packages/mutt
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

!30 fix CVE-2020-14154

Browse Source 
From: @starlet-dx
Reviewed-by: @small_leek
Signed-off-by: @small_leek
This commit is contained in:
openeuler-ci-bot 2021-10-15 02:44:02 +00:00 committed by Gitee
commit 1ae70d79e3
4 changed files with 300 additions and 1 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

188
CVE-2020-14154-1.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
From bb0e6277a45a5d4c3a30d3b968eeb31d78124e95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kevin McCarthy <kevin@8t8.us>
Date: Fri, 5 Jun 2020 15:21:03 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Fix GnuTLS tls_verify_peers() checking.
* Change the function to pass the certstatus parameter by reference,
and indicate success/failure of the function via the return value. It
was previously returning the certstatus, but was also returning 0 or
the *unset* certstatus on error too. Since a 0 certstatus means
"success", this meant a gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2() failure
would be regarded as a valid cert.
* The gnutls_certificate_type_get() inside tls_verify_peers() checks
the *client* certificate type. Since it was only called if gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2() failed, I assume was either a
mistake, or perhaps an attempt to give a special error message if the
client cert was OpenPGP. In either case, the error message was not
very informative, so just remove the call and special error message.
* Fix GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND check to be against verify_ret
instead of certstat.
* Fix gnutls_strerror() call to use verify_ret instead of certstat.
* gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2() already calls and checks gnutls_auth_get_type(), so remove call at the beginning of tls_check_certificate().
* gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2() also verifies the certificate
type for the *server* is GNUTLS_CRT_X509. Add a comment about that.
---
mutt_ssl_gnutls.c | 100 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 60 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mutt_ssl_gnutls.c b/mutt_ssl_gnutls.c
index 8fc6421..19d47b3 100644
--- a/mutt_ssl_gnutls.c
+++ b/mutt_ssl_gnutls.c
@@ -684,6 +684,9 @@ static int tls_check_stored_hostname (const gnutls_datum_t *cert,
return 0;
}
+/* Returns 0 on success
+ * -1 on failure
+ */
static int tls_check_preauth (const gnutls_datum_t *certdata,
gnutls_certificate_status_t certstat,
const char *hostname, int chainidx, int* certerr,
@@ -802,8 +805,8 @@ static int tls_check_preauth (const gnutls_datum_t *certdata,
return -1;
}
-/*
- * Returns 0 on failure, nonzero on success.
+/* Returns 1 on success.
+ * 0 on failure.
*/
static int tls_check_one_certificate (const gnutls_datum_t *certdata,
gnutls_certificate_status_t certstat,
@@ -1086,44 +1089,57 @@ static int tls_check_one_certificate (const gnutls_datum_t *certdata,
mutt_menuDestroy (&menu);
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (cert);
- return (done == 2);
+ return (done == 2) ? 1 : 0;
}
-/* sanity-checking wrapper for gnutls_certificate_verify_peers */
-static gnutls_certificate_status_t tls_verify_peers (gnutls_session_t tlsstate)
+/* sanity-checking wrapper for gnutls_certificate_verify_peers.
+ *
+ * certstat is technically a bitwise-or of gnutls_certificate_status_t
+ * values.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * - 0 if certstat was set. note: this does not mean success.
+ * - nonzero on failure.
+ */
+static int tls_verify_peers (gnutls_session_t tlsstate,
+ gnutls_certificate_status_t *certstat)
{
int verify_ret;
- unsigned int status;
- verify_ret = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2 (tlsstate, &status);
+ /* gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2() chains to
+ * gnutls_x509_trust_list_verify_crt2(). That function's documentation says:
+ *
+ * When a certificate chain of cert_list_size with more than one
+ * certificates is provided, the verification status will apply to
+ * the first certificate in the chain that failed
+ * verification. The verification process starts from the end of
+ * the chain (from CA to end certificate). The first certificate
+ * in the chain must be the end-certificate while the rest of the
+ * members may be sorted or not.
+ *
+ * This is why tls_check_certificate() loops from CA to host in that order,
+ * calling the menu, and recalling tls_verify_peers() for each approved
+ * cert in the chain.
+ */
+ verify_ret = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2 (tlsstate, certstat);
+
+ /* certstat was set */
if (!verify_ret)
- return status;
+ return 0;
- if (status == GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND)
- {
+ if (verify_ret == GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND)
mutt_error (_("Unable to get certificate from peer"));
- mutt_sleep (2);
- return 0;
- }
- if (verify_ret < 0)
- {
+ else
mutt_error (_("Certificate verification error (%s)"),
- gnutls_strerror (status));
- mutt_sleep (2);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* We only support X.509 certificates (not OpenPGP) at the moment */
- if (gnutls_certificate_type_get (tlsstate) != GNUTLS_CRT_X509)
- {
- mutt_error (_("Certificate is not X.509"));
- mutt_sleep (2);
- return 0;
- }
+ gnutls_strerror (verify_ret));
- return status;
+ mutt_sleep (2);
+ return verify_ret;
}
+/* Returns 1 on success.
+ * 0 on failure.
+ */
static int tls_check_certificate (CONNECTION* conn)
{
tlssockdata *data = conn->sockdata;
@@ -1133,15 +1149,16 @@ static int tls_check_certificate (CONNECTION* conn)
gnutls_certificate_status_t certstat;
int certerr, i, preauthrc, savedcert, rc = 0;
int rcpeer = -1; /* the result of tls_check_preauth() on the peer's EE cert */
+ int rcsettrust;
- if (gnutls_auth_get_type (state) != GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE)
- {
- mutt_error (_("Unable to get certificate from peer"));
- mutt_sleep (2);
+ /* tls_verify_peers() calls gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(),
+ * which verifies the auth_type is GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE
+ * and that get_certificate_type() for the server is GNUTLS_CRT_X509.
+ * If it returns 0, certstat will be set with failure codes for the first
+ * cert in the chain (from CA to host) with an error.
+ */
+ if (tls_verify_peers (state, &certstat) != 0)
return 0;
- }
-
- certstat = tls_verify_peers (state);
cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers (state, &cert_list_size);
if (!cert_list)
@@ -1184,12 +1201,15 @@ static int tls_check_certificate (CONNECTION* conn)
/* add signers to trust set, then reverify */
if (i && rc) {
- rc = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_mem (data->xcred, &cert_list[i],
- GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
- if (rc != 1)
- dprint (1, (debugfile, "error trusting certificate %d: %d\n", i, rc));
+ rcsettrust = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_mem (data->xcred,
+ &cert_list[i],
+ GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
+ if (rcsettrust != 1)
+ dprint (1, (debugfile, "error trusting certificate %d: %d\n", i, rcsettrust));
+
+ if (tls_verify_peers (state, &certstat) != 0)
+ return 0;
- certstat = tls_verify_peers (state);
/* If the cert chain now verifies, and the peer's cert was otherwise
* valid (rcpeer==0), we are done.
*/
--
2.27.0

38
CVE-2020-14154-2.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
From 5fccf603ebcf352ba783136d6b2d2600d811fb3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kevin McCarthy <kevin@8t8.us>
Date: Fri, 5 Jun 2020 18:16:31 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Abort GnuTLS certificate check if a cert in the chain is
rejected.
GnuTLS is not checking dates because we disabled that in
tls_negotiate().
So if we don't do this, rejecting an expired intermediate cert will
have no effect. Certstat won't contain an expiration error, and
tls_check_preauth() will only look at each subsequent cert in the
chain's dates.
---
mutt_ssl_gnutls.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/mutt_ssl_gnutls.c b/mutt_ssl_gnutls.c
index 19d47b3..6f98f50 100644
--- a/mutt_ssl_gnutls.c
+++ b/mutt_ssl_gnutls.c
@@ -1199,8 +1199,12 @@ static int tls_check_certificate (CONNECTION* conn)
rc = tls_check_one_certificate (&cert_list[i], certstat, conn->account.host,
i, cert_list_size);
+ /* Stop checking if the menu cert is aborted or rejected. */
+ if (!rc)
+ break;
+
/* add signers to trust set, then reverify */
- if (i && rc) {
+ if (i) {
rcsettrust = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_mem (data->xcred,
&cert_list[i],
GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
--
2.27.0

67
CVE-2020-14154-3.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
From f64ec1deefb67d471a642004e102cd1c501a1db3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kevin McCarthy <kevin@8t8.us>
Date: Sat, 6 Jun 2020 20:03:56 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Fix GnuTLS interactive prompt short-circuiting.
tls_verify_peers() doesn't verify expiration dates. So aborting early
because of a 0 certstat and the leaf passing tls_check_preauth() does
not mean subsequent intermediate certs are okay: they could beexpired.
In the saved-cert preauth loop, instead of just noting the
tls_check_preauth() rc for the leaf, note the highest cert that passes
preauth.
Then, in the interactive loop (which goes in the opposite order, from
CA to leaf) check that value instead. Since we are trusting certs one
by one, anything that passed in the previous loop will certainly pass
the preauth check at the beginning of tls_check_one_certificate().
---
mutt_ssl_gnutls.c | 17 ++++++-----------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mutt_ssl_gnutls.c b/mutt_ssl_gnutls.c
index 6f98f50..09d628a 100644
--- a/mutt_ssl_gnutls.c
+++ b/mutt_ssl_gnutls.c
@@ -1148,7 +1148,7 @@ static int tls_check_certificate (CONNECTION* conn)
unsigned int cert_list_size = 0;
gnutls_certificate_status_t certstat;
int certerr, i, preauthrc, savedcert, rc = 0;
- int rcpeer = -1; /* the result of tls_check_preauth() on the peer's EE cert */
+ int max_preauth_pass = -1;
int rcsettrust;
/* tls_verify_peers() calls gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(),
@@ -1176,13 +1176,8 @@ static int tls_check_certificate (CONNECTION* conn)
rc = tls_check_preauth(&cert_list[i], certstat, conn->account.host, i,
&certerr, &savedcert);
preauthrc += rc;
- if (i == 0)
- {
- /* This is the peer's end-entity X.509 certificate. Stash the result
- * to check later in this function.
- */
- rcpeer = rc;
- }
+ if (!preauthrc)
+ max_preauth_pass = i;
if (savedcert)
{
@@ -1214,10 +1209,10 @@ static int tls_check_certificate (CONNECTION* conn)
if (tls_verify_peers (state, &certstat) != 0)
return 0;
- /* If the cert chain now verifies, and the peer's cert was otherwise
- * valid (rcpeer==0), we are done.
+ /* If the cert chain now verifies, and all lower certs already
+ * passed preauth, we are done.
*/
- if (!certstat && !rcpeer)
+ if (!certstat && (max_preauth_pass >= i - 1))
return 1;
}
}
--
2.27.0

8
mutt.spec
View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
Name: mutt
Version: 1.10.1
Release: 6
Release: 7
Epoch: 5
Summary: Text-based mail client
License: GPLv2+ and Public Domain
@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ Patch13: CVE-2020-28896.patch
Patch14: CVE-2021-3181.patch
Patch15: backport-CVE-2020-14093-1.patch
Patch16: backport-CVE-2020-14093-2.patch
Patch17: CVE-2020-14154-1.patch
Patch18: CVE-2020-14154-2.patch
Patch19: CVE-2020-14154-3.patch
BuildRequires: gcc ncurses-devel gettext automake /usr/bin/xsltproc
BuildRequires: lynx docbook-style-xsl perl-interpreter perl-generators
@ -123,6 +126,9 @@ ln -sf ./muttrc.5 %{buildroot}%{_mandir}/man5/muttrc.local.5
%{_mandir}/man5/muttrc.*
%changelog
- Fri Oct 15 2021 yaoxin<yaoxin30@huawei.com> - 1.10.1-7
- fix CVE-2020-14154
- Tue Jul 27 2021 wangyue<wangyue92@huawei.com> - 1.10.1-6
- fix CVE-2020-14093