!133 [sync] PR-131: add sw_64 support

From: @openeuler-sync-bot Reviewed-by: @weidongkl Signed-off-by: @weidongkl
update emacs.spec.
2025-03-13 06:14:52 +00:00 · 2025-03-13 09:09:03 +08:00 · 2025-03-13 09:09:03 +08:00 · 2025-02-17 07:20:07 +00:00 · 2025-02-13 06:34:29 +00:00 · 2024-07-03 01:10:27 +00:00
19 changed files with 403 additions and 667 deletions
--- a/backport-0001-CVE-2023-28617.patch
+++ b/backport-0001-CVE-2023-28617.patch
@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-From 8f8ec2ccf3f5ef8f38d68ec84a7e4739c45db485 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Xi Lu <lx@shellcodes.org>
-Date: Sat, 18 Feb 2023 18:03:28 +0800
-Subject: * lisp/ob-latex.el (org-babel-execute:latex): Fix command injection
- vulnerability
-
-Link: https://orgmode.org/list/tencent_5C4D5D0DEFDDBBFC66F855703927E60C7706@qq.com
-
-TINYCHANGE
-
-Reference:https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/emacs/org-mode.git/commit/?id=8f8ec2ccf3f5ef8f38d68ec84a7e4739c45db485
-Conflict:NA
-
---
- lisp/org/ob-latex.el | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/lisp/org/ob-latex.el b/lisp/org/ob-latex.el
-index 428907a..a0154bf 100644
--- a/lisp/org/ob-latex.el
-+++ b/lisp/org/ob-latex.el
-@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ This function is called by `org-babel-execute-src-block'."
- 	                     tmp-pdf
-                              (list org-babel-latex-pdf-svg-process)
-                              extension err-msg log-buf)))
-              (shell-command (format "mv %s %s" img-out out-file)))))
-+              (rename-file img-out out-file t))))
-          ((string-suffix-p ".tikz" out-file)
- 	  (when (file-exists-p out-file) (delete-file out-file))
- 	  (with-temp-file out-file
-- 
-cgit v1.1
--- a/backport-0002-CVE-2022-48337.patch
+++ b/backport-0002-CVE-2022-48337.patch
@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-From c6ece14812f32a7f9f0d69497c886d178730a75f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Super User <root@localhost.localdomain>
-Date: Mon, 25 Sep 2023 14:14:02 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] backport 0002 CVE-2022-48337
-
---
- lib-src/etags.c | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/lib-src/etags.c b/lib-src/etags.c
-index a6bd7f6..ea80ba6 100644
--- a/lib-src/etags.c
-+++ b/lib-src/etags.c
-@@ -1714,6 +1714,8 @@ process_file_name (char *file, language *lang)
-           int buf_len = strlen (compr->command) + strlen ("  > ") + strlen (new_real_name) + strlen (new_tmp_name) + 1;
-           char *cmd = xmalloc (buf_len);
-           snprintf (cmd, buf_len, "%s %s > %s", compr->command, new_real_name, new_tmp_name);
-+	  free (new_real_name);
-+	  free (new_tmp_name);
- #endif
- 	  inf = (system (cmd) == -1
- 		 ? NULL
-- 
-2.41.0
-
--- a/backport-0002-CVE-2023-28617.patch
+++ b/backport-0002-CVE-2023-28617.patch
@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-From a8006ea580ed74f27f974d60b598143b04ad1741 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Xi Lu <lx@shellcodes.org>
-Date: Sat, 11 Mar 2023 18:53:37 +0800
-Subject: * lisp/ob-latex.el: Fix command injection vulnerability
-
-(org-babel-execute:latex):
-Replaced the `(shell-command "mv BAR NEWBAR")' with `rename-file'.
-
-TINYCHANGE
-
-Reference:https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/emacs/org-mode.git/commit/?id=a8006ea580ed74f27f974d60b598143b04ad1741
-Conflict:NA
-
---
- lisp/org/ob-latex.el | 13 +++++--------
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lisp/org/ob-latex.el b/lisp/org/ob-latex.el
-index a2c24b3..ce39628 100644
--- a/lisp/org/ob-latex.el
-+++ b/lisp/org/ob-latex.el
-@@ -218,17 +218,14 @@ This function is called by `org-babel-execute-src-block'."
- 	    (if (string-suffix-p ".svg" out-file)
- 		(progn
- 		  (shell-command "pwd")
-		  (shell-command (format "mv %s %s"
-					 (concat (file-name-sans-extension tex-file) "-1.svg")
-					 out-file)))
-+                  (rename-file (concat (file-name-sans-extension tex-file) "-1.svg")
-+                               out-file t))
- 	      (error "SVG file produced but HTML file requested")))
- 	   ((file-exists-p (concat (file-name-sans-extension tex-file) ".html"))
- 	    (if (string-suffix-p ".html" out-file)
-		(shell-command "mv %s %s"
-			       (concat (file-name-sans-extension tex-file)
-				       ".html")
-			       out-file)
-	      (error "HTML file produced but SVG file requested")))))
-+                (rename-file (concat (file-name-sans-extension tex-file) ".html")
-+                             out-file t)
-+              (error "HTML file produced but SVG file requested")))))
- 	 ((or (string= "pdf" extension) imagemagick)
- 	  (with-temp-file tex-file
- 	    (require 'ox-latex)
-- 
-cgit v1.1
--- a/backport-CVE-2022-45939.patch
+++ b/backport-CVE-2022-45939.patch
@ -1,272 +0,0 @@
-From d48bb4874bc6cd3e69c7a15fc3c91cc141025c51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: lu4nx <lx@shellcodes.org>
-Date: Fri, 25 Nov 2022 14:38:29 +0800
-Subject: Fixed ctags local command execute vulnerability
-
-* lib-src/etags.c:
-
-(clean_matched_file_tag): New function
-(do_move_file): New function
-(readline_internal):
-Add `leave_cr` parameter, if true, include the \r character
-
-* test/manual/etags/CTAGS.good_crlf: New file
-* test/manual/etags/CTAGS.good_update: New file
-* test/manual/etags/crlf: New file
-* test/manual/etags/Makefile: Add `ctags -u` test cases
-
-Conflict:Removed test case related code, so the patch is over 9000 lines, it's too big
-Reference:https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/emacs.git/commit/?id=d48bb4874bc6cd3e69c7a15fc3c91cc141025c51
---
- lib-src/etags.c                     |  149 +-
- 1 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib-src/etags.c b/lib-src/etags.c
-index 3107c7b..b6f51df 100644
--- a/lib-src/etags.c
-+++ b/lib-src/etags.c
-@@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ static void just_read_file (FILE *);
- 
- static language *get_language_from_langname (const char *);
- static void readline (linebuffer *, FILE *);
-static ptrdiff_t readline_internal (linebuffer *, FILE *, char const *);
-+static ptrdiff_t readline_internal (linebuffer *, FILE *, char const *, const bool);
- static bool nocase_tail (const char *);
- static void get_tag (char *, char **);
- static void get_lispy_tag (char *);
-@@ -399,7 +399,9 @@ static void free_fdesc (fdesc *);
- static void pfnote (char *, bool, char *, ptrdiff_t, intmax_t, intmax_t);
- static void invalidate_nodes (fdesc *, node **);
- static void put_entries (node *);
-+static void clean_matched_file_tag (char const * const, char const * const);
- 
-+static void do_move_file (const char *, const char *);
- static char *concat (const char *, const char *, const char *);
- static char *skip_spaces (char *);
- static char *skip_non_spaces (char *);
-@@ -1332,7 +1334,7 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
- 		  if (parsing_stdin)
- 		    fatal ("cannot parse standard input "
- 			   "AND read file names from it");
-		  while (readline_internal (&filename_lb, stdin, "-") > 0)
-+		  while (readline_internal (&filename_lb, stdin, "-", false) > 0)
- 		    process_file_name (filename_lb.buffer, lang);
- 		}
- 	      else
-@@ -1380,9 +1382,6 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
-   /* From here on, we are in (CTAGS && !cxref_style) */
-   if (update)
-     {
-      char *cmd =
-	xmalloc (strlen (tagfile) + whatlen_max +
-		 sizeof "mv..OTAGS;grep -Fv '\t\t' OTAGS >;rm OTAGS");
-       for (i = 0; i < current_arg; ++i)
- 	{
- 	  switch (argbuffer[i].arg_type)
-@@ -1393,17 +1392,8 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
- 	    default:
- 	      continue;		/* the for loop */
- 	    }
-	  char *z = stpcpy (cmd, "mv ");
-	  z = stpcpy (z, tagfile);
-	  z = stpcpy (z, " OTAGS;grep -Fv '\t");
-	  z = stpcpy (z, argbuffer[i].what);
-	  z = stpcpy (z, "\t' OTAGS >");
-	  z = stpcpy (z, tagfile);
-	  strcpy (z, ";rm OTAGS");
-	  if (system (cmd) != EXIT_SUCCESS)
-	    fatal ("failed to execute shell command");
-+          clean_matched_file_tag (tagfile, argbuffer[i].what);
- 	}
-      free (cmd);
-       append_to_tagfile = true;
-     }
- 
-@@ -1448,6 +1438,51 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
-   return EXIT_SUCCESS;
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * Equivalent to: mv tags OTAGS;grep -Fv ' filename ' OTAGS >tags;rm OTAGS
-+ */
-+static void
-+clean_matched_file_tag (const char* tagfile, const char* match_file_name)
-+{
-+  FILE *otags_f = fopen ("OTAGS", "wb");
-+  FILE *tag_f = fopen (tagfile, "rb");
-+
-+  if (otags_f == NULL)
-+    pfatal ("OTAGS");
-+
-+  if (tag_f == NULL)
-+    pfatal (tagfile);
-+
-+  int buf_len = strlen (match_file_name) + sizeof ("\t\t ") + 1;
-+  char *buf = xmalloc (buf_len);
-+  snprintf (buf, buf_len, "\t%s\t", match_file_name);
-+
-+  linebuffer line;
-+  linebuffer_init (&line);
-+  while (readline_internal (&line, tag_f, tagfile, true) > 0)
-+    {
-+      if (ferror (tag_f))
-+        pfatal (tagfile);
-+
-+      if (strstr (line.buffer, buf) == NULL)
-+        {
-+          fprintf (otags_f, "%s\n", line.buffer);
-+          if (ferror (tag_f))
-+            pfatal (tagfile);
-+        }
-+    }
-+  free (buf);
-+  free (line.buffer);
-+
-+  if (fclose (otags_f) == EOF)
-+    pfatal ("OTAGS");
-+
-+  if (fclose (tag_f) == EOF)
-+    pfatal (tagfile);
-+
-+  do_move_file ("OTAGS", tagfile);
-+  return;
-+}
- 
- /*
-  * Return a compressor given the file name.  If EXTPTR is non-zero,
-@@ -1831,7 +1866,7 @@ find_entries (FILE *inf)
- 
-   /* Else look for sharp-bang as the first two characters. */
-   if (parser == NULL
-      && readline_internal (&lb, inf, infilename) > 0
-+      && readline_internal (&lb, inf, infilename, false) > 0
-       && lb.len >= 2
-       && lb.buffer[0] == '#'
-       && lb.buffer[1] == '!')
-@@ -6878,7 +6913,7 @@ analyze_regex (char *regex_arg)
- 	if (regexfp == NULL)
- 	  pfatal (regexfile);
- 	linebuffer_init (&regexbuf);
-	while (readline_internal (&regexbuf, regexfp, regexfile) > 0)
-+	while (readline_internal (&regexbuf, regexfp, regexfile, false) > 0)
- 	  analyze_regex (regexbuf.buffer);
- 	free (regexbuf.buffer);
- 	if (fclose (regexfp) != 0)
-@@ -7226,11 +7261,13 @@ get_lispy_tag (register char *bp)
- 
- /*
-  * Read a line of text from `stream' into `lbp', excluding the
- * newline or CR-NL, if any.  Return the number of characters read from
- * `stream', which is the length of the line including the newline.
-+ * newline or CR-NL (if `leave_cr` is false), if any.  Return the
-+ * number of characters read from `stream', which is the length
-+ * of the line including the newline.
-  *
- * On DOS or Windows we do not count the CR character, if any before the
- * NL, in the returned length; this mirrors the behavior of Emacs on those
-+ * On DOS or Windows, if `leave_cr` is false, we do not count the
-+ * CR character, if any before the NL, in the returned length;
-+ * this mirrors the behavior of Emacs on those
-  * platforms (for text files, it translates CR-NL to NL as it reads in the
-  * file).
-  *
-@@ -7238,7 +7275,7 @@ get_lispy_tag (register char *bp)
-  * appended to `filebuf'.
-  */
- static ptrdiff_t
-readline_internal (linebuffer *lbp, FILE *stream, char const *filename)
-+readline_internal (linebuffer *lbp, FILE *stream, char const *filename, const bool leave_cr)
- {
-   char *buffer = lbp->buffer;
-   char *p = lbp->buffer;
-@@ -7268,19 +7305,19 @@ readline_internal (linebuffer *lbp, FILE *stream, char const *filename)
- 	  break;
- 	}
-       if (c == '\n')
-	{
-	  if (p > buffer && p[-1] == '\r')
-	    {
-	      p -= 1;
-	      chars_deleted = 2;
-	    }
-	  else
-	    {
-	      chars_deleted = 1;
-	    }
-	  *p = '\0';
-	  break;
-	}
-+        {
-+          if (!leave_cr && p > buffer && p[-1] == '\r')
-+            {
-+              p -= 1;
-+              chars_deleted = 2;
-+            }
-+          else
-+            {
-+              chars_deleted = 1;
-+            }
-+          *p = '\0';
-+          break;
-+        }
-       *p++ = c;
-     }
-   lbp->len = p - buffer;
-@@ -7311,7 +7348,7 @@ static void
- readline (linebuffer *lbp, FILE *stream)
- {
-   linecharno = charno;		/* update global char number of line start */
-  ptrdiff_t result = readline_internal (lbp, stream, infilename);
-+  ptrdiff_t result = readline_internal (lbp, stream, infilename, false);
-   lineno += 1;			/* increment global line number */
-   charno += result;		/* increment global char number */
- 
-@@ -7669,6 +7706,46 @@ etags_mktmp (void)
-   return templt;
- }
- 
-+static void
-+do_move_file(const char *src_file, const char *dst_file)
-+{
-+  if (rename (src_file, dst_file) == 0)
-+    return;
-+
-+  FILE *src_f = fopen (src_file, "rb");
-+  FILE *dst_f = fopen (dst_file, "wb");
-+
-+  if (src_f == NULL)
-+    pfatal (src_file);
-+
-+  if (dst_f == NULL)
-+    pfatal (dst_file);
-+
-+  int c;
-+  while ((c = fgetc (src_f)) != EOF)
-+    {
-+      if (ferror (src_f))
-+        pfatal (src_file);
-+
-+      if (ferror (dst_f))
-+        pfatal (dst_file);
-+
-+      if (fputc (c, dst_f) == EOF)
-+        pfatal ("cannot write");
-+    }
-+
-+  if (fclose (src_f) == EOF)
-+    pfatal (src_file);
-+
-+  if (fclose (dst_f) == EOF)
-+    pfatal (dst_file);
-+
-+  if (unlink (src_file) == -1)
-+    pfatal ("unlink error");
-+
-+  return;
-+}
-+
- /* Return a newly allocated string containing the file name of FILE
-    relative to the absolute directory DIR (which should end with a slash). */
- static char *
-- 
-cgit v1.1
--- a/backport-CVE-2022-48337.patch
+++ b/backport-CVE-2022-48337.patch
@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
-From 01a4035c869b91c153af9a9132c87adb7669ea1c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: lu4nx <lx@shellcodes.org>
-Date: Tue, 6 Dec 2022 15:42:40 +0800
-Subject: Fix etags local command injection vulnerability
-
-* lib-src/etags.c: (escape_shell_arg_string): New function.
-(process_file_name): Use it to quote file names passed to the
-shell.  (Bug#59817)
-
-Reference:https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/emacs.git/commit/?id=01a4035c869b91c153af9a9132c87adb7669ea1c
-Conflict:NA
---
- lib-src/etags.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
- 1 file changed, 58 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib-src/etags.c b/lib-src/etags.c
-index d1d2085..ba0092c 100644
--- a/lib-src/etags.c
-+++ b/lib-src/etags.c
-@@ -401,6 +401,7 @@ static void invalidate_nodes (fdesc *, node **);
- static void put_entries (node *);
- static void clean_matched_file_tag (char const * const, char const * const);
- 
-+static char *escape_shell_arg_string (char *);
- static void do_move_file (const char *, const char *);
- static char *concat (const char *, const char *, const char *);
- static char *skip_spaces (char *);
-@@ -1713,13 +1714,16 @@ process_file_name (char *file, language *lang)
-       else
- 	{
- #if MSDOS || defined (DOS_NT)
-	  char *cmd1 = concat (compr->command, " \"", real_name);
-	  char *cmd = concat (cmd1, "\" > ", tmp_name);
-+          int buf_len = strlen (compr->command) + strlen (" \"\" > \"\"") + strlen (real_name) + strlen (tmp_name) + 1;
-+          char *cmd = xmalloc (buf_len);
-+          snprintf (cmd, buf_len, "%s \"%s\" > \"%s\"", compr->command, real_name, tmp_name);
- #else
-	  char *cmd1 = concat (compr->command, " '", real_name);
-	  char *cmd = concat (cmd1, "' > ", tmp_name);
-+          char *new_real_name = escape_shell_arg_string (real_name);
-+          char *new_tmp_name = escape_shell_arg_string (tmp_name);
-+          int buf_len = strlen (compr->command) + strlen ("  > ") + strlen (new_real_name) + strlen (new_tmp_name) + 1;
-+          char *cmd = xmalloc (buf_len);
-+          snprintf (cmd, buf_len, "%s %s > %s", compr->command, new_real_name, new_tmp_name);
- #endif
-	  free (cmd1);
- 	  inf = (system (cmd) == -1
- 		 ? NULL
- 		 : fopen (tmp_name, "r" FOPEN_BINARY));
-@@ -7707,6 +7711,55 @@ etags_mktmp (void)
-   return templt;
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * Adds single quotes around a string, if found single quotes, escaped it.
-+ * Return a newly-allocated string.
-+ *
-+ * For example:
-+ * escape_shell_arg_string("test.txt") => 'test.txt'
-+ * escape_shell_arg_string("'test.txt") => ''\''test.txt'
-+ */
-+static char *
-+escape_shell_arg_string (char *str)
-+{
-+  char *p = str;
-+  int need_space = 2;           /* ' at begin and end */
-+
-+  while (*p != '\0')
-+    {
-+      if (*p == '\'')
-+        need_space += 4;        /* ' to '\'', length is 4 */
-+      else
-+        need_space++;
-+
-+      p++;
-+    }
-+
-+  char *new_str = xnew (need_space + 1, char);
-+  new_str[0] = '\'';
-+  new_str[need_space-1] = '\'';
-+
-+  int i = 1;                    /* skip first byte */
-+  p = str;
-+  while (*p != '\0')
-+    {
-+      new_str[i] = *p;
-+      if (*p == '\'')
-+        {
-+          new_str[i+1] = '\\';
-+          new_str[i+2] = '\'';
-+          new_str[i+3] = '\'';
-+          i += 3;
-+        }
-+
-+      i++;
-+      p++;
-+    }
-+
-+  new_str[need_space] = '\0';
-+  return new_str;
-+}
-+
- static void
- do_move_file(const char *src_file, const char *dst_file)
- {
-- 
-cgit v1.1
--- a/backport-CVE-2022-48338.patch
+++ b/backport-CVE-2022-48338.patch
@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-From 9a3b08061feea14d6f37685ca1ab8801758bfd1c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Xi Lu <lx@shellcodes.org>
-Date: Fri, 23 Dec 2022 12:52:48 +0800
-Subject: Fix ruby-mode.el local command injection vulnerability (bug#60268)
-
-* lisp/progmodes/ruby-mode.el
-(ruby-find-library-file): Fix local command injection vulnerability.
-
-Reference:https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/emacs.git/commit/?id=9a3b08061feea14d6f37685ca1ab8801758bfd1c
-Conflict:NA
---
- lisp/progmodes/ruby-mode.el | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/lisp/progmodes/ruby-mode.el b/lisp/progmodes/ruby-mode.el
-index 1f3e9b6..a4aa619 100644
--- a/lisp/progmodes/ruby-mode.el
-+++ b/lisp/progmodes/ruby-mode.el
-@@ -1899,7 +1899,7 @@ or `gem' statement around point."
-       (setq feature-name (read-string "Feature name: " init))))
-   (let ((out
-          (substring
-          (shell-command-to-string (concat "gem which " feature-name))
-+          (shell-command-to-string (concat "gem which " (shell-quote-argument feature-name)))
-           0 -1)))
-     (if (string-match-p "\\`ERROR" out)
-         (user-error "%s" out)
-- 
-cgit v1.1
--- a/backport-CVE-2022-48339.patch
+++ b/backport-CVE-2022-48339.patch
@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-From 1b4dc4691c1f87fc970fbe568b43869a15ad0d4c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Xi Lu <lx@shellcodes.org>
-Date: Sat, 24 Dec 2022 16:28:54 +0800
-Subject: Fix htmlfontify.el command injection vulnerability.
-
-* lisp/htmlfontify.el (hfy-text-p): Fix command injection
-vulnerability.  (Bug#60295)
-
-Reference:https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/emacs.git/commit/?id=1b4dc4691c1f87fc970fbe568b43869a15ad0d4c
-Conflict:NA
---
- lisp/htmlfontify.el | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/lisp/htmlfontify.el b/lisp/htmlfontify.el
-index df4c6ab..389b929 100644
--- a/lisp/htmlfontify.el
-+++ b/lisp/htmlfontify.el
-@@ -1850,7 +1850,7 @@ Hardly bombproof, but good enough in the context in which it is being used."
- 
- (defun hfy-text-p (srcdir file)
-   "Is SRCDIR/FILE text?  Use `hfy-istext-command' to determine this."
-  (let* ((cmd (format hfy-istext-command (expand-file-name file srcdir)))
-+  (let* ((cmd (format hfy-istext-command (shell-quote-argument (expand-file-name file srcdir))))
-          (rsp (shell-command-to-string    cmd)))
-     (string-match "text" rsp)))
- 
-- 
-cgit v1.1
--- a/backport-CVE-2023-27985.patch
+++ b/backport-CVE-2023-27985.patch
@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-From d32091199ae5de590a83f1542a01d75fba000467 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Ulrich=20M=C3=BCller?= <ulm@gentoo.org>
-Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2022 16:51:20 +0100
-Subject: Fix quoted argument in emacsclient-mail.desktop Exec key
-
-Apparently the emacsclient-mail.desktop file doesn't conform to the
-Desktop Entry Specification at
-https://specifications.freedesktop.org/desktop-entry-spec/desktop-entry-spec-latest.html#exec-variables
-which says about the Exec key:
-
-| Field codes must not be used inside a quoted argument, the result of
-| field code expansion inside a quoted argument is undefined.
-
-However, the %u field code is used inside a quoted argument of the
-Exec key in both the [Desktop Entry] and [Desktop Action new-window]
-sections.
-* etc/emacsclient-mail.desktop (Exec): The Desktop Entry
-Specification does not allow field codes like %u inside a quoted
-argument. Work around it by passing %u as first parameter ($1)
-to the shell wrapper.
-* etc/emacsclient.desktop (Exec): Use `sh` rather than `placeholder`
-as the command name of the shell wrapper.  (Bug#60204)
---
- etc/emacsclient-mail.desktop | 4 ++--
- etc/emacsclient.desktop      | 2 +-
- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/etc/emacsclient-mail.desktop b/etc/emacsclient-mail.desktop
-index b575a41..91df122 100644
--- a/etc/emacsclient-mail.desktop
-+++ b/etc/emacsclient-mail.desktop
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- [Desktop Entry]
- Categories=Network;Email;
- Comment=GNU Emacs is an extensible, customizable text editor - and more
-Exec=sh -c "exec emacsclient --alternate-editor= --display=\\"\\$DISPLAY\\" --eval \\\\(message-mailto\\\\ \\\\\\"%u\\\\\\"\\\\)"
-+Exec=sh -c "exec emacsclient --alternate-editor= --display=\\"\\$DISPLAY\\" --eval \\"(message-mailto \\\\\\"\\$1\\\\\\")\\"" sh %u
- Icon=emacs
- Name=Emacs (Mail, Client)
- MimeType=x-scheme-handler/mailto;
-@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Actions=new-window;new-instance;
- 
- [Desktop Action new-window]
- Name=New Window
-Exec=emacsclient --alternate-editor= --create-frame --eval "(message-mailto \\"%u\\")"
-+Exec=sh -c "exec emacsclient --alternate-editor= --create-frame --eval \\"(message-mailto \\\\\\"\\$1\\\\\\")\\"" sh %u
- 
- [Desktop Action new-instance]
- Name=New Instance
-diff --git a/etc/emacsclient.desktop b/etc/emacsclient.desktop
-index 1ecdecf..a9f840c7 100644
--- a/etc/emacsclient.desktop
-+++ b/etc/emacsclient.desktop
-@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ Name=Emacs (Client)
- GenericName=Text Editor
- Comment=Edit text
- MimeType=text/english;text/plain;text/x-makefile;text/x-c++hdr;text/x-c++src;text/x-chdr;text/x-csrc;text/x-java;text/x-moc;text/x-pascal;text/x-tcl;text/x-tex;application/x-shellscript;text/x-c;text/x-c++;
-Exec=sh -c "if [ -n \\"\\$*\\" ]; then exec emacsclient --alternate-editor= --display=\\"\\$DISPLAY\\" \\"\\$@\\"; else exec emacsclient --alternate-editor= --create-frame; fi" placeholder %F
-+Exec=sh -c "if [ -n \\"\\$*\\" ]; then exec emacsclient --alternate-editor= --display=\\"\\$DISPLAY\\" \\"\\$@\\"; else exec emacsclient --alternate-editor= --create-frame; fi" sh %F
- Icon=emacs
- Type=Application
- Terminal=false
-- 
-cgit v1.1
--- a/backport-CVE-2023-27986.patch
+++ b/backport-CVE-2023-27986.patch
@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-From 3c1693d08b0a71d40a77e7b40c0ebc42dca2d2cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Ulrich=20M=C3=BCller?= <ulm@gentoo.org>
-Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2023 18:25:37 +0100
-Subject: Fix Elisp code injection vulnerability in emacsclient-mail.desktop
-
-A crafted mailto URI could contain unescaped double-quote
-characters, allowing injection of Elisp code.  Therefore, any
-'\' and '"' characters are replaced by '\\' and '\"', using Bash
-pattern substitution (which is not available in the POSIX shell).
-
-We want to pass literal 'u=${1//\\/\\\\}; u=${u//\"/\\\"};' in the
-bash -c command, but in the desktop entry '"', '$', and '\' must
-be escaped as '\\"', '\\$', and '\\\\', respectively (backslashes
-are expanded twice, see the Desktop Entry Specification).
-
-Reported by Gabriel Corona <gabriel.corona@free.fr>.
-
-* etc/emacsclient-mail.desktop (Exec): Escape backslash and
-double-quote characters.
---
- etc/emacsclient-mail.desktop | 7 +++++--
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/etc/emacsclient-mail.desktop b/etc/emacsclient-mail.desktop
-index 91df122..49c6f99 100644
--- a/etc/emacsclient-mail.desktop
-+++ b/etc/emacsclient-mail.desktop
-@@ -1,7 +1,10 @@
- [Desktop Entry]
- Categories=Network;Email;
- Comment=GNU Emacs is an extensible, customizable text editor - and more
-Exec=sh -c "exec emacsclient --alternate-editor= --display=\\"\\$DISPLAY\\" --eval \\"(message-mailto \\\\\\"\\$1\\\\\\")\\"" sh %u
-+# We want to pass the following commands to the shell wrapper:
-+# u=${1//\\/\\\\}; u=${u//\"/\\\"}; exec emacsclient --alternate-editor= --display="$DISPLAY" --eval "(message-mailto \"$u\")"
-+# Special chars '"', '$', and '\' must be escaped as '\\"', '\\$', and '\\\\'.
-+Exec=bash -c "u=\\${1//\\\\\\\\/\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\}; u=\\${u//\\\\\\"/\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"}; exec emacsclient --alternate-editor= --display=\\"\\$DISPLAY\\" --eval \\"(message-mailto \\\\\\"\\$u\\\\\\")\\"" bash %u
- Icon=emacs
- Name=Emacs (Mail, Client)
- MimeType=x-scheme-handler/mailto;
-@@ -13,7 +16,7 @@ Actions=new-window;new-instance;
- 
- [Desktop Action new-window]
- Name=New Window
-Exec=sh -c "exec emacsclient --alternate-editor= --create-frame --eval \\"(message-mailto \\\\\\"\\$1\\\\\\")\\"" sh %u
-+Exec=bash -c "u=\\${1//\\\\\\\\/\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\}; u=\\${u//\\\\\\"/\\\\\\\\\\\\\\"}; exec emacsclient --alternate-editor= --create-frame --eval \\"(message-mailto \\\\\\"\\$u\\\\\\")\\"" bash %u
- 
- [Desktop Action new-instance]
- Name=New Instance
-- 
-cgit v1.1
--- a/backport-CVE-2024-30202.patch
+++ b/backport-CVE-2024-30202.patch
@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From befa9fcaae29a6c9a283ba371c3c5234c7f644eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ihor Radchenko <yantar92@posteo.net>
+Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2024 12:19:46 +0300
+Subject: org-macro--set-templates: Prevent code evaluation
+
+* lisp/org/org-macro.el (org-macro--set-templates): Get rid of any
+risk to evaluate code when `org-macro--set-templates' is called as a
+part of major mode initialization.  This way, no code evaluation is
+ever triggered when user merely opens the file or when
+`mm-display-org-inline' invokes Org major mode to fontify mime part
+preview in email messages.
+---
+ lisp/org/org-macro.el | 9 ++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lisp/org/org-macro.el b/lisp/org/org-macro.el
+index 776d162..0be51ee 100644
+--- a/lisp/org/org-macro.el
+++ b/lisp/org/org-macro.el
+@@ -109,6 +109,13 @@ previous one, unless VALUE is nil.  Return the updated list."
+   (let ((new-templates nil))
+     (pcase-dolist (`(,name . ,value) templates)
+       (let ((old-definition (assoc name new-templates)))
+        ;; This code can be evaluated unconditionally, as a part of
+        ;; loading Org mode.  We *must not* evaluate any code present
+        ;; inside the Org buffer while loading.  Org buffers may come
+        ;; from various sources, like received email messages from
+        ;; potentially malicious senders.  Org mode might be used to
+        ;; preview such messages and no code evaluation from inside the
+        ;; received Org text should ever happen without user consent.
+         (when (and (stringp value) (string-match-p "\\`(eval\\>" value))
+           ;; Pre-process the evaluation form for faster macro expansion.
+           (let* ((args (org-macro--makeargs value))
+@@ -121,7 +128,7 @@ previous one, unless VALUE is nil.  Return the updated list."
+ 		      (cadr (read value))
+ 		    (error
+                      (user-error "Invalid definition for macro %S" name)))))
+-	    (setq value (eval (macroexpand-all `(lambda ,args ,body)) t))))
+	    (setq value `(lambda ,args ,body))))
+         (cond ((and value old-definition) (setcdr old-definition value))
+ 	      (old-definition)
+ 	      (t (push (cons name (or value "")) new-templates)))))
+-- 
+cgit v1.1
+
--- a/backport-CVE-2024-30203-pre.patch
+++ b/backport-CVE-2024-30203-pre.patch
@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From ccc188fcf98ad9166ee551fac9d94b2603c3a51b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ihor Radchenko <yantar92@posteo.net>
+Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2024 12:43:51 +0300
+Subject: * lisp/files.el (untrusted-content): New variable.
+
+The new variable is to be used when buffer contents comes from untrusted
+source.
+---
+ lisp/files.el | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lisp/files.el b/lisp/files.el
+index c0d26b2..5536af0 100644
+--- a/lisp/files.el
+++ b/lisp/files.el
+@@ -695,6 +695,14 @@ Also see the `permanently-enabled-local-variables' variable."
+ Some modes may wish to set this to nil to prevent directory-local
+ settings being applied, but still respect file-local ones.")
+ 
+(defvar-local untrusted-content nil
+  "Non-nil means that current buffer originated from an untrusted source.
+Email clients and some other modes may set this non-nil to mark the
+buffer contents as untrusted.
+
+This variable might be subject to change without notice.")
+(put 'untrusted-content 'permanent-local t)
+
+ ;; This is an odd variable IMO.
+ ;; You might wonder why it is needed, when we could just do:
+ ;; (setq-local enable-local-variables nil)
+-- 
+cgit v1.1
+
--- a/backport-CVE-2024-30203.patch
+++ b/backport-CVE-2024-30203.patch
@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From 937b9042ad7426acdcca33e3d931d8f495bdd804 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ihor Radchenko <yantar92@posteo.net>
+Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2024 12:44:30 +0300
+Subject: * lisp/gnus/mm-view.el (mm-display-inline-fontify): Mark contents
+ untrusted.
+
+---
+ lisp/gnus/mm-view.el | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/lisp/gnus/mm-view.el b/lisp/gnus/mm-view.el
+index 2e1261c..5f234e5 100644
+--- a/lisp/gnus/mm-view.el
+++ b/lisp/gnus/mm-view.el
+@@ -504,6 +504,7 @@ If MODE is not set, try to find mode automatically."
+ 	  (setq coding-system (mm-find-buffer-file-coding-system)))
+ 	(setq text (buffer-string))))
+     (with-temp-buffer
+      (setq untrusted-content t)
+       (insert (cond ((eq charset 'gnus-decoded)
+ 		     (with-current-buffer (mm-handle-buffer handle)
+ 		       (buffer-string)))
+-- 
+cgit v1.1
+
--- a/backport-CVE-2024-30204.patch
+++ b/backport-CVE-2024-30204.patch
@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+From 6f9ea396f49cbe38c2173e0a72ba6af3e03b271c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ihor Radchenko <yantar92@posteo.net>
+Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2024 12:47:24 +0300
+Subject: org-latex-preview: Add protection when `untrusted-content' is non-nil
+
+* lisp/org/org.el (org--latex-preview-when-risky): New variable
+controlling how to handle LaTeX previews in Org files from untrusted
+origin.
+(org-latex-preview): Consult `org--latex-preview-when-risky' before
+generating previews.
+
+This patch adds a layer of protection when LaTeX preview is requested
+for an email attachment, where `untrusted-content' is set to non-nil.
+---
+ lisp/org/org.el | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lisp/org/org.el b/lisp/org/org.el
+index c75afbf..0f5d17d 100644
+--- a/lisp/org/org.el
+++ b/lisp/org/org.el
+@@ -1140,6 +1140,24 @@ the following lines anywhere in the buffer:
+   :package-version '(Org . "8.0")
+   :type 'boolean)
+ 
+(defvar untrusted-content) ; defined in files.el
+(defvar org--latex-preview-when-risky nil
+  "If non-nil, enable LaTeX preview in Org buffers from unsafe source.
+
+Some specially designed LaTeX code may generate huge pdf or log files
+that may exhaust disk space.
+
+This variable controls how to handle LaTeX preview when rendering LaTeX
+fragments that originate from incoming email messages.  It has no effect
+when Org mode is unable to determine the origin of the Org buffer.
+
+An Org buffer is considered to be from unsafe source when the
+variable `untrusted-content' has a non-nil value in the buffer.
+
+If this variable is non-nil, LaTeX previews are rendered unconditionally.
+
+This variable may be renamed or changed in the future.")
+
+ (defcustom org-insert-mode-line-in-empty-file nil
+   "Non-nil means insert the first line setting Org mode in empty files.
+ When the function `org-mode' is called interactively in an empty file, this
+@@ -15695,6 +15713,7 @@ fragments in the buffer."
+   (interactive "P")
+   (cond
+    ((not (display-graphic-p)) nil)
+   ((and untrusted-content (not org--latex-preview-when-risky)) nil)
+    ;; Clear whole buffer.
+    ((equal arg '(64))
+     (org-clear-latex-preview (point-min) (point-max))
+-- 
+cgit v1.1
+
--- a/backport-CVE-2024-30205.patch
+++ b/backport-CVE-2024-30205.patch
@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From 2bc865ace050ff118db43f01457f95f95112b877 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ihor Radchenko <yantar92@posteo.net>
+Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2024 14:59:20 +0300
+Subject: org-file-contents: Consider all remote files unsafe
+
+* lisp/org/org.el (org-file-contents): When loading files, consider all
+remote files (like TRAMP-fetched files) unsafe, in addition to URLs.
+---
+ lisp/org/org.el | 6 +++++-
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lisp/org/org.el b/lisp/org/org.el
+index 0f5d17d..76559c9 100644
+--- a/lisp/org/org.el
+++ b/lisp/org/org.el
+@@ -4576,12 +4576,16 @@ from file or URL, and return nil.
+ If NOCACHE is non-nil, do a fresh fetch of FILE even if cached version
+ is available.  This option applies only if FILE is a URL."
+   (let* ((is-url (org-url-p file))
+         (is-remote (condition-case nil
+                        (file-remote-p file)
+                      ;; In case of error, be safe.
+                      (t t)))
+          (cache (and is-url
+                      (not nocache)
+                      (gethash file org--file-cache))))
+     (cond
+      (cache)
+-     (is-url
+     ((or is-url is-remote)
+       (if (org--should-fetch-remote-resource-p file)
+           (condition-case error
+               (with-current-buffer (url-retrieve-synchronously file)
+-- 
+cgit v1.1
+
--- a/backport-CVE-2024-39331.patch
+++ b/backport-CVE-2024-39331.patch
@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+From c645e1d8205f0f0663ec4a2d27575b238c646c7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ihor Radchenko <yantar92@posteo.net>
+Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 15:45:25 +0200
+Subject: org-link-expand-abbrev: Do not evaluate arbitrary unsafe Elisp code
+
+* lisp/org/ol.el (org-link-expand-abbrev): Refuse expanding %(...)
+link abbrevs that specify unsafe function.  Instead, display a
+warning, and do not expand the abbrev.  Clear all the text properties
+from the returned link, to avoid any potential vulnerabilities caused
+by properties that may contain arbitrary Elisp.
+---
+ lisp/org/ol.el | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
+ 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lisp/org/ol.el b/lisp/org/ol.el
+index 4c84e62..c34d92b 100644
+--- a/lisp/org/ol.el
+++ b/lisp/org/ol.el
+@@ -1063,17 +1063,35 @@ Abbreviations are defined in `org-link-abbrev-alist'."
+       (if (not as)
+ 	  link
+ 	(setq rpl (cdr as))
+-	(cond
+-	 ((symbolp rpl) (funcall rpl tag))
+-	 ((string-match "%(\\([^)]+\\))" rpl)
+-	  (replace-match
+-	   (save-match-data
+-	     (funcall (intern-soft (match-string 1 rpl)) tag))
+-	   t t rpl))
+-	 ((string-match "%s" rpl) (replace-match (or tag "") t t rpl))
+-	 ((string-match "%h" rpl)
+-	  (replace-match (url-hexify-string (or tag "")) t t rpl))
+-	 (t (concat rpl tag)))))))
+        ;; Drop any potentially dangerous text properties like
+        ;; `modification-hooks' that may be used as an attack vector.
+        (substring-no-properties
+	 (cond
+	  ((symbolp rpl) (funcall rpl tag))
+	  ((string-match "%(\\([^)]+\\))" rpl)
+           (let ((rpl-fun-symbol (intern-soft (match-string 1 rpl))))
+             ;; Using `unsafep-function' is not quite enough because
+             ;; Emacs considers functions like `genenv' safe, while
+             ;; they can potentially be used to expose private system
+             ;; data to attacker if abbreviated link is clicked.
+             (if (or (eq t (get rpl-fun-symbol 'org-link-abbrev-safe))
+                     (eq t (get rpl-fun-symbol 'pure)))
+                 (replace-match
+	          (save-match-data
+	            (funcall (intern-soft (match-string 1 rpl)) tag))
+	          t t rpl)
+               (org-display-warning
+                (format "Disabling unsafe link abbrev: %s
+You may mark function safe via (put '%s 'org-link-abbrev-safe t)"
+                        rpl (match-string 1 rpl)))
+               (setq org-link-abbrev-alist-local (delete as org-link-abbrev-alist-local)
+                     org-link-abbrev-alist (delete as org-link-abbrev-alist))
+               link
+	       )))
+	  ((string-match "%s" rpl) (replace-match (or tag "") t t rpl))
+	  ((string-match "%h" rpl)
+	   (replace-match (url-hexify-string (or tag "")) t t rpl))
+	  (t (concat rpl tag))))))))
+ 
+ (defun org-link-open (link &optional arg)
+   "Open a link object LINK.
+-- 
+cgit v1.1
+
--- a/backport-CVE-2025-1244.patch
+++ b/backport-CVE-2025-1244.patch
@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From 820f0793f0b46448928905552726c1f1b999062f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Xi Lu <lx@shellcodes.org>
+Date: Tue, 10 Oct 2023 22:20:05 +0800
+Subject: Fix man.el shell injection vulnerability
+
+* lisp/man.el (Man-translate-references): Fix shell injection
+vulnerability.  (Bug#66390)
+* test/lisp/man-tests.el (man-tests-Man-translate-references): New
+test.
+
+Reference:https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/emacs.git/commit/?id=820f0793f0b46448928905552726c1f1b999062f
+Conflict:NA
+
+---
+ lisp/man.el            |  6 +++++-
+ test/lisp/man-tests.el | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lisp/man.el b/lisp/man.el
+index 55cb938..d963964 100644
+--- a/lisp/man.el
+++ b/lisp/man.el
+@@ -761,7 +761,11 @@ and the `Man-section-translations-alist' variables)."
+       (setq name (match-string 2 ref)
+ 	    section (match-string 1 ref))))
+     (if (string= name "")
+-	ref				; Return the reference as is
+        ;; see Bug#66390
+	(mapconcat 'identity
+                   (mapcar #'shell-quote-argument
+                           (split-string ref "\\s-+"))
+                   " ")                 ; Return the reference as is
+       (if Man-downcase-section-letters-flag
+ 	  (setq section (downcase section)))
+       (while slist
+diff --git a/test/lisp/man-tests.el b/test/lisp/man-tests.el
+index 140482e..11f5f80 100644
+--- a/test/lisp/man-tests.el
+++ b/test/lisp/man-tests.el
+@@ -161,6 +161,18 @@ DESCRIPTION
+           (let ((button (button-at (match-beginning 0))))
+             (should (and button (eq 'Man-xref-header-file (button-type button))))))))))
+ 
+(ert-deftest man-tests-Man-translate-references ()
+  (should (equal (Man-translate-references "basename")
+                 "basename"))
+  (should (equal (Man-translate-references "basename(3)")
+                 "3 basename"))
+  (should (equal (Man-translate-references "basename(3v)")
+                 "3v basename"))
+  (should (equal (Man-translate-references ";id")
+                 "\\;id"))
+  (should (equal (Man-translate-references "-k basename")
+                 "-k basename")))
+
+ (provide 'man-tests)
+ 
+ ;;; man-tests.el ends here
+-- 
+cgit v1.1
+
--- a/emacs-29.1.tar.xz
+++ b/emacs-29.1.tar.xz
--- a/emacs-add-sw64-support.patch
+++ b/emacs-add-sw64-support.patch
@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From 8fe8fef3274d006bd01900b8aee838c229e81cbd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: mahailiang <mahailiang@uniontech.com>
+Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2024 09:46:14 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] add sw64 support
+
+---
+ configure.ac           | 2 +-
+ src/unexelf.c          | 8 +++++++-
+ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index ad1068a..dce63ff 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -740,7 +740,7 @@ case "${canonical}" in
+   *-apple-darwin* )
+     case "${canonical}" in
+       *-apple-darwin[0-9].*) unported=yes ;;
+-      i[3456]86-* | x86_64-* | arm-* | aarch64-* )  ;;
+      i[3456]86-* | x86_64-* | arm-* | sw_64-* | aarch64-* )  ;;
+       * )            unported=yes ;;
+     esac
+     opsys=darwin
+diff --git a/src/unexelf.c b/src/unexelf.c
+index 607ac0c..da5cbd6 100644
+--- a/src/unexelf.c
+++ b/src/unexelf.c
+@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ /*
+  * NetBSD does not have normal-looking user-land ELF support.
+  */
+-# if defined __alpha__ || defined __sparc_v9__ || defined _LP64
+# if defined __alpha__ || defined __sparc_v9__ || defined _LP64 || defined __sw_64__
+ #  define ELFSIZE	64
+ # else
+ #  define ELFSIZE	32
+@@ -150,6 +150,12 @@ typedef struct {
+ #  define pHDRR		HDRR *
+ # endif /* __alpha__ */
+ 
+# ifdef __sw_64__
+#  include <sys/exec_ecoff.h>
+#  define HDRR		struct ecoff_symhdr
+#  define pHDRR		HDRR *
+# endif /* __sw_64__ */
+
+ #ifdef __mips__			/* was in pkgsrc patches for 20.7 */
+ # define SHT_MIPS_DEBUG	DT_MIPS_FLAGS
+ # define HDRR		struct Elf_Shdr
+-- 
+2.39.3
+
--- a/emacs.spec
+++ b/emacs.spec
@ -7,7 +7,7 @@

 Name:          emacs
 Epoch:         1
-Version:       28.2
+Version:       29.1
 Release:       5
 Summary:       An extensible GNU text editor
 License:       GPLv3+ and CC0-1.0
@ -26,18 +26,16 @@ Source7:       emacs-terminal.desktop
 Patch6001:        emacs-spellchecker.patch
 #https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/emacs/blob/rawhide/f/emacs-system-crypto-policies.patch
 Patch6002:        emacs-system-crypto-policies.patch
-
-Patch6003:        backport-CVE-2022-45939.patch
-Patch6004:        backport-CVE-2022-48337.patch
-Patch6005:        backport-CVE-2022-48338.patch
-Patch6006:        backport-CVE-2022-48339.patch
-Patch6007:        backport-CVE-2023-27985.patch
-Patch6008:        backport-CVE-2023-27986.patch
-Patch6009:        backport-0001-CVE-2023-28617.patch
-Patch6010:        backport-0002-CVE-2023-28617.patch
-Patch6011:        backport-0002-CVE-2022-48337.patch
+Patch6003:        backport-CVE-2024-30202.patch
+Patch6004:        backport-CVE-2024-30203-pre.patch
+Patch6005:        backport-CVE-2024-30203.patch
+Patch6006:        backport-CVE-2024-30204.patch
+Patch6007:        backport-CVE-2024-30205.patch
+Patch6008:        backport-CVE-2024-39331.patch
+Patch6009:        backport-CVE-2025-1244.patch

 Patch9000:        emacs-deal-taboo-words.patch
+Patch9001:	      emacs-add-sw64-support.patch

 BuildRequires: gcc atk-devel cairo-devel freetype-devel fontconfig-devel dbus-devel giflib-devel
 BuildRequires: glibc-devel zlib-devel gnutls-devel libselinux-devel GConf2-devel alsa-lib-devel
@ -169,7 +167,7 @@ ln -s ../../%{name}/%{version}/etc/COPYING doc
 ln -s ../../%{name}/%{version}/etc/NEWS doc

 %build
-%ifarch loongarch64
+%ifarch loongarch64 sw_64
 %_update_config_guess
 %_update_config_sub
 %endif
@ -243,7 +241,7 @@ cd ..
 rm %{buildroot}%{_bindir}/emacs
 touch %{buildroot}%{_bindir}/emacs

-rm %{buildroot}%{emacs_libexecdir}/emacs.pdmp
+rm %{buildroot}%{emacs_libexecdir}/emacs-*.pdmp

 gunzip %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/emacs/%{version}/lisp/jka*.el.gz

@ -420,6 +418,21 @@ fi
 %{_mandir}/*/*

 %changelog
+* Wed Mar 12 2025 mahailiang <mahailiang@uniontech.com> - 1:29.1-5
+- add sw_64 support
+
+* Thu Feb 13 2025 zhangpan <zhangpan103@h-partners.com> - 1:29.1-4
+- fix CVE-2025-1244
+
+* Tue Jul 02 2024 zhangpan <zhangpan103@h-partners.com> - 1:29.1-3
+- fix CVE-2024-39331
+
+* Mon Apr 01 2024 lingsheng <lingsheng1@h-partners.com> - 1:29.1-2
+- fix CVE-2024-30202 CVE-2024-30203 CVE-2024-30204 CVE-2024-30205
+
+* Tue Jan 23 2024 zhangpan <zhangpan103@h-partners.com> - 1:29.1-1
+- update to 29.1
+
 * Mon Sep 25 2023 leeffo <liweiganga@uniontech.com> - 1:28.2-5
 - fix CVE-2022-48337
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
openeuler-ci-bot	20087d728b	!133 [sync] PR-131: add sw_64 support From: @openeuler-sync-bot Reviewed-by: @weidongkl Signed-off-by: @weidongkl	2025-03-13 06:14:52 +00:00
Hailiang	08ff4fbe82	update emacs.spec. Signed-off-by: Hailiang <mahailiang@uniontech.com> (cherry picked from commit e470d16f18baa6d1e714a661c40e39ba880ad4d4)	2025-03-13 09:09:03 +08:00
Hailiang	aafcdc4975	add sw_64 support (cherry picked from commit 24976793faf51fb6d7514c65e967739910af029c)	2025-03-13 09:09:03 +08:00
openeuler-ci-bot	16e036447b	!125 fix CVE-2025-1244 From: @zppzhangpan Reviewed-by: @yanan-rock Signed-off-by: @yanan-rock	2025-02-17 07:20:07 +00:00
zhangpan	7b001effa7	fix CVE-2025-1244	2025-02-13 06:34:29 +00:00
openeuler-ci-bot	6fc82d3e0c	!114 [sync] PR-111: fix CVE-2024-39331 From: @openeuler-sync-bot Reviewed-by: @t_feng Signed-off-by: @t_feng	2024-07-03 01:10:27 +00:00
zhangpan	1181e6c3c9	fix CVE-2024-39331 (cherry picked from commit 8b1147dc99256511c7d456db5045cfe8fcee5b8c)	2024-07-02 17:23:59 +08:00
openeuler-ci-bot	f133572b7e	!99 [sync] PR-98: fix CVE-2024-30202 CVE-2024-30203 CVE-2024-30204 CVE-2024-30205 From: @openeuler-sync-bot Reviewed-by: @t_feng Signed-off-by: @t_feng	2024-04-02 06:09:34 +00:00
lingsheng	5e6d56db96	fix CVE-2024-30202 CVE-2024-30203 CVE-2024-30204 CVE-2024-30205 (cherry picked from commit 2579dacb55a0102c3e1636dede4be3a21b797e0a)	2024-04-01 17:14:46 +08:00
openeuler-ci-bot	ae5d41fb37	!91 update to 29.1 From: @zppzhangpan Reviewed-by: @yanan-rock Signed-off-by: @yanan-rock	2024-02-06 07:45:49 +00:00
zhangpan	92c4b308de	update to 29.1	2024-01-23 09:26:01 +00:00