!94 [sync] PR-89: Fix CVE-2024-42472
From: @openeuler-sync-bot Reviewed-by: @lyn1001 Signed-off-by: @lyn1001
This commit is contained in:
commit
1dd69bf453
225
CVE-2024-42472.patch
Normal file
225
CVE-2024-42472.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
|
||||
Origin:
|
||||
https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/8a18137d7e80f0575e8defabf677d81e5cc3a788
|
||||
https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/db3a785241fda63bf53f0ec12bb519aa5210de19
|
||||
https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/847dfb88cebbdf8825332730b837489684dfb91e
|
||||
https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/7c63e53bb2af0aae9097fd2edfd6a9ba9d453e97
|
||||
|
||||
From 7c63e53bb2af0aae9097fd2edfd6a9ba9d453e97 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2024 13:44:30 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] persist directories: Pass using new bwrap --bind-fd option
|
||||
|
||||
Instead of passing a /proc/self/fd bind mount we use --bind-fd, which
|
||||
has two advantages:
|
||||
* bwrap closes the fd when used, so it doesn't leak into the started app
|
||||
* bwrap ensures that what was mounted was the passed in fd (same dev/ino),
|
||||
as there is a small (required) gap between symlink resolve and mount
|
||||
where the target path could be replaced.
|
||||
|
||||
Please note that this change requires an updated version of bubblewrap.
|
||||
|
||||
Resolves: CVE-2024-42472, GHSA-7hgv-f2j8-xw87
|
||||
[smcv: Make whitespace consistent]
|
||||
Co-authored-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
common/flatpak-context.c | 109 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
|
||||
configure.ac | 3 ++
|
||||
tests/test-run.sh | 39 ++++++++++++++
|
||||
3 files changed, 148 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/common/flatpak-context.c b/common/flatpak-context.c
|
||||
index 6303c71..09dd440 100644
|
||||
--- a/common/flatpak-context.c
|
||||
+++ b/common/flatpak-context.c
|
||||
@@ -2616,6 +2616,90 @@ flatpak_context_get_run_flags (FlatpakContext *context)
|
||||
return flags;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+/* This creates zero or more directories unders base_fd+basedir, each
|
||||
+ * being guaranteed to either exist and be a directory (no symlinks)
|
||||
+ * or be created as a directory. The last directory is opened
|
||||
+ * and the fd is returned.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+static gboolean
|
||||
+mkdir_p_open_nofollow_at (int base_fd,
|
||||
+ const char *basedir,
|
||||
+ int mode,
|
||||
+ const char *subdir,
|
||||
+ int *out_fd,
|
||||
+ GError **error)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ glnx_autofd int parent_fd = -1;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (g_path_is_absolute (subdir))
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ const char *skipped_prefix = subdir;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ while (*skipped_prefix == '/')
|
||||
+ skipped_prefix++;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ g_warning ("--persist=\"%s\" is deprecated, treating it as --persist=\"%s\"", subdir, skipped_prefix);
|
||||
+ subdir = skipped_prefix;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ g_autofree char *subdir_dirname = g_path_get_dirname (subdir);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (strcmp (subdir_dirname, ".") == 0)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ /* It is ok to open basedir with follow=true */
|
||||
+ if (!glnx_opendirat (base_fd, basedir, TRUE, &parent_fd, error))
|
||||
+ return FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ else if (strcmp (subdir_dirname, "..") == 0)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ return glnx_throw (error, "'..' not supported in --persist paths");
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ else
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ if (!mkdir_p_open_nofollow_at (base_fd, basedir, mode,
|
||||
+ subdir_dirname, &parent_fd, error))
|
||||
+ return FALSE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ g_autofree char *subdir_basename = g_path_get_basename (subdir);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (strcmp (subdir_basename, ".") == 0)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ *out_fd = glnx_steal_fd (&parent_fd);
|
||||
+ return TRUE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ else if (strcmp (subdir_basename, "..") == 0)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ return glnx_throw (error, "'..' not supported in --persist paths");
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (!glnx_shutil_mkdir_p_at (parent_fd, subdir_basename, mode, NULL, error))
|
||||
+ return FALSE;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ int fd = openat (parent_fd, subdir_basename, O_PATH | O_NONBLOCK | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC | O_NOCTTY | O_NOFOLLOW);
|
||||
+ if (fd == -1)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ int saved_errno = errno;
|
||||
+ struct stat stat_buf;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* If it's a symbolic link, that could be a user trying to offload
|
||||
+ * large data to another filesystem, but it could equally well be
|
||||
+ * a malicious or compromised app trying to exploit GHSA-7hgv-f2j8-xw87.
|
||||
+ * Produce a clearer error message in this case.
|
||||
+ * Unfortunately the errno we get in this case is ENOTDIR, so we have
|
||||
+ * to ask again to find out whether it's really a symlink. */
|
||||
+ if (saved_errno == ENOTDIR &&
|
||||
+ fstatat (parent_fd, subdir_basename, &stat_buf, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) == 0 &&
|
||||
+ S_ISLNK (stat_buf.st_mode))
|
||||
+ return glnx_throw (error, "Symbolic link \"%s\" not allowed to avoid sandbox escape", subdir_basename);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return glnx_throw_errno_prefix (error, "openat(%s)", subdir_basename);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ *out_fd = fd;
|
||||
+ return TRUE;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
void
|
||||
flatpak_context_append_bwrap_filesystem (FlatpakContext *context,
|
||||
FlatpakBwrap *bwrap,
|
||||
@@ -2643,12 +2727,31 @@ flatpak_context_append_bwrap_filesystem (FlatpakContext *context,
|
||||
while (g_hash_table_iter_next (&iter, &key, NULL))
|
||||
{
|
||||
const char *persist = key;
|
||||
- g_autofree char *src = g_build_filename (g_get_home_dir (), ".var/app", app_id, persist, NULL);
|
||||
+ g_autofree char *appdir = g_build_filename (g_get_home_dir (), ".var/app", app_id, NULL);
|
||||
g_autofree char *dest = g_build_filename (g_get_home_dir (), persist, NULL);
|
||||
|
||||
- g_mkdir_with_parents (src, 0755);
|
||||
+ g_autoptr(GError) local_error = NULL;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (g_mkdir_with_parents (appdir, 0755) != 0)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ g_warning ("Unable to create directory %s", appdir);
|
||||
+ continue;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* Don't follow symlinks from the persist directory, as it is under user control */
|
||||
+ glnx_autofd int src_fd = -1;
|
||||
+ if (!mkdir_p_open_nofollow_at (AT_FDCWD, appdir, 0755,
|
||||
+ persist, &src_fd,
|
||||
+ &local_error))
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ g_warning ("Failed to create persist path %s: %s", persist, local_error->message);
|
||||
+ continue;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ g_autofree char *src_via_proc = g_strdup_printf ("%d", src_fd);
|
||||
|
||||
- flatpak_bwrap_add_bind_arg (bwrap, "--bind", src, dest);
|
||||
+ flatpak_bwrap_add_fd (bwrap, glnx_steal_fd (&src_fd));
|
||||
+ flatpak_bwrap_add_bind_arg (bwrap, "--bind-fd", src_via_proc, dest);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
|
||||
index 8bf37b0..0862ae5 100644
|
||||
--- a/configure.ac
|
||||
+++ b/configure.ac
|
||||
@@ -175,6 +175,9 @@ if test "x$BWRAP" != xfalse; then
|
||||
BWRAP_VERSION=`$BWRAP --version | sed 's,.*\ \([0-9]*\.[0-9]*\.[0-9]*\)$,\1,'`
|
||||
AX_COMPARE_VERSION([$SYSTEM_BWRAP_REQS],[gt],[$BWRAP_VERSION],
|
||||
[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need at least version $SYSTEM_BWRAP_REQS of bubblewrap to use the system installed version])])
|
||||
+ AS_IF([$BWRAP --help | grep '@<:@-@:>@-bind-fd' >/dev/null],
|
||||
+ [:],
|
||||
+ [AC_MSG_ERROR([$BWRAP does not list required option --bind-fd in its --help])])
|
||||
AM_CONDITIONAL([WITH_SYSTEM_BWRAP], [true])
|
||||
else
|
||||
AC_CHECK_LIB(cap, cap_from_text, CAP_LIB=-lcap)
|
||||
diff --git a/tests/test-run.sh b/tests/test-run.sh
|
||||
index 3c344df..f087ff2 100644
|
||||
--- a/tests/test-run.sh
|
||||
+++ b/tests/test-run.sh
|
||||
@@ -494,3 +494,42 @@ ${FLATPAK} ${U} info -m org.test.App > out
|
||||
assert_file_has_content out "^sdk=org\.test\.Sdk/$(flatpak --default-arch)/stable$"
|
||||
|
||||
ok "--sdk option"
|
||||
+
|
||||
+rm -fr "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello"
|
||||
+mkdir -p "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello"
|
||||
+run --command=sh --persist=.persist org.test.Hello -c 'echo can-persist > .persist/rc'
|
||||
+sed -e 's,^,#--persist=.persist# ,g' < "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/.persist/rc" >&2
|
||||
+assert_file_has_content "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/.persist/rc" "can-persist"
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ok "--persist=.persist persists a directory"
|
||||
+
|
||||
+rm -fr "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello"
|
||||
+mkdir -p "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello"
|
||||
+# G_DEBUG= to avoid the deprecation warning being fatal
|
||||
+G_DEBUG= run --command=sh --persist=/.persist org.test.Hello -c 'echo can-persist > .persist/rc'
|
||||
+sed -e 's,^,#--persist=/.persist# ,g' < "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/.persist/rc" >&2
|
||||
+assert_file_has_content "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/.persist/rc" "can-persist"
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ok "--persist=/.persist is a deprecated form of --persist=.persist"
|
||||
+
|
||||
+rm -fr "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello"
|
||||
+mkdir -p "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello"
|
||||
+run --command=sh --persist=. org.test.Hello -c 'echo can-persist > .persistrc'
|
||||
+sed -e 's,^,#--persist=.# ,g' < "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/.persistrc" >&2
|
||||
+assert_file_has_content "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/.persistrc" "can-persist"
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ok "--persist=. persists all files"
|
||||
+
|
||||
+mkdir "${TEST_DATA_DIR}/inaccessible"
|
||||
+echo FOO > ${TEST_DATA_DIR}/inaccessible/secret-file
|
||||
+rm -fr "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello"
|
||||
+mkdir -p "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello"
|
||||
+ln -fns "${TEST_DATA_DIR}/inaccessible" "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/persist"
|
||||
+# G_DEBUG= to avoid the warnings being fatal when we reject a --persist option.
|
||||
+# LC_ALL=C so we get the expected non-localized string.
|
||||
+LC_ALL=C G_DEBUG= run --command=ls --persist=persist --persist=relative/../escape org.test.Hello -la ~/persist &> hello_out || true
|
||||
+sed -e 's,^,#--persist=symlink# ,g' < hello_out >&2
|
||||
+assert_file_has_content hello_out "not allowed to avoid sandbox escape"
|
||||
+assert_not_file_has_content hello_out "secret-file"
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ok "--persist doesn't allow sandbox escape via a symlink (CVE-2024-42472)"
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.33.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
Name: flatpak
|
||||
Version: 1.10.2
|
||||
Release: 8
|
||||
Release: 9
|
||||
Summary: Application deployment framework for desktop apps
|
||||
License: LGPLv2+
|
||||
URL: http://flatpak.org/
|
||||
@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ Patch6022: CVE-2023-28101-1.patch
|
||||
# https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/e88eedce76f79a5573df4fc38b344bbeaf7af024
|
||||
Patch6023: CVE-2023-28101-2.patch
|
||||
Patch6024: CVE-2024-32462.patch
|
||||
Patch6025: CVE-2024-42472.patch
|
||||
|
||||
BuildRequires: pkgconfig(appstream-glib) pkgconfig(gio-unix-2.0) pkgconfig(gobject-introspection-1.0) >= 1.40.0 pkgconfig(json-glib-1.0) pkgconfig(libarchive) >= 2.8.0
|
||||
BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libsoup-2.4) pkgconfig(libxml-2.0) >= 2.4 pkgconfig(ostree-1) >= 2020.8 pkgconfig(polkit-gobject-1) pkgconfig(libseccomp) pkgconfig(xau)
|
||||
@ -145,6 +146,9 @@ flatpak remote-list --system &> /dev/null || :
|
||||
%{_mandir}/man5/flatpak-remote.5*
|
||||
|
||||
%changelog
|
||||
* Thu Aug 15 2024 wangkai <13474090681@163.com> - 1.10.2-9
|
||||
- Fix CVE-2024-42472
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Apr 19 2024 wangkai <13474090681@163.com> - 1.10.2-8
|
||||
- Fix CVE-2024-32462
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user