packages/libgcrypt
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Package init

Browse Source
This commit is contained in:
overweight 2019-09-30 10:56:07 -04:00
commit f8456d907f
21 changed files with 7128 additions and 0 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

34
Fix-memory-leak-in-secmem-in-out-of-core-conditions.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
From f74687fd43f5772a372f54031d5a9527597f4ce4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2018 11:55:34 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 098/152] Fix memory leak in secmem in out of core conditions.
* src/secmem.c (_gcry_secmem_malloc_internal): Release pool descriptor
if the pool could not be allocated.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 4211
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
---
src/secmem.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/secmem.c b/src/secmem.c
index 79c135f..3e091d8 100644
--- a/src/secmem.c
+++ b/src/secmem.c
@@ -658,7 +658,10 @@ _gcry_secmem_malloc_internal (size_t size, int xhint)
pool->size = auto_expand? auto_expand : STANDARD_POOL_SIZE;
pool->mem = malloc (pool->size);
if (!pool->mem)
- return NULL; /* Not enough memory available for a new pool. */
+ {
+ free (pool);
+ return NULL; /* Not enough memory available for a new pool. */
+ }
/* Initialize first memory block. */
mb = (memblock_t *) pool->mem;
mb->size = pool->size - BLOCK_HEAD_SIZE;
--
1.8.3.1

144
curves.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
/* curves.c - ECC curves regression tests
* Copyright (C) 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of Libgcrypt.
*
* Libgcrypt is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as
* published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of
* the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* Libgcrypt is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
*/
#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
#include <config.h>
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "../src/gcrypt-int.h"
#define PGM "curves"
#include "t-common.h"
/* Number of curves defined in ../cipger/ecc.c */
#define N_CURVES 14
/* A real world sample public key. */
static char const sample_key_1[] =
"(public-key\n"
" (ecdsa\n"
" (p #00FFFFFFFF00000001000000000000000000000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF#)\n"
" (a #00FFFFFFFF00000001000000000000000000000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC#)\n"
" (b #5AC635D8AA3A93E7B3EBBD55769886BC651D06B0CC53B0F63BCE3C3E27D2604B#)\n"
" (g #046B17D1F2E12C4247F8BCE6E563A440F277037D812DEB33A0F4A13945D898C296"
"4FE342E2FE1A7F9B8EE7EB4A7C0F9E162BCE33576B315ECECBB6406837BF51F5#)\n"
" (n #00FFFFFFFF00000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFBCE6FAADA7179E84F3B9CAC2FC632551#)\n"
" (h #000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001#)\n"
" (q #0442B927242237639A36CE9221B340DB1A9AB76DF2FE3E171277F6A4023DED146EE"
"86525E38CCECFF3FB8D152CC6334F70D23A525175C1BCBDDE6E023B2228770E#)\n"
" ))";
static char const sample_key_1_curve[] = "NIST P-256";
static unsigned int sample_key_1_nbits = 256;
static void
list_curves (void)
{
int idx;
const char *name;
unsigned int nbits;
for (idx=0; (name = gcry_pk_get_curve (NULL, idx, &nbits)); idx++)
{
if (verbose)
printf ("%s - %u bits\n", name, nbits);
}
if (idx != N_CURVES)
fail ("expected %d curves but got %d\n", N_CURVES, idx);
if (gcry_pk_get_curve (NULL, -1, NULL))
fail ("curve iteration failed\n");
}
static void
check_matching (void)
{
gpg_error_t err;
gcry_sexp_t key;
const char *name;
unsigned int nbits;
err = gcry_sexp_new (&key, sample_key_1, 0, 1);
if (err)
die ("parsing s-expression string failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
name = gcry_pk_get_curve (key, 0, &nbits);
if (!name)
fail ("curve name not found for sample_key_1\n");
else if (strcmp (name, sample_key_1_curve))
fail ("expected curve name %s but got %s for sample_key_1\n",
sample_key_1_curve, name);
else if (nbits != sample_key_1_nbits)
fail ("expected curve size %u but got %u for sample_key_1\n",
sample_key_1_nbits, nbits);
gcry_sexp_release (key);
}
static void
check_get_params (void)
{
gcry_sexp_t param;
const char *name;
param = gcry_pk_get_param (GCRY_PK_ECDSA, sample_key_1_curve);
if (!param)
fail ("error gerring parameters for `%s'\n", sample_key_1_curve);
name = gcry_pk_get_curve (param, 0, NULL);
if (!name)
fail ("get_param: curve name not found for sample_key_1\n");
else if (strcmp (name, sample_key_1_curve))
fail ("get_param: expected curve name %s but got %s for sample_key_1\n",
sample_key_1_curve, name);
gcry_sexp_release (param);
}
int
main (int argc, char **argv)
{
if (argc > 1 && !strcmp (argv[1], "--verbose"))
verbose = 1;
else if (argc > 1 && !strcmp (argv[1], "--debug"))
verbose = debug = 1;
if (!gcry_check_version (GCRYPT_VERSION))
die ("version mismatch\n");
xgcry_control (GCRYCTL_DISABLE_SECMEM, 0);
xgcry_control (GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED, 0);
if (debug)
xgcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_DEBUG_FLAGS, 1u, 0);
list_curves ();
check_matching ();
check_get_params ();
return error_count ? 1 : 0;
}

64
ecc-Fix-memory-leak-in-the-error-case-of-ecc_encrypt.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
From e57e75ea517f32109b508113f18298fc69fd1192 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2018 11:50:46 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 097/152] ecc: Fix memory leak in the error case of
ecc_encrypt_raw
* cipher/ecc.c (ecc_encrypt_raw): Add proper error cleanup in the main
block.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 4210
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
---
cipher/ecc.c | 10 ++++++----
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/cipher/ecc.c b/cipher/ecc.c
index 4e3e5b1..3f221a2 100644
--- a/cipher/ecc.c
+++ b/cipher/ecc.c
@@ -1392,6 +1392,7 @@ ecc_encrypt_raw (gcry_sexp_t *r_ciph, gcry_sexp_t s_data, gcry_sexp_t keyparms)
unsigned char *rawmpi;
unsigned int rawmpilen;
+ rc = 0;
x = mpi_new (0);
if (ec->model == MPI_EC_MONTGOMERY)
y = NULL;
@@ -1418,7 +1419,7 @@ ecc_encrypt_raw (gcry_sexp_t *r_ciph, gcry_sexp_t s_data, gcry_sexp_t keyparms)
if (!(flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK))
{ /* It's not for X25519, then, the input data was simply wrong. */
rc = GPG_ERR_INV_DATA;
- goto leave;
+ goto leave_main;
}
}
if (y)
@@ -1443,7 +1444,7 @@ ecc_encrypt_raw (gcry_sexp_t *r_ciph, gcry_sexp_t s_data, gcry_sexp_t keyparms)
if (_gcry_mpi_ec_get_affine (x, y, &R, ec))
{
rc = GPG_ERR_INV_DATA;
- goto leave;
+ goto leave_main;
}
if (y)
mpi_e = _gcry_ecc_ec2os (x, y, pk.E.p);
@@ -1461,11 +1462,12 @@ ecc_encrypt_raw (gcry_sexp_t *r_ciph, gcry_sexp_t s_data, gcry_sexp_t keyparms)
}
}
-
+ leave_main:
mpi_free (x);
mpi_free (y);
-
point_free (&R);
+ if (rc)
+ goto leave;
}
if (!rc)
--
1.8.3.1

34
ecc-Fix-possible-memory-leakage-in-parameter-check-o.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
From 149ceb3cae03d0385341d32430aa5ae57de90007 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2018 09:50:17 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 096/152] ecc: Fix possible memory leakage in parameter check
of eddsa.
* cipher/ecc-eddsa.c (_gcry_ecc_eddsa_verify): Fix mem leak.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 4209
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
---
cipher/ecc-eddsa.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/cipher/ecc-eddsa.c b/cipher/ecc-eddsa.c
index 813e030..89b708a 100644
--- a/cipher/ecc-eddsa.c
+++ b/cipher/ecc-eddsa.c
@@ -760,7 +760,10 @@ _gcry_ecc_eddsa_verify (gcry_mpi_t input, ECC_public_key *pkey,
pkey->E.p, pkey->E.a, pkey->E.b);
b = ctx->nbits/8;
if (b != 256/8)
- return GPG_ERR_INTERNAL; /* We only support 256 bit. */
+ {
+ rc = GPG_ERR_INTERNAL; /* We only support 256 bit. */
+ goto leave;
+ }
/* Decode and check the public key. */
rc = _gcry_ecc_eddsa_decodepoint (pk, ctx, &Q, &encpk, &encpklen);
--
1.8.3.1

1207
ecc-curves.c Normal file
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

11
hobble-libgcrypt Executable file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Quit out if anything fails.
set -e -x
# Clean out patent-or-otherwise-encumbered code.
# EC: ????????? ??/??/2015
rm -f cipher/ecc-curves.c
rm -f tests/curves.c
rm -f tests/t-mpi-point.c

104
libgcrypt-1.6.1-mpicoder-gccopt.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
diff -up libgcrypt-1.6.1/mpi/mpicoder.c.gccopt libgcrypt-1.6.1/mpi/mpicoder.c
--- libgcrypt-1.6.1/mpi/mpicoder.c.gccopt 2014-02-28 15:37:53.983139821 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.6.1/mpi/mpicoder.c 2014-02-28 15:47:35.312576387 +0100
@@ -627,16 +627,16 @@ _gcry_mpi_print (enum gcry_mpi_format fo
extra = 1;
}
- if (buffer && n > len)
- {
- /* The provided buffer is too short. */
- xfree (tmp);
- return GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT;
- }
if (buffer)
{
unsigned char *s = buffer;
+ if (n > len)
+ {
+ /* The provided buffer is too short. */
+ xfree (tmp);
+ return GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT;
+ }
if (extra == 1)
*s++ = 0;
else if (extra)
@@ -654,13 +654,12 @@ _gcry_mpi_print (enum gcry_mpi_format fo
/* Note: We ignore the sign for this format. */
/* FIXME: for performance reasons we should put this into
mpi_aprint because we can then use the buffer directly. */
-
- if (buffer && n > len)
- return GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT;
if (buffer)
{
unsigned char *tmp;
+ if (n > len)
+ return GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT;
tmp = _gcry_mpi_get_buffer (a, 0, &n, NULL);
if (!tmp)
return gpg_err_code_from_syserror ();
@@ -678,14 +677,14 @@ _gcry_mpi_print (enum gcry_mpi_format fo
if (negative)
return GPG_ERR_INV_ARG;
- if (buffer && n+2 > len)
- return GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT;
-
if (buffer)
{
unsigned char *tmp;
unsigned char *s = buffer;
+ if (n+2 > len)
+ return GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT;
+
s[0] = nbits >> 8;
s[1] = nbits;
@@ -724,16 +723,16 @@ _gcry_mpi_print (enum gcry_mpi_format fo
extra=1;
}
- if (buffer && n+4 > len)
- {
- xfree(tmp);
- return GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT;
- }
-
if (buffer)
{
unsigned char *s = buffer;
+ if (n+4 > len)
+ {
+ xfree(tmp);
+ return GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT;
+ }
+
*s++ = n >> 24;
*s++ = n >> 16;
*s++ = n >> 8;
@@ -761,15 +760,15 @@ _gcry_mpi_print (enum gcry_mpi_format fo
if (!n || (*tmp & 0x80))
extra = 2;
- if (buffer && 2*n + extra + negative + 1 > len)
- {
- xfree(tmp);
- return GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT;
- }
if (buffer)
{
unsigned char *s = buffer;
+ if (2*n + extra + negative + 1 > len)
+ {
+ xfree(tmp);
+ return GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT;
+ }
if (negative)
*s++ = '-';
if (extra)

89
libgcrypt-1.6.2-use-fipscheck.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
diff -up libgcrypt-1.6.2/src/fips.c.use-fipscheck libgcrypt-1.6.2/src/fips.c
--- libgcrypt-1.6.2/src/fips.c.use-fipscheck 2014-08-21 14:50:39.000000000 +0200
+++ libgcrypt-1.6.2/src/fips.c 2014-09-26 11:42:20.999588282 +0200
@@ -578,23 +578,50 @@ run_random_selftests (void)
return !!err;
}
+#ifdef ENABLE_HMAC_BINARY_CHECK
+static int
+get_library_path(const char *libname, const char *symbolname, char *path, size_t pathlen)
+{
+ Dl_info info;
+ void *dl, *sym;
+ int rv = -1;
+
+ dl = dlopen(libname, RTLD_LAZY);
+ if (dl == NULL) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ sym = dlsym(dl, symbolname);
+
+ if (sym != NULL && dladdr(sym, &info)) {
+ strncpy(path, info.dli_fname, pathlen-1);
+ path[pathlen-1] = '\0';
+ rv = 0;
+ }
+
+ dlclose(dl);
+
+ return rv;
+}
+#endif
+
/* Run an integrity check on the binary. Returns 0 on success. */
static int
check_binary_integrity (void)
{
#ifdef ENABLE_HMAC_BINARY_CHECK
gpg_error_t err;
- Dl_info info;
+ char libpath[4096];
unsigned char digest[32];
int dlen;
char *fname = NULL;
- const char key[] = "What am I, a doctor or a moonshuttle conductor?";
-
- if (!dladdr ("gcry_check_version", &info))
+ const char key[] = "orboDeJITITejsirpADONivirpUkvarP";
+
+ if (get_library_path ("libgcrypt.so.20", "gcry_check_version", libpath, sizeof(libpath)))
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
{
- dlen = _gcry_hmac256_file (digest, sizeof digest, info.dli_fname,
+ dlen = _gcry_hmac256_file (digest, sizeof digest, libpath,
key, strlen (key));
if (dlen < 0)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
@@ -602,7 +629,7 @@ check_binary_integrity (void)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL);
else
{
- fname = xtrymalloc (strlen (info.dli_fname) + 1 + 5 + 1 );
+ fname = xtrymalloc (strlen (libpath) + 1 + 5 + 1 );
if (!fname)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
@@ -611,7 +638,7 @@ check_binary_integrity (void)
char *p;
/* Prefix the basename with a dot. */
- strcpy (fname, info.dli_fname);
+ strcpy (fname, libpath);
p = strrchr (fname, '/');
if (p)
p++;
diff -up libgcrypt-1.6.2/src/Makefile.in.use-fipscheck libgcrypt-1.6.2/src/Makefile.in
--- libgcrypt-1.6.2/src/Makefile.in.use-fipscheck 2014-08-21 15:14:08.000000000 +0200
+++ libgcrypt-1.6.2/src/Makefile.in 2014-09-26 11:41:13.271059281 +0200
@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ libgcrypt_la_LIBADD = $(gcrypt_res) \
../cipher/libcipher.la \
../random/librandom.la \
../mpi/libmpi.la \
- ../compat/libcompat.la $(GPG_ERROR_LIBS)
+ ../compat/libcompat.la $(GPG_ERROR_LIBS) -ldl
dumpsexp_SOURCES = dumpsexp.c
dumpsexp_CFLAGS = $(arch_gpg_error_cflags)

122
libgcrypt-1.7.3-ecc-test-fix.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
diff -up libgcrypt-1.7.3/tests/benchmark.c.eccfix libgcrypt-1.7.3/tests/benchmark.c
--- libgcrypt-1.7.3/tests/benchmark.c.eccfix 2016-07-14 11:19:17.000000000 +0200
+++ libgcrypt-1.7.3/tests/benchmark.c 2016-11-22 16:21:00.109004197 +0100
@@ -1412,7 +1412,7 @@ ecc_bench (int iterations, int print_hea
{
#if USE_ECC
gpg_error_t err;
- const char *p_sizes[] = { "192", "224", "256", "384", "521", "Ed25519",
+ const char *p_sizes[] = { "224", "256", "384", "521", "Ed25519",
"gost256", "gost512" };
int testno;
diff -up libgcrypt-1.7.3/tests/dsa-rfc6979.c.eccfix libgcrypt-1.7.3/tests/dsa-rfc6979.c
--- libgcrypt-1.7.3/tests/dsa-rfc6979.c.eccfix 2016-02-18 09:38:03.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.7.3/tests/dsa-rfc6979.c 2016-11-22 16:22:11.804674008 +0100
@@ -210,16 +210,6 @@ check_dsa_rfc6979 (void)
" ))"
},
{
- "ECDSA, 192 bits (prime field)",
- "(private-key"
- " (ecdsa"
- " (curve \"NIST P-192\")"
- " (q #04AC2C77F529F91689FEA0EA5EFEC7F210D8EEA0B9E047ED56"
- " 3BC723E57670BD4887EBC732C523063D0A7C957BC97C1C43#)"
- " (d #6FAB034934E4C0FC9AE67F5B5659A9D7D1FEFD187EE09FD4#)"
- " ))"
- },
- {
"ECDSA, 224 bits (prime field)",
"(private-key"
" (ecdsa"
@@ -443,89 +433,6 @@ check_dsa_rfc6979 (void)
"C9F0BDABCC0D880BB137A994CC7F3980CE91CC10FAF529FC46565B15CEA854E1"
},
{
- "ECDSA, 192 bits (prime field)",
- "With SHA-1, message = \"sample\"",
- "sha1", "sample",
- "37D7CA00D2C7B0E5E412AC03BD44BA837FDD5B28CD3B0021",
- "98C6BD12B23EAF5E2A2045132086BE3EB8EBD62ABF6698FF",
- "57A22B07DEA9530F8DE9471B1DC6624472E8E2844BC25B64"
- },
- {
- "ECDSA, 192 bits (prime field)",
- "With SHA-224, message = \"sample\"",
- "sha224", "sample",
- "4381526B3FC1E7128F202E194505592F01D5FF4C5AF015D8",
- "A1F00DAD97AEEC91C95585F36200C65F3C01812AA60378F5",
- "E07EC1304C7C6C9DEBBE980B9692668F81D4DE7922A0F97A"
- },
- {
- "ECDSA, 192 bits (prime field)",
- "With SHA-256, message = \"sample\"",
- "sha256", "sample",
- "32B1B6D7D42A05CB449065727A84804FB1A3E34D8F261496",
- "4B0B8CE98A92866A2820E20AA6B75B56382E0F9BFD5ECB55",
- "CCDB006926EA9565CBADC840829D8C384E06DE1F1E381B85"
- },
- {
- "ECDSA, 192 bits (prime field)",
- "With SHA-384, message = \"sample\"",
- "sha384", "sample",
- "4730005C4FCB01834C063A7B6760096DBE284B8252EF4311",
- "DA63BF0B9ABCF948FBB1E9167F136145F7A20426DCC287D5",
- "C3AA2C960972BD7A2003A57E1C4C77F0578F8AE95E31EC5E"
- },
- {
- "ECDSA, 192 bits (prime field)",
- "With SHA-512, message = \"sample\"",
- "sha512", "sample",
- "A2AC7AB055E4F20692D49209544C203A7D1F2C0BFBC75DB1",
- "4D60C5AB1996BD848343B31C00850205E2EA6922DAC2E4B8",
- "3F6E837448F027A1BF4B34E796E32A811CBB4050908D8F67"
- },
- {
- "ECDSA, 192 bits (prime field)",
- "With SHA-1, message = \"test\"",
- "sha1", "test",
- "D9CF9C3D3297D3260773A1DA7418DB5537AB8DD93DE7FA25",
- "0F2141A0EBBC44D2E1AF90A50EBCFCE5E197B3B7D4DE036D",
- "EB18BC9E1F3D7387500CB99CF5F7C157070A8961E38700B7"
- },
- {
- "ECDSA, 192 bits (prime field)",
- "With SHA-224, message = \"test\"",
- "sha224", "test",
- "F5DC805F76EF851800700CCE82E7B98D8911B7D510059FBE",
- "6945A1C1D1B2206B8145548F633BB61CEF04891BAF26ED34",
- "B7FB7FDFC339C0B9BD61A9F5A8EAF9BE58FC5CBA2CB15293"
- },
- {
- "ECDSA, 192 bits (prime field)",
- "With SHA-256, message = \"test\"",
- "sha256", "test",
- "5C4CE89CF56D9E7C77C8585339B006B97B5F0680B4306C6C",
- "3A718BD8B4926C3B52EE6BBE67EF79B18CB6EB62B1AD97AE",
- "5662E6848A4A19B1F1AE2F72ACD4B8BBE50F1EAC65D9124F"
- },
- {
- "ECDSA, 192 bits (prime field)",
- "With SHA-384, message = \"test\"",
- "sha384", "test",
- "5AFEFB5D3393261B828DB6C91FBC68C230727B030C975693",
- "B234B60B4DB75A733E19280A7A6034BD6B1EE88AF5332367",
- "7994090B2D59BB782BE57E74A44C9A1C700413F8ABEFE77A"
- },
- {
- "ECDSA, 192 bits (prime field)",
- "With SHA-512, message = \"test\"",
- "sha512", "test",
- "0758753A5254759C7CFBAD2E2D9B0792EEE44136C9480527",
- "FE4F4AE86A58B6507946715934FE2D8FF9D95B6B098FE739",
- "74CF5605C98FBA0E1EF34D4B5A1577A7DCF59457CAE52290"
- },
-
-
-
- {
"ECDSA, 224 bits (prime field)",
"With SHA-1, message = \"sample\"",
"sha1", "sample",

1311
libgcrypt-1.7.3-fips-cavs.patch Normal file
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

35
libgcrypt-1.7.3-fips-reqs.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
diff -up libgcrypt-1.7.3/src/visibility.c.fips-reqs libgcrypt-1.7.3/src/visibility.c
--- libgcrypt-1.7.3/src/visibility.c.fips-reqs 2016-03-23 12:59:34.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.7.3/src/visibility.c 2016-11-22 16:29:36.992042480 +0100
@@ -1288,6 +1288,8 @@ gcry_kdf_derive (const void *passphrase,
unsigned long iterations,
size_t keysize, void *keybuffer)
{
+ if (!fips_is_operational ())
+ return gpg_error (fips_not_operational ());
return gpg_error (_gcry_kdf_derive (passphrase, passphraselen, algo, hashalgo,
salt, saltlen, iterations,
keysize, keybuffer));
@@ -1343,6 +1345,13 @@ void
gcry_mpi_randomize (gcry_mpi_t w,
unsigned int nbits, enum gcry_random_level level)
{
+ if (!fips_is_operational ())
+ {
+ (void)fips_not_operational ();
+ fips_signal_fatal_error ("called in non-operational state");
+ fips_noreturn ();
+ }
+
_gcry_mpi_randomize (w, nbits, level);
}
@@ -1368,6 +1377,8 @@ gcry_prime_generate (gcry_mpi_t *prime,
gcry_random_level_t random_level,
unsigned int flags)
{
+ if (!fips_is_operational ())
+ return gpg_error (fips_not_operational ());
return gpg_error (_gcry_prime_generate (prime, prime_bits, factor_bits,
factors, cb_func, cb_arg,
random_level, flags));

115
libgcrypt-1.8.0-tests.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.0/cipher/dsa.c.tests libgcrypt-1.8.0/cipher/dsa.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.0/cipher/dsa.c.tests 2016-04-07 17:30:08.000000000 +0200
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.0/cipher/dsa.c 2017-08-15 15:10:39.551600227 +0200
@@ -457,11 +457,22 @@ generate_fips186 (DSA_secret_key *sk, un
&prime_q, &prime_p,
r_counter,
r_seed, r_seedlen);
- else
- ec = _gcry_generate_fips186_3_prime (nbits, qbits, NULL, 0,
+ else if (!domain->p || !domain->q)
+ ec = _gcry_generate_fips186_3_prime (nbits, qbits,
+ initial_seed.seed,
+ initial_seed.seedlen,
&prime_q, &prime_p,
r_counter,
r_seed, r_seedlen, NULL);
+ else
+ {
+ /* Domain parameters p and q are given; use them. */
+ prime_p = mpi_copy (domain->p);
+ prime_q = mpi_copy (domain->q);
+ gcry_assert (mpi_get_nbits (prime_p) == nbits);
+ gcry_assert (mpi_get_nbits (prime_q) == qbits);
+ ec = 0;
+ }
sexp_release (initial_seed.sexp);
if (ec)
goto leave;
@@ -855,13 +866,12 @@ dsa_generate (const gcry_sexp_t genparms
sexp_release (l1);
sexp_release (domainsexp);
- /* Check that all domain parameters are available. */
- if (!domain.p || !domain.q || !domain.g)
+ /* Check that p and q domain parameters are available. */
+ if (!domain.p || !domain.q || (!domain.g && !(flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_USE_FIPS186)))
{
_gcry_mpi_release (domain.p);
_gcry_mpi_release (domain.q);
_gcry_mpi_release (domain.g);
- sexp_release (deriveparms);
return GPG_ERR_MISSING_VALUE;
}
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.0/cipher/rsa.c.tests libgcrypt-1.8.0/cipher/rsa.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.0/cipher/rsa.c.tests 2017-07-06 10:21:36.000000000 +0200
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.0/cipher/rsa.c 2017-08-15 15:10:39.551600227 +0200
@@ -696,7 +696,7 @@ generate_x931 (RSA_secret_key *sk, unsig
*swapped = 0;
- if (e_value == 1) /* Alias for a secure value. */
+ if (e_value == 1 || e_value == 0) /* Alias for a secure value. */
e_value = 65537;
/* Point 1 of section 4.1: k = 1024 + 256s with S >= 0 */
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.0/tests/keygen.c.tests libgcrypt-1.8.0/tests/keygen.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.0/tests/keygen.c.tests 2017-08-15 15:10:39.551600227 +0200
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.0/tests/keygen.c 2017-08-15 15:16:05.433176171 +0200
@@ -200,11 +200,11 @@ check_rsa_keys (void)
if (verbose)
- info ("creating 512 bit RSA key with e=257\n");
+ info ("creating 1024 bit RSA key with e=257\n");
rc = gcry_sexp_new (&keyparm,
"(genkey\n"
" (rsa\n"
- " (nbits 3:512)\n"
+ " (nbits 4:1024)\n"
" (rsa-use-e 3:257)\n"
" ))", 0, 1);
if (rc)
@@ -225,11 +225,11 @@ check_rsa_keys (void)
gcry_sexp_release (key);
if (verbose)
- info ("creating 512 bit RSA key with default e\n");
+ info ("creating 1024 bit RSA key with default e\n");
rc = gcry_sexp_new (&keyparm,
"(genkey\n"
" (rsa\n"
- " (nbits 3:512)\n"
+ " (nbits 4:1024)\n"
" (rsa-use-e 1:0)\n"
" ))", 0, 1);
if (rc)
@@ -309,12 +309,12 @@ check_dsa_keys (void)
}
if (verbose)
- info ("creating 1536 bit DSA key\n");
+ info ("creating 2048 bit DSA key\n");
rc = gcry_sexp_new (&keyparm,
"(genkey\n"
" (dsa\n"
- " (nbits 4:1536)\n"
- " (qbits 3:224)\n"
+ " (nbits 4:2048)\n"
+ " (qbits 3:256)\n"
" ))", 0, 1);
if (rc)
die ("error creating S-expression: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.0/tests/pubkey.c.tests libgcrypt-1.8.0/tests/pubkey.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.0/tests/pubkey.c.tests 2017-01-18 15:24:25.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.0/tests/pubkey.c 2017-08-15 15:10:39.552600207 +0200
@@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ get_dsa_key_fips186_with_seed_new (gcry_
" (use-fips186)"
" (transient-key)"
" (derive-parms"
- " (seed #0cb1990c1fd3626055d7a0096f8fa99807399871#))))",
+ " (seed #8b4c4d671fff82e8ed932260206d0571e3a1c2cee8cd94cb73fe58f9b67488fa#))))",
0, 1);
if (rc)
die ("error creating S-expression: %s\n", gcry_strerror (rc));

77
libgcrypt-1.8.0-use-poll.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.0/random/rndlinux.c.use-poll libgcrypt-1.8.0/random/rndlinux.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.0/random/rndlinux.c.use-poll 2017-06-24 13:34:29.000000000 +0200
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.0/random/rndlinux.c 2017-08-15 15:37:37.604629377 +0200
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <poll.h>
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(HAVE_SYSCALL)
# include <sys/syscall.h>
#endif
@@ -216,9 +217,8 @@ _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random (void (*add
return with something we will actually use 100ms. */
while (length)
{
- fd_set rfds;
- struct timeval tv;
int rc;
+ struct pollfd pfd;
/* If we have a modern Linux kernel and we want to read from the
* the non-blocking /dev/urandom, we first try to use the new
@@ -276,36 +276,25 @@ _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random (void (*add
any_need_entropy = 1;
}
- /* If the system has no limit on the number of file descriptors
- and we encounter an fd which is larger than the fd_set size,
- we don't use the select at all. The select code is only used
- to emit progress messages. A better solution would be to
- fall back to poll() if available. */
-#ifdef FD_SETSIZE
- if (fd < FD_SETSIZE)
-#endif
+ pfd.fd = fd;
+ pfd.events = POLLIN;
+
+ _gcry_pre_syscall ();
+ rc = poll(&pfd, 1, delay);
+ _gcry_post_syscall ();
+ if (!rc)
{
- FD_ZERO(&rfds);
- FD_SET(fd, &rfds);
- tv.tv_sec = delay;
- tv.tv_usec = delay? 0 : 100000;
- _gcry_pre_syscall ();
- rc = select (fd+1, &rfds, NULL, NULL, &tv);
- _gcry_post_syscall ();
- if (!rc)
- {
- any_need_entropy = 1;
- delay = 3; /* Use 3 seconds henceforth. */
- continue;
- }
- else if( rc == -1 )
- {
- log_error ("select() error: %s\n", strerror(errno));
- if (!delay)
- delay = 1; /* Use 1 second if we encounter an error before
- we have ever blocked. */
- continue;
- }
+ any_need_entropy = 1;
+ delay = 3000; /* Use 3 seconds henceforth. */
+ continue;
+ }
+ else if( rc == -1 )
+ {
+ log_error ("poll() error: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+ if (!delay)
+ delay = 1000; /* Use 1 second if we encounter an error before
+ we have ever blocked. */
+ continue;
}
do

253
libgcrypt-1.8.3-fips-ctor.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,253 @@
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.3/cipher/md.c.fips-ctor libgcrypt-1.8.3/cipher/md.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.3/cipher/md.c.fips-ctor 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.3/cipher/md.c 2018-07-12 13:02:49.599423390 +0200
@@ -411,11 +411,8 @@ md_enable (gcry_md_hd_t hd, int algorith
if (!err && algorithm == GCRY_MD_MD5 && fips_mode ())
{
- _gcry_inactivate_fips_mode ("MD5 used");
if (_gcry_enforced_fips_mode () )
{
- /* We should never get to here because we do not register
- MD5 in enforced fips mode. But better throw an error. */
err = GPG_ERR_DIGEST_ALGO;
}
}
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/fips.c.fips-ctor libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/fips.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/fips.c.fips-ctor 2018-07-12 13:02:49.589423158 +0200
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/fips.c 2018-07-12 13:08:45.955663998 +0200
@@ -91,6 +91,31 @@ static void fips_new_state (enum module_
+/* Initialize the FSM lock - this function may only
+ be called once and is intended to be run from the library
+ constructor */
+void
+_gcry_initialize_fsm_lock (void)
+{
+ gpg_error_t err;
+ /* Intitialize the lock to protect the FSM. */
+ err = gpgrt_lock_init (&fsm_lock);
+ if (err)
+ {
+ /* If that fails we can't do anything but abort the
+ process. We need to use log_info so that the FSM won't
+ get involved. */
+ log_info ("FATAL: failed to create the FSM lock in libgcrypt: %s\n",
+ gpg_strerror (err));
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG
+ syslog (LOG_USER|LOG_ERR, "Libgcrypt error: "
+ "creating FSM lock failed: %s - abort",
+ gpg_strerror (err));
+#endif /*HAVE_SYSLOG*/
+ abort ();
+ }
+}
+
/* Check whether the OS is in FIPS mode and record that in a module
local variable. If FORCE is passed as true, fips mode will be
enabled anyway. Note: This function is not thread-safe and should
@@ -100,7 +125,6 @@ void
_gcry_initialize_fips_mode (int force)
{
static int done;
- gpg_error_t err;
/* Make sure we are not accidentally called twice. */
if (done)
@@ -179,24 +203,6 @@ _gcry_initialize_fips_mode (int force)
/* Yes, we are in FIPS mode. */
FILE *fp;
- /* Intitialize the lock to protect the FSM. */
- err = gpgrt_lock_init (&fsm_lock);
- if (err)
- {
- /* If that fails we can't do anything but abort the
- process. We need to use log_info so that the FSM won't
- get involved. */
- log_info ("FATAL: failed to create the FSM lock in libgcrypt: %s\n",
- gpg_strerror (err));
-#ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG
- syslog (LOG_USER|LOG_ERR, "Libgcrypt error: "
- "creating FSM lock failed: %s - abort",
- gpg_strerror (err));
-#endif /*HAVE_SYSLOG*/
- abort ();
- }
-
-
/* If the FIPS force files exists, is readable and has a number
!= 0 on its first line, we enable the enforced fips mode. */
fp = fopen (FIPS_FORCE_FILE, "r");
@@ -359,16 +365,20 @@ _gcry_fips_is_operational (void)
{
int result;
- if (!fips_mode ())
+ lock_fsm ();
+ if (current_state == STATE_POWERON && !fips_mode ())
+ /* If we are at this point in POWERON state it means the FIPS
+ module installation was not completed. (/etc/system-fips
+ is not present.) */
result = 1;
else
{
- lock_fsm ();
- if (current_state == STATE_INIT)
+ if (current_state == STATE_INIT || current_state == STATE_SELFTEST)
{
- /* If we are still in the INIT state, we need to run the
- selftests so that the FSM can eventually get into
- operational state. Given that we would need a 2-phase
+ /* If we are still in the INIT (or SELFTEST) state,
+ we need to run (or finish) the selftests so
+ that the FSM can eventually get into operational
+ state. Given that we would need a 2-phase
initialization of libgcrypt, but that has traditionally
not been enforced, we use this on demand self-test
checking. Note that Proper applications would do the
@@ -384,9 +394,11 @@ _gcry_fips_is_operational (void)
lock_fsm ();
}
- result = (current_state == STATE_OPERATIONAL);
- unlock_fsm ();
+ result = (current_state == STATE_OPERATIONAL) || !fips_mode ();
+ /* We always run the selftests but ignore the result
+ in non-FIPS mode. */
}
+ unlock_fsm ();
return result;
}
@@ -709,9 +721,25 @@ _gcry_fips_run_selftests (int extended)
{
enum module_states result = STATE_ERROR;
gcry_err_code_t ec = GPG_ERR_SELFTEST_FAILED;
+ int in_poweron;
- if (fips_mode ())
- fips_new_state (STATE_SELFTEST);
+ lock_fsm ();
+ in_poweron = (current_state == STATE_POWERON);
+ unlock_fsm ();
+
+ fips_new_state (STATE_SELFTEST);
+
+ /* We first check the integrity of the binary.
+ If run from the constructor we are in POWERON state,
+ we return and finish the remaining selftests before
+ real use of the library. It will be in the POWERON
+ state meanwhile. */
+ if (in_poweron)
+ if (check_binary_integrity ())
+ goto leave;
+
+ if (in_poweron)
+ return 0;
if (run_cipher_selftests (extended))
goto leave;
@@ -730,18 +758,12 @@ _gcry_fips_run_selftests (int extended)
if (run_pubkey_selftests (extended))
goto leave;
- /* Now check the integrity of the binary. We do this this after
- having checked the HMAC code. */
- if (check_binary_integrity ())
- goto leave;
-
/* All selftests passed. */
result = STATE_OPERATIONAL;
ec = 0;
leave:
- if (fips_mode ())
- fips_new_state (result);
+ fips_new_state (result);
return ec;
}
@@ -797,6 +819,7 @@ fips_new_state (enum module_states new_s
{
case STATE_POWERON:
if (new_state == STATE_INIT
+ || new_state == STATE_SELFTEST
|| new_state == STATE_ERROR
|| new_state == STATE_FATALERROR)
ok = 1;
@@ -811,6 +834,8 @@ fips_new_state (enum module_states new_s
case STATE_SELFTEST:
if (new_state == STATE_OPERATIONAL
+ || new_state == STATE_INIT
+ || new_state == STATE_SELFTEST
|| new_state == STATE_ERROR
|| new_state == STATE_FATALERROR)
ok = 1;
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/global.c.fips-ctor libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/global.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/global.c.fips-ctor 2017-11-23 19:25:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/global.c 2018-07-12 13:02:49.599423390 +0200
@@ -141,6 +141,29 @@ global_init (void)
}
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE_PATH
+#define FIPS_MODULE_PATH "/etc/system-fips"
+#endif
+
+void __attribute__ ((constructor)) _gcry_global_constructor (void)
+{
+ int rv;
+
+ /* We always need the FSM lock to be functional. */
+ _gcry_initialize_fsm_lock ();
+
+ rv = access (FIPS_MODULE_PATH, F_OK);
+ if (rv < 0 && errno != ENOENT)
+ rv = 0;
+
+ if (!rv)
+ {
+ /* We run the integrity check at this point. The remaining
+ selftests are run before use of the library by application. */
+ _gcry_fips_run_selftests (0);
+ }
+}
+
/* This function is called by the macro fips_is_operational and makes
sure that the minimal initialization has been done. This is far
from a perfect solution and hides problems with an improper
@@ -671,8 +694,7 @@ _gcry_vcontrol (enum gcry_ctl_cmds cmd,
case GCRYCTL_FIPS_MODE_P:
if (fips_mode ()
- && !_gcry_is_fips_mode_inactive ()
- && !no_secure_memory)
+ && !_gcry_is_fips_mode_inactive ())
rc = GPG_ERR_GENERAL; /* Used as TRUE value */
break;
@@ -749,7 +771,7 @@ _gcry_vcontrol (enum gcry_ctl_cmds cmd,
break;
case GCRYCTL_SET_ENFORCED_FIPS_FLAG:
- if (!any_init_done)
+ if (fips_mode ())
{
/* Not yet initialized at all. Set the enforced fips mode flag */
_gcry_set_preferred_rng_type (0);
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/g10lib.h.fips-ctor libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/g10lib.h
--- libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/g10lib.h.fips-ctor 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.3/src/g10lib.h 2018-07-12 13:02:49.600423413 +0200
@@ -422,6 +422,8 @@ gpg_err_code_t _gcry_sexp_vextract_param
/*-- fips.c --*/
+void _gcry_initialize_fsm_lock (void);
+
void _gcry_initialize_fips_mode (int force);
int _gcry_fips_mode (void);

101
libgcrypt-1.8.3-getrandom.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.3/random/random.c.getrandom libgcrypt-1.8.3/random/random.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.3/random/random.c.getrandom 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.3/random/random.c 2018-07-10 15:38:34.303855808 +0200
@@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ _gcry_random_read_conf (void)
unsigned int result = 0;
fp = fopen (fname, "r");
- if (!fp)
- return result;
+ if (!fp) /* We make only_urandom the default. */
+ return RANDOM_CONF_ONLY_URANDOM;
for (;;)
{
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.3/random/random-csprng.c.getrandom libgcrypt-1.8.3/random/random-csprng.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.3/random/random-csprng.c.getrandom 2017-11-23 19:16:58.000000000 +0100
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.3/random/random-csprng.c 2018-06-14 16:31:04.731179208 +0200
@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@
#ifdef __MINGW32__
#include <process.h>
#endif
+#if defined(__linux__) && defined(HAVE_SYSCALL)
+# include <sys/syscall.h>
+# include <linux/random.h>
+#endif
#include "g10lib.h"
#include "random.h"
#include "rand-internal.h"
@@ -1116,6 +1120,22 @@ getfnc_gather_random (void))(void (*)(co
enum random_origins, size_t, int);
#if USE_RNDLINUX
+#if defined(__linux__) && defined(HAVE_SYSCALL) && defined(__NR_getrandom)
+ long ret;
+ char buffer[1];
+
+ _gcry_pre_syscall ();
+ ret = syscall (__NR_getrandom,
+ (void*)buffer, (size_t)1, (unsigned int)GRND_NONBLOCK);
+ _gcry_post_syscall ();
+ if (ret != -1 || errno != ENOSYS)
+ {
+ fnc = _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random;
+ return fnc;
+ }
+ else
+ /* The syscall is not supported - fallback to /dev/urandom. */
+#endif
if ( !access (NAME_OF_DEV_RANDOM, R_OK)
&& !access (NAME_OF_DEV_URANDOM, R_OK))
{
diff -up libgcrypt-1.8.3/random/rndlinux.c.getrandom libgcrypt-1.8.3/random/rndlinux.c
--- libgcrypt-1.8.3/random/rndlinux.c.getrandom 2018-06-14 16:31:04.722178971 +0200
+++ libgcrypt-1.8.3/random/rndlinux.c 2018-07-10 15:55:03.301075155 +0200
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#include <poll.h>
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(HAVE_SYSCALL)
# include <sys/syscall.h>
+# include <linux/random.h>
#endif
#include "types.h"
@@ -204,6 +205,18 @@ _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random (void (*add
{
if (fd_urandom == -1)
{
+#if defined(__linux__) && defined(HAVE_SYSCALL) && defined(__NR_getrandom)
+ long ret;
+
+ _gcry_pre_syscall ();
+ ret = syscall (__NR_getrandom,
+ (void*)buffer, (size_t)1, (unsigned int)GRND_NONBLOCK);
+ _gcry_post_syscall ();
+ if (ret > -1 || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)
+ fd_urandom = -2;
+ else
+ /* The syscall is not supported - fallback to /dev/urandom. */
+#endif
fd_urandom = open_device (NAME_OF_DEV_URANDOM, (ever_opened & 2));
ever_opened |= 2;
}
@@ -230,7 +243,7 @@ _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random (void (*add
* syscall and not a new device and thus we are not able to use
* select(2) to have a timeout. */
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(HAVE_SYSCALL) && defined(__NR_getrandom)
- if (fd == fd_urandom)
+ if (fd == -2)
{
long ret;
size_t nbytes;
@@ -246,9 +259,7 @@ _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random (void (*add
_gcry_post_syscall ();
}
while (ret == -1 && errno == EINTR);
- if (ret == -1 && errno == ENOSYS)
- ; /* The syscall is not supported - fallback to /dev/urandom. */
- else
+ if (1)
{ /* The syscall is supported. Some sanity checks. */
if (ret == -1)
log_fatal ("unexpected error from getrandom: %s\n",

BIN
libgcrypt-1.8.3.tar.gz Normal file
View File

Binary file not shown.

146
libgcrypt.spec Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
%define gcrylibdir %{_libdir}
Name: libgcrypt
Version: 1.8.3
Release: 4
Summary: A general-purpose cryptography library
License: LGPLv2+
URL: https://www.gnupg.org/
Source0: https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-%{version}.tar.gz
Source2: wk@g10code.com
Source3: hobble-libgcrypt
Source4: ecc-curves.c
Source5: curves.c
Source6: t-mpi-point.c
Source7: random.conf
Patch2: libgcrypt-1.6.2-use-fipscheck.patch
Patch5: libgcrypt-1.8.0-tests.patch
Patch7: libgcrypt-1.7.3-fips-cavs.patch
Patch11: libgcrypt-1.8.0-use-poll.patch
Patch13: libgcrypt-1.6.1-mpicoder-gccopt.patch
Patch14: libgcrypt-1.7.3-ecc-test-fix.patch
Patch18: libgcrypt-1.8.3-fips-ctor.patch
Patch22: libgcrypt-1.7.3-fips-reqs.patch
Patch24: libgcrypt-1.8.3-getrandom.patch
Patch6000: sexp-Fix-uninitialized-use-of-a-var-in-the-error-cas.patch
Patch6001: ecc-Fix-possible-memory-leakage-in-parameter-check-o.patch
Patch6002: ecc-Fix-memory-leak-in-the-error-case-of-ecc_encrypt.patch
Patch6003: Fix-memory-leak-in-secmem-in-out-of-core-conditions.patch
BuildRequires: gcc fipscheck texinfo git
BuildRequires: gawk libgpg-error-devel >= 1.11 pkgconfig
%description
Libgcrypt is a general purpose cryptographic library originally based on code from GnuPG.
%package devel
Summary: Development files for the %{name} package
License: LGPLv2+ and GPLv2+
Requires(pre): /sbin/install-info
Requires(post): /sbin/install-info
Requires: libgpg-error-devel %{name} = %{version}-%{release}
%description devel
Libgcrypt is a general purpose crypto library based on the code used
in GNU Privacy Guard. This package contains files needed to develop
applications using libgcrypt.
%package_help
%prep
%autosetup -n %{name}-%{version} -p1 -S git
chmod +x %{SOURCE3}
%{SOURCE3}
cp %{SOURCE4} cipher/
cp %{SOURCE5} %{SOURCE6} tests/
%build
%configure --enable-noexecstack --enable-hmac-binary-check \
--enable-pubkey-ciphers='dsa elgamal rsa ecc' --disable-O-flag-munging
sed -i -e '/^sys_lib_dlsearch_path_spec/s,/lib /usr/lib,/usr/lib /lib64 /usr/lib64 /lib,g' libtool
%make_build
%check
fipshmac src/.libs/libgcrypt.so.??
%define __spec_install_post \
%{?__debug_package:%{__debug_install_post}} \
%{__arch_install_post} \
%{__os_install_post} \
fipshmac $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{gcrylibdir}/*.so.?? \
%{nil}
%install
%make_install
sed -i -e 's,^libdir="/usr/lib.*"$,libdir="/usr/lib",g' $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/libgcrypt-config
sed -i -e 's,^my_host=".*"$,my_host="none",g' $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/libgcrypt-config
%delete_la
/sbin/ldconfig -n $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}
%if "%{gcrylibdir}" != "%{_libdir}"
mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{gcrylibdir}
for shlib in $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/*.so* ; do
if test -L "$shlib" ; then
rm "$shlib"
else
mv "$shlib" $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{gcrylibdir}/
fi
done
/sbin/ldconfig -n $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_lib}/
%endif
pushd $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{gcrylibdir}
for shlib in lib*.so.?? ; do
target=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/`echo "$shlib" | sed -e 's,\.so.*,,g'`.so
%if "%{gcrylibdir}" != "%{_libdir}"
shlib=%{gcrylibdir}/$shlib
%endif
ln -sf $shlib $target
done
popd
mkdir -p -m 755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/gcrypt
install -m644 %{SOURCE7} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/gcrypt/random.conf
%ldconfig_scriptlets
%post devel
[ -f %{_infodir}/gcrypt.info.gz ] && \
/sbin/install-info %{_infodir}/gcrypt.info.gz %{_infodir}/dir
exit 0
%preun devel
if [ $1 = 0 -a -f %{_infodir}/gcrypt.info.gz ]; then
/sbin/install-info --delete %{_infodir}/gcrypt.info.gz %{_infodir}/dir
fi
exit 0
%files
%defattr(-,root,root)
%doc AUTHORS NEWS THANKS
%license COPYING.LIB COPYING
%dir /etc/gcrypt
%config(noreplace) /etc/gcrypt/random.conf
%{gcrylibdir}/*.so.*
%{gcrylibdir}/.*.so.*.hmac
%exclude %{_infodir}/dir
%files devel
%defattr(-,root,root)
%{_bindir}/*
%{_includedir}/*
%{_libdir}/*.so
%{_datadir}/aclocal/*
%files help
%defattr(-,root,root)
%{_mandir}/man1/*
%{_infodir}/gcrypt.info*
%changelog
* Thu Sep 05 2019 openEuler Buildteam <buildteam@openeuler.org> - 1.8.3-4
- Package init

4
random.conf Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
# use only /dev/urandom - see https://www.2uo.de/myths-about-urandom/
only-urandom
# Keep jitter entropy generator enabled (should do no harm)
#disable-jent

45
sexp-Fix-uninitialized-use-of-a-var-in-the-error-cas.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
From 9f2c7ec4d8b07e82663ad084c90c016d3c3b80c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2018 22:51:40 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 088/152] sexp: Fix uninitialized use of a var in the error
case.
* src/sexp.c (_gcry_sexp_vextract_param): Initialize L1.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 4212
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
---
src/gcrypt.h.in | 2 +-
src/sexp.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/gcrypt.h.in b/src/gcrypt.h.in
index d2dfe80..36bbf20 100644
--- a/src/gcrypt.h.in
+++ b/src/gcrypt.h.in
@@ -1318,7 +1318,7 @@ gpg_error_t gcry_md_extract (gcry_md_hd_t hd, int algo, void *buffer,
size_t length);
/* Convenience function to calculate the hash from the data in BUFFER
- of size LENGTH using the algorithm ALGO avoiding the creating of a
+ of size LENGTH using the algorithm ALGO avoiding the creation of a
hash object. The hash is returned in the caller provided buffer
DIGEST which must be large enough to hold the digest of the given
algorithm. */
diff --git a/src/sexp.c b/src/sexp.c
index 9d89268..f2a164c 100644
--- a/src/sexp.c
+++ b/src/sexp.c
@@ -2232,7 +2232,7 @@ _gcry_sexp_vextract_param (gcry_sexp_t sexp, const char *path,
gcry_mpi_t *array[20];
char arrayisdesc[20];
int idx;
- gcry_sexp_t l1;
+ gcry_sexp_t l1 = NULL;
int mode = '+'; /* Default to GCRYMPI_FMT_USG. */
gcry_sexp_t freethis = NULL;
--
1.8.3.1

1225
t-mpi-point.c Normal file
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

2007
wk@g10code.com Normal file
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff