diff --git a/backport-01-CVE-2023-0361.patch b/backport-01-CVE-2023-0361.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5d36b4d --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-01-CVE-2023-0361.patch @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +From 80a6ce8ddb02477cd724cd5b2944791aaddb702a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alexander Sosedkin +Date: Tue, 9 Aug 2022 16:05:53 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 1/2] auth/rsa: side-step potential side-channel + +Remove branching that depends on secret data. + +Signed-off-by: Alexander Sosedkin +Signed-off-by: Hubert Kario +Tested-by: Hubert Kario +--- + lib/auth/rsa.c | 10 ---------- + 1 file changed, 10 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa.c b/lib/auth/rsa.c +index 8108ee8..6b158ba 100644 +--- a/lib/auth/rsa.c ++++ b/lib/auth/rsa.c +@@ -155,7 +155,6 @@ static int + proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data, + size_t _data_size) + { +- const char attack_error[] = "auth_rsa: Possible PKCS #1 attack\n"; + gnutls_datum_t ciphertext; + int ret, dsize; + ssize_t data_size = _data_size; +@@ -235,15 +234,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data, + ok &= CONSTCHECK_NOT_EQUAL(check_ver_min, 0) & + CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(session->key.key.data[1], ver_min); + +- if (ok) { +- /* call logging function unconditionally so all branches are +- * indistinguishable for timing and cache access when debug +- * logging is disabled */ +- _gnutls_no_log("%s", attack_error); +- } else { +- _gnutls_debug_log("%s", attack_error); +- } +- + /* This is here to avoid the version check attack + * discussed above. + */ +-- +2.27.0 + diff --git a/backport-02-CVE-2023-0361.patch b/backport-02-CVE-2023-0361.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..899b970 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-02-CVE-2023-0361.patch @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +From 4b7ff428291c7ed77c6d2635577c83a43bbae558 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Hubert Kario +Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2023 14:32:09 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 2/2] rsa: remove dead code + +since the `ok` variable isn't used any more, we can remove all code +used to calculate it + +Signed-off-by: Hubert Kario +--- + lib/auth/rsa.c | 20 +++----------------- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa.c b/lib/auth/rsa.c +index 562518d93..492ec119f 100644 +--- a/lib/auth/rsa.c ++++ b/lib/auth/rsa.c + +diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa.c b/lib/auth/rsa.c +index 6b158ba..d9635a9 100644 +--- a/lib/auth/rsa.c ++++ b/lib/auth/rsa.c +@@ -159,8 +159,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data, + int ret, dsize; + ssize_t data_size = _data_size; + volatile uint8_t ver_maj, ver_min; +- volatile uint8_t check_ver_min; +- volatile uint32_t ok; + + #ifdef ENABLE_SSL3 + if (get_num_version(session) == GNUTLS_SSL3) { +@@ -186,7 +184,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data, + + ver_maj = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session); + ver_min = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session); +- check_ver_min = (session->internals.allow_wrong_pms == 0); + + session->key.key.data = gnutls_malloc(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE); + if (session->key.key.data == NULL) { +@@ -205,10 +202,9 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data, + return ret; + } + +- ret = +- gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key, +- 0, &ciphertext, session->key.key.data, +- session->key.key.size); ++ gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key, ++ 0, &ciphertext, session->key.key.data, ++ session->key.key.size); + /* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences + * in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side + * channel that can be used as an oracle, so treat very carefully */ +@@ -224,16 +220,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data, + * Vlastimil Klima, Ondej Pokorny and Tomas Rosa. + */ + +- /* ok is 0 in case of error and 1 in case of success. */ +- +- /* if ret < 0 */ +- ok = CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(ret, 0); +- /* session->key.key.data[0] must equal ver_maj */ +- ok &= CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(session->key.key.data[0], ver_maj); +- /* if check_ver_min then session->key.key.data[1] must equal ver_min */ +- ok &= CONSTCHECK_NOT_EQUAL(check_ver_min, 0) & +- CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(session->key.key.data[1], ver_min); +- + /* This is here to avoid the version check attack + * discussed above. + */ +-- +2.27.0 + diff --git a/gnutls.spec b/gnutls.spec index d10eac5..64ad086 100644 --- a/gnutls.spec +++ b/gnutls.spec @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ Name: gnutls Version: 3.7.8 -Release: 1 +Release: 2 Summary: The GNU Secure Communication Protocol Library License: LGPLv2.1+ and GPLv3+ @@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ Source0: https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnutls/v3.7/%{name}-%{version}.tar.xz Source1: https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnutls/v3.7/%{name}-%{version}.tar.xz.sig Patch1: fix-ipv6-handshake-failed.patch +Patch2: backport-01-CVE-2023-0361.patch +Patch3: backport-02-CVE-2023-0361.patch %bcond_without dane %bcond_with guile @@ -199,6 +201,9 @@ make check %{?_smp_mflags} %endif %changelog +* Wed Feb 15 2023 xuraoqing - 3.7.8-2 +- fix CVE-2023-0361 + * Mon Jan 30 2023 xuraoqing - 3.7.8-1 - update to 3.7.8