!111 fix CVE-2024-5535

From: @qsw333 
Reviewed-by: @houmingyong 
Signed-off-by: @houmingyong

0007-fix-C-17-build-failed.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From 07c4e80ed24038bf602fb6099b5ffde9583e4aa6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: qsw333 <wangqingsan@huawei.com>
+Date: Sun, 25 Feb 2024 11:21:33 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] fix C++17 build failed
+
+---
+ psw/ae/aesm_service/source/CMakeLists.txt | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/psw/ae/aesm_service/source/CMakeLists.txt b/psw/ae/aesm_service/source/CMakeLists.txt
+index a77d53f..adb88be 100644
+--- a/psw/ae/aesm_service/source/CMakeLists.txt
++++ b/psw/ae/aesm_service/source/CMakeLists.txt
+@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ endif()
+ add_definitions("-DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=10101")
+ 
+ set(CMAKE_CXX_STANDARD_REQUIRED 1)
+-set(CMAKE_CXX_STANDARD 11)
++set(CMAKE_CXX_STANDARD 17)
+ set(CMAKE_SKIP_BUILD_RPATH true)
+ 
+ ########## SGX SDK Settings ##########
+-- 
+2.33.0
+

backport-CVE-2023-0464-x509-excessive-resource-use-verifying-policy-constra.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
+From 879f7080d7e141f415c79eaa3a8ac4a3dad0348b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Pauli <pauli@openssl.org>
+Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2023 15:28:20 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] x509: excessive resource use verifying policy constraints
+
+A security vulnerability has been identified in all supported versions
+of OpenSSL related to the verification of X.509 certificate chains
+that include policy constraints.  Attackers may be able to exploit this
+vulnerability by creating a malicious certificate chain that triggers
+exponential use of computational resources, leading to a denial-of-service
+(DoS) attack on affected systems.
+
+Fixes CVE-2023-0464
+
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20569)
+
+Reference:https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/879f7080d7e141f415c79eaa3a8ac4a3dad0348b
+Confilts:NA
+
+---
+ crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h |  8 +++++++-
+ crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c  | 12 +++++++++---
+ crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c  | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
+ 3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h
+index 5daf78de45..344aa06765 100644
+--- a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h
++++ b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h
+@@ -111,6 +111,11 @@ struct X509_POLICY_LEVEL_st {
+ };
+ 
+ struct X509_POLICY_TREE_st {
++    /* The number of nodes in the tree */
++    size_t node_count;
++    /* The maximum number of nodes in the tree */
++    size_t node_maximum;
++
+     /* This is the tree 'level' data */
+     X509_POLICY_LEVEL *levels;
+     int nlevel;
+@@ -159,7 +164,8 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *tree_find_sk(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *sk,
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+                                  X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
+                                  X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
+-                                 X509_POLICY_TREE *tree);
++                                 X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
++                                 int extra_data);
+ void policy_node_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node);
+ int policy_node_match(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lvl,
+                       const X509_POLICY_NODE *node, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid);
+diff --git a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c
+index e2d7b15322..d574fb9d66 100644
+--- a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c
++++ b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c
+@@ -59,10 +59,15 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_find_node(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+                                  X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
+                                  X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
+-                                 X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
++                                 X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
++                                 int extra_data)
+ {
+     X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
+ 
++    /* Verify that the tree isn't too large.  This mitigates CVE-2023-0464 */
++    if (tree->node_maximum > 0 && tree->node_count >= tree->node_maximum)
++        return NULL;
++
+     node = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*node));
+     if (node == NULL) {
+         X509V3err(X509V3_F_LEVEL_ADD_NODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+@@ -70,7 +75,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+     }
+     node->data = data;
+     node->parent = parent;
+-    if (level) {
++    if (level != NULL) {
+         if (OBJ_obj2nid(data->valid_policy) == NID_any_policy) {
+             if (level->anyPolicy)
+                 goto node_error;
+@@ -90,7 +95,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+         }
+     }
+ 
+-    if (tree) {
++    if (extra_data) {
+         if (tree->extra_data == NULL)
+             tree->extra_data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_new_null();
+         if (tree->extra_data == NULL){
+@@ -103,6 +108,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+         }
+     }
+ 
++    tree->node_count++;
+     if (parent)
+         parent->nchild++;
+ 
+diff --git a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
+index 6e8322cbc5..6c7fd35405 100644
+--- a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
++++ b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
+@@ -13,6 +13,18 @@
+ 
+ #include "pcy_local.h"
+ 
++/*
++ * If the maximum number of nodes in the policy tree isn't defined, set it to
++ * a generous default of 1000 nodes.
++ *
++ * Defining this to be zero means unlimited policy tree growth which opens the
++ * door on CVE-2023-0464.
++ */
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX
++# define OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX 1000
++#endif
++
+ /*
+  * Enable this to print out the complete policy tree at various point during
+  * evaluation.
+@@ -168,6 +180,9 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+         return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
+     }
+ 
++    /* Limit the growth of the tree to mitigate CVE-2023-0464 */
++    tree->node_maximum = OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX;
++
+     /*
+      * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.2, figure 3.
+      *
+@@ -184,7 +199,7 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+     level = tree->levels;
+     if ((data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0)) == NULL)
+         goto bad_tree;
+-    if (level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree) == NULL) {
++    if (level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree, 1) == NULL) {
+         policy_data_free(data);
+         goto bad_tree;
+     }
+@@ -243,7 +258,8 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+  * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise
+  */
+ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+-                                    X509_POLICY_DATA *data)
++                                    X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
++                                    X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+ {
+     X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
+     int i, matched = 0;
+@@ -253,13 +269,13 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+         X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
+ 
+         if (policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) {
+-            if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL) == NULL)
++            if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 0) == NULL)
+                 return 0;
+             matched = 1;
+         }
+     }
+     if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) {
+-        if (level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL)
++        if (level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL)
+             return 0;
+     }
+     return 1;
+@@ -272,7 +288,8 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+  * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+  */
+ static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+-                           const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache)
++                           const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
++                           X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+ {
+     int i;
+ 
+@@ -280,7 +297,7 @@ static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+         X509_POLICY_DATA *data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i);
+ 
+         /* Look for matching nodes in previous level */
+-        if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data))
++        if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data, tree))
+             return 0;
+     }
+     return 1;
+@@ -311,7 +328,7 @@ static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+     /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */
+     data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
+     data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
+-    if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree) == NULL) {
++    if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 1) == NULL) {
+         policy_data_free(data);
+         return 0;
+     }
+@@ -373,7 +390,7 @@ static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+     }
+     /* Finally add link to anyPolicy */
+     if (last->anyPolicy &&
+-        level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL)
++        level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL)
+         return 0;
+     return 1;
+ }
+@@ -555,7 +572,7 @@ static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
+             extra->qualifier_set = anyPolicy->data->qualifier_set;
+             extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS
+                 | POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE;
+-            node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree);
++            node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree, 1);
+         }
+         if (!tree->user_policies) {
+             tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
+@@ -582,7 +599,7 @@ static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+ 
+     for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) {
+         cache = policy_cache_set(curr->cert);
+-        if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache))
++        if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache, tree))
+             return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
+ 
+         if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)
+-- 
+2.27.0
+

backport-CVE-2023-0465-Ensure-that-EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY-is-checked-even-in.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+From b013765abfa80036dc779dd0e50602c57bb3bf95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2023 16:52:55 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Ensure that EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY is checked even in leaf
+ certs
+
+Even though we check the leaf cert to confirm it is valid, we
+later ignored the invalid flag and did not notice that the leaf
+cert was bad.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2023-0465
+
+Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20588)
+
+Reference:https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/b013765abfa80036dc779dd0e50602c57bb3bf95
+Confilts:NA
+
+---
+ crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 11 +++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+index 925fbb5412..1dfe4f9f31 100644
+--- a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
++++ b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+@@ -1649,18 +1649,25 @@ static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+     }
+     /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
+     if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) {
+-        int i;
++        int i, cbcalled = 0;
+ 
+         /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
+-        for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
++        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
+             X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ 
+             if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
+                 continue;
++            cbcalled = 1;
+             if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
+                                 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION))
+                 return 0;
+         }
++        if (!cbcalled) {
++            /* Should not be able to get here */
++            X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            return 0;
++        }
++        /* The callback ignored the error so we return success */
+         return 1;
+     }
+     if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) {
+-- 
+2.27.0
+

backport-CVE-2023-0466-Fix-documentation-of-X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From 0d16b7e99aafc0b4a6d729eec65a411a7e025f0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2023 16:15:47 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy()
+
+The function was incorrectly documented as enabling policy checking.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2023-0466
+
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20564)
+
+Reference:https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/0d16b7e99aafc0b4a6d729eec65a411a7e025f0a
+Confilts:CHANGES,NEWS
+
+---
+ doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod | 9 +++++++--
+ 1 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
+index f6f304bf7b..aa292f9336 100644
+--- a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
++++ b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
+@@ -92,8 +92,9 @@ B<trust>.
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time() sets the verification time in B<param> to
+ B<t>. Normally the current time is used.
+ 
+-X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() enables policy checking (it is disabled
+-by default) and adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set.
++X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set.
++Contrary to preexisting documentation of this function it does not enable
++policy checking.
+ 
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies() enables policy checking (it is disabled
+ by default) and sets the acceptable policy set to B<policies>. Any existing
+@@ -377,6 +378,10 @@ and has no effect.
+ 
+ The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0i.
+ 
++The function X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() was historically documented as
++enabling policy checking however the implementation has never done this.
++The documentation was changed to align with the implementation.
++
+ =head1 COPYRIGHT
+ 
+ Copyright 2009-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+-- 
+2.27.0
+

backport-CVE-2023-2650-Restrict-the-size-of-OBJECT-IDENTIFIERs-that-OBJ_obj.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+From 9e209944b35cf82368071f160a744b6178f9b098 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 12 May 2023 10:00:13 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Restrict the size of OBJECT IDENTIFIERs that OBJ_obj2txt will
+ translate
+
+OBJ_obj2txt() would translate any size OBJECT IDENTIFIER to canonical
+numeric text form.  For gigantic sub-identifiers, this would take a very
+long time, the time complexity being O(n^2) where n is the size of that
+sub-identifier.
+
+To mitigate this, a restriction on the size that OBJ_obj2txt() will
+translate to canonical numeric text form is added, based on RFC 2578
+(STD 58), which says this:
+
+> 3.5. OBJECT IDENTIFIER values
+>
+> An OBJECT IDENTIFIER value is an ordered list of non-negative numbers.
+> For the SMIv2, each number in the list is referred to as a sub-identifier,
+> there are at most 128 sub-identifiers in a value, and each sub-identifier
+> has a maximum value of 2^32-1 (4294967295 decimal).
+
+Fixes otc/security#96
+Fixes CVE-2023-2650
+
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+
+Reference:https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/9e209944b35cf82368071f160a744b6178f9b098
+Confilts:CHANGES,NEWS
+
+---
+ crypto/objects/obj_dat.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 files changed, 19 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
+index 7e8de727f3..d699915b20 100644
+--- a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
++++ b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
+@@ -428,6 +428,25 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name)
+     first = 1;
+     bl = NULL;
+ 
++    /*
++     * RFC 2578 (STD 58) says this about OBJECT IDENTIFIERs:
++     *
++     * > 3.5. OBJECT IDENTIFIER values
++     * >
++     * > An OBJECT IDENTIFIER value is an ordered list of non-negative
++     * > numbers. For the SMIv2, each number in the list is referred to as a
++     * > sub-identifier, there are at most 128 sub-identifiers in a value,
++     * > and each sub-identifier has a maximum value of 2^32-1 (4294967295
++     * > decimal).
++     *
++     * So a legitimate OID according to this RFC is at most (32 * 128 / 7),
++     * i.e. 586 bytes long.
++     *
++     * Ref: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2578#section-3.5
++     */
++    if (len > 586)
++        goto err;
++
+     while (len > 0) {
+         l = 0;
+         use_bn = 0;
+-- 
+2.27.0
+

backport-CVE-2023-3446-Fix-DH_check-excessive-time-with-over-sized-modulus.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+From 8780a896543a654e757db1b9396383f9d8095528 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 16:36:35 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix DH_check() excessive time with over sized modulus
+
+The DH_check() function checks numerous aspects of the key or parameters
+that have been supplied. Some of those checks use the supplied modulus
+value even if it is excessively large.
+
+There is already a maximum DH modulus size (10,000 bits) over which
+OpenSSL will not generate or derive keys. DH_check() will however still
+perform various tests for validity on such a large modulus. We introduce a
+new maximum (32,768) over which DH_check() will just fail.
+
+An application that calls DH_check() and supplies a key or parameters
+obtained from an untrusted source could be vulnerable to a Denial of
+Service attack.
+
+The function DH_check() is itself called by a number of other OpenSSL
+functions. An application calling any of those other functions may
+similarly be affected. The other functions affected by this are
+DH_check_ex() and EVP_PKEY_param_check().
+
+CVE-2023-3446
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
+Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21452)
+
+Reference:https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/8780a896543a654e757db1b9396383f9d8095528
+Confilts:Change the Source File Patch
+
+---
+ crypto/dh/dh_check.c    | 6 ++++++
+ crypto/dh/dh_err.c      | 3 ++-
+ include/openssl/dh.h    | 3 +++
+ include/openssl/dherr.h | 3 ++-
+ 4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+index 4ac169e75c..e5f9dd5030 100644
+--- a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
++++ b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+@@ -101,6 +101,12 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
+     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+     BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL;
+ 
++    /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
++    if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
++        DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
+     if (!DH_check_params(dh, ret))
+         return 0;
+ 
+diff --git a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/dh/dh_err.c b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
+index 7285587b4a..92800d3fcc 100644
+--- a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
++++ b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ /*
+  * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
++ * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+  *
+  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA DH_str_functs[] = {
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DHPARAMS_PRINT_FP, 0), "DHparams_print_fp"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS, 0),
+      "dh_builtin_genparams"},
++    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_CHECK, 0), "DH_check"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX, 0), "DH_check_ex"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_CHECK_PARAMS_EX, 0), "DH_check_params_ex"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_F_DH_CHECK_PUB_KEY_EX, 0), "DH_check_pub_key_ex"},
+diff --git a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/include/openssl/dh.h b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/include/openssl/dh.h
+index 3527540cdd..892e31559d 100644
+--- a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/include/openssl/dh.h
++++ b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/include/openssl/dh.h
+@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ extern "C" {
+ # ifndef OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
+ #  define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS    10000
+ # endif
++# ifndef OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
++#  define OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS  32768
++# endif
+ 
+ # define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024
+ 
+diff --git a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/include/openssl/dherr.h b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/include/openssl/dherr.h
+index 916b3bed0b..528c819856 100644
+--- a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/include/openssl/dherr.h
++++ b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/include/openssl/dherr.h
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ /*
+  * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+- * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
++ * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+  *
+  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ int ERR_load_DH_strings(void);
+ #  define DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY                                 102
+ #  define DH_F_DHPARAMS_PRINT_FP                           101
+ #  define DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS                        106
++#  define DH_F_DH_CHECK                                    126
+ #  define DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX                                 121
+ #  define DH_F_DH_CHECK_PARAMS_EX                          122
+ #  define DH_F_DH_CHECK_PUB_KEY_EX                         123
+-- 
+2.27.0
+

backport-CVE-2023-3817-DH_check-Do-not-try-checking-q-properties-if-it-is-o.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+From 91ddeba0f2269b017dc06c46c993a788974b1aa5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 21 Jul 2023 11:39:41 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] DH_check(): Do not try checking q properties if it is
+ obviously invalid
+
+If  |q| >= |p| then the q value is obviously wrong as q
+is supposed to be a prime divisor of p-1.
+
+We check if p is overly large so this added test implies that
+q is not large either when performing subsequent tests using that
+q value.
+
+Otherwise if it is too large these additional checks of the q value
+such as the primality test can then trigger DoS by doing overly long
+computations.
+
+Fixes CVE-2023-3817
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21551)
+
+Reference:https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/91ddeba0f2269b017dc06c46c993a788974b1aa5
+Confilts:Change the Source File Patch
+
+---
+ crypto/dh/dh_check.c | 11 +++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+index 2001d2e7cb..9ae96991eb 100644
+--- a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
++++ b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ int DH_check_ex(const DH *dh)
+ 
+ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
+ {
+-    int ok = 0, r;
++    int ok = 0, r, q_good = 0;
+     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+     BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL;
+ 
+@@ -120,7 +120,14 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
+     if (t2 == NULL)
+         goto err;
+ 
+-    if (dh->q) {
++    if (dh->q != NULL) {
++        if (BN_ucmp(dh->p, dh->q) > 0)
++            q_good = 1;
++        else
++            *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE;
++    }
++
++    if (q_good) {
+         if (BN_cmp(dh->g, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
+             *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
+         else if (BN_cmp(dh->g, dh->p) >= 0)
+-- 
+2.27.0
+

backport-CVE-2023-5678-Make-DH_check_pub_key-and-DH_generate_key-safer-yet.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+From 58589a46204c0dfca58906d6e66cf610caa11d88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: lanming1120 <lanming1120@126.com>
+Date: Tue, 7 Nov 2023 14:42:28 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Make DH_check_pub_key() and DH_generate_key() safer yet
+
+Signed-off-by: lanming1120 <lanming1120@126.com>
+
+Reference:https://gitee.com/openeuler/openssl/commit/58589a46204c0dfca58906d6e66cf610caa11d88
+Confilts:NA
+
+---
+ crypto/dh/dh_check.c    | 13 +++++++++++++
+ crypto/dh/dh_err.c      |  1 +
+ crypto/dh/dh_key.c      | 12 ++++++++++++
+ crypto/err/openssl.txt  |  1 +
+ include/openssl/dh.h    |  5 +++--
+ include/openssl/dherr.h |  1 +
+ 6 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+index ae1b03bc92..779cfbcd91 100644
+--- a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
++++ b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+@@ -198,6 +198,19 @@ int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
+     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ 
+     *ret = 0;
++
++    /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
++    if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
++        DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
++        *ret = DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
++        return 0;
++    }
++
++    if (dh->q != NULL && BN_ucmp(dh->p, dh->q) < 0) {
++        *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
++        return 1;
++    }
++
+     ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+     if (ctx == NULL)
+         goto err;
+diff --git a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/dh/dh_err.c b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
+index 92800d3fcc..b3b1e7a706 100644
+--- a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
++++ b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
+@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA DH_str_reasons[] = {
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR),
+     "parameter encoding error"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR), "peer key error"},
++    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE), "q too large"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR), "shared info error"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR),
+     "unable to check generator"},
+diff --git a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+index 117f2fa883..4c4c4b9874 100644
+--- a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
++++ b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+@@ -109,6 +109,12 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
+     BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
+     BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
+ 
++   if (dh->q != NULL
++        && BN_num_bits(dh->q) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
++        DHerr(DH_F_GENERATE_KEY, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
+     if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+         DHerr(DH_F_GENERATE_KEY, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+         return 0;
+@@ -202,6 +208,12 @@ static int compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
+     int ret = -1;
+     int check_result;
+ 
++   if (dh->q != NULL
++        && BN_num_bits(dh->q) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
++        DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE);
++        goto err;
++    }
++
+     if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+         DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+         goto err;
+diff --git a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+index c111822eac..56d4093ada 100644
+--- a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/err/openssl.txt
++++ b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+@@ -2139,6 +2139,7 @@ DH_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET:107:no parameters set
+ DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE:100:no private value
+ DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR:105:parameter encoding error
+ DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR:111:peer key error
++DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE:130:q too large
+ DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR:113:shared info error
+ DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR:121:unable to check generator
+ DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE:102:bad q value
+diff --git a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/include/openssl/dh.h b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/include/openssl/dh.h
+index 6c6ff3636a..7509f4fc3e 100644
+--- a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/include/openssl/dh.h
++++ b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/include/openssl/dh.h
+@@ -71,14 +71,15 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(DHparams)
+ /* #define DH_GENERATOR_3       3 */
+ # define DH_GENERATOR_5          5
+ 
+-/* DH_check error codes */
++/* DH_check error codes, some of them shared with DH_check_pub_key */
+ # define DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME            0x01
+ # define DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME       0x02
+ # define DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR    0x04
+ # define DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR       0x08
+ # define DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME            0x10
+-# define DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE        0x20
++# define DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE        0x20 /* +DH_check_pub_key */
+ # define DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE        0x40
++# define DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE            0x100
+ 
+ /* DH_check_pub_key error codes */
+ # define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL       0x01
+diff --git a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/include/openssl/dherr.h b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/include/openssl/dherr.h
+index 528c819856..d66c35aa8e 100644
+--- a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/include/openssl/dherr.h
++++ b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/include/openssl/dherr.h
+@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ int ERR_load_DH_strings(void);
+ #  define DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE                            100
+ #  define DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR                    105
+ #  define DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR                              111
++#  define DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE                                 130
+ #  define DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR                           113
+ #  define DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR                   121
+ 
+-- 
+2.27.0
+

backport-CVE-2024-5535-Fix-SSL_select_next_proto-and-add-ALPN.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+From d7afe8e89ced1f4d5f1e5aab474dd9c069115b6e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: xuhuiyue <xuhuiyue@huawei.com>
+Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2024 17:31:29 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Fix SSL_select_next_proto and add ALPN validation in the
+ client
+
+Fix CVE-2024-5535.
+
+Signed-off-by: xuhuiyue <xuhuiyue@huawei.com>
+---
+ ssl/ssl_lib.c                | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
+ ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c | 27 +++++++++++++++-
+ ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c |  3 +-
+ 3 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+index 00410a7385..cb2dca4247 100644
+--- a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/ssl/ssl_lib.c
++++ b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+@@ -2767,37 +2767,54 @@ int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
+                           unsigned int server_len,
+                           const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
+ {
+-    unsigned int i, j;
+-    const unsigned char *result;
+-    int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
++    PACKET cpkt, csubpkt, spkt, ssubpkt;
++
++    if (!PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)
++            || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)
++            || PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt) == 0) {
++        *out = NULL;
++        *outlen = 0;
++        return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Set the default opportunistic protocol. Will be overwritten if we find
++     * a match.
++     */
++    *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&csubpkt);
++    *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt);
+ 
+     /*
+      * For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it.
+      */
+-    for (i = 0; i < server_len;) {
+-        for (j = 0; j < client_len;) {
+-            if (server[i] == client[j] &&
+-                memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) {
+-                /* We found a match */
+-                result = &server[i];
+-                status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
+-                goto found;
++    if (PACKET_buf_init(&spkt, server, server_len)) {
++        while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&spkt, &ssubpkt)) {
++            if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) == 0)
++                continue; /* Invalid - ignore it */
++            if (PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)) {
++                while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)) {
++                    if (PACKET_equal(&csubpkt, PACKET_data(&ssubpkt),
++                                     PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt))) {
++                        /* We found a match */
++                        *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&ssubpkt);
++                        *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt);
++                        return OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
++                    }
++                }
++                /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the client list */
++            } else {
++                /* This should never happen */
++                return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
+             }
+-            j += client[j];
+-            j++;
+         }
+-        i += server[i];
+-        i++;
++        /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the server list */
+     }
+ 
+-    /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
+-    result = client;
+-    status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
+-
+- found:
+-    *out = (unsigned char *)result + 1;
+-    *outlen = result[0];
+-    return status;
++    /*
++     * There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. We use
++     * the default opportunistic protocol selected earlier
++     */
++    return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
+ }
+ 
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+diff --git a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
+index c641ae7351..4ad75c8e2d 100644
+--- a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
++++ b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
+@@ -1602,7 +1602,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+                                   PACKET_data(pkt),
+                                   PACKET_remaining(pkt),
+                                   s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) !=
+-             SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
++                                  SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
++            || selected_len == 0) {
+         SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
+                  SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+         return 0;
+@@ -1633,6 +1634,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+                         size_t chainidx)
+ {
+     size_t len;
++    PACKET confpkt, protpkt;
++    int valid = 0;
+ 
+     /* We must have requested it. */
+     if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
+@@ -1653,6 +1656,28 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+                  SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+         return 0;
+     }
++
++    /* It must be a protocol that we sent */
++    if (!PACKET_buf_init(&confpkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) {
++        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++        return 0;
++    }
++    while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&confpkt, &protpkt)) {
++        if (PACKET_remaining(&protpkt) != len)
++            continue;
++        if (memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_data(&protpkt), len) == 0) {
++            /* Valid protocol found */
++            valid = 1;
++            break;
++        }
++    }
++
++    if (!valid) {
++        /* The protocol sent from the server does not match one we advertised */
++        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
+     OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+     s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+     if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
+diff --git a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
+index 775d9a7444..a08027fd6d 100644
+--- a/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
++++ b/external/dcap_source/QuoteVerification/sgxssl/openssl_source/openssl-1.1.1t/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
+@@ -1562,9 +1562,10 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+             return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+         }
+         s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
++        return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+     }
+ 
+-    return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
++    return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+ }
+ #endif
+ 
+-- 
+2.33.0
+
+

linux-sgx.spec

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Name:           linux-sgx
 Version:        2.19
-Release:        1
+Release:        6
 Summary:        Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions for Linux* OS
 ExclusiveArch:	x86_64
 License:        BSD-3-Clause
@@ -31,6 +31,15 @@ Patch2:         0003-add-secure-compilation-options.patch
 Patch3:         0004-adapt-openssl-CVE.patch
 Patch4:         0005-DCAP-disabling-the-rpatch-option.patch
 Patch5:         0006-fix-build-error.patch
+Patch6:         0007-fix-C-17-build-failed.patch
+Patch7:         backport-CVE-2023-0464-x509-excessive-resource-use-verifying-policy-constra.patch
+Patch8:         backport-CVE-2023-0465-Ensure-that-EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY-is-checked-even-in.patch
+Patch9:         backport-CVE-2023-0466-Fix-documentation-of-X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy.patch
+Patch10:        backport-CVE-2023-2650-Restrict-the-size-of-OBJECT-IDENTIFIERs-that-OBJ_obj.patch
+Patch11:        backport-CVE-2023-3446-Fix-DH_check-excessive-time-with-over-sized-modulus.patch
+Patch12:        backport-CVE-2023-3817-DH_check-Do-not-try-checking-q-properties-if-it-is-o.patch
+Patch13:        backport-CVE-2023-5678-Make-DH_check_pub_key-and-DH_generate_key-safer-yet.patch
+Patch14:        backport-CVE-2024-5535-Fix-SSL_select_next_proto-and-add-ALPN.patch
 
 BuildRequires:  gcc-c++ protobuf-devel libtool ocaml ocaml-ocamlbuild compat-openssl11-devel cmake python curl-devel createrepo_c git nasm
 BuildRequires:  protobuf-lite-devel protobuf-c-devel boost-devel
@@ -719,8 +728,10 @@ rm -rf %{?buildroot}/libsgx-headers-dir/
 
 %pre
 
-%posttrans -n sgx-aesm-service
+%post -n sgx-aesm-service
-if [ -x /opt/intel/sgx-aesm-service/startup.sh ]; then /opt/intel/sgx-aesm-service/startup.sh; fi
+if [ "$1" = "1" ];then
+   if [ -x /opt/intel/sgx-aesm-service/startup.sh ]; then /opt/intel/sgx-aesm-service/startup.sh; fi
+fi
 
 %post -n libsgx-enclave-common
 trigger_udev() {
@@ -868,6 +879,21 @@ if [ -x /opt/intel/sgx-dcap-pccs/startup.sh ]; then /opt/intel/sgx-dcap-pccs/sta
 %files -n libsgx-headers -f %{LINUX_INSTALLER_RPM_DIR}/libsgx-headers/build/list-libsgx-headers
 
 %changelog
+* Thu Jul 18 2024 wangqingsan<wangqingsan@huawei.com> - 2.19-6
+- fix CVE-2024-5535
+
+* Mon Jun 17 2024 gengqihu<gengqihu2@h-partners.com> - 2.19-5
+- Disabling the Automatic Startup of Software Package Upgrade
+
+* Mon Feb 26 2024 wangqingsan<wangqingsan@huawei.com> - 2.19-4
+- fix CVE-2023-0464,CVE-2023-0465,CVE-2023-0466,CVE-2023-2650,CVE-2023-3446,CVE-2023-3817,CVE-2023-5678.
+
+* Sun Feb 25 2024 wangqingsan<wangqingsan@huawei.com> - 2.19-3
+- fix build failed.
+
+* Thu Aug 10 2023 zhoushuiqing <zhoushuiqing2@huawei.com> - 2.19-2
+- Keep in sync with the version number of intel-sgx-ssl.
+
 * Sat Jul 22 2023 zhoushuiqing <zhoushuiqing2@huawei.com> - 2.19-1
 - Upgrade to 2.19