ecc_mod_mul_canonical for point comparison. - -* eddsa-verify.c (equal_h): Use ecc_mod_mul_canonical. - -(cherry picked from commit 5b7608fde3a6d2ab82bffb35db1e4e330927c906) ---- - ChangeLog | 4 ++++ - eddsa-verify.c | 9 ++------- - 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) - -#diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog -#index 5cc5c188..2a9217a6 100644 -#--- a/ChangeLog -#+++ b/ChangeLog -#@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@ -#+2021-03-13 Niels Möller -#+ -#+ * eddsa-verify.c (equal_h): Use ecc_mod_mul_canonical. -#+ -# 2021-03-11 Niels Möller -# -# * ecc-mod-arith.c (ecc_mod_mul_canonical, ecc_mod_sqr_canonical): ---- a/eddsa-verify.c -+++ b/eddsa-verify.c -@@ -53,13 +53,8 @@ equal_h (const struct ecc_modulo *p, - #define t0 scratch - #define t1 (scratch + p->size) - -- ecc_mod_mul (p, t0, x1, z2); -- if (mpn_cmp (t0, p->m, p->size) >= 0) -- mpn_sub_n (t0, t0, p->m, p->size); -- -- ecc_mod_mul (p, t1, x2, z1); -- if (mpn_cmp (t1, p->m, p->size) >= 0) -- mpn_sub_n (t1, t1, p->m, p->size); -+ ecc_mod_mul_canonical (p, t0, x1, z2, t0); -+ ecc_mod_mul_canonical (p, t1, x2, z1, t1); - - return mpn_cmp (t0, t1, p->size) == 0; - diff --git a/backport-0003-CVE-2021-20305.patch b/backport-0003-CVE-2021-20305.patch deleted file mode 100644 index ac7da97..0000000 --- a/backport-0003-CVE-2021-20305.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,107 +0,0 @@ -From 74ee0e82b6891e090f20723750faeb19064e31b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: =?UTF-8?q?Niels=20M=C3=B6ller?= -Date: Sat, 13 Mar 2021 15:19:19 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] Fix bug in ecc_ecdsa_verify. - -* ecc-ecdsa-verify.c (ecc_ecdsa_verify): Use ecc_mod_mul_canonical -to compute the scalars used for ecc multiplication. -* testsuite/ecdsa-verify-test.c (test_main): Add test case that -triggers an assert on 64-bit platforms, without above fix. -* testsuite/ecdsa-sign-test.c (test_main): Test case generating -the same signature. - -(cherry picked from commit 2397757b3f95fcae1e2d3011bf99ca5b5438378f) ---- - ChangeLog | 10 +++++++++- - ecc-ecdsa-verify.c | 4 ++-- - testsuite/ecdsa-sign-test.c | 13 +++++++++++++ - testsuite/ecdsa-verify-test.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ - 4 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) - -#diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog -#index 2a9217a6..63848f53 100644 -#--- a/ChangeLog -#+++ b/ChangeLog -#@@ -1,7 +1,15 @@ -# 2021-03-13 Niels Möller -# -#- * eddsa-verify.c (equal_h): Use ecc_mod_mul_canonical. -#+ * ecc-ecdsa-verify.c (ecc_ecdsa_verify): Use ecc_mod_mul_canonical -#+ to compute the scalars used for ecc multiplication. -#+ * testsuite/ecdsa-verify-test.c (test_main): Add test case that -#+ triggers an assert on 64-bit platforms, without above fix. -#+ * testsuite/ecdsa-sign-test.c (test_main): Test case generating -#+ the same signature. -#+ -#+2021-03-13 Niels Möller -# -#+ * eddsa-verify.c (equal_h): Use ecc_mod_mul_canonical. -# 2021-03-11 Niels Möller -# -# * ecc-mod-arith.c (ecc_mod_mul_canonical, ecc_mod_sqr_canonical): ---- a/ecc-ecdsa-verify.c -+++ b/ecc-ecdsa-verify.c -@@ -102,10 +102,10 @@ ecc_ecdsa_verify (const struct ecc_curve - - /* u1 = h / s, P1 = u1 * G */ - ecc_hash (&ecc->q, hp, length, digest); -- ecc_mod_mul (&ecc->q, u1, hp, sinv); -+ ecc_mod_mul_canonical (&ecc->q, u1, hp, sinv, u1); - - /* u2 = r / s, P2 = u2 * Y */ -- ecc_mod_mul (&ecc->q, u2, rp, sinv); -+ ecc_mod_mul_canonical (&ecc->q, u2, rp, sinv, u2); - - /* Total storage: 5*ecc->p.size + ecc->mul_itch */ - ecc->mul (ecc, P2, u2, pp, u2 + ecc->p.size); ---- a/testsuite/ecdsa-sign-test.c -+++ b/testsuite/ecdsa-sign-test.c -@@ -58,6 +58,19 @@ test_ecdsa (const struct ecc_curve *ecc, - void - test_main (void) - { -+ /* Producing the signature for corresponding test in -+ ecdsa-verify-test.c, with special u1 and u2. */ -+ test_ecdsa (&_nettle_secp_224r1, -+ "99b5b787484def12894ca507058b3bf5" -+ "43d72d82fa7721d2e805e5e6", -+ "2", -+ SHEX("cdb887ac805a3b42e22d224c85482053" -+ "16c755d4a736bb2032c92553"), -+ "706a46dc76dcb76798e60e6d89474788" -+ "d16dc18032d268fd1a704fa6", /* r */ -+ "3a41e1423b1853e8aa89747b1f987364" -+ "44705d6d6d8371ea1f578f2e"); /* s */ -+ - /* Test cases for the smaller groups, verified with a - proof-of-concept implementation done for Yubico AB. */ - /* From RFC 4754 */ ---- a/testsuite/ecdsa-verify-test.c -+++ b/testsuite/ecdsa-verify-test.c -@@ -81,6 +81,26 @@ test_ecdsa (const struct ecc_curve *ecc, - void - test_main (void) - { -+ /* Corresponds to nonce k = 2 and private key z = -+ 0x99b5b787484def12894ca507058b3bf543d72d82fa7721d2e805e5e6. z and -+ hash are chosen so that intermediate scalars in the verify -+ equations are u1 = 0x6b245680e700, u2 = -+ 259da6542d4ba7d21ad916c3bd57f811. These values require canonical -+ reduction of the scalars. Bug caused by missing canonical -+ reduction reported by Guido Vranken. */ -+ test_ecdsa (&_nettle_secp_224r1, -+ "9e7e6cc6b1bdfa8ee039b66ad85e5490" -+ "7be706a900a3cba1c8fdd014", /* x */ -+ "74855db3f7c1b4097ae095745fc915e3" -+ "8a79d2a1de28f282eafb22ba", /* y */ -+ -+ SHEX("cdb887ac805a3b42e22d224c85482053" -+ "16c755d4a736bb2032c92553"), -+ "706a46dc76dcb76798e60e6d89474788" -+ "d16dc18032d268fd1a704fa6", /* r */ -+ "3a41e1423b1853e8aa89747b1f987364" -+ "44705d6d6d8371ea1f578f2e"); /* s */ -+ - /* From RFC 4754 */ - test_ecdsa (&_nettle_secp_256r1, - "2442A5CC 0ECD015F A3CA31DC 8E2BBC70" diff --git a/backport-0004-CVE-2021-20305.patch b/backport-0004-CVE-2021-20305.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 6fa857a..0000000 --- a/backport-0004-CVE-2021-20305.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,40 +0,0 @@ -From 51f643eee00e2caa65c8a2f5857f49acdf3ef1ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: =?UTF-8?q?Niels=20M=C3=B6ller?= -Date: Sat, 13 Mar 2021 16:27:50 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] Ensure ecdsa_sign output is canonically reduced. - -* ecc-ecdsa-sign.c (ecc_ecdsa_sign): Ensure s output is reduced to -canonical range. - -(cherry picked from commit c24b36160dc5303f7541dd9da1429c4046f27398) ---- - ChangeLog | 3 +++ - ecc-ecdsa-sign.c | 3 +-- - 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -#diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog -#index 63848f53..fb2d7f66 100644 -#--- a/ChangeLog -#+++ b/ChangeLog -#@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@ -# 2021-03-13 Niels Möller -# -#+ * ecc-ecdsa-sign.c (ecc_ecdsa_sign): Ensure s output is reduced to -#+ canonical range. -#+ -# * ecc-ecdsa-verify.c (ecc_ecdsa_verify): Use ecc_mod_mul_canonical -# to compute the scalars used for ecc multiplication. -# * testsuite/ecdsa-verify-test.c (test_main): Add test case that ---- a/ecc-ecdsa-sign.c -+++ b/ecc-ecdsa-sign.c -@@ -90,9 +90,8 @@ ecc_ecdsa_sign (const struct ecc_curve * - - ecc_mod_mul (&ecc->q, tp, zp, rp); - ecc_mod_add (&ecc->q, hp, hp, tp); -- ecc_mod_mul (&ecc->q, tp, hp, kinv); -+ ecc_mod_mul_canonical (&ecc->q, sp, hp, kinv, tp); - -- mpn_copyi (sp, tp, ecc->p.size); - #undef P - #undef hp - #undef kinv diff --git a/backport-0005-CVE-2021-20305.patch b/backport-0005-CVE-2021-20305.patch deleted file mode 100644 index d7b9c55..0000000 --- a/backport-0005-CVE-2021-20305.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,44 +0,0 @@ -From 401c8d53d8a8cf1e79980e62bda3f946f8e07c14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: =?UTF-8?q?Niels=20M=C3=B6ller?= -Date: Sat, 13 Mar 2021 16:29:50 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] Analogous fix to ecc_gostdsa_verify. - -* ecc-gostdsa-verify.c (ecc_gostdsa_verify): Use ecc_mod_mul_canonical -to compute the scalars used for ecc multiplication. - -(cherry picked from commit fbaefb64b90cb45b7075a0ed72a92f2a1fbcd2ab) ---- - ChangeLog | 3 +++ - ecc-gostdsa-verify.c | 6 +++--- - 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) - -#diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog -#index fb2d7f66..5f8a22c2 100644 -#--- a/ChangeLog -#+++ b/ChangeLog -#@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@ -# 2021-03-13 Niels Möller -# -#+ * ecc-gostdsa-verify.c (ecc_gostdsa_verify): Use ecc_mod_mul_canonical -#+ to compute the scalars used for ecc multiplication. -#+ -# * ecc-ecdsa-sign.c (ecc_ecdsa_sign): Ensure s output is reduced to -# canonical range. -# ---- a/ecc-gostdsa-verify.c -+++ b/ecc-gostdsa-verify.c -@@ -102,11 +102,11 @@ ecc_gostdsa_verify (const struct ecc_cur - ecc->q.invert (&ecc->q, vp, hp, vp + 2*ecc->p.size); - - /* z1 = s / h, P1 = z1 * G */ -- ecc_mod_mul (&ecc->q, z1, sp, vp); -+ ecc_mod_mul_canonical (&ecc->q, z1, sp, vp, z1); - - /* z2 = - r / h, P2 = z2 * Y */ -- ecc_mod_mul (&ecc->q, z2, rp, vp); -- mpn_sub_n (z2, ecc->q.m, z2, ecc->p.size); -+ mpn_sub_n (hp, ecc->q.m, rp, ecc->p.size); -+ ecc_mod_mul_canonical (&ecc->q, z2, hp, vp, z2); - - /* Total storage: 5*ecc->p.size + ecc->mul_itch */ - ecc->mul (ecc, P2, z2, pp, z2 + ecc->p.size); diff --git a/backport-0006-CVE-2021-20305.patch b/backport-0006-CVE-2021-20305.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 4d00c35..0000000 --- a/backport-0006-CVE-2021-20305.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,55 +0,0 @@ -From ae3801a0e5cce276c270973214385c86048d5f7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: =?UTF-8?q?Niels=20M=C3=B6ller?= -Date: Sat, 13 Mar 2021 16:42:21 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] Similar fix for eddsa. - -* eddsa-hash.c (_eddsa_hash): Ensure result is canonically -reduced. Two of the three call sites need that. - -(cherry picked from commit d9b564e4b3b3a5691afb9328c7342b3f7ca64288) ---- - ChangeLog | 3 +++ - eddsa-hash.c | 10 +++++++--- - 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) - -#diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog -#index 5f8a22c2..ce330831 100644 -#--- a/ChangeLog -#+++ b/ChangeLog -#@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@ -# 2021-03-13 Niels Möller -# -#+ * eddsa-hash.c (_eddsa_hash): Ensure result is canonically -#+ reduced. Two of the three call sites need that. -#+ -# * ecc-gostdsa-verify.c (ecc_gostdsa_verify): Use ecc_mod_mul_canonical -# to compute the scalars used for ecc multiplication. -# ---- a/eddsa-hash.c -+++ b/eddsa-hash.c -@@ -44,13 +44,14 @@ - #include "ecc-internal.h" - #include "nettle-internal.h" - --/* Convert hash digest to integer, and reduce modulo q, to m->size -- limbs. Needs space for 2*m->size + 1 at rp. */ -+/* Convert hash digest to integer, and reduce canonically modulo q. -+ Needs space for 2*m->size + 1 at rp. */ - void - _eddsa_hash (const struct ecc_modulo *m, - mp_limb_t *rp, size_t digest_size, const uint8_t *digest) - { - mp_size_t nlimbs = (8*digest_size + GMP_NUMB_BITS - 1) / GMP_NUMB_BITS; -+ mp_limb_t cy; - - mpn_set_base256_le (rp, nlimbs, digest, digest_size); - -@@ -75,4 +76,8 @@ _eddsa_hash (const struct ecc_modulo *m, - assert (hi == 0); - } - m->mod (m, rp); -+ mpn_copyi (rp + m->size, rp, m->size); -+ /* Ensure canonical reduction. */ -+ cy = mpn_sub_n (rp, rp + m->size, m->m, m->size); -+ cnd_copy (cy, rp, rp + m->size, m->size); - } diff --git a/backport-0007-CVE-2021-20305.patch b/backport-0007-CVE-2021-20305.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 23559e3..0000000 --- a/backport-0007-CVE-2021-20305.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,38 +0,0 @@ -From 63f222c60b03470c0005aa9bc4296fbf585f68b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: =?UTF-8?q?Niels=20M=C3=B6ller?= -Date: Sat, 13 Mar 2021 16:45:34 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] Fix canonical reduction in gostdsa_vko. - -* gostdsa-vko.c (gostdsa_vko): Use ecc_mod_mul_canonical to -compute the scalar used for ecc multiplication. - -(cherry picked from commit b30e0ca6d2b41579a5b6a010fc54065d790e8d55) ---- - ChangeLog | 3 +++ - gostdsa-vko.c | 2 +- - 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -#diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog -#index ce330831..8a27a9a6 100644 -#--- a/ChangeLog -#+++ b/ChangeLog -#@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@ -# 2021-03-13 Niels Möller -# -#+ * gostdsa-vko.c (gostdsa_vko): Use ecc_mod_mul_canonical to -#+ compute the scalar used for ecc multiplication. -#+ -# * eddsa-hash.c (_eddsa_hash): Ensure result is canonically -# reduced. Two of the three call sites need that. -# ---- a/gostdsa-vko.c -+++ b/gostdsa-vko.c -@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ gostdsa_vko (const struct ecc_scalar *pr - if (mpn_zero_p (UKM, size)) - UKM[0] = 1; - -- ecc_mod_mul (&ecc->q, TEMP, priv->p, UKM); /* TEMP = UKM * priv */ -+ ecc_mod_mul_canonical (&ecc->q, TEMP, priv->p, UKM, TEMP); /* TEMP = UKM * priv */ - ecc->mul (ecc, XYZ, TEMP, pub->p, scratch + 4*size); /* XYZ = UKM * priv * pub */ - ecc->h_to_a (ecc, 0, TEMP, XYZ, scratch + 5*size); /* TEMP = XYZ */ - mpn_get_base256_le (out, bsize, TEMP, size); diff --git a/backport-CVE-2021-3580.patch b/backport-CVE-2021-3580.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 0cf8ae3..0000000 --- a/backport-CVE-2021-3580.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,382 +0,0 @@ -Description: Fix for CVE-2021-3580 - potential crash on invalid input to the RSA decryption functions. -Origin: upstream, https://git.lysator.liu.se/nettle/nettle/-/compare/7a5f86321f4c67d7219aa87ea4e2ddca677d7378...0ad0b5df315665250dfdaa4a1e087f4799edaefe -Bug-RedHat: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2021-3580 - ---- a/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c -+++ b/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c -@@ -64,7 +64,9 @@ _pkcs1_sec_decrypt (size_t length, uint8 - volatile int ok; - size_t i, t; - -- assert (padded_message_length >= length); -+ /* Message independent branch */ -+ if (length + 11 > padded_message_length) -+ return 0; - - t = padded_message_length - length - 1; - ---- a/rsa-decrypt-tr.c -+++ b/rsa-decrypt-tr.c -@@ -52,14 +52,17 @@ rsa_decrypt_tr(const struct rsa_public_k - mp_size_t key_limb_size; - int res; - -- key_limb_size = NETTLE_OCTET_SIZE_TO_LIMB_SIZE(key->size); -+ /* First check that input is in range. */ -+ if (mpz_sgn (gibberish) < 0 || mpz_cmp (gibberish, pub->n) >= 0) -+ return 0; -+ -+ key_limb_size = mpz_size(pub->n); - - TMP_GMP_ALLOC (m, key_limb_size); - TMP_GMP_ALLOC (em, key->size); -+ mpz_limbs_copy(m, gibberish, key_limb_size); - -- res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m, -- mpz_limbs_read(gibberish), -- mpz_size(gibberish)); -+ res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m, m); - - mpn_get_base256 (em, key->size, m, key_limb_size); - ---- a/rsa-decrypt.c -+++ b/rsa-decrypt.c -@@ -48,6 +48,16 @@ rsa_decrypt(const struct rsa_private_key - int res; - - mpz_init(m); -+ -+ /* First check that input is in range. Since we don't have the -+ public key available here, we need to reconstruct n. */ -+ mpz_mul (m, key->p, key->q); -+ if (mpz_sgn (gibberish) < 0 || mpz_cmp (gibberish, m) >= 0) -+ { -+ mpz_clear (m); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ - rsa_compute_root(key, m, gibberish); - - res = pkcs1_decrypt (key->size, m, length, message); ---- a/rsa-internal.h -+++ b/rsa-internal.h -@@ -53,11 +53,11 @@ _rsa_sec_compute_root(const struct rsa_p - mp_limb_t *scratch); - - /* Safe side-channel silent variant, using RSA blinding, and checking the -- * result after CRT. */ -+ * result after CRT. In-place calls, with x == m, is allowed. */ - int - _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub, - const struct rsa_private_key *key, - void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random, -- mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m, size_t mn); -+ mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m); - - #endif /* NETTLE_RSA_INTERNAL_H_INCLUDED */ ---- a/rsa-sec-decrypt.c -+++ b/rsa-sec-decrypt.c -@@ -54,12 +54,19 @@ rsa_sec_decrypt(const struct rsa_public_ - TMP_GMP_DECL (em, uint8_t); - int res; - -+ /* First check that input is in range. */ -+ if (mpz_sgn (gibberish) < 0 || mpz_cmp (gibberish, pub->n) >= 0) -+ return 0; -+ - TMP_GMP_ALLOC (m, mpz_size(pub->n)); - TMP_GMP_ALLOC (em, key->size); - -- res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m, -- mpz_limbs_read(gibberish), -- mpz_size(gibberish)); -+ /* We need a copy because m can be shorter than key_size, -+ * but _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr expect all inputs to be -+ * normalized to a key_size long buffer length */ -+ mpz_limbs_copy(m, gibberish, mpz_size(pub->n)); -+ -+ res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m, m); - - mpn_get_base256 (em, key->size, m, mpz_size(pub->n)); - ---- a/rsa-sign-tr.c -+++ b/rsa-sign-tr.c -@@ -131,35 +131,34 @@ int - _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub, - const struct rsa_private_key *key, - void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random, -- mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m, size_t mn) -+ mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m) - { -+ mp_size_t nn; - mpz_t mz; - mpz_t xz; - int res; - -- mpz_init(mz); - mpz_init(xz); - -- mpn_copyi(mpz_limbs_write(mz, mn), m, mn); -- mpz_limbs_finish(mz, mn); -+ nn = mpz_size (pub->n); - -- res = rsa_compute_root_tr(pub, key, random_ctx, random, xz, mz); -+ res = rsa_compute_root_tr(pub, key, random_ctx, random, xz, -+ mpz_roinit_n(mz, m, nn)); - - if (res) -- mpz_limbs_copy(x, xz, mpz_size(pub->n)); -+ mpz_limbs_copy(x, xz, nn); - -- mpz_clear(mz); - mpz_clear(xz); - return res; - } - #else - /* Blinds m, by computing c = m r^e (mod n), for a random r. Also -- returns the inverse (ri), for use by rsa_unblind. */ -+ returns the inverse (ri), for use by rsa_unblind. Must have c != m, -+ no in-place operation.*/ - static void - rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub, - void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random, -- mp_limb_t *c, mp_limb_t *ri, const mp_limb_t *m, -- mp_size_t mn) -+ mp_limb_t *c, mp_limb_t *ri, const mp_limb_t *m) - { - const mp_limb_t *ep = mpz_limbs_read (pub->e); - const mp_limb_t *np = mpz_limbs_read (pub->n); -@@ -177,15 +176,15 @@ rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_k - - /* c = m*(r^e) mod n */ - itch = mpn_sec_powm_itch(nn, ebn, nn); -- i2 = mpn_sec_mul_itch(nn, mn); -+ i2 = mpn_sec_mul_itch(nn, nn); - itch = MAX(itch, i2); -- i2 = mpn_sec_div_r_itch(nn + mn, nn); -+ i2 = mpn_sec_div_r_itch(2*nn, nn); - itch = MAX(itch, i2); - i2 = mpn_sec_invert_itch(nn); - itch = MAX(itch, i2); - -- TMP_GMP_ALLOC (tp, nn + mn + itch); -- scratch = tp + nn + mn; -+ TMP_GMP_ALLOC (tp, 2*nn + itch); -+ scratch = tp + 2*nn; - - /* ri = r^(-1) */ - do -@@ -198,9 +197,8 @@ rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_k - while (!mpn_sec_invert (ri, tp, np, nn, 2 * nn * GMP_NUMB_BITS, scratch)); - - mpn_sec_powm (c, rp, nn, ep, ebn, np, nn, scratch); -- /* normally mn == nn, but m can be smaller in some cases */ -- mpn_sec_mul (tp, c, nn, m, mn, scratch); -- mpn_sec_div_r (tp, nn + mn, np, nn, scratch); -+ mpn_sec_mul (tp, c, nn, m, nn, scratch); -+ mpn_sec_div_r (tp, 2*nn, np, nn, scratch); - mpn_copyi(c, tp, nn); - - TMP_GMP_FREE (r); -@@ -208,7 +206,7 @@ rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_k - TMP_GMP_FREE (tp); - } - --/* m = c ri mod n */ -+/* m = c ri mod n. Allows x == c. */ - static void - rsa_sec_unblind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub, - mp_limb_t *x, mp_limb_t *ri, const mp_limb_t *c) -@@ -298,7 +296,7 @@ int - _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub, - const struct rsa_private_key *key, - void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random, -- mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m, size_t mn) -+ mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m) - { - TMP_GMP_DECL (c, mp_limb_t); - TMP_GMP_DECL (ri, mp_limb_t); -@@ -306,7 +304,7 @@ _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rs - size_t key_limb_size; - int ret; - -- key_limb_size = NETTLE_OCTET_SIZE_TO_LIMB_SIZE(key->size); -+ key_limb_size = mpz_size(pub->n); - - /* mpz_powm_sec handles only odd moduli. If p, q or n is even, the - key is invalid and rejected by rsa_private_key_prepare. However, -@@ -320,19 +318,18 @@ _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rs - } - - assert(mpz_size(pub->n) == key_limb_size); -- assert(mn <= key_limb_size); - - TMP_GMP_ALLOC (c, key_limb_size); - TMP_GMP_ALLOC (ri, key_limb_size); - TMP_GMP_ALLOC (scratch, _rsa_sec_compute_root_itch(key)); - -- rsa_sec_blind (pub, random_ctx, random, x, ri, m, mn); -+ rsa_sec_blind (pub, random_ctx, random, c, ri, m); - -- _rsa_sec_compute_root(key, c, x, scratch); -+ _rsa_sec_compute_root(key, x, c, scratch); - -- ret = rsa_sec_check_root(pub, c, x); -+ ret = rsa_sec_check_root(pub, x, c); - -- rsa_sec_unblind(pub, x, ri, c); -+ rsa_sec_unblind(pub, x, ri, x); - - cnd_mpn_zero(1 - ret, x, key_limb_size); - -@@ -356,17 +353,17 @@ rsa_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_pub - mpz_t x, const mpz_t m) - { - TMP_GMP_DECL (l, mp_limb_t); -+ mp_size_t nn = mpz_size(pub->n); - int res; - -- mp_size_t l_size = NETTLE_OCTET_SIZE_TO_LIMB_SIZE(key->size); -- TMP_GMP_ALLOC (l, l_size); -+ TMP_GMP_ALLOC (l, nn); -+ mpz_limbs_copy(l, m, nn); - -- res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, l, -- mpz_limbs_read(m), mpz_size(m)); -+ res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, l, l); - if (res) { -- mp_limb_t *xp = mpz_limbs_write (x, l_size); -- mpn_copyi (xp, l, l_size); -- mpz_limbs_finish (x, l_size); -+ mp_limb_t *xp = mpz_limbs_write (x, nn); -+ mpn_copyi (xp, l, nn); -+ mpz_limbs_finish (x, nn); - } - - TMP_GMP_FREE (l); ---- a/rsa.h -+++ b/rsa.h -@@ -433,13 +433,14 @@ rsa_sec_decrypt(const struct rsa_public_ - size_t length, uint8_t *message, - const mpz_t gibberish); - --/* Compute x, the e:th root of m. Calling it with x == m is allowed. */ -+/* Compute x, the e:th root of m. Calling it with x == m is allowed. -+ It is required that 0 <= m < n. */ - void - rsa_compute_root(const struct rsa_private_key *key, - mpz_t x, const mpz_t m); - - /* Safer variant, using RSA blinding, and checking the result after -- CRT. */ -+ CRT. It is required that 0 <= m < n. */ - int - rsa_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub, - const struct rsa_private_key *key, ---- a/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c -+++ b/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c -@@ -19,10 +19,12 @@ test_main(void) - uint8_t after; - - mpz_t gibberish; -+ mpz_t bad_input; - - rsa_private_key_init(&key); - rsa_public_key_init(&pub); - mpz_init(gibberish); -+ mpz_init(bad_input); - - knuth_lfib_init(&lfib, 17); - -@@ -101,6 +103,42 @@ test_main(void) - ASSERT(decrypted[decrypted_length] == after); - ASSERT(decrypted[0] == 'A'); - -+ /* Test zero input. */ -+ mpz_set_ui (bad_input, 0); -+ decrypted_length = msg_length; -+ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input)); -+ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt_tr(&pub, &key, -+ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random, -+ &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input)); -+ ASSERT(!rsa_sec_decrypt(&pub, &key, -+ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random, -+ decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input)); -+ ASSERT(decrypted_length == msg_length); -+ -+ /* Test input that is slightly larger than n */ -+ mpz_add(bad_input, gibberish, pub.n); -+ decrypted_length = msg_length; -+ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input)); -+ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt_tr(&pub, &key, -+ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random, -+ &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input)); -+ ASSERT(!rsa_sec_decrypt(&pub, &key, -+ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random, -+ decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input)); -+ ASSERT(decrypted_length == msg_length); -+ -+ /* Test input that is considerably larger than n */ -+ mpz_mul_2exp (bad_input, pub.n, 100); -+ mpz_add (bad_input, bad_input, gibberish); -+ decrypted_length = msg_length; -+ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input)); -+ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt_tr(&pub, &key, -+ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random, -+ &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input)); -+ ASSERT(!rsa_sec_decrypt(&pub, &key, -+ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random, -+ decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input)); -+ ASSERT(decrypted_length == msg_length); - - /* Test invalid key. */ - mpz_add_ui (key.q, key.q, 2); -@@ -112,6 +150,6 @@ test_main(void) - rsa_private_key_clear(&key); - rsa_public_key_clear(&pub); - mpz_clear(gibberish); -+ mpz_clear(bad_input); - free(decrypted); - } -- ---- a/testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c -+++ b/testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c -@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ rsa_decrypt_for_test(const struct rsa_pu - #endif - - #define PAYLOAD_SIZE 50 -+#define DECRYPTED_SIZE 256 - void - test_main(void) - { -@@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ test_main(void) - struct knuth_lfib_ctx random_ctx; - - uint8_t plaintext[PAYLOAD_SIZE]; -- uint8_t decrypted[PAYLOAD_SIZE]; -+ uint8_t decrypted[DECRYPTED_SIZE]; - uint8_t verifybad[PAYLOAD_SIZE]; - unsigned n_size = 1024; - mpz_t gibberish; -@@ -98,6 +99,20 @@ test_main(void) - PAYLOAD_SIZE, decrypted, gibberish) == 1); - ASSERT (MEMEQ (PAYLOAD_SIZE, plaintext, decrypted)); - -+ ASSERT (pub.size > 10); -+ ASSERT (pub.size <= DECRYPTED_SIZE); -+ -+ /* Check that too large message length is rejected, largest -+ valid size is pub.size - 11. */ -+ ASSERT (!rsa_decrypt_for_test (&pub, &key, &random_ctx, -+ (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random, -+ pub.size - 10, decrypted, gibberish)); -+ -+ /* This case used to result in arithmetic underflow and a crash. */ -+ ASSERT (!rsa_decrypt_for_test (&pub, &key, &random_ctx, -+ (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random, -+ pub.size, decrypted, gibberish)); -+ - /* bad one */ - memcpy(decrypted, verifybad, PAYLOAD_SIZE); - nettle_mpz_random_size(garbage, &random_ctx, - diff --git a/nettle-3.6.tar.gz b/nettle-3.6.tar.gz deleted file mode 100644 index 9c73f17..0000000 Binary files a/nettle-3.6.tar.gz and /dev/null differ diff --git a/nettle-3.7.3.tar.gz b/nettle-3.7.3.tar.gz new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7e42ccb Binary files /dev/null and b/nettle-3.7.3.tar.gz differ diff --git a/nettle.spec b/nettle.spec index 0cc52aa..c7e5aec 100644 --- a/nettle.spec +++ b/nettle.spec @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ Name: nettle -Version: 3.6 -Release: 7 +Version: 3.7.3 +Release: 1 Summary: A low-level cryptographic library License: LGPLv3+ or GPLv2+ URL: https://www.lysator.liu.se/~nisse/nettle/ @@ -8,15 +8,6 @@ Source0: https://www.lysator.liu.se/~nisse/archive/%{name}-%{version}.tar Patch0: 0000-nettle-3.3-remove-ecc-testsuite.patch -Patch6000: backport-0001-CVE-2021-20305.patch -Patch6001: backport-0002-CVE-2021-20305.patch -Patch6002: backport-0003-CVE-2021-20305.patch -Patch6003: backport-0004-CVE-2021-20305.patch -Patch6004: backport-0005-CVE-2021-20305.patch -Patch6005: backport-0006-CVE-2021-20305.patch -Patch6006: backport-0007-CVE-2021-20305.patch -Patch6007: backport-CVE-2021-3580.patch - BuildRequires: automake autoconf fipscheck gcc gettext-devel gmp-devel libtool m4 BuildRequires: nettle @@ -36,11 +27,11 @@ The devel for %{name} %package_help %prep -%autosetup -n %{name}-3.6 -p1 +%autosetup -n %{name}-%{version} -p1 sed s/ggdb3/g/ -i configure -sed 's/ecc-192.c//g' -i Makefile.in -sed 's/ecc-224.c//g' -i Makefile.in +sed 's/ecc-secp192r1.c//g' -i Makefile.in +sed 's/ecc-secp224r1.c//g' -i Makefile.in %build autoreconf -ifv @@ -87,6 +78,12 @@ make check %ldconfig_scriptlets %changelog +* Sat Mar 19 2022 quanhongfei - 3.7.3-1 +- Type:requirements +- Id:NA +- SUG:NA +- DESC:update nettle to 3.7.3 + * Mon Aug 16 2021 gaihuiying - 3.6-7 - Type:CVE - CVE:CVE-2021-3580