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update to 3.8.2

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Signed-off-by: xuraoqing <xuraoqing@huawei.com>
This commit is contained in:
xuraoqing 2024-01-29 14:49:47 +08:00
parent db477d677e
commit ecee7e4bf3
9 changed files with 70 additions and 261 deletions
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209
backport-CVE-2023-5981-auth-rsa_psk-side-step-potential-side-channel.patch
View File

@ -1,209 +0,0 @@
From 29d6298d0b04cfff970b993915db71ba3f580b6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
Date: Mon, 23 Oct 2023 09:26:57 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] auth/rsa_psk: side-step potential side-channel
This removes branching that depends on secret data, porting changes
for regular RSA key exchange from
4804febddc2ed958e5ae774de2a8f85edeeff538 and
80a6ce8ddb02477cd724cd5b2944791aaddb702a. This also removes the
allow_wrong_pms as it was used sorely to control debug output
depending on the branching.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
Conflict::rsa_psk.c
---
lib/auth/rsa.c | 2 +-
lib/auth/rsa_psk.c | 90 ++++++++++++++++++----------------------------
lib/gnutls_int.h | 4 ---
lib/priority.c | 1 -
4 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa.c b/lib/auth/rsa.c
index 492ec11..dd0fea1 100644
--- a/lib/auth/rsa.c
+++ b/lib/auth/rsa.c
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data, size_t _data_size)
session->key.key.size);
/* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
* in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
- * channel that can be used as an oracle, so treat very carefully */
+ * channel that can be used as an oracle, so tread carefully */
/* Error handling logic:
* In case decryption fails then don't inform the peer. Just use the
diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c b/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
index c1e9ac4..289ecbd 100644
--- a/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
+++ b/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
@@ -255,14 +255,13 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
{
gnutls_datum_t username;
psk_auth_info_t info;
- gnutls_datum_t plaintext;
gnutls_datum_t ciphertext;
gnutls_datum_t pwd_psk = { NULL, 0 };
int ret, dsize;
- int randomize_key = 0;
ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t cred;
gnutls_datum_t premaster_secret = { NULL, 0 };
+ volatile uint8_t ver_maj, ver_min;
cred = (gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t)
_gnutls_get_cred(session, GNUTLS_CRD_PSK);
@@ -320,68 +319,47 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
}
ciphertext.size = dsize;
- ret =
- gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data(session->internals.selected_key, 0,
- &ciphertext, &plaintext);
- if (ret < 0 || plaintext.size != GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE) {
- /* In case decryption fails then don't inform
- * the peer. Just use a random key. (in order to avoid
- * attack against pkcs-1 formatting).
- */
+ ver_maj = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
+ ver_min = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
+
+ premaster_secret.data = gnutls_malloc(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
+ if (premaster_secret.data == NULL) {
gnutls_assert();
- _gnutls_debug_log
- ("auth_rsa_psk: Possible PKCS #1 format attack\n");
- if (ret >= 0) {
- gnutls_free(plaintext.data);
- }
- randomize_key = 1;
- } else {
- /* If the secret was properly formatted, then
- * check the version number.
- */
- if (_gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session) != plaintext.data[0]
- || (session->internals.allow_wrong_pms == 0
- && _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session) !=
- plaintext.data[1])) {
- /* No error is returned here, if the version number check
- * fails. We proceed normally.
- * That is to defend against the attack described in the paper
- * "Attacking RSA-based sessions in SSL/TLS" by Vlastimil Klima,
- * Ondej Pokorny and Tomas Rosa.
- */
- gnutls_assert();
- _gnutls_debug_log
- ("auth_rsa: Possible PKCS #1 version check format attack\n");
- }
+ return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
}
+ premaster_secret.size = GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE;
- if (randomize_key != 0) {
- premaster_secret.size = GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE;
- premaster_secret.data = gnutls_malloc(premaster_secret.size);
- if (premaster_secret.data == NULL) {
- gnutls_assert();
- return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
- }
-
- /* we do not need strong random numbers here.
- */
- ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, premaster_secret.data,
- premaster_secret.size);
- if (ret < 0) {
- gnutls_assert();
- goto cleanup;
- }
- } else {
- premaster_secret.data = plaintext.data;
- premaster_secret.size = plaintext.size;
+ /* Fallback value when decryption fails. Needs to be unpredictable. */
+ ret = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, premaster_secret.data,
+ premaster_secret.size);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ gnutls_assert();
+ goto cleanup;
}
+ gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key, 0,
+ &ciphertext, premaster_secret.data,
+ premaster_secret.size);
+ /* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
+ * in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
+ * channel that can be used as an oracle, so tread carefully */
+
+ /* Error handling logic:
+ * In case decryption fails then don't inform the peer. Just use the
+ * random key previously generated. (in order to avoid attack against
+ * pkcs-1 formatting).
+ *
+ * If we get version mismatches no error is returned either. We
+ * proceed normally. This is to defend against the attack described
+ * in the paper "Attacking RSA-based sessions in SSL/TLS" by
+ * Vlastimil Klima, Ondej Pokorny and Tomas Rosa.
+ */
+
/* This is here to avoid the version check attack
* discussed above.
*/
-
- premaster_secret.data[0] = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
- premaster_secret.data[1] = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
+ premaster_secret.data[0] = ver_maj;
+ premaster_secret.data[1] = ver_min;
/* find the key of this username
*/
diff --git a/lib/gnutls_int.h b/lib/gnutls_int.h
index 969454b..034059a 100644
--- a/lib/gnutls_int.h
+++ b/lib/gnutls_int.h
@@ -977,7 +977,6 @@ struct gnutls_priority_st {
bool _no_etm;
bool _no_ext_master_secret;
bool _allow_key_usage_violation;
- bool _allow_wrong_pms;
bool _dumbfw;
unsigned int _dh_prime_bits; /* old (deprecated) variable */
@@ -995,7 +994,6 @@ struct gnutls_priority_st {
(x)->no_etm = 1; \
(x)->no_ext_master_secret = 1; \
(x)->allow_key_usage_violation = 1; \
- (x)->allow_wrong_pms = 1; \
(x)->dumbfw = 1
# define ENABLE_PRIO_COMPAT(x) \
@@ -1004,7 +1002,6 @@ struct gnutls_priority_st {
(x)->_no_etm = 1; \
(x)->_no_ext_master_secret = 1; \
(x)->_allow_key_usage_violation = 1; \
- (x)->_allow_wrong_pms = 1; \
(x)->_dumbfw = 1
/* DH and RSA parameters types.
@@ -1129,7 +1126,6 @@ typedef struct {
bool no_etm;
bool no_ext_master_secret;
bool allow_key_usage_violation;
- bool allow_wrong_pms;
bool dumbfw;
/* old (deprecated) variable. This is used for both srp_prime_bits
diff --git a/lib/priority.c b/lib/priority.c
index 154929e..8dd9c42 100644
--- a/lib/priority.c
+++ b/lib/priority.c
@@ -725,7 +725,6 @@ int gnutls_priority_set(gnutls_session_t session, gnutls_priority_t priority)
COPY_TO_INTERNALS(no_etm);
COPY_TO_INTERNALS(no_ext_master_secret);
COPY_TO_INTERNALS(allow_key_usage_violation);
- COPY_TO_INTERNALS(allow_wrong_pms);
COPY_TO_INTERNALS(dumbfw);
COPY_TO_INTERNALS(dh_prime_bits);
--
2.33.0

37
backport-CVE-2024-0553-rsa-psk-minimize-branching-after-decryption.patch
View File

@ -10,24 +10,25 @@ decryption. This also avoids an extra memcpy to session->key.key.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org> Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
Reference: https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/40dbbd8de499668590e8af51a15799fbc430595e Reference: https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/40dbbd8de499668590e8af51a15799fbc430595e
Conflicts: lib/auth/rsa_psk.c Conflicts: NA
--- ---
lib/auth/rsa_psk.c | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- lib/auth/rsa_psk.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c b/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c b/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
index 289ecbd..4043a64 100644 index 99f908460..399fb4da1 100644
--- a/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c --- a/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
+++ b/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c +++ b/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
@@ -260,7 +260,6 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data, @@ -256,7 +256,6 @@ static int _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session,
int ret, dsize; int ret, dsize;
ssize_t data_size = _data_size; ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t cred; gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t cred;
- gnutls_datum_t premaster_secret = { NULL, 0 }; - gnutls_datum_t premaster_secret = { NULL, 0 };
volatile uint8_t ver_maj, ver_min; volatile uint8_t ver_maj, ver_min;
cred = (gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t) cred = (gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t)_gnutls_get_cred(
@@ -322,24 +321,48 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data, @@ -318,24 +317,49 @@ static int _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session,
ver_maj = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session); ver_maj = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
ver_min = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session); ver_min = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
@ -37,7 +38,8 @@ index 289ecbd..4043a64 100644
+ * filled in if the key is not found. + * filled in if the key is not found.
+ */ + */
+ ret = _gnutls_psk_pwd_find_entry(session, info->username, + ret = _gnutls_psk_pwd_find_entry(session, info->username,
+ strlen(info->username), &pwd_psk); + strlen(info->username), &pwd_psk,
+ NULL);
+ if (ret < 0) + if (ret < 0)
+ return gnutls_assert_val(ret); + return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
+ +
@ -84,7 +86,7 @@ index 289ecbd..4043a64 100644
/* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences /* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
* in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side * in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
* channel that can be used as an oracle, so tread carefully */ * channel that can be used as an oracle, so tread carefully */
@@ -358,31 +381,10 @@ _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data, @@ -354,31 +378,10 @@ static int _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session,
/* This is here to avoid the version check attack /* This is here to avoid the version check attack
* discussed above. * discussed above.
*/ */
@ -93,14 +95,16 @@ index 289ecbd..4043a64 100644
- -
- /* find the key of this username - /* find the key of this username
- */ - */
- ret = - ret = _gnutls_psk_pwd_find_entry(session, info->username,
- _gnutls_psk_pwd_find_entry(session, info->username, - strlen(info->username), &pwd_psk,
- strlen(info->username), &pwd_psk); - NULL);
- if (ret < 0) { - if (ret < 0) {
- gnutls_assert(); - gnutls_assert();
- goto cleanup; - goto cleanup;
- } - }
- + session->key.key.data[2] = ver_maj;
+ session->key.key.data[3] = ver_min;
- ret = set_rsa_psk_session_key(session, &pwd_psk, &premaster_secret); - ret = set_rsa_psk_session_key(session, &pwd_psk, &premaster_secret);
- if (ret < 0) { - if (ret < 0) {
- gnutls_assert(); - gnutls_assert();
@ -108,18 +112,15 @@ index 289ecbd..4043a64 100644
- } - }
- -
- ret = 0; - ret = 0;
- cleanup: -cleanup:
- _gnutls_free_key_datum(&pwd_psk); - _gnutls_free_key_datum(&pwd_psk);
- _gnutls_free_temp_key_datum(&premaster_secret); - _gnutls_free_temp_key_datum(&premaster_secret);
- -
- return ret; - return ret;
+ session->key.key.data[2] = ver_maj;
+ session->key.key.data[3] = ver_min;
+
+ return 0; + return 0;
} }
static int static int _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_server_kx(gnutls_session_t session,
-- --
2.33.0 2.33.0

31
backport-CVE-2024-0567-x509-detect-loop-in-certificate-chain.patch
View File

@ -17,18 +17,18 @@ manner.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org> Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
Reference: https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/9edbdaa84e38b1bfb53a7d72c1de44f8de373405 Reference: https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/9edbdaa84e38b1bfb53a7d72c1de44f8de373405
Conflict: tests/test-chains.h Conflict: NA
--- ---
lib/x509/common.c | 4 ++ lib/x509/common.c | 4 ++
tests/test-chains.h | 124 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tests/test-chains.h | 125 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 128 insertions(+) 2 files changed, 129 insertions(+)
diff --git a/lib/x509/common.c b/lib/x509/common.c diff --git a/lib/x509/common.c b/lib/x509/common.c
index 2cc95c9..44317ba 100644 index 861cace4c..d749a062c 100644
--- a/lib/x509/common.c --- a/lib/x509/common.c
+++ b/lib/x509/common.c +++ b/lib/x509/common.c
@@ -1771,6 +1771,10 @@ unsigned int _gnutls_sort_clist(gnutls_x509_crt_t * clist, @@ -1741,6 +1741,10 @@ unsigned int _gnutls_sort_clist(gnutls_x509_crt_t *clist,
break; break;
} }
@ -40,10 +40,10 @@ index 2cc95c9..44317ba 100644
insorted[prev] = 1; insorted[prev] = 1;
} }
diff --git a/tests/test-chains.h b/tests/test-chains.h diff --git a/tests/test-chains.h b/tests/test-chains.h
index 6355f28..c11a097 100644 index 9ce23764d..3e559fecd 100644
--- a/tests/test-chains.h --- a/tests/test-chains.h
+++ b/tests/test-chains.h +++ b/tests/test-chains.h
@@ -4263,6 +4263,129 @@ static const char *rsa_sha1_not_in_trusted_ca[] = { @@ -4260,6 +4260,129 @@ static const char *rsa_sha1_not_in_trusted_ca[] = {
NULL NULL
}; };
@ -171,14 +171,15 @@ index 6355f28..c11a097 100644
+}; +};
+ +
#if defined __clang__ || __GNUC__ > 4 || (__GNUC__ == 4 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 5) #if defined __clang__ || __GNUC__ > 4 || (__GNUC__ == 4 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 5)
# pragma GCC diagnostic push #pragma GCC diagnostic push
# pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wunused-variable" #pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wunused-variable"
@@ -4442,6 +4565,7 @@ static struct @@ -4571,6 +4694,8 @@ static struct {
rsa_sha1_not_in_trusted, rsa_sha1_not_in_trusted_ca, GNUTLS_PROFILE_TO_VFLAGS(GNUTLS_PROFILE_MEDIUM),
GNUTLS_PROFILE_TO_VFLAGS(GNUTLS_PROFILE_MEDIUM), GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM | GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID, NULL,
GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM | GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID, NULL, 1620118136, 1}, 1620118136, 1 },
+ { "cross signed - ok", cross_signed, cross_signed_ca, 0, 0, 0, 1704955300}, + { "cross signed - ok", cross_signed, cross_signed_ca, 0, 0, 0,
{ NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, 0} + 1704955300 },
{ NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, 0 }
}; };
-- --

29
fix-ipv6-handshake-failed.patch
View File

@ -6,31 +6,32 @@ Subject: [PATCH] fix ipv6 handshake failed
reason: fix ipv6 handshake failed reason: fix ipv6 handshake failed
Signed-off-by: lvying <lvying6@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: lvying <lvying6@huawei.com>
--- ---
lib/ext/server_name.c | 4 +++- lib/ext/server_name.c | 4 +++-
lib/str.h | 10 ++++++++++ lib/str.h | 10 ++++++++++
2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/lib/ext/server_name.c b/lib/ext/server_name.c diff --git a/lib/ext/server_name.c b/lib/ext/server_name.c
index 259dc99..f61c1f2 100644 index a7329d0..7be1ca1 100644
--- a/lib/ext/server_name.c --- a/lib/ext/server_name.c
+++ b/lib/ext/server_name.c +++ b/lib/ext/server_name.c
@@ -112,7 +112,9 @@ _gnutls_server_name_recv_params(gnutls_session_t session, @@ -108,7 +108,9 @@ static int _gnutls_server_name_recv_params(gnutls_session_t session,
DECR_LEN(data_size, len); DECR_LEN(data_size, len);
if (type == 0) { /* NAME_DNS */ if (type == 0) { /* NAME_DNS */
- if (!_gnutls_dnsname_is_valid((char *)p, len)) { - if (!_gnutls_dnsname_is_valid((char *)p, len)) {
+ _gnutls_debug_log("HSK[%p]: recieve server name: '%.*s'\n", session, len, p); + _gnutls_debug_log("HSK[%p]: recieve server name: '%.*s'\n", session, len, p);
+ /* fix ipv6 format server name invaild problem */ + /* fix ipv6 format server name invaild problem */
+ if (!_gnutls_dnsname_is_valid((char*)p, len) && !_gnutls_ipv6_is_valid((char*)p, len)) { + if (!_gnutls_dnsname_is_valid((char*)p, len) && !_gnutls_ipv6_is_valid((char*)p, len)) {
_gnutls_handshake_log _gnutls_handshake_log(
("HSK[%p]: Server name is not acceptable: '%.*s'\n", "HSK[%p]: Server name is not acceptable: '%.*s'\n",
session, (int)len, p); session, (int)len, p);
diff --git a/lib/str.h b/lib/str.h diff --git a/lib/str.h b/lib/str.h
index 9f0e7d6..e0bca4b 100644 index 1f670cd..aa4b5b2 100644
--- a/lib/str.h --- a/lib/str.h
+++ b/lib/str.h +++ b/lib/str.h
@@ -60,6 +60,16 @@ inline static unsigned _gnutls_str_is_print(const char *str, unsigned size) @@ -64,6 +64,16 @@ inline static unsigned _gnutls_str_is_print(const char *str, unsigned size)
return 1; return 1;
} }
@ -48,5 +49,5 @@ index 9f0e7d6..e0bca4b 100644
{ {
unsigned i; unsigned i;
-- --
2.19.1 2.33.0

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25
gnutls.spec
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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
Name: gnutls Name: gnutls
Version: 3.8.0 Version: 3.8.2
Release: 3 Release: 1
Summary: The GNU Secure Communication Protocol Library Summary: The GNU Secure Communication Protocol Library
License: LGPLv2.1+ and GPLv3+ License: LGPLv2.1+ and GPLv3+
@ -9,9 +9,8 @@ Source0: https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnutls/v3.8/%{name}-%{version}.tar.xz
Source1: https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnutls/v3.8/%{name}-%{version}.tar.xz.sig Source1: https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnutls/v3.8/%{name}-%{version}.tar.xz.sig
Patch0: fix-ipv6-handshake-failed.patch Patch0: fix-ipv6-handshake-failed.patch
Patch1: backport-CVE-2023-5981-auth-rsa_psk-side-step-potential-side-channel.patch Patch1: backport-CVE-2024-0553-rsa-psk-minimize-branching-after-decryption.patch
Patch2: backport-CVE-2024-0553-rsa-psk-minimize-branching-after-decryption.patch Patch2: backport-CVE-2024-0567-x509-detect-loop-in-certificate-chain.patch
Patch3: backport-CVE-2024-0567-x509-detect-loop-in-certificate-chain.patch
%bcond_without dane %bcond_without dane
%bcond_with guile %bcond_with guile
@ -201,6 +200,22 @@ make check %{?_smp_mflags}
%endif %endif
%changelog %changelog
* Mon Jan 29 2024 xuraoqing <xuraoqing@huawei.com> - 3.8.2-1
- update to 3.8.2
- some API and ABI modifications, see NEWS for details
- New option --attime to specify current time
- libgnutls: Add a mechanism to control whether to enforce extended master secret (RFC 7627)
- libgnutls: Add additional PBKDF limit checks in FIPS mode as defined in SP 800-132
- libgnutls: %GNUTLS_NO_EXTENSIONS has been renamed to %GNUTLS_NO_DEFAULT_EXTENSIONS.
- libgnutls: Add support for RFC 9258 external PSK importer.
- libgnutls: ClientHello extensions are randomized by default,
To make fingerprinting harder, TLS extensions in ClientHello messages are shuffled.
- gnutls-cli: New option --starttls-name.
- libgnutls: transparent KTLS support is extended to FreeBSD kernel.
- libgnutls: Added support for AES-GCM-SIV ciphers (RFC 8452).
- libgnutls: Add API functions to perform ECDH and DH key agreement.
- libgnutls: Fix timing side-channel inside RSA-PSK key exchange(CVE-2023-5981).
* Wed Jan 17 2024 xuraoqing <xuraoqing@huawei.com> - 3.8.0-3 * Wed Jan 17 2024 xuraoqing <xuraoqing@huawei.com> - 3.8.0-3
- fix CVE-2024-0553 and CVE-2024-0567 - fix CVE-2024-0553 and CVE-2024-0567