fix spec file format

This commit is contained in:
orange-snn 2020-06-04 16:06:10 +08:00
parent ccbe676899
commit 84d63c959c

View File

@ -1,118 +1,119 @@
From 43f24eb152b8ec62473d2de6108d7c0b267b2419 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Will Cosgrove <will@panic.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2019 10:58:52 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] kex.c: improve bounds checking in kex_agree_methods() (#399)
file: kex.c
notes:
use _libssh2_get_string instead of kex_string_pair which does additional checks
---
src/kex.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------------------
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/kex.c b/src/kex.c
index df9a4fdd6..7b111feaa 100644
--- a/src/kex.c
+++ b/src/kex.c
@@ -3937,35 +3937,10 @@ static int kex_agree_comp(LIBSSH2_SESSION *session,
}
-
/* TODO: When in server mode we need to turn this logic on its head
* The Client gets to make the final call on "agreed methods"
*/
-/*
- * kex_string_pair() extracts a string from the packet and makes sure it fits
- * within the given packet.
- */
-static int kex_string_pair(unsigned char **sp, /* parsing position */
- unsigned char *data, /* start pointer to packet */
- size_t data_len, /* size of total packet */
- size_t *lenp, /* length of the string */
- unsigned char **strp) /* pointer to string start */
-{
- unsigned char *s = *sp;
- *lenp = _libssh2_ntohu32(s);
-
- /* the length of the string must fit within the current pointer and the
- end of the packet */
- if(*lenp > (data_len - (s - data) -4))
- return 1;
- *strp = s + 4;
- s += 4 + *lenp;
-
- *sp = s;
- return 0;
-}
-
/* kex_agree_methods
* Decide which specific method to use of the methods offered by each party
*/
@@ -3976,40 +3951,48 @@ static int kex_agree_methods(LIBSSH2_SESSION * session, unsigned char *data,
*mac_cs, *mac_sc;
size_t kex_len, hostkey_len, crypt_cs_len, crypt_sc_len, comp_cs_len;
size_t comp_sc_len, mac_cs_len, mac_sc_len;
- unsigned char *s = data;
+ struct string_buf buf;
- /* Skip packet_type, we know it already */
- s++;
+ if(data_len < 17)
+ return -1;
+
+ buf.data = (unsigned char *)data;
+ buf.len = data_len;
+ buf.dataptr = buf.data;
+ buf.dataptr++; /* advance past packet type */
/* Skip cookie, don't worry, it's preserved in the kexinit field */
- s += 16;
+ buf.dataptr += 16;
/* Locate each string */
- if(kex_string_pair(&s, data, data_len, &kex_len, &kex))
+ if(_libssh2_get_string(&buf, &kex, &kex_len))
return -1;
- if(kex_string_pair(&s, data, data_len, &hostkey_len, &hostkey))
+ if(_libssh2_get_string(&buf, &hostkey, &hostkey_len))
return -1;
- if(kex_string_pair(&s, data, data_len, &crypt_cs_len, &crypt_cs))
+ if(_libssh2_get_string(&buf, &crypt_cs, &crypt_cs_len))
return -1;
- if(kex_string_pair(&s, data, data_len, &crypt_sc_len, &crypt_sc))
+ if(_libssh2_get_string(&buf, &crypt_sc, &crypt_sc_len))
return -1;
- if(kex_string_pair(&s, data, data_len, &mac_cs_len, &mac_cs))
+ if(_libssh2_get_string(&buf, &mac_cs, &mac_cs_len))
return -1;
- if(kex_string_pair(&s, data, data_len, &mac_sc_len, &mac_sc))
+ if(_libssh2_get_string(&buf, &mac_sc, &mac_sc_len))
return -1;
- if(kex_string_pair(&s, data, data_len, &comp_cs_len, &comp_cs))
+ if(_libssh2_get_string(&buf, &comp_cs, &comp_cs_len))
return -1;
- if(kex_string_pair(&s, data, data_len, &comp_sc_len, &comp_sc))
+ if(_libssh2_get_string(&buf, &comp_sc, &comp_sc_len))
return -1;
/* If the server sent an optimistic packet, assume that it guessed wrong.
* If the guess is determined to be right (by kex_agree_kex_hostkey)
* This flag will be reset to zero so that it's not ignored */
- session->burn_optimistic_kexinit = *(s++);
- /* Next uint32 in packet is all zeros (reserved) */
+ if(_libssh2_check_length(&buf, 1)) {
+ session->burn_optimistic_kexinit = *(buf.dataptr++);
+ }
+ else {
+ return -1;
+ }
- if(data_len < (unsigned) (s - data))
- return -1; /* short packet */
+ /* Next uint32 in packet is all zeros (reserved) */
if(kex_agree_kex_hostkey(session, kex, kex_len, hostkey, hostkey_len)) {
return -1;
From 43f24eb152b8ec62473d2de6108d7c0b267b2419 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Will Cosgrove <will@panic.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2019 10:58:52 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] kex.c: improve bounds checking in kex_agree_methods() (#399)
file: kex.c
notes:
use _libssh2_get_string instead of kex_string_pair which does additional checks
---
src/kex.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------------------
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/kex.c b/src/kex.c
index df9a4fdd6..7b111feaa 100644
--- a/src/kex.c
+++ b/src/kex.c
@@ -3937,35 +3937,10 @@ static int kex_agree_comp(LIBSSH2_SESSION *session,
}
-
/* TODO: When in server mode we need to turn this logic on its head
* The Client gets to make the final call on "agreed methods"
*/
-/*
- * kex_string_pair() extracts a string from the packet and makes sure it fits
- * within the given packet.
- */
-static int kex_string_pair(unsigned char **sp, /* parsing position */
- unsigned char *data, /* start pointer to packet */
- size_t data_len, /* size of total packet */
- size_t *lenp, /* length of the string */
- unsigned char **strp) /* pointer to string start */
-{
- unsigned char *s = *sp;
- *lenp = _libssh2_ntohu32(s);
-
- /* the length of the string must fit within the current pointer and the
- end of the packet */
- if(*lenp > (data_len - (s - data) -4))
- return 1;
- *strp = s + 4;
- s += 4 + *lenp;
-
- *sp = s;
- return 0;
-}
-
/* kex_agree_methods
* Decide which specific method to use of the methods offered by each party
*/
@@ -3976,40 +3951,48 @@ static int kex_agree_methods(LIBSSH2_SESSION * session, unsigned char *data,
*mac_cs, *mac_sc;
size_t kex_len, hostkey_len, crypt_cs_len, crypt_sc_len, comp_cs_len;
size_t comp_sc_len, mac_cs_len, mac_sc_len;
- unsigned char *s = data;
+ struct string_buf buf;
- /* Skip packet_type, we know it already */
- s++;
+ if(data_len < 17)
+ return -1;
+
+ buf.data = (unsigned char *)data;
+ buf.len = data_len;
+ buf.dataptr = buf.data;
+ buf.dataptr++; /* advance past packet type */
/* Skip cookie, don't worry, it's preserved in the kexinit field */
- s += 16;
+ buf.dataptr += 16;
/* Locate each string */
- if(kex_string_pair(&s, data, data_len, &kex_len, &kex))
+ if(_libssh2_get_string(&buf, &kex, &kex_len))
return -1;
- if(kex_string_pair(&s, data, data_len, &hostkey_len, &hostkey))
+ if(_libssh2_get_string(&buf, &hostkey, &hostkey_len))
return -1;
- if(kex_string_pair(&s, data, data_len, &crypt_cs_len, &crypt_cs))
+ if(_libssh2_get_string(&buf, &crypt_cs, &crypt_cs_len))
return -1;
- if(kex_string_pair(&s, data, data_len, &crypt_sc_len, &crypt_sc))
+ if(_libssh2_get_string(&buf, &crypt_sc, &crypt_sc_len))
return -1;
- if(kex_string_pair(&s, data, data_len, &mac_cs_len, &mac_cs))
+ if(_libssh2_get_string(&buf, &mac_cs, &mac_cs_len))
return -1;
- if(kex_string_pair(&s, data, data_len, &mac_sc_len, &mac_sc))
+ if(_libssh2_get_string(&buf, &mac_sc, &mac_sc_len))
return -1;
- if(kex_string_pair(&s, data, data_len, &comp_cs_len, &comp_cs))
+ if(_libssh2_get_string(&buf, &comp_cs, &comp_cs_len))
return -1;
- if(kex_string_pair(&s, data, data_len, &comp_sc_len, &comp_sc))
+ if(_libssh2_get_string(&buf, &comp_sc, &comp_sc_len))
return -1;
/* If the server sent an optimistic packet, assume that it guessed wrong.
* If the guess is determined to be right (by kex_agree_kex_hostkey)
* This flag will be reset to zero so that it's not ignored */
- session->burn_optimistic_kexinit = *(s++);
- /* Next uint32 in packet is all zeros (reserved) */
+ if(_libssh2_check_length(&buf, 1)) {
+ session->burn_optimistic_kexinit = *(buf.dataptr++);
+ }
+ else {
+ return -1;
+ }
- if(data_len < (unsigned) (s - data))
- return -1; /* short packet */
+ /* Next uint32 in packet is all zeros (reserved) */
if(kex_agree_kex_hostkey(session, kex, kex_len, hostkey, hostkey_len)) {
return -1;