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Fix CVE-2024-52005

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(cherry picked from commit f18ec62789fa2e3b713d4e488968cf0d1b4f1606)
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fly_fzc 2025-01-17 17:14:17 +08:00 committed by openeuler-sync-bot
parent 32f1379e74
commit 82c376fb9b
2 changed files with 396 additions and 1 deletions
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backport-CVE-2024-52005.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,388 @@
From 5b257412e25ad29410c389300324886aa59e1f83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Date: Wed, 6 Nov 2024 20:34:50 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] sideband: mask control characters
The output of `git clone` is a vital component for understanding what
has happened when things go wrong. However, these logs are partially
under the control of the remote server (via the "sideband", which
typically contains what the remote `git pack-objects` process sends to
`stderr`), and is currently not sanitized by Git.
This makes Git susceptible to ANSI escape sequence injection (see
CWE-150, https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/150.html), which allows
attackers to corrupt terminal state, to hide information, and even to
insert characters into the input buffer (i.e. as if the user had typed
those characters).
To plug this vulnerability, disallow any control character in the
sideband, replacing them instead with the common `^<letter/symbol>`
(e.g. `^[` for `\x1b`, `^A` for `\x01`).
There is likely a need for more fine-grained controls instead of using a
"heavy hammer" like this, which will be introduced subsequently.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
---
sideband.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
t/t5409-colorize-remote-messages.sh | 12 ++++++++++++
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sideband.c b/sideband.c
index 85bddfdcd4f57a..9384cb02d56a04 100644
--- a/sideband.c
+++ b/sideband.c
@@ -61,6 +61,19 @@ void list_config_color_sideband_slots(struct string_list *list, const char *pref
list_config_item(list, prefix, keywords[i].keyword);
}
+static void strbuf_add_sanitized(struct strbuf *dest, const char *src, int n)
+{
+ strbuf_grow(dest, n);
+ for (; n && *src; src++, n--) {
+ if (!iscntrl(*src) || *src == '\t' || *src == '\n')
+ strbuf_addch(dest, *src);
+ else {
+ strbuf_addch(dest, '^');
+ strbuf_addch(dest, 0x40 + *src);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
/*
* Optionally highlight one keyword in remote output if it appears at the start
* of the line. This should be called for a single line only, which is
@@ -73,7 +86,7 @@ static void maybe_colorize_sideband(struct strbuf *dest, const char *src, int n)
int i;
if (!want_color_stderr(use_sideband_colors())) {
- strbuf_add(dest, src, n);
+ strbuf_add_sanitized(dest, src, n);
return;
}
@@ -106,7 +119,7 @@ static void maybe_colorize_sideband(struct strbuf *dest, const char *src, int n)
}
}
- strbuf_add(dest, src, n);
+ strbuf_add_sanitized(dest, src, n);
}
diff --git a/t/t5409-colorize-remote-messages.sh b/t/t5409-colorize-remote-messages.sh
index fa5de4500a4f50..6a6e0d15b21050 100755
--- a/t/t5409-colorize-remote-messages.sh
+++ b/t/t5409-colorize-remote-messages.sh
@@ -98,4 +98,16 @@ test_expect_success 'fallback to color.ui' '
grep "<BOLD;RED>error<RESET>: error" decoded
'
+test_expect_success 'disallow (color) control sequences in sideband' '
+ write_script .git/color-me-surprised <<-\EOF &&
+ printf "error: Have you \\033[31mread\\033[m this?\\n" >&2
+ exec "$@"
+ EOF
+ test_config_global uploadPack.packObjectshook ./color-me-surprised &&
+ test_commit need-at-least-one-commit &&
+ git clone --no-local . throw-away 2>stderr &&
+ test_decode_color <stderr >decoded &&
+ test_i18ngrep ! RED decoded
+'
+
test_done
From a8c289b0a531d25336a96eaa5e3584414ed4c6c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Date: Wed, 6 Nov 2024 21:07:51 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] sideband: introduce an "escape hatch" to allow control
characters
The preceding commit fixed the vulnerability whereas sideband messages
(that are under the control of the remote server) could contain ANSI
escape sequences that would be sent to the terminal verbatim.
However, this fix may not be desirable under all circumstances, e.g.
when remote servers deliberately add coloring to their messages to
increase their urgency.
To help with those use cases, give users a way to opt-out of the
protections: `sideband.allowControlCharacters`.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
---
Documentation/config.txt | 2 ++
Documentation/config/sideband.txt | 5 +++++
sideband.c | 10 ++++++++++
t/t5409-colorize-remote-messages.sh | 8 +++++++-
4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/config/sideband.txt
diff --git a/Documentation/config.txt b/Documentation/config.txt
index 0e93aef86264db..abdbfba9bd756a 100644
--- a/Documentation/config.txt
+++ b/Documentation/config.txt
@@ -511,6 +511,8 @@ include::config/sequencer.txt[]
include::config/showbranch.txt[]
+include::config/sideband.txt[]
+
include::config/sparse.txt[]
include::config/splitindex.txt[]
diff --git a/Documentation/config/sideband.txt b/Documentation/config/sideband.txt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000000..3fb5045cd79581
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/config/sideband.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+sideband.allowControlCharacters::
+ By default, control characters that are delivered via the sideband
+ are masked, to prevent potentially unwanted ANSI escape sequences
+ from being sent to the terminal. Use this config setting to override
+ this behavior.
diff --git a/sideband.c b/sideband.c
index 9384cb02d56a04..8ebf1f0743e6b6 100644
--- a/sideband.c
+++ b/sideband.c
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ static struct keyword_entry keywords[] = {
{ "error", GIT_COLOR_BOLD_RED },
};
+static int allow_control_characters;
+
/* Returns a color setting (GIT_COLOR_NEVER, etc). */
static int use_sideband_colors(void)
{
@@ -33,6 +35,9 @@ static int use_sideband_colors(void)
if (use_sideband_colors_cached >= 0)
return use_sideband_colors_cached;
+ git_config_get_bool("sideband.allowcontrolcharacters",
+ &allow_control_characters);
+
if (!git_config_get_string(key, &value)) {
use_sideband_colors_cached = git_config_colorbool(key, value);
} else if (!git_config_get_string("color.ui", &value)) {
@@ -63,6 +68,11 @@ void list_config_color_sideband_slots(struct string_list *list, const char *pref
static void strbuf_add_sanitized(struct strbuf *dest, const char *src, int n)
{
+ if (allow_control_characters) {
+ strbuf_add(dest, src, n);
+ return;
+ }
+
strbuf_grow(dest, n);
for (; n && *src; src++, n--) {
if (!iscntrl(*src) || *src == '\t' || *src == '\n')
diff --git a/t/t5409-colorize-remote-messages.sh b/t/t5409-colorize-remote-messages.sh
index 6a6e0d15b21050..1cd0640f200009 100755
--- a/t/t5409-colorize-remote-messages.sh
+++ b/t/t5409-colorize-remote-messages.sh
@@ -105,9 +105,15 @@ test_expect_success 'disallow (color) control sequences in sideband' '
EOF
test_config_global uploadPack.packObjectshook ./color-me-surprised &&
test_commit need-at-least-one-commit &&
+
git clone --no-local . throw-away 2>stderr &&
test_decode_color <stderr >decoded &&
- test_i18ngrep ! RED decoded
+ test_i18ngrep ! RED decoded &&
+
+ rm -rf throw-away &&
+ git -c sideband.allowControlCharacters clone --no-local . throw-away 2>stderr &&
+ test_decode_color <stderr >decoded &&
+ test_i18ngrep RED decoded
'
test_done
From c7049c2a7f47c99a67fd869f1ee89d7aa1a328d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2024 21:42:57 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] sideband: do allow ANSI color sequences by default
The preceding two commits introduced special handling of the sideband
channel to neutralize ANSI escape sequences before sending the payload
to the terminal, and `sideband.allowControlCharacters` to override that
behavior.
However, some `pre-receive` hooks that are actively used in practice
want to color their messages and therefore rely on the fact that Git
passes them through to the terminal.
In contrast to other ANSI escape sequences, it is highly unlikely that
coloring sequences can be essential tools in attack vectors that mislead
Git users e.g. by hiding crucial information.
Therefore we can have both: Continue to allow ANSI coloring sequences to
be passed to the terminal, and neutralize all other ANSI escape
sequences.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
---
Documentation/config/sideband.txt | 17 ++++++--
sideband.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
t/t5409-colorize-remote-messages.sh | 16 +++++++-
3 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/config/sideband.txt b/Documentation/config/sideband.txt
index 3fb5045cd79581..f347fd6b33004a 100644
--- a/Documentation/config/sideband.txt
+++ b/Documentation/config/sideband.txt
@@ -1,5 +1,16 @@
sideband.allowControlCharacters::
By default, control characters that are delivered via the sideband
- are masked, to prevent potentially unwanted ANSI escape sequences
- from being sent to the terminal. Use this config setting to override
- this behavior.
+ are masked, except ANSI color sequences. This prevents potentially
+ unwanted ANSI escape sequences from being sent to the terminal. Use
+ this config setting to override this behavior:
++
+--
+ color::
+ Allow ANSI color sequences, line feeds and horizontal tabs,
+ but mask all other control characters. This is the default.
+ false::
+ Mask all control characters other than line feeds and
+ horizontal tabs.
+ true::
+ Allow all control characters to be sent to the terminal.
+--
diff --git a/sideband.c b/sideband.c
index 8ebf1f0743e6b6..afd62aa008154b 100644
--- a/sideband.c
+++ b/sideband.c
@@ -20,7 +20,11 @@ static struct keyword_entry keywords[] = {
{ "error", GIT_COLOR_BOLD_RED },
};
-static int allow_control_characters;
+static enum {
+ ALLOW_NO_CONTROL_CHARACTERS = 0,
+ ALLOW_ALL_CONTROL_CHARACTERS = 1,
+ ALLOW_ANSI_COLOR_SEQUENCES = 2
+} allow_control_characters = ALLOW_ANSI_COLOR_SEQUENCES;
/* Returns a color setting (GIT_COLOR_NEVER, etc). */
static int use_sideband_colors(void)
@@ -35,8 +39,24 @@ static int use_sideband_colors(void)
if (use_sideband_colors_cached >= 0)
return use_sideband_colors_cached;
- git_config_get_bool("sideband.allowcontrolcharacters",
- &allow_control_characters);
+ switch (git_config_get_maybe_bool("sideband.allowcontrolcharacters", &i)) {
+ case 0: /* Boolean value */
+ allow_control_characters = i ? ALLOW_ALL_CONTROL_CHARACTERS :
+ ALLOW_NO_CONTROL_CHARACTERS;
+ break;
+ case -1: /* non-Boolean value */
+ if (git_config_get_string("sideband.allowcontrolcharacters",
+ &value))
+ ; /* huh? `get_maybe_bool()` returned -1 */
+ else if (!strcmp(value, "color"))
+ allow_control_characters = ALLOW_ANSI_COLOR_SEQUENCES;
+ else
+ warning(_("unrecognized value for `sideband."
+ "allowControlCharacters`: '%s'"), value);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break; /* not configured */
+ }
if (!git_config_get_string(key, &value)) {
use_sideband_colors_cached = git_config_colorbool(key, value);
@@ -66,9 +86,37 @@ void list_config_color_sideband_slots(struct string_list *list, const char *pref
list_config_item(list, prefix, keywords[i].keyword);
}
+static int handle_ansi_color_sequence(struct strbuf *dest, const char *src, int n)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Valid ANSI color sequences are of the form
+ *
+ * ESC [ [<n> [; <n>]*] m
+ */
+
+ if (allow_control_characters != ALLOW_ANSI_COLOR_SEQUENCES ||
+ n < 3 || src[0] != '\x1b' || src[1] != '[')
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = 2; i < n; i++) {
+ if (src[i] == 'm') {
+ strbuf_add(dest, src, i + 1);
+ return i;
+ }
+ if (!isdigit(src[i]) && src[i] != ';')
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static void strbuf_add_sanitized(struct strbuf *dest, const char *src, int n)
{
- if (allow_control_characters) {
+ int i;
+
+ if (allow_control_characters == ALLOW_ALL_CONTROL_CHARACTERS) {
strbuf_add(dest, src, n);
return;
}
@@ -77,7 +125,10 @@ static void strbuf_add_sanitized(struct strbuf *dest, const char *src, int n)
for (; n && *src; src++, n--) {
if (!iscntrl(*src) || *src == '\t' || *src == '\n')
strbuf_addch(dest, *src);
- else {
+ else if ((i = handle_ansi_color_sequence(dest, src, n))) {
+ src += i;
+ n -= i;
+ } else {
strbuf_addch(dest, '^');
strbuf_addch(dest, 0x40 + *src);
}
diff --git a/t/t5409-colorize-remote-messages.sh b/t/t5409-colorize-remote-messages.sh
index 1cd0640f200009..43296ea51c5db1 100755
--- a/t/t5409-colorize-remote-messages.sh
+++ b/t/t5409-colorize-remote-messages.sh
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ test_expect_success 'fallback to color.ui' '
test_expect_success 'disallow (color) control sequences in sideband' '
write_script .git/color-me-surprised <<-\EOF &&
- printf "error: Have you \\033[31mread\\033[m this?\\n" >&2
+ printf "error: Have you \\033[31mread\\033[m this?\\a\\n" >&2
exec "$@"
EOF
test_config_global uploadPack.packObjectshook ./color-me-surprised &&
@@ -108,12 +108,24 @@ test_expect_success 'disallow (color) control sequences in sideband' '
git clone --no-local . throw-away 2>stderr &&
test_decode_color <stderr >decoded &&
+ test_i18ngrep RED decoded &&
+ test_i18ngrep "\\^G" stderr &&
+ tr -dc "\\007" <stderr >actual &&
+ test_must_be_empty actual &&
+
+ rm -rf throw-away &&
+ git -c sideband.allowControlCharacters=false \
+ clone --no-local . throw-away 2>stderr &&
+ test_decode_color <stderr >decoded &&
test_i18ngrep ! RED decoded &&
+ test_i18ngrep "\\^G" stderr &&
rm -rf throw-away &&
git -c sideband.allowControlCharacters clone --no-local . throw-away 2>stderr &&
test_decode_color <stderr >decoded &&
- test_i18ngrep RED decoded
+ test_i18ngrep RED decoded &&
+ tr -dc "\\007" <stderr >actual &&
+ test_file_not_empty actual
'
test_done

9
git.spec
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
%global gitexecdir %{_libexecdir}/git-core
Name: git
Version: 2.43.0
Release: 5
Release: 6
Summary: A popular and widely used Version Control System
License: GPLv2+ or LGPLv2.1
URL: https://git-scm.com/
@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ Patch7: backport-CVE-2024-32465-upload-pack-disable-lazy-fetching-by-default
Patch8: backport-CVE-2024-50349-credential_format-also-encode-host-port.patch
Patch9: backport-CVE-2024-50349-credential-sanitize-the-user-prompt.patch
Patch10: backport-CVE-2024-52006-credential-disallow-Carriage-Returns-in-the-protocol.patch
Patch11: backport-CVE-2024-52005.patch
BuildRequires: gcc gettext
BuildRequires: openssl-devel libcurl-devel expat-devel systemd asciidoc xmlto glib2-devel libsecret-devel pcre2-devel desktop-file-utils
@ -307,6 +308,12 @@ make %{?_smp_mflags} test
%{_mandir}/man7/git*.7.*
%changelog
* Fri Jan 17 2025 fuanan <fuanan3@h-partners.com> - 2.43.0-6
- Type:CVE
- ID:CVE-2024-52005
- SUG:NA
- DESC:Fix CVE-2024-52005
* Wed Jan 15 2025 fuanan <fuanan3@h-partners.com> - 2.43.0-5
- Type:CVE
- ID:CVE-2024-50349 CVE-2024-52006