upgrade to 1.2.2
Signed-off-by: zhuyan <zhuyan34@huawei.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
fcc6497f25
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@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
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From 3ab2a4e02682df1382955071919d8aa3c3ec40d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Rich Felker <dalias@aerifal.cx>
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Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2020 17:12:43 -0500
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Subject: [PATCH] rewrite wcsnrtombs to fix buffer overflow and other bugs
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the original wcsnrtombs implementation, which has been largely
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untouched since 0.5.0, attempted to build input-length-limiting
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conversion on top of wcsrtombs, which only limits output length. as
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best I recall, this choice was made out of a mix of disdain over
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having yet another variant function to implement (added in POSIX 2008;
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not standard C) and preference not to switch things around and
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implement the wcsrtombs in terms of the more general new function,
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probably over namespace issues. the strategy employed was to impose
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output limits that would ensure the input limit wasn't exceeded, then
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finish up the tail character-at-a-time. unfortunately, none of that
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worked correctly.
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first, the logic in the wcsrtombs loop was wrong in that it could
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easily get stuck making no forward progress, by imposing an output
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limit too small to convert even one character.
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the character-at-a-time loop that followed was even worse. it made no
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effort to ensure that the converted multibyte character would fit in
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the remaining output space, only that there was a nonzero amount of
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output space remaining. it also employed an incorrect interpretation
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of wcrtomb's interface contract for converting the null character,
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thereby failing to act on end of input, and remaining space accounting
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was subject to unsigned wrap-around. together these errors allow
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unbounded overflow of the destination buffer, controlled by input
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length limit and input wchar_t string contents.
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given the extent to which this function was broken, it's plausible
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that most applications that would have been rendered exploitable were
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sufficiently broken not to be usable in the first place. however, it's
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also plausible that common (especially ASCII-only) inputs succeeded in
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the wcsrtombs loop, which mostly worked, while leaving the wildly
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erroneous code in the second loop exposed to particular non-ASCII
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inputs.
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CVE-2020-28928 has been assigned for this issue.
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---
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src/multibyte/wcsnrtombs.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++----------------------
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1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/multibyte/wcsnrtombs.c b/src/multibyte/wcsnrtombs.c
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index 676932b5..95e25e70 100644
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--- a/src/multibyte/wcsnrtombs.c
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+++ b/src/multibyte/wcsnrtombs.c
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@@ -1,41 +1,33 @@
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#include <wchar.h>
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+#include <limits.h>
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+#include <string.h>
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size_t wcsnrtombs(char *restrict dst, const wchar_t **restrict wcs, size_t wn, size_t n, mbstate_t *restrict st)
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{
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- size_t l, cnt=0, n2;
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- char *s, buf[256];
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const wchar_t *ws = *wcs;
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- const wchar_t *tmp_ws;
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-
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- if (!dst) s = buf, n = sizeof buf;
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- else s = dst;
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-
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- while ( ws && n && ( (n2=wn)>=n || n2>32 ) ) {
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- if (n2>=n) n2=n;
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- tmp_ws = ws;
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- l = wcsrtombs(s, &ws, n2, 0);
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- if (!(l+1)) {
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- cnt = l;
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- n = 0;
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+ size_t cnt = 0;
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+ if (!dst) n=0;
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+ while (ws && wn) {
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+ char tmp[MB_LEN_MAX];
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+ size_t l = wcrtomb(n<MB_LEN_MAX ? tmp : dst, *ws, 0);
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+ if (l==-1) {
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+ cnt = -1;
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break;
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}
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- if (s != buf) {
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- s += l;
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+ if (dst) {
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+ if (n<MB_LEN_MAX) {
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+ if (l>n) break;
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+ memcpy(dst, tmp, l);
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+ }
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+ dst += l;
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n -= l;
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}
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- wn = ws ? wn - (ws - tmp_ws) : 0;
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- cnt += l;
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- }
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- if (ws) while (n && wn) {
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- l = wcrtomb(s, *ws, 0);
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- if ((l+1)<=1) {
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- if (!l) ws = 0;
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- else cnt = l;
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+ if (!*ws) {
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+ ws = 0;
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break;
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}
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- ws++; wn--;
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- /* safe - this loop runs fewer than sizeof(buf) times */
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- s+=l; n-=l;
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+ ws++;
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+ wn--;
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cnt += l;
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}
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if (dst) *wcs = ws;
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--
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2.27.0
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Binary file not shown.
BIN
musl-1.2.2.tar.gz
Normal file
BIN
musl-1.2.2.tar.gz
Normal file
Binary file not shown.
@ -45,12 +45,12 @@
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%global _includedir %{_prefix}/musl/include
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Name: musl
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Version: 1.2.0
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Release: 3
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Version: 1.2.2
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Release: 1
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Summary: An implementation of the standard library for Linux-based systems
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License: MIT
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URL: https://musl.libc.org
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URL: https://musl-libc.org
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Source0: %{url}/releases/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
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Patch6000: backport-rewrite-wcsnrtombs-to-fix-buffer-overflow.patch
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@ -182,6 +182,9 @@ ln -sr %{buildroot}%{_libdir}/libc.so %{buildroot}%{_libdir}/libutil.so.1
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%{_libdir}/musl-gcc.specs
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%changelog
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* Fri Sep 24 2021 zhuyan <zhuyan34@huawei.com> - 1.2.2-1
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- upgrade to 1.2.2
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* Tue Aug 19 2021 zhuyan <zhuyan34@huawei.com> - 1.2.0-3
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- fix CVE-2020-28928
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