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!3 fix CVE-2021-21261

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From: @wangxiao65
Reviewed-by: @small_leek
Signed-off-by: @small_leek
This commit is contained in:
openeuler-ci-bot 2021-02-07 16:10:22 +08:00 committed by Gitee
commit 8a6f620707
7 changed files with 846 additions and 1 deletions
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156
CVE-2021-21261-1.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
From b04ab0f0c4fe4970737187a76389b20029e27488 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2021 12:21:31 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] run: Convert all environment variables into bwrap
arguments
This avoids some of them being filtered out by a setuid bwrap. It also
means that if they came from an untrusted source, they cannot be used
to inject arbitrary code into a non-setuid bwrap via mechanisms like
LD_PRELOAD.
Because they get bundled into a memfd or temporary file, they do not
actually appear in argv, ensuring that they remain inaccessible to
processes running under a different uid (which is important if their
values are tokens or other secrets).
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Part-of: https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/security/advisories/GHSA-4ppf-fxf6-vxg2
---
common/flatpak-bwrap-private.h | 3 +++
common/flatpak-bwrap.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
common/flatpak-run.c | 24 ++++++++++++-------
3 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- flatpak.orig/common/flatpak-bwrap-private.h
+++ flatpak/common/flatpak-bwrap-private.h
@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ void flatpak_bwrap_unset_env (F
const char *variable);
void flatpak_bwrap_add_arg (FlatpakBwrap *bwrap,
const char *arg);
+void flatpak_bwrap_take_arg (FlatpakBwrap *bwrap,
+ char *arg);
void flatpak_bwrap_add_noinherit_fd (FlatpakBwrap *bwrap,
int fd);
void flatpak_bwrap_add_fd (FlatpakBwrap *bwrap,
@@ -73,6 +75,7 @@ void flatpak_bwrap_add_bind_arg
const char *type,
const char *src,
const char *dest);
+void flatpak_bwrap_envp_to_args (FlatpakBwrap *bwrap);
gboolean flatpak_bwrap_bundle_args (FlatpakBwrap *bwrap,
int start,
int end,
--- flatpak.orig/common/flatpak-bwrap.c
+++ flatpak/common/flatpak-bwrap.c
@@ -108,6 +108,18 @@ flatpak_bwrap_add_arg (FlatpakBwrap *bwr
g_ptr_array_add (bwrap->argv, g_strdup (arg));
}
+/*
+ * flatpak_bwrap_take_arg:
+ * @arg: (transfer full): Take ownership of this argument
+ *
+ * Add @arg to @bwrap's argv, taking ownership of the pointer.
+ */
+void
+flatpak_bwrap_take_arg (FlatpakBwrap *bwrap, char *arg)
+{
+ g_ptr_array_add (bwrap->argv, arg);
+}
+
void
flatpak_bwrap_finish (FlatpakBwrap *bwrap)
{
@@ -273,6 +285,37 @@ flatpak_bwrap_add_bind_arg (FlatpakBwrap
}
}
+/*
+ * Convert bwrap->envp into a series of --setenv arguments for bwrap(1),
+ * assumed to be applied to an empty environment. Reset envp to be an
+ * empty environment.
+ */
+void
+flatpak_bwrap_envp_to_args (FlatpakBwrap *bwrap)
+{
+ gsize i;
+
+ for (i = 0; bwrap->envp[i] != NULL; i++)
+ {
+ char *key_val = bwrap->envp[i];
+ char *eq = strchr (key_val, '=');
+
+ if (eq)
+ {
+ flatpak_bwrap_add_arg (bwrap, "--setenv");
+ flatpak_bwrap_take_arg (bwrap, g_strndup (key_val, eq - key_val));
+ flatpak_bwrap_add_arg (bwrap, eq + 1);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ g_warn_if_reached ();
+ }
+ }
+
+ g_strfreev (g_steal_pointer (&bwrap->envp));
+ bwrap->envp = g_strdupv (flatpak_bwrap_empty_env);
+}
+
gboolean
flatpak_bwrap_bundle_args (FlatpakBwrap *bwrap,
int start,
--- flatpak.orig/common/flatpak-run.c
+++ flatpak/common/flatpak-run.c
@@ -1120,15 +1120,6 @@ flatpak_run_add_environment_args (Flatpa
flatpak_run_add_system_dbus_args (bwrap, proxy_arg_bwrap, context, flags);
flatpak_run_add_a11y_dbus_args (bwrap, proxy_arg_bwrap, context, flags);
- if (g_environ_getenv (bwrap->envp, "LD_LIBRARY_PATH") != NULL)
- {
- /* LD_LIBRARY_PATH is overridden for setuid helper, so pass it as cmdline arg */
- flatpak_bwrap_add_args (bwrap,
- "--setenv", "LD_LIBRARY_PATH", g_environ_getenv (bwrap->envp, "LD_LIBRARY_PATH"),
- NULL);
- flatpak_bwrap_unset_env (bwrap, "LD_LIBRARY_PATH");
- }
-
/* Must run this before spawning the dbus proxy, to ensure it
ends up in the app cgroup */
if (!flatpak_run_in_transient_unit (app_id, &my_error))
@@ -3139,6 +3130,8 @@ flatpak_run_app (const char *app_ref
command = default_command;
}
+ flatpak_bwrap_envp_to_args (bwrap);
+
if (!flatpak_bwrap_bundle_args (bwrap, 1, -1, FALSE, error))
return FALSE;
@@ -3161,6 +3154,12 @@ flatpak_run_app (const char *app_ref
char pid_str[64];
g_autofree char *pid_path = NULL;
+ /* flatpak_bwrap_envp_to_args() moved the environment variables to
+ * be set into --setenv instructions in argv, so the environment
+ * in which the bwrap command runs must be empty. */
+ g_assert (bwrap->envp != NULL);
+ g_assert (bwrap->envp[0] == NULL);
+
if (!g_spawn_async (NULL,
(char **) bwrap->argv->pdata,
bwrap->envp,
@@ -3185,6 +3184,13 @@ flatpak_run_app (const char *app_ref
/* Ensure we unset O_CLOEXEC */
flatpak_bwrap_child_setup_cb (bwrap->fds);
+
+ /* flatpak_bwrap_envp_to_args() moved the environment variables to
+ * be set into --setenv instructions in argv, so the environment
+ * in which the bwrap command runs must be empty. */
+ g_assert (bwrap->envp != NULL);
+ g_assert (bwrap->envp[0] == NULL);
+
if (execvpe (flatpak_get_bwrap (), (char **) bwrap->argv->pdata, bwrap->envp) == -1)
{
g_set_error_literal (error, G_IO_ERROR, g_io_error_from_errno (errno),

228
CVE-2021-21261-2.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
From 1b82bf2f9df06ee60d222b4fb45fe3490d05ef94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2021 14:51:36 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] common: Move flatpak_buffer_to_sealed_memfd_or_tmpfile
to its own file
We'll need this to use it in flatpak-portal without pulling the rest of
the common/ directory.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
---
common/Makefile.am.inc | 2 +
common/flatpak-utils-memfd-private.h | 32 ++++++++++
common/flatpak-utils-memfd.c | 90 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
common/flatpak-utils-private.h | 1 +
common/flatpak-utils.c | 50 ----------------
5 files changed, 125 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 common/flatpak-utils-memfd-private.h
create mode 100644 common/flatpak-utils-memfd.c
--- flatpak.orig/common/Makefile.am.inc
+++ flatpak/common/Makefile.am.inc
@@ -96,6 +96,8 @@ libflatpak_common_la_SOURCES = \
common/flatpak-utils.c \
common/flatpak-utils-http.c \
common/flatpak-utils-http-private.h \
+ common/flatpak-utils-memfd.c \
+ common/flatpak-utils-memfd-private.h \
common/flatpak-utils-private.h \
common/flatpak-chain-input-stream.c \
common/flatpak-chain-input-stream-private.h \
--- /dev/null
+++ flatpak/common/flatpak-utils-memfd-private.h
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright © 2014 Red Hat, Inc
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this library. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef __FLATPAK_UTILS_MEMFD_H__
+#define __FLATPAK_UTILS_MEMFD_H__
+
+#include "libglnx/libglnx.h"
+
+gboolean flatpak_buffer_to_sealed_memfd_or_tmpfile (GLnxTmpfile *tmpf,
+ const char *name,
+ const char *str,
+ size_t len,
+ GError **error);
+
+#endif /* __FLATPAK_UTILS_MEMFD_H__ */
--- /dev/null
+++ flatpak/common/flatpak-utils-memfd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright © 2014 Red Hat, Inc
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this library. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com>
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include "flatpak-utils-memfd-private.h"
+
+#include "valgrind-private.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/file.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/utsname.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <termios.h>
+
+/* If memfd_create() is available, generate a sealed memfd with contents of
+ * @str. Otherwise use an O_TMPFILE @tmpf in anonymous mode, write @str to
+ * @tmpf, and lseek() back to the start. See also similar uses in e.g.
+ * rpm-ostree for running dracut.
+ */
+gboolean
+flatpak_buffer_to_sealed_memfd_or_tmpfile (GLnxTmpfile *tmpf,
+ const char *name,
+ const char *str,
+ size_t len,
+ GError **error)
+{
+ if (len == -1)
+ len = strlen (str);
+ glnx_autofd int memfd = memfd_create (name, MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
+ int fd; /* Unowned */
+ if (memfd != -1)
+ {
+ fd = memfd;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* We use an anonymous fd (i.e. O_EXCL) since we don't want
+ * the target container to potentially be able to re-link it.
+ */
+ if (!G_IN_SET (errno, ENOSYS, EOPNOTSUPP))
+ return glnx_throw_errno_prefix (error, "memfd_create");
+ if (!glnx_open_anonymous_tmpfile (O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC, tmpf, error))
+ return FALSE;
+ fd = tmpf->fd;
+ }
+ if (ftruncate (fd, len) < 0)
+ return glnx_throw_errno_prefix (error, "ftruncate");
+ if (glnx_loop_write (fd, str, len) < 0)
+ return glnx_throw_errno_prefix (error, "write");
+ if (lseek (fd, 0, SEEK_SET) < 0)
+ return glnx_throw_errno_prefix (error, "lseek");
+ if (memfd != -1)
+ {
+ /* Valgrind doesn't currently handle G_ADD_SEALS, so lets not seal when debugging... */
+ if ((!RUNNING_ON_VALGRIND) &&
+ fcntl (memfd, F_ADD_SEALS, F_SEAL_SHRINK | F_SEAL_GROW | F_SEAL_WRITE | F_SEAL_SEAL) < 0)
+ return glnx_throw_errno_prefix (error, "fcntl(F_ADD_SEALS)");
+ /* The other values can stay default */
+ tmpf->fd = glnx_steal_fd (&memfd);
+ tmpf->initialized = TRUE;
+ }
+ return TRUE;
+}
--- flatpak.orig/common/flatpak-utils-private.h
+++ flatpak/common/flatpak-utils-private.h
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include "flatpak-context-private.h"
#include "flatpak-error.h"
#include "flatpak-utils-http-private.h"
+#include "flatpak-utils-memfd-private.h"
#include <ostree.h>
#include <json-glib/json-glib.h>
--- flatpak.orig/common/flatpak-utils.c
+++ flatpak/common/flatpak-utils.c
@@ -2280,56 +2280,6 @@ flatpak_file_rename (GFile *from,
return TRUE;
}
-/* If memfd_create() is available, generate a sealed memfd with contents of
- * @str. Otherwise use an O_TMPFILE @tmpf in anonymous mode, write @str to
- * @tmpf, and lseek() back to the start. See also similar uses in e.g.
- * rpm-ostree for running dracut.
- */
-gboolean
-flatpak_buffer_to_sealed_memfd_or_tmpfile (GLnxTmpfile *tmpf,
- const char *name,
- const char *str,
- size_t len,
- GError **error)
-{
- if (len == -1)
- len = strlen (str);
- glnx_autofd int memfd = memfd_create (name, MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
- int fd; /* Unowned */
- if (memfd != -1)
- {
- fd = memfd;
- }
- else
- {
- /* We use an anonymous fd (i.e. O_EXCL) since we don't want
- * the target container to potentially be able to re-link it.
- */
- if (!G_IN_SET (errno, ENOSYS, EOPNOTSUPP))
- return glnx_throw_errno_prefix (error, "memfd_create");
- if (!glnx_open_anonymous_tmpfile (O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC, tmpf, error))
- return FALSE;
- fd = tmpf->fd;
- }
- if (ftruncate (fd, len) < 0)
- return glnx_throw_errno_prefix (error, "ftruncate");
- if (glnx_loop_write (fd, str, len) < 0)
- return glnx_throw_errno_prefix (error, "write");
- if (lseek (fd, 0, SEEK_SET) < 0)
- return glnx_throw_errno_prefix (error, "lseek");
- if (memfd != -1)
- {
- /* Valgrind doesn't currently handle G_ADD_SEALS, so lets not seal when debugging... */
- if ((!RUNNING_ON_VALGRIND) &&
- fcntl (memfd, F_ADD_SEALS, F_SEAL_SHRINK | F_SEAL_GROW | F_SEAL_WRITE | F_SEAL_SEAL) < 0)
- return glnx_throw_errno_prefix (error, "fcntl(F_ADD_SEALS)");
- /* The other values can stay default */
- tmpf->fd = glnx_steal_fd (&memfd);
- tmpf->initialized = TRUE;
- }
- return TRUE;
-}
-
gboolean
flatpak_open_in_tmpdir_at (int tmpdir_fd,
int mode,

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@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
From 7a93013153a425d4cb8466cd9b665b98e713451d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2021 16:18:58 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] context: Add --env-fd option
This allows environment variables to be added to the context without
making their values visible to processes running under a different uid,
which might be significant if the variable's value is a token or some
other secret value.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Part-of: https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/security/advisories/GHSA-4ppf-fxf6-vxg2
---
common/flatpak-context.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
doc/flatpak-build-finish.xml | 18 +++++++++++
doc/flatpak-build.xml | 18 +++++++++++
doc/flatpak-override.xml | 18 +++++++++++
doc/flatpak-run.xml | 18 +++++++++++
5 files changed, 132 insertions(+)
--- flatpak.orig/common/flatpak-context.c
+++ flatpak/common/flatpak-context.c
@@ -1040,6 +1040,65 @@ option_env_cb (const gchar *option_name,
}
static gboolean
+option_env_fd_cb (const gchar *option_name,
+ const gchar *value,
+ gpointer data,
+ GError **error)
+{
+ FlatpakContext *context = data;
+ g_autoptr(GBytes) env_block = NULL;
+ gsize remaining;
+ const char *p;
+ guint64 fd;
+ gchar *endptr;
+
+ fd = g_ascii_strtoull (value, &endptr, 10);
+
+ if (endptr == NULL || *endptr != '\0' || fd > G_MAXINT)
+ return glnx_throw (error, "Not a valid file descriptor: %s", value);
+
+ env_block = glnx_fd_readall_bytes ((int) fd, NULL, error);
+
+ if (env_block == NULL)
+ return FALSE;
+
+ p = g_bytes_get_data (env_block, &remaining);
+
+ /* env_block might not be \0-terminated */
+ while (remaining > 0)
+ {
+ size_t len = strnlen (p, remaining);
+ const char *equals;
+
+ g_assert (len <= remaining);
+
+ equals = memchr (p, '=', len);
+
+ if (equals == NULL || equals == p)
+ return glnx_throw (error,
+ "Environment variable must be given in the form VARIABLE=VALUE, not %.*s", (int) len, p);
+
+ flatpak_context_set_env_var (context,
+ g_strndup (p, equals - p),
+ g_strndup (equals + 1, len - (equals - p) - 1));
+ p += len;
+ remaining -= len;
+
+ if (remaining > 0)
+ {
+ g_assert (*p == '\0');
+ p += 1;
+ remaining -= 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (fd >= 3)
+ close (fd);
+
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+static gboolean
option_own_name_cb (const gchar *option_name,
const gchar *value,
gpointer data,
@@ -1206,6 +1265,7 @@ static GOptionEntry context_options[] =
{ "filesystem", 0, G_OPTION_FLAG_IN_MAIN, G_OPTION_ARG_CALLBACK, &option_filesystem_cb, N_("Expose filesystem to app (:ro for read-only)"), N_("FILESYSTEM[:ro]") },
{ "nofilesystem", 0, G_OPTION_FLAG_IN_MAIN, G_OPTION_ARG_CALLBACK, &option_nofilesystem_cb, N_("Don't expose filesystem to app"), N_("FILESYSTEM") },
{ "env", 0, G_OPTION_FLAG_IN_MAIN, G_OPTION_ARG_CALLBACK, &option_env_cb, N_("Set environment variable"), N_("VAR=VALUE") },
+ { "env-fd", 0, G_OPTION_FLAG_IN_MAIN, G_OPTION_ARG_CALLBACK, &option_env_fd_cb, N_("Read environment variables in env -0 format from FD"), N_("FD") },
{ "own-name", 0, G_OPTION_FLAG_IN_MAIN, G_OPTION_ARG_CALLBACK, &option_own_name_cb, N_("Allow app to own name on the session bus"), N_("DBUS_NAME") },
{ "talk-name", 0, G_OPTION_FLAG_IN_MAIN, G_OPTION_ARG_CALLBACK, &option_talk_name_cb, N_("Allow app to talk to name on the session bus"), N_("DBUS_NAME") },
{ "system-own-name", 0, G_OPTION_FLAG_IN_MAIN, G_OPTION_ARG_CALLBACK, &option_system_own_name_cb, N_("Allow app to own name on the system bus"), N_("DBUS_NAME") },
--- flatpak.orig/doc/flatpak-build-finish.xml
+++ flatpak/doc/flatpak-build-finish.xml
@@ -277,6 +277,24 @@ key=v1;v2;
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
+ <term><option>--env-fd=<replaceable>FD</replaceable></option></term>
+
+ <listitem><para>
+ Read environment variables from the file descriptor
+ <replaceable>FD</replaceable>, and set them as if
+ via <option>--env</option>. This can be used to avoid
+ environment variables and their values becoming visible
+ to other users.
+ </para><para>
+ Each environment variable is in the form
+ <replaceable>VAR</replaceable>=<replaceable>VALUE</replaceable>
+ followed by a zero byte. This is the same format used by
+ <literal>env -0</literal> and
+ <filename>/proc/*/environ</filename>.
+ </para></listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
<term><option>--own-name=NAME</option></term>
<listitem><para>
--- flatpak.orig/doc/flatpak-build.xml
+++ flatpak/doc/flatpak-build.xml
@@ -284,6 +284,24 @@ key=v1;v2;
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
+ <term><option>--env-fd=<replaceable>FD</replaceable></option></term>
+
+ <listitem><para>
+ Read environment variables from the file descriptor
+ <replaceable>FD</replaceable>, and set them as if
+ via <option>--env</option>. This can be used to avoid
+ environment variables and their values becoming visible
+ to other users.
+ </para><para>
+ Each environment variable is in the form
+ <replaceable>VAR</replaceable>=<replaceable>VALUE</replaceable>
+ followed by a zero byte. This is the same format used by
+ <literal>env -0</literal> and
+ <filename>/proc/*/environ</filename>.
+ </para></listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
<term><option>--own-name=NAME</option></term>
<listitem><para>
--- flatpak.orig/doc/flatpak-override.xml
+++ flatpak/doc/flatpak-override.xml
@@ -258,6 +258,24 @@ key=v1;v2;
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
+ <term><option>--env-fd=<replaceable>FD</replaceable></option></term>
+
+ <listitem><para>
+ Read environment variables from the file descriptor
+ <replaceable>FD</replaceable>, and set them as if
+ via <option>--env</option>. This can be used to avoid
+ environment variables and their values becoming visible
+ to other users.
+ </para><para>
+ Each environment variable is in the form
+ <replaceable>VAR</replaceable>=<replaceable>VALUE</replaceable>
+ followed by a zero byte. This is the same format used by
+ <literal>env -0</literal> and
+ <filename>/proc/*/environ</filename>.
+ </para></listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
<term><option>--own-name=NAME</option></term>
<listitem><para>
--- flatpak.orig/doc/flatpak-run.xml
+++ flatpak/doc/flatpak-run.xml
@@ -361,6 +361,24 @@ key=v1;v2;
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
+ <term><option>--env-fd=<replaceable>FD</replaceable></option></term>
+
+ <listitem><para>
+ Read environment variables from the file descriptor
+ <replaceable>FD</replaceable>, and set them as if
+ via <option>--env</option>. This can be used to avoid
+ environment variables and their values becoming visible
+ to other users.
+ </para><para>
+ Each environment variable is in the form
+ <replaceable>VAR</replaceable>=<replaceable>VALUE</replaceable>
+ followed by a zero byte. This is the same format used by
+ <literal>env -0</literal> and
+ <filename>/proc/*/environ</filename>.
+ </para></listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
<term><option>--own-name=NAME</option></term>
<listitem><para>

138
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@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
From ce6a6e593310d42f7aecddb88d98e759f22ab6db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2021 12:25:59 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] portal: Convert --env in extra-args into --env-fd
This hides overridden variables from the command-line, which means
processes running under other uids can't see them in /proc/*/cmdline,
which might be important if they contain secrets.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Part-of: https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/security/advisories/GHSA-4ppf-fxf6-vxg2
---
portal/Makefile.am.inc | 4 ++-
portal/flatpak-portal.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- flatpak.orig/portal/Makefile.am.inc
+++ flatpak/portal/Makefile.am.inc
@@ -29,11 +29,13 @@ flatpak_portal_SOURCES = \
portal/flatpak-portal-app-info.h \
common/flatpak-portal-error.c \
common/flatpak-portal-error.h \
+ common/flatpak-utils-memfd.c \
+ common/flatpak-utils-memfd-private.h \
$(NULL)
BUILT_SOURCES += $(nodist_flatpak_portal_SOURCES)
CLEANFILES += $(nodist_flatpak_portal_SOURCES)
-flatpak_portal_LDADD = $(AM_LDADD) $(BASE_LIBS)
+flatpak_portal_LDADD = $(AM_LDADD) $(BASE_LIBS) libglnx.la
flatpak_portal_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(BASE_CFLAGS) -DFLATPAK_COMPILATION
flatpak_portal_CPPFLAGS = $(AM_CPPFLAGS) -I$(builddir)/portal
--- flatpak.orig/portal/flatpak-portal.c
+++ flatpak/portal/flatpak-portal.c
@@ -32,6 +32,14 @@
#include "flatpak-portal.h"
#include "flatpak-portal-app-info.h"
#include "flatpak-portal-error.h"
+#include "flatpak-utils-memfd-private.h"
+
+/* Syntactic sugar added in newer GLib, which makes the error paths more
+ * clearly correct */
+#ifndef G_DBUS_METHOD_INVOCATION_HANDLED
+# define G_DBUS_METHOD_INVOCATION_HANDLED TRUE
+# define G_DBUS_METHOD_INVOCATION_UNHANDLED FALSE
+#endif
#define IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECS 10 * 60
@@ -166,9 +174,16 @@ typedef struct
int fd_map_len;
gboolean set_tty;
int tty;
+ int env_fd;
} ChildSetupData;
static void
+drop_cloexec (int fd)
+{
+ fcntl (fd, F_SETFD, 0);
+}
+
+static void
child_setup_func (gpointer user_data)
{
ChildSetupData *data = (ChildSetupData *) user_data;
@@ -176,6 +191,9 @@ child_setup_func (gpointer user_data)
sigset_t set;
int i;
+ if (data->env_fd != -1)
+ drop_cloexec (data->env_fd);
+
/* Unblock all signals */
sigemptyset (&set);
if (pthread_sigmask (SIG_SETMASK, &set, NULL) == -1)
@@ -321,6 +339,9 @@ handle_spawn (PortalFlatpak *obj
g_auto(GStrv) sandbox_expose = NULL;
g_auto(GStrv) sandbox_expose_ro = NULL;
gboolean sandboxed;
+ g_autoptr(GString) env_string = g_string_new ("");
+
+ child_setup_data.env_fd = -1;
app_info = g_object_get_data (G_OBJECT (invocation), "app-info");
g_assert (app_info != NULL);
@@ -505,7 +526,49 @@ handle_spawn (PortalFlatpak *obj
else
{
for (i = 0; extra_args != NULL && extra_args[i] != NULL; i++)
- g_ptr_array_add (flatpak_argv, g_strdup (extra_args[i]));
+ {
+ if (g_str_has_prefix (extra_args[i], "--env="))
+ {
+ const char *var_val = extra_args[i] + strlen ("--env=");
+
+ if (var_val[0] == '\0' || var_val[0] == '=')
+ {
+ g_warning ("Environment variable in extra-args has empty name");
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (strchr (var_val, '=') == NULL)
+ {
+ g_warning ("Environment variable in extra-args has no value");
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ g_string_append (env_string, var_val);
+ g_string_append_c (env_string, '\0');
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ g_ptr_array_add (flatpak_argv, g_strdup (extra_args[i]));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (env_string->len > 0)
+ {
+ g_auto(GLnxTmpfile) env_tmpf = { 0, };
+
+ if (!flatpak_buffer_to_sealed_memfd_or_tmpfile (&env_tmpf, "environ",
+ env_string->str,
+ env_string->len, &error))
+ {
+ g_dbus_method_invocation_return_gerror (invocation, error);
+ return G_DBUS_METHOD_INVOCATION_HANDLED;
+ }
+
+ child_setup_data.env_fd = glnx_steal_fd (&env_tmpf.fd);
+ g_ptr_array_add (flatpak_argv,
+ g_strdup_printf ("--env-fd=%d",
+ child_setup_data.env_fd));
}
/* Inherit launcher network access from launcher, unless

67
CVE-2021-21261-5.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
From f527eaeb132dcd5bb06115b987d6a6f8bfafac9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2021 16:25:29 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] portal: Do not use caller-supplied variables in
environment
If the caller specifies a variable that can be used to inject arbitrary
code into processes, we must not allow it to enter the environment
block used to run `flatpak run`, which runs unsandboxed.
This change requires the previous commit "context: Add --env-fd option",
which adds infrastructure used here.
To be secure, this change also requires the previous commit
"run: Convert all environment variables into bwrap arguments", which
protects a non-setuid bwrap(1) from the same attack.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Part-of: https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/security/advisories/GHSA-4ppf-fxf6-vxg2
---
portal/flatpak-portal.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- flatpak.orig/portal/flatpak-portal.c
+++ flatpak/portal/flatpak-portal.c
@@ -506,6 +506,13 @@ handle_spawn (PortalFlatpak *obj
else
env = g_get_environ ();
+ /* Let the environment variables given by the caller override the ones
+ * from extra_args. Don't add them to @env, because they are controlled
+ * by our caller, which might be trying to use them to inject code into
+ * flatpak(1); add them to the environment block instead.
+ *
+ * We don't use --env= here, so that if the values are something that
+ * should not be exposed to other uids, they can remain confidential. */
n_envs = g_variant_n_children (arg_envs);
for (i = 0; i < n_envs; i++)
{
@@ -513,7 +520,26 @@ handle_spawn (PortalFlatpak *obj
const char *val = NULL;
g_variant_get_child (arg_envs, i, "{&s&s}", &var, &val);
- env = g_environ_setenv (env, var, val, TRUE);
+ if (var[0] == '\0')
+ {
+ g_dbus_method_invocation_return_error (invocation, G_DBUS_ERROR,
+ G_DBUS_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS,
+ "Environment variable cannot have empty name");
+ return G_DBUS_METHOD_INVOCATION_HANDLED;
+ }
+
+ if (strchr (var, '=') != NULL)
+ {
+ g_dbus_method_invocation_return_error (invocation, G_DBUS_ERROR,
+ G_DBUS_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS,
+ "Environment variable name cannot contain '='");
+ return G_DBUS_METHOD_INVOCATION_HANDLED;
+ }
+
+ g_string_append (env_string, var);
+ g_string_append_c (env_string, '=');
+ g_string_append (env_string, val);
+ g_string_append_c (env_string, '\0');
}
g_ptr_array_add (flatpak_argv, g_strdup ("flatpak"));

12
flatpak.spec
View File

@ -1,10 +1,16 @@
Name: flatpak Name: flatpak
Version: 1.0.3 Version: 1.0.3
Release: 2 Release: 3
Summary: Application deployment framework for desktop apps Summary: Application deployment framework for desktop apps
License: LGPLv2+ License: LGPLv2+
URL: http://flatpak.org/ URL: http://flatpak.org/
Source0: https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/releases/download/%{version}/%{name}-%{version}.tar.xz Source0: https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/releases/download/%{version}/%{name}-%{version}.tar.xz
Patch0000: modify-automake-version.patch
Patch0001: CVE-2021-21261-1.patch
Patch0002: CVE-2021-21261-2.patch
Patch0003: CVE-2021-21261-3.patch
Patch0004: CVE-2021-21261-4.patch
Patch0005: CVE-2021-21261-5.patch
BuildRequires: pkgconfig(appstream-glib) pkgconfig(gio-unix-2.0) pkgconfig(gobject-introspection-1.0) >= 1.40.0 pkgconfig(json-glib-1.0) pkgconfig(libarchive) >= 2.8.0 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(appstream-glib) pkgconfig(gio-unix-2.0) pkgconfig(gobject-introspection-1.0) >= 1.40.0 pkgconfig(json-glib-1.0) pkgconfig(libarchive) >= 2.8.0
BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libsoup-2.4) pkgconfig(libxml-2.0) >= 2.4 pkgconfig(ostree-1) >= 2018.7 pkgconfig(polkit-gobject-1) pkgconfig(libseccomp) pkgconfig(xau) BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libsoup-2.4) pkgconfig(libxml-2.0) >= 2.4 pkgconfig(ostree-1) >= 2018.7 pkgconfig(polkit-gobject-1) pkgconfig(libseccomp) pkgconfig(xau)
@ -99,5 +105,9 @@ flatpak remote-list --system &> /dev/null || :
%{_mandir}/man5/flatpak-remote.5* %{_mandir}/man5/flatpak-remote.5*
%changelog %changelog
* Sun Feb 07 2021 wangxiao <wangxiao65> - 1.0.3-3
- Modify automake version
- Fix CVE-2021-21261
* Thu Nov 21 2019 openEuler Buildteam <buildteam@openeuler.org> - 1.0.3-2 * Thu Nov 21 2019 openEuler Buildteam <buildteam@openeuler.org> - 1.0.3-2
- Package init - Package init

42
modify-automake-version.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
From b3dc7f6af7f2812d5b4a42592976c5b9d7febaad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: wangxiao65 <wangxiao65@huawei.com>
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2021 12:02:08 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] modify automake version
When Makefile.am is modified, automake needs to be executed.
if the version of automake in the compile enviroment is inconsistent
with the version specified in configure, the compile will fail.
---
configure | 2 +-
configure.ac | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index 13abc0a..da4fa78 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -12762,7 +12762,7 @@ CC=$lt_save_CC
ac_config_headers="$ac_config_headers config.h"
-am__api_version='1.15'
+am__api_version='1.16'
# Find a good install program. We prefer a C program (faster),
# so one script is as good as another. But avoid the broken or
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 202ffc8..4ca143e 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ LT_INIT([disable-static])
AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([common/flatpak-dir.c])
AC_CONFIG_HEADERS([config.h])
AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR([m4])
-AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([1.13.4 no-define no-dist-gzip dist-xz tar-ustar foreign subdir-objects])
+AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([1.16.2 no-define no-dist-gzip dist-xz tar-ustar foreign subdir-objects])
AC_PROG_SED
AC_PROG_YACC
--
2.23.0