!83 update version to 2.38.1

From: @fly_fzc 
Reviewed-by: @overweight 
Signed-off-by: @overweight

backport-CVE-2022-29187.patch

@@ -1,166 +0,0 @@
-From 8dda857a86aa8e4f6ae39951164ed6493ed6678f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: yinyongkang <yinyongkang@kylinos.cn>
-Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2022 14:46:25 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-8959555 (setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level
-directory, 2022-03-02), adds a function to check for ownership of
-repositories using a directory that is representative of it, and ways to
-add exempt a specific repository from said check if needed, but that
-check didn't account for owership of the gitdir, or (when used) the
-gitfile that points to that gitdir.
-
-An attacker could create a git repository in a directory that they can
-write into but that is owned by the victim to work around the fix that
-was introduced with CVE-2022-24765 to potentially run code as the
-victim.
-
-An example that could result in privilege escalation to root in *NIX would
-be to set a repository in a shared tmp directory by doing (for example):
-
-  $ git -C /tmp init
-
-To avoid that, extend the ensure_valid_ownership function to be able to
-check for all three paths.
-
-This will have the side effect of tripling the number of stat() calls
-when a repository is detected, but the effect is expected to be likely
-minimal, as it is done only once during the directory walk in which Git
-looks for a repository.
-
-Additionally make sure to resolve the gitfile (if one was used) to find
-the relevant gitdir for checking.
-
-While at it change the message printed on failure so it is clear we are
-referring to the repository by its worktree (or gitdir if it is bare) and
-not to a specific directory.
-
-Helped-by: Junio C Hamano <junio@pobox.com>
-Helped-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>
-Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
----
- setup.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
- 1 file changed, 60 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/setup.c b/setup.c
-index a7b36f3..ca6a5dd 100644
---- a/setup.c
-+++ b/setup.c
-@@ -1120,14 +1120,32 @@ static int safe_directory_cb(const char *key, const char *value, void *d)
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--static int ensure_valid_ownership(const char *path)
-+/*
-+ * Check if a repository is safe, by verifying the ownership of the
-+ * worktree (if any), the git directory, and the gitfile (if any).
-+ *
-+ * Exemptions for known-safe repositories can be added via `safe.directory`
-+ * config settings; for non-bare repositories, their worktree needs to be
-+ * added, for bare ones their git directory.
-+ */
-+static int ensure_valid_ownership(const char *gitfile,
-+				const char *worktree, const char *gitdir)
- {
--	struct safe_directory_data data = { .path = path };
-+	struct safe_directory_data data = {
-+		.path = worktree ? worktree : gitdir
-+	};
- 
- 	if (!git_env_bool("GIT_TEST_ASSUME_DIFFERENT_OWNER", 0) &&
--	    is_path_owned_by_current_user(path))
-+	   (!gitfile || is_path_owned_by_current_user(gitfile)) &&
-+	   (!worktree || is_path_owned_by_current_user(worktree)) &&
-+	   (!gitdir || is_path_owned_by_current_user(gitdir)))
- 		return 1;
- 
-+	/*
-+	 * data.path is the "path" that identifies the repository and it is
-+	 * constant regardless of what failed above. data.is_safe should be
-+	 * initialized to false, and might be changed by the callback.
-+	 */
- 	read_very_early_config(safe_directory_cb, &data);
- 
- 	return data.is_safe;
-@@ -1215,6 +1233,8 @@ static enum discovery_result setup_git_directory_gently_1(struct strbuf *dir,
- 		current_device = get_device_or_die(dir->buf, NULL, 0);
- 	for (;;) {
- 		int offset = dir->len, error_code = 0;
-+		char *gitdir_path = NULL;
-+		char *gitfile = NULL;
- 
- 		if (offset > min_offset)
- 			strbuf_addch(dir, '/');
-@@ -1225,21 +1245,50 @@ static enum discovery_result setup_git_directory_gently_1(struct strbuf *dir,
- 			if (die_on_error ||
- 			    error_code == READ_GITFILE_ERR_NOT_A_FILE) {
- 				/* NEEDSWORK: fail if .git is not file nor dir */
--				if (is_git_directory(dir->buf))
-+				if (is_git_directory(dir->buf)) {
- 					gitdirenv = DEFAULT_GIT_DIR_ENVIRONMENT;
-+					gitdir_path = xstrdup(dir->buf);
-+				}
- 			} else if (error_code != READ_GITFILE_ERR_STAT_FAILED)
- 				return GIT_DIR_INVALID_GITFILE;
--		}
-+		} else
-+			gitfile = xstrdup(dir->buf);
-+		/*
-+		 * Earlier, we tentatively added DEFAULT_GIT_DIR_ENVIRONMENT
-+		 * to check that directory for a repository.
-+		 * Now trim that tentative addition away, because we want to
-+		 * focus on the real directory we are in.
-+		 */
- 		strbuf_setlen(dir, offset);
- 		if (gitdirenv) {
--			if (!ensure_valid_ownership(dir->buf))
--				return GIT_DIR_INVALID_OWNERSHIP;
--			strbuf_addstr(gitdir, gitdirenv);
--			return GIT_DIR_DISCOVERED;
-+			enum discovery_result ret;
-+
-+			if (ensure_valid_ownership(gitfile,
-+						 dir->buf,
-+				 (gitdir_path ? gitdir_path : gitdirenv))) {
-+				strbuf_addstr(gitdir, gitdirenv);
-+				ret = GIT_DIR_DISCOVERED;
-+			} else
-+				ret = GIT_DIR_INVALID_OWNERSHIP;
-+
-+			/*
-+			 * Earlier, during discovery, we might have allocated
-+			 * string copies for gitdir_path or gitfile so make
-+			 * sure we don't leak by freeing them now, before
-+			 * leaving the loop and function.
-+			 *
-+			 * Note: gitdirenv will be non-NULL whenever these are
-+			 * allocated, therefore we need not take care of releasing
-+			 * them outside of this conditional block.
-+			 */
-+			free(gitdir_path);
-+			free(gitfile);
-+
-+			return ret;
- 		}
- 
- 		if (is_git_directory(dir->buf)) {
--			if (!ensure_valid_ownership(dir->buf))
-+			if (!ensure_valid_ownership(NULL, NULL, dir->buf))
- 				return GIT_DIR_INVALID_OWNERSHIP;
- 			strbuf_addstr(gitdir, ".");
- 			return GIT_DIR_BARE;
-@@ -1377,7 +1426,7 @@ const char *setup_git_directory_gently(int *nongit_ok)
- 			struct strbuf quoted = STRBUF_INIT;
- 
- 			sq_quote_buf_pretty(&quoted, dir.buf);
--			die(_("unsafe repository ('%s' is owned by someone else)\n"
-+			die(_("detected dubious ownership in repository at '%s'\n"
- 			      "To add an exception for this directory, call:\n"
- 			      "\n"
- 			      "\tgit config --global --add safe.directory %s"),
--- 
-2.33.0
-

git.spec

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 %global gitexecdir          %{_libexecdir}/git-core
 Name:       git
-Version:    2.36.1
-Release:    2
+Version:    2.38.1
+Release:    1
 Summary:    A popular and widely used Version Control System
 License:    GPLv2+ or LGPLv2.1
 URL:        https://git-scm.com/
@@ -12,8 +12,6 @@ Source100:  git-gui.desktop
 Source101:  git@.service.in
 Source102:  git.socket
 
-Patch6000:     backport-CVE-2022-29187.patch
-
 BuildRequires: gcc gettext
 BuildRequires: openssl-devel libcurl-devel expat-devel systemd asciidoc xmlto glib2-devel libsecret-devel pcre-devel desktop-file-utils
 BuildRequires: python3-devel perl-generators perl-interpreter perl-Error perl(Test::More) perl-MailTools perl(Test)
@@ -288,11 +286,18 @@ make %{?_smp_mflags} test
 %exclude %{_pkgdocdir}/{README.md,*.gitweb}
 %{_pkgdocdir}/*
 %{_mandir}/man1/git*.1.*
+%{_mandir}/man1/scalar*.1.*
 %{_mandir}/man3/Git.*
 %{_mandir}/man5/git*.5.*
 %{_mandir}/man7/git*.7.*
 
 %changelog
+* Fri Oct 21 2022 fuanan <fuanan3@h-partners.com> - 2.38.1-1
+- Type:enhancement
+- ID:NA
+- SUG:NA
+- DESC:update version to 2.38.1
+
 * Fri Jul 15 2022 yinyongkang <yinyongkang@kylinos.cn> -2.36.1-2
 - Type:CVE
 - ID:CVE-2022-29187