fix CVE-2022-25308,CVE-2022-25309,CVE-2022-25310

This commit is contained in:
zhouwenpei 2022-09-14 10:37:08 +08:00
parent c3cad71cd8
commit f06a1202ea
4 changed files with 108 additions and 1 deletions

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@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
From ad3a19e6372b1e667128ed1ea2f49919884587e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Akira TAGOH <akira@tagoh.org>
Date: Thu, 17 Feb 2022 17:30:12 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] Fix the stack buffer overflow issue
strlen() could returns 0. Without a conditional check for len,
accessing S_ pointer with len - 1 may causes a stack buffer overflow.
AddressSanitizer reports this like:
==1219243==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ffdce043c1f at pc 0x000000403547 bp 0x7ffdce0
43b30 sp 0x7ffdce043b28
READ of size 1 at 0x7ffdce043c1f thread T0
#0 0x403546 in main ../bin/fribidi-main.c:393
#1 0x7f226804e58f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2d58f)
#2 0x7f226804e648 in __libc_start_main_impl (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2d648)
#3 0x4036f4 in _start (/tmp/fribidi/build/bin/fribidi+0x4036f4)
Address 0x7ffdce043c1f is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 63 in frame
#0 0x4022bf in main ../bin/fribidi-main.c:193
This frame has 5 object(s):
[32, 36) 'option_index' (line 233)
[48, 52) 'base' (line 386)
[64, 65064) 'S_' (line 375) <== Memory access at offset 63 underflows this variable
[65328, 130328) 'outstring' (line 385)
[130592, 390592) 'logical' (line 384)
This fixes https://github.com/fribidi/fribidi/issues/181
---
bin/fribidi-main.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/bin/fribidi-main.c b/bin/fribidi-main.c
index 3cf9fe1..3ae4fb6 100644
--- a/bin/fribidi-main.c
+++ b/bin/fribidi-main.c
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ FRIBIDI_END_IGNORE_DEPRECATIONS
S_[sizeof (S_) - 1] = 0;
len = strlen (S_);
/* chop */
- if (S_[len - 1] == '\n')
+ if (len > 0 && S_[len - 1] == '\n')
{
len--;
S_[len] = '\0';

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@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
From f22593b82b5d1668d1997dbccd10a9c31ffea3b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dov Grobgeld <dov.grobgeld@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 25 Mar 2022 09:09:49 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] Protected against garbage in the CapRTL encoder
---
lib/fribidi-char-sets-cap-rtl.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/lib/fribidi-char-sets-cap-rtl.c b/lib/fribidi-char-sets-cap-rtl.c
index b0c0e4a..f74e010 100644
--- a/lib/fribidi-char-sets-cap-rtl.c
+++ b/lib/fribidi-char-sets-cap-rtl.c
@@ -232,7 +232,12 @@ fribidi_cap_rtl_to_unicode (
}
}
else
- us[j++] = caprtl_to_unicode[(int) s[i]];
+ {
+ if ((int)s[i] < 0)
+ us[j++] = '?';
+ else
+ us[j++] = caprtl_to_unicode[(int) s[i]];
+ }
}
return j;

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@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
From 175850b03e1af251d705c1d04b2b9b3c1c06e48f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Akira TAGOH <akira@tagoh.org>
Date: Thu, 17 Feb 2022 19:06:10 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] Fix SEGV issue in fribidi_remove_bidi_marks
Escape from fribidi_remove_bidi_marks() immediately if str is null.
This fixes https://github.com/fribidi/fribidi/issues/183
---
lib/fribidi.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/lib/fribidi.c b/lib/fribidi.c
index f5da0da..70bdab2 100644
--- a/lib/fribidi.c
+++ b/lib/fribidi.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ fribidi_remove_bidi_marks (
fribidi_boolean status = false;
if UNLIKELY
- (len == 0)
+ (len == 0 || str == NULL)
{
status = true;
goto out;

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@ -1,11 +1,15 @@
Name: fribidi
Version: 1.0.10
Release: 1
Release: 2
Summary: Library implementing the Unicode Bidirectional Algorithm
License: LGPLv2+ and UCD
URL: https://github.com/fribidi/fribidi/
Source: https://github.com/%{name}/%{name}/releases/download/v%{version}/%{name}-%{version}.tar.xz
Patch6001: backport-CVE-2022-25308.patch
Patch6002: backport-CVE-2022-25309.patch
Patch6003: backport-CVE-2022-25310.patch
BuildRequires: gcc meson
%description
@ -52,6 +56,9 @@ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/*.la
#%%{_mandir}/man3/*.gz
%changelog
* Wed Sep 14 2022 zhouwenpei <zhouwenpei1@h-partners.com> - 1.0.10-2
- fix CVE-2022-25308,CVE-2022-25309,CVE-2022-25310
* Mon Jul 20 2020 wangye <wangye70@huawei.com> - 1.0.10-1
- version update to 1.0.10