mutt/CVE-2020-14154-1.patch

189 lines
6.8 KiB
Diff
Raw Normal View History

2021-10-15 09:36:49 +08:00
From bb0e6277a45a5d4c3a30d3b968eeb31d78124e95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kevin McCarthy <kevin@8t8.us>
Date: Fri, 5 Jun 2020 15:21:03 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Fix GnuTLS tls_verify_peers() checking.
* Change the function to pass the certstatus parameter by reference,
and indicate success/failure of the function via the return value. It
was previously returning the certstatus, but was also returning 0 or
the *unset* certstatus on error too. Since a 0 certstatus means
"success", this meant a gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2() failure
would be regarded as a valid cert.
* The gnutls_certificate_type_get() inside tls_verify_peers() checks
the *client* certificate type. Since it was only called if gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2() failed, I assume was either a
mistake, or perhaps an attempt to give a special error message if the
client cert was OpenPGP. In either case, the error message was not
very informative, so just remove the call and special error message.
* Fix GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND check to be against verify_ret
instead of certstat.
* Fix gnutls_strerror() call to use verify_ret instead of certstat.
* gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2() already calls and checks gnutls_auth_get_type(), so remove call at the beginning of tls_check_certificate().
* gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2() also verifies the certificate
type for the *server* is GNUTLS_CRT_X509. Add a comment about that.
---
mutt_ssl_gnutls.c | 100 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 60 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mutt_ssl_gnutls.c b/mutt_ssl_gnutls.c
index 8fc6421..19d47b3 100644
--- a/mutt_ssl_gnutls.c
+++ b/mutt_ssl_gnutls.c
@@ -684,6 +684,9 @@ static int tls_check_stored_hostname (const gnutls_datum_t *cert,
return 0;
}
+/* Returns 0 on success
+ * -1 on failure
+ */
static int tls_check_preauth (const gnutls_datum_t *certdata,
gnutls_certificate_status_t certstat,
const char *hostname, int chainidx, int* certerr,
@@ -802,8 +805,8 @@ static int tls_check_preauth (const gnutls_datum_t *certdata,
return -1;
}
-/*
- * Returns 0 on failure, nonzero on success.
+/* Returns 1 on success.
+ * 0 on failure.
*/
static int tls_check_one_certificate (const gnutls_datum_t *certdata,
gnutls_certificate_status_t certstat,
@@ -1086,44 +1089,57 @@ static int tls_check_one_certificate (const gnutls_datum_t *certdata,
mutt_menuDestroy (&menu);
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (cert);
- return (done == 2);
+ return (done == 2) ? 1 : 0;
}
-/* sanity-checking wrapper for gnutls_certificate_verify_peers */
-static gnutls_certificate_status_t tls_verify_peers (gnutls_session_t tlsstate)
+/* sanity-checking wrapper for gnutls_certificate_verify_peers.
+ *
+ * certstat is technically a bitwise-or of gnutls_certificate_status_t
+ * values.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * - 0 if certstat was set. note: this does not mean success.
+ * - nonzero on failure.
+ */
+static int tls_verify_peers (gnutls_session_t tlsstate,
+ gnutls_certificate_status_t *certstat)
{
int verify_ret;
- unsigned int status;
- verify_ret = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2 (tlsstate, &status);
+ /* gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2() chains to
+ * gnutls_x509_trust_list_verify_crt2(). That function's documentation says:
+ *
+ * When a certificate chain of cert_list_size with more than one
+ * certificates is provided, the verification status will apply to
+ * the first certificate in the chain that failed
+ * verification. The verification process starts from the end of
+ * the chain (from CA to end certificate). The first certificate
+ * in the chain must be the end-certificate while the rest of the
+ * members may be sorted or not.
+ *
+ * This is why tls_check_certificate() loops from CA to host in that order,
+ * calling the menu, and recalling tls_verify_peers() for each approved
+ * cert in the chain.
+ */
+ verify_ret = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2 (tlsstate, certstat);
+
+ /* certstat was set */
if (!verify_ret)
- return status;
+ return 0;
- if (status == GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND)
- {
+ if (verify_ret == GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND)
mutt_error (_("Unable to get certificate from peer"));
- mutt_sleep (2);
- return 0;
- }
- if (verify_ret < 0)
- {
+ else
mutt_error (_("Certificate verification error (%s)"),
- gnutls_strerror (status));
- mutt_sleep (2);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* We only support X.509 certificates (not OpenPGP) at the moment */
- if (gnutls_certificate_type_get (tlsstate) != GNUTLS_CRT_X509)
- {
- mutt_error (_("Certificate is not X.509"));
- mutt_sleep (2);
- return 0;
- }
+ gnutls_strerror (verify_ret));
- return status;
+ mutt_sleep (2);
+ return verify_ret;
}
+/* Returns 1 on success.
+ * 0 on failure.
+ */
static int tls_check_certificate (CONNECTION* conn)
{
tlssockdata *data = conn->sockdata;
@@ -1133,15 +1149,16 @@ static int tls_check_certificate (CONNECTION* conn)
gnutls_certificate_status_t certstat;
int certerr, i, preauthrc, savedcert, rc = 0;
int rcpeer = -1; /* the result of tls_check_preauth() on the peer's EE cert */
+ int rcsettrust;
- if (gnutls_auth_get_type (state) != GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE)
- {
- mutt_error (_("Unable to get certificate from peer"));
- mutt_sleep (2);
+ /* tls_verify_peers() calls gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(),
+ * which verifies the auth_type is GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE
+ * and that get_certificate_type() for the server is GNUTLS_CRT_X509.
+ * If it returns 0, certstat will be set with failure codes for the first
+ * cert in the chain (from CA to host) with an error.
+ */
+ if (tls_verify_peers (state, &certstat) != 0)
return 0;
- }
-
- certstat = tls_verify_peers (state);
cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers (state, &cert_list_size);
if (!cert_list)
@@ -1184,12 +1201,15 @@ static int tls_check_certificate (CONNECTION* conn)
/* add signers to trust set, then reverify */
if (i && rc) {
- rc = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_mem (data->xcred, &cert_list[i],
- GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
- if (rc != 1)
- dprint (1, (debugfile, "error trusting certificate %d: %d\n", i, rc));
+ rcsettrust = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_mem (data->xcred,
+ &cert_list[i],
+ GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
+ if (rcsettrust != 1)
+ dprint (1, (debugfile, "error trusting certificate %d: %d\n", i, rcsettrust));
+
+ if (tls_verify_peers (state, &certstat) != 0)
+ return 0;
- certstat = tls_verify_peers (state);
/* If the cert chain now verifies, and the peer's cert was otherwise
* valid (rcpeer==0), we are done.
*/
--
2.27.0