Fix CVE-2021-33560 CVE-2021-40528
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zou_lin77
parent
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@ -1,105 +1,73 @@
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From 3462280f2e23e16adf3ed5176e0f2413d8861320 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From e8b7f10be275bcedb5fc05ed4837a89bfd605c61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
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Date: Fri, 21 May 2021 11:15:07 +0900
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Subject: [PATCH] cipher: Fix ElGamal encryption for other implementations.
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Date: Tue, 13 Apr 2021 10:00:00 +0900
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Subject: [PATCH] cipher: Hardening ElGamal by introducing exponent blinding
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too.
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* cipher/elgamal.c (gen_k): Remove support of smaller K.
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(do_encrypt): Never use smaller K.
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(sign): Folllow the change of gen_k.
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* cipher/elgamal.c (do_encrypt): Also do exponent blinding.
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--
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Cherry-pick master commit of:
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632d80ef30e13de6926d503aa697f92b5dbfbc5e
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Base blinding had been introduced with USE_BLINDING. This patch add
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exponent blinding as well to mitigate side-channel attack on mpi_powm.
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This change basically reverts encryption changes in two commits:
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74386120dad6b3da62db37f7044267c8ef34689b
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78531373a342aeb847950f404343a05e36022065
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Use of smaller K for ephemeral key in ElGamal encryption is only good,
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when we can guarantee that recipient's key is generated by our
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implementation (or compatible).
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For detail, please see:
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Luca De Feo, Bertram Poettering, Alessandro Sorniotti,
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"On the (in)security of ElGamal in OpenPGP";
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in the proceedings of CCS'2021.
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CVE-id: CVE-2021-33560
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GnuPG-bug-id: 5328
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Suggested-by: Luca De Feo, Bertram Poettering, Alessandro Sorniotti
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Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
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---
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cipher/elgamal.c | 24 ++++++------------------
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1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
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cipher/elgamal.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++---
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1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/cipher/elgamal.c b/cipher/elgamal.c
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index 9835122..eead450 100644
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index 4eb52d6..9835122 100644
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--- a/cipher/elgamal.c
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+++ b/cipher/elgamal.c
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@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static const char *elg_names[] =
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static int test_keys (ELG_secret_key *sk, unsigned int nbits, int nodie);
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-static gcry_mpi_t gen_k (gcry_mpi_t p, int small_k);
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+static gcry_mpi_t gen_k (gcry_mpi_t p);
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static gcry_err_code_t generate (ELG_secret_key *sk, unsigned nbits,
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gcry_mpi_t **factors);
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static int check_secret_key (ELG_secret_key *sk);
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@@ -189,11 +189,10 @@ test_keys ( ELG_secret_key *sk, unsigned int nbits, int nodie )
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/****************
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* Generate a random secret exponent k from prime p, so that k is
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- * relatively prime to p-1. With SMALL_K set, k will be selected for
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- * better encryption performance - this must never be used signing!
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+ * relatively prime to p-1.
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*/
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static gcry_mpi_t
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-gen_k( gcry_mpi_t p, int small_k )
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+gen_k( gcry_mpi_t p )
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@@ -522,8 +522,9 @@ do_encrypt(gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, gcry_mpi_t input, ELG_public_key *pkey )
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static void
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decrypt (gcry_mpi_t output, gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, ELG_secret_key *skey )
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{
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gcry_mpi_t k = mpi_alloc_secure( 0 );
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gcry_mpi_t temp = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(p) );
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@@ -202,18 +201,7 @@ gen_k( gcry_mpi_t p, int small_k )
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unsigned int nbits, nbytes;
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char *rndbuf = NULL;
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- gcry_mpi_t t1, t2, r;
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+ gcry_mpi_t t1, t2, r, r1, h;
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unsigned int nbits = mpi_get_nbits (skey->p);
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+ gcry_mpi_t x_blind;
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- if (small_k)
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- {
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- /* Using a k much lesser than p is sufficient for encryption and
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- * it greatly improves the encryption performance. We use
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- * Wiener's table and add a large safety margin. */
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- nbits = wiener_map( orig_nbits ) * 3 / 2;
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- if( nbits >= orig_nbits )
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- BUG();
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- }
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- else
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- nbits = orig_nbits;
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-
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+ nbits = orig_nbits;
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mpi_normalize (a);
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mpi_normalize (b);
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@@ -534,20 +535,33 @@ decrypt (gcry_mpi_t output, gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, ELG_secret_key *skey )
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nbytes = (nbits+7)/8;
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if( DBG_CIPHER )
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@@ -492,7 +480,7 @@ do_encrypt(gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, gcry_mpi_t input, ELG_public_key *pkey )
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* error code.
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*/
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t2 = mpi_snew (nbits);
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r = mpi_new (nbits);
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+ r1 = mpi_new (nbits);
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+ h = mpi_new (nbits);
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+ x_blind = mpi_snew (nbits);
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- k = gen_k( pkey->p, 1 );
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+ k = gen_k( pkey->p );
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mpi_powm (a, pkey->g, k, pkey->p);
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/* We need a random number of about the prime size. The random
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number merely needs to be unpredictable; thus we use level 0. */
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_gcry_mpi_randomize (r, nbits, GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM);
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+ /* Also, exponent blinding: x_blind = x + (p-1)*r1 */
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+ _gcry_mpi_randomize (r1, nbits, GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM);
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+ mpi_set_highbit (r1, nbits - 1);
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+ mpi_sub_ui (h, skey->p, 1);
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+ mpi_mul (x_blind, h, r1);
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+ mpi_add (x_blind, skey->x, x_blind);
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+
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/* t1 = r^x mod p */
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- mpi_powm (t1, r, skey->x, skey->p);
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+ mpi_powm (t1, r, x_blind, skey->p);
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/* t2 = (a * r)^-x mod p */
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mpi_mulm (t2, a, r, skey->p);
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- mpi_powm (t2, t2, skey->x, skey->p);
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+ mpi_powm (t2, t2, x_blind, skey->p);
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mpi_invm (t2, t2, skey->p);
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/* t1 = (t1 * t2) mod p*/
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mpi_mulm (t1, t1, t2, skey->p);
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+ mpi_free (x_blind);
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+ mpi_free (h);
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+ mpi_free (r1);
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mpi_free (r);
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mpi_free (t2);
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/* b = (y^k * input) mod p
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@@ -608,7 +596,7 @@ sign(gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, gcry_mpi_t input, ELG_secret_key *skey )
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*
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*/
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mpi_sub_ui(p_1, p_1, 1);
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- k = gen_k( skey->p, 0 /* no small K ! */ );
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+ k = gen_k( skey->p );
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mpi_powm( a, skey->g, k, skey->p );
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mpi_mul(t, skey->x, a );
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mpi_subm(t, input, t, p_1 );
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--
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1.8.3.1
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105
CVE-2021-40528.patch
Normal file
105
CVE-2021-40528.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
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From 3462280f2e23e16adf3ed5176e0f2413d8861320 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
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Date: Fri, 21 May 2021 11:15:07 +0900
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Subject: [PATCH] cipher: Fix ElGamal encryption for other implementations.
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* cipher/elgamal.c (gen_k): Remove support of smaller K.
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(do_encrypt): Never use smaller K.
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(sign): Folllow the change of gen_k.
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--
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Cherry-pick master commit of:
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632d80ef30e13de6926d503aa697f92b5dbfbc5e
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This change basically reverts encryption changes in two commits:
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74386120dad6b3da62db37f7044267c8ef34689b
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78531373a342aeb847950f404343a05e36022065
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Use of smaller K for ephemeral key in ElGamal encryption is only good,
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when we can guarantee that recipient's key is generated by our
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implementation (or compatible).
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For detail, please see:
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Luca De Feo, Bertram Poettering, Alessandro Sorniotti,
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"On the (in)security of ElGamal in OpenPGP";
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in the proceedings of CCS'2021.
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CVE-id: CVE-2021-33560(This patch actually modifies CVE-2021-40528,see:https://dev.gnupg.org/T5328#149606)
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GnuPG-bug-id: 5328
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Suggested-by: Luca De Feo, Bertram Poettering, Alessandro Sorniotti
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Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
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---
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cipher/elgamal.c | 24 ++++++------------------
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1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/cipher/elgamal.c b/cipher/elgamal.c
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index 9835122..eead450 100644
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--- a/cipher/elgamal.c
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+++ b/cipher/elgamal.c
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@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static const char *elg_names[] =
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static int test_keys (ELG_secret_key *sk, unsigned int nbits, int nodie);
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-static gcry_mpi_t gen_k (gcry_mpi_t p, int small_k);
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+static gcry_mpi_t gen_k (gcry_mpi_t p);
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static gcry_err_code_t generate (ELG_secret_key *sk, unsigned nbits,
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gcry_mpi_t **factors);
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static int check_secret_key (ELG_secret_key *sk);
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@@ -189,11 +189,10 @@ test_keys ( ELG_secret_key *sk, unsigned int nbits, int nodie )
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/****************
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* Generate a random secret exponent k from prime p, so that k is
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- * relatively prime to p-1. With SMALL_K set, k will be selected for
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- * better encryption performance - this must never be used signing!
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+ * relatively prime to p-1.
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*/
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static gcry_mpi_t
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-gen_k( gcry_mpi_t p, int small_k )
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+gen_k( gcry_mpi_t p )
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{
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gcry_mpi_t k = mpi_alloc_secure( 0 );
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gcry_mpi_t temp = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(p) );
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@@ -202,18 +201,7 @@ gen_k( gcry_mpi_t p, int small_k )
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unsigned int nbits, nbytes;
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char *rndbuf = NULL;
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- if (small_k)
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- {
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- /* Using a k much lesser than p is sufficient for encryption and
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- * it greatly improves the encryption performance. We use
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- * Wiener's table and add a large safety margin. */
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- nbits = wiener_map( orig_nbits ) * 3 / 2;
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- if( nbits >= orig_nbits )
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- BUG();
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- }
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- else
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- nbits = orig_nbits;
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-
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+ nbits = orig_nbits;
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nbytes = (nbits+7)/8;
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if( DBG_CIPHER )
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@@ -492,7 +480,7 @@ do_encrypt(gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, gcry_mpi_t input, ELG_public_key *pkey )
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* error code.
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*/
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- k = gen_k( pkey->p, 1 );
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+ k = gen_k( pkey->p );
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mpi_powm (a, pkey->g, k, pkey->p);
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/* b = (y^k * input) mod p
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@@ -608,7 +596,7 @@ sign(gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, gcry_mpi_t input, ELG_secret_key *skey )
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*
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*/
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mpi_sub_ui(p_1, p_1, 1);
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- k = gen_k( skey->p, 0 /* no small K ! */ );
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+ k = gen_k( skey->p );
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mpi_powm( a, skey->g, k, skey->p );
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mpi_mul(t, skey->x, a );
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mpi_subm(t, input, t, p_1 );
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--
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1.8.3.1
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@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
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Name: libgcrypt
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Version: 1.8.7
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Release: 3
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Release: 4
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Summary: A general-purpose cryptography library
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License: LGPLv2+
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URL: https://www.gnupg.org/
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@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ Patch16: CVE-2019-12904-1.patch
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Patch17: CVE-2019-12904-2.patch
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Patch18: CVE-2019-12904-3.patch
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Patch19: CVE-2021-33560.patch
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Patch20: CVE-2021-40528.patch
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BuildRequires: gcc texinfo autoconf automake libtool
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BuildRequires: gawk libgpg-error-devel >= 1.11 pkgconfig
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@ -136,6 +137,12 @@ install -m644 %{SOURCE7} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/gcrypt/random.conf
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%{_infodir}/gcrypt.info*
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%changelog
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* Fri Sep 24 2021 zoulin <zoulin13@huawei.com> - 1.8.7-4
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- Type:cves
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- ID:NA
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- SUG:NA
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- DESC:Fix CVE-2021-33560 CVE-2021-40528
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* Fri Jul 30 2021 chenyanpanHW <chenyanpan@huawei.com> - 1.8.7-3
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- DESC: delete -S git from %autosetup, and delete BuildRequires git
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