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Fix some CVE

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CVE-2023-3446、CVE-2023-3817、CVE-2024-0727、CVE-2023-2975、CVE-2023-6129

Signed-off-by: yexiao <yexiao7@huawei.com>
This commit is contained in:
yexiao 2024-01-26 10:32:43 +08:00 committed by MaYunlong
parent d36cfacf44
commit 73840139ff
10 changed files with 662 additions and 1 deletions
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69
0003-Add-testcases-for-empty-associated-data-entries-with.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
From 02ea09fc1e2ca35033db52384543c47329d3566f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Date: Tue, 4 Jul 2023 17:50:37 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/9] Add testcases for empty associated data entries with
AES-SIV
CVE-2023-2975
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
reference: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21384
Signed-off-by: yexiao <yexiao7@huawei.com>
---
.../30-test_evp_data/evpciph_aes_siv.txt | 31 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 31 insertions(+)
diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph_aes_siv.txt b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph_aes_siv.txt
index a78a4915..e434f13f 100644
--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph_aes_siv.txt
+++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph_aes_siv.txt
@@ -20,6 +20,19 @@ Tag = 85632d07c6e8f37f950acd320a2ecc93
Plaintext = 112233445566778899aabbccddee
Ciphertext = 40c02b9690c4dc04daef7f6afe5c
+Cipher = aes-128-siv
+Key = fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff
+Tag = f1c5fdeac1f15a26779c1501f9fb7588
+Plaintext = 112233445566778899aabbccddee
+Ciphertext = 27e946c669088ab06da58c5c831c
+
+Cipher = aes-128-siv
+Key = fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff
+AAD =
+Tag = d1022f5b3664e5a4dfaf90f85be6f28a
+Plaintext = 112233445566778899aabbccddee
+Ciphertext = b66cff6b8eca0b79f083b39a0901
+
Cipher = aes-128-siv
Key = 7f7e7d7c7b7a79787776757473727170404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f
AAD = 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeffdeaddadadeaddadaffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100
@@ -29,6 +42,24 @@ Tag = 7bdb6e3b432667eb06f4d14bff2fbd0f
Plaintext = 7468697320697320736f6d6520706c61696e7465787420746f20656e6372797074207573696e67205349562d414553
Ciphertext = cb900f2fddbe404326601965c889bf17dba77ceb094fa663b7a3f748ba8af829ea64ad544a272e9c485b62a3fd5c0d
+Cipher = aes-128-siv
+Key = 7f7e7d7c7b7a79787776757473727170404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f
+AAD = 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeffdeaddadadeaddadaffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100
+AAD =
+AAD = 09f911029d74e35bd84156c5635688c0
+Tag = 83ce6593a8fa67eb6fcd2819cedfc011
+Plaintext = 7468697320697320736f6d6520706c61696e7465787420746f20656e6372797074207573696e67205349562d414553
+Ciphertext = 30d937b42f71f71f93fc2d8d702d3eac8dc7651eefcd81120081ff29d626f97f3de17f2969b691c91b69b652bf3a6d
+
+Cipher = aes-128-siv
+Key = 7f7e7d7c7b7a79787776757473727170404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f
+AAD =
+AAD = 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeffdeaddadadeaddadaffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100
+AAD = 09f911029d74e35bd84156c5635688c0
+Tag = 77dd4a44f5a6b41302121ee7f378de25
+Plaintext = 7468697320697320736f6d6520706c61696e7465787420746f20656e6372797074207573696e67205349562d414553
+Ciphertext = 0fcd664c922464c88939d71fad7aefb864e501b0848a07d39201c1067a7288f3dadf0131a823a0bc3d588e8564a5fe
+
Cipher = aes-192-siv
Key = fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfefffffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0
AAD = 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f2021222324252627
--
2.33.0

57
0004-Do-not-ignore-empty-associated-data-with-AES-SIV-mod.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
From 7058d271753e1c2ca7d9384e09fd84b98e92c440 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Date: Tue, 4 Jul 2023 17:30:35 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/9] Do not ignore empty associated data with AES-SIV mode
The AES-SIV mode allows for multiple associated data items
authenticated separately with any of these being 0 length.
The provided implementation ignores such empty associated data
which is incorrect in regards to the RFC 5297 and is also
a security issue because such empty associated data then become
unauthenticated if an application expects to authenticate them.
Fixes CVE-2023-2975
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
reference: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21384
Signed-off-by: yexiao <yexiao7@huawei.com>
---
.../implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c | 18 +++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
index 45010b90..b396c865 100644
--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
+++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
@@ -120,14 +120,18 @@ static int siv_cipher(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
return 0;
- if (inl == 0) {
- *outl = 0;
- return 1;
- }
+ /* Ignore just empty encryption/decryption call and not AAD. */
+ if (out != NULL) {
+ if (inl == 0) {
+ if (outl != NULL)
+ *outl = 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
- if (outsize < inl) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
- return 0;
+ if (outsize < inl) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
+ }
}
if (ctx->hw->cipher(ctx, out, in, inl) <= 0)
--
2.33.0

63
0005-Add-a-test-for-CVE-2023-3446.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
From 3a2feb831096ede8621a9ae9053b48f732dc30b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 7 Jul 2023 14:39:48 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 3/9] Add a test for CVE-2023-3446
Confirm that the only errors DH_check() finds with DH parameters with an
excessively long modulus is that the modulus is too large. We should not
be performing time consuming checks using that modulus.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
reference: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21451
Signed-off-by: yexiao <yexiao7@huawei.com>
---
.../Library/OpensslLib/openssl/test/dhtest.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/test/dhtest.c b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/test/dhtest.c
index 7b587f3c..f8dd8f3a 100644
--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/test/dhtest.c
+++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/test/dhtest.c
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static int dh_test(void)
goto err1;
/* check fails, because p is way too small */
- if (!DH_check(dh, &i))
+ if (!TEST_true(DH_check(dh, &i)))
goto err2;
i ^= DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL;
if (!TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME)
@@ -124,6 +124,17 @@ static int dh_test(void)
/* We'll have a stale error on the queue from the above test so clear it */
ERR_clear_error();
+ /* Modulus of size: dh check max modulus bits + 1 */
+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 1))
+ || !TEST_true(BN_lshift(p, p, OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)))
+ goto err3;
+
+ /*
+ * We expect no checks at all for an excessively large modulus
+ */
+ if (!TEST_false(DH_check(dh, &i)))
+ goto err3;
+
/*
* II) key generation
*/
@@ -138,7 +149,7 @@ static int dh_test(void)
goto err3;
/* ... and check whether it is valid */
- if (!DH_check(a, &i))
+ if (!TEST_true(DH_check(a, &i)))
goto err3;
if (!TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME)
|| !TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME)
--
2.33.0

74
0006-Fix-DH_check-excessive-time-with-over-sized-modulus.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
From 96452ca9276610c46b7cb61f9efaf787bea627d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 16:36:35 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 4/9] Fix DH_check() excessive time with over sized modulus
The DH_check() function checks numerous aspects of the key or parameters
that have been supplied. Some of those checks use the supplied modulus
value even if it is excessively large.
There is already a maximum DH modulus size (10,000 bits) over which
OpenSSL will not generate or derive keys. DH_check() will however still
perform various tests for validity on such a large modulus. We introduce a
new maximum (32,768) over which DH_check() will just fail.
An application that calls DH_check() and supplies a key or parameters
obtained from an untrusted source could be vulnerable to a Denial of
Service attack.
The function DH_check() is itself called by a number of other OpenSSL
functions. An application calling any of those other functions may
similarly be affected. The other functions affected by this are
DH_check_ex() and EVP_PKEY_param_check().
CVE-2023-3446
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
reference: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21451
Signed-off-by: yexiao <yexiao7@huawei.com>
---
CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_check.c | 6 ++++++
CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/include/openssl/dh.h | 6 +++++-
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
index 0b391910..84a92699 100644
--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
@@ -152,6 +152,12 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
if (nid != NID_undef)
return 1;
+ /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
+ if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (!DH_check_params(dh, ret))
return 0;
diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/include/openssl/dh.h b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/include/openssl/dh.h
index b97871ec..36420f51 100644
--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/include/openssl/dh.h
+++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/include/openssl/dh.h
@@ -89,7 +89,11 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_dh_kdf_ukm(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **ukm);
# include <openssl/dherr.h>
# ifndef OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
-# define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
+# define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
+# define OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 32768
# endif
# define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024
--
2.33.0

39
0007-Make-DH_check-set-some-error-bits-in-recently-added-.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
From 66ed0773fff248363b63273f78de8fe6da87a8b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Date: Sun, 23 Jul 2023 14:27:54 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 5/9] Make DH_check set some error bits in recently added error
The pre-existing error cases where DH_check returned zero
are not related to the dh params in any way, but are only
triggered by out-of-memory errors, therefore having *ret
set to zero feels right, but since the new error case is
triggered by too large p values that is something different.
On the other hand some callers of this function might not
be prepared to handle the return value correctly but only
rely on *ret. Therefore we set some error bits in *ret as
additional safety measure.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
reference: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21524
Signed-off-by: yexiao <yexiao7@huawei.com>
---
CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_check.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
index 84a92699..aef6f9b1 100644
--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
@@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
/* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ *ret = DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE | DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME;
return 0;
}
--
2.33.0

60
0008-DH_check-Do-not-try-checking-q-properties-if-it-is-o.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
From 7d3ba65d3f707ba29c854e6b1c73a68c941041ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2023 15:22:48 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 6/9] DH_check(): Do not try checking q properties if it is
obviously invalid
If |q| >= |p| then the q value is obviously wrong as q
is supposed to be a prime divisor of p-1.
We check if p is overly large so this added test implies that
q is not large either when performing subsequent tests using that
q value.
Otherwise if it is too large these additional checks of the q value
such as the primality test can then trigger DoS by doing overly long
computations.
Fixes CVE-2023-3817
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
reference: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21550
Signed-off-by: yexiao <yexiao7@huawei.com>
---
.../Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_check.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
index aef6f9b1..fbe27975 100644
--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
return DH_check_params(dh, ret);
#else
- int ok = 0, r;
+ int ok = 0, r, q_good = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL;
int nid = DH_get_nid((DH *)dh);
@@ -172,6 +172,13 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
goto err;
if (dh->params.q != NULL) {
+ if (BN_ucmp(dh->params.p, dh->params.q) > 0)
+ q_good = 1;
+ else
+ *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE;
+ }
+
+ if (q_good) {
if (BN_cmp(dh->params.g, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
*ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
else if (BN_cmp(dh->params.g, dh->params.p) >= 0)
--
2.33.0

52
0009-dhtest.c-Add-test-of-DH_check-with-q-p-1.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
From 6f3b1ae0a836880038787a1315b5b815f2951c8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2023 15:23:43 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 7/9] dhtest.c: Add test of DH_check() with q = p + 1
This must fail with DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE and
with DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME unset.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
reference: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21550
Signed-off-by: yexiao <yexiao7@huawei.com>
---
CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/test/dhtest.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/test/dhtest.c b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/test/dhtest.c
index f8dd8f3a..d02b3b7c 100644
--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/test/dhtest.c
+++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/test/dhtest.c
@@ -124,6 +124,15 @@ static int dh_test(void)
/* We'll have a stale error on the queue from the above test so clear it */
ERR_clear_error();
+ if (!TEST_ptr(BN_copy(q, p)) || !TEST_true(BN_add(q, q, BN_value_one())))
+ goto err3;
+
+ if (!TEST_true(DH_check(dh, &i)))
+ goto err3;
+ if (!TEST_true(i & DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE)
+ || !TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME))
+ goto err3;
+
/* Modulus of size: dh check max modulus bits + 1 */
if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 1))
|| !TEST_true(BN_lshift(p, p, OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)))
@@ -135,6 +144,9 @@ static int dh_test(void)
if (!TEST_false(DH_check(dh, &i)))
goto err3;
+ /* We'll have a stale error on the queue from the above test so clear it */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
/*
* II) key generation
*/
--
2.33.0

123
0010-Add-NULL-checks-where-ContentInfo-data-can-be-NULL.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
From 6b5fa79607808b28830ac267253dfbf6ed9c463c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: liwei <liwei3013@126.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2024 18:45:28 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] Add NULL checks where ContentInfo data can be NULL
PKCS12 structures contain PKCS7 ContentInfo fields. These fields are
optional and can be NULL even if the "type" is a valid value. OpenSSL
was not properly accounting for this and a NULL dereference can occur
causing a crash.
CVE-2024-0727
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
reference: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/09df4395b5071217b76dc7d3d2e630eb8c5a79c2
Signed-off-by: yexiao <yexiao7@huawei.com>
---
.../OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
.../openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c | 5 +++++
.../openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c | 5 +++--
.../OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c | 7 +++++--
4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
index 6fd4184a..80ce31b3 100644
--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
+++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
@@ -78,6 +78,12 @@ STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7data(PKCS7 *p7)
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
return NULL;
}
+
+ if (p7->d.data == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
return ASN1_item_unpack(p7->d.data, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS));
}
@@ -150,6 +156,12 @@ STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(PKCS7 *p7, const char *pass,
{
if (!PKCS7_type_is_encrypted(p7))
return NULL;
+
+ if (p7->d.encrypted == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
return PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i_ex(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS),
pass, passlen,
@@ -188,6 +200,12 @@ STACK_OF(PKCS7) *PKCS12_unpack_authsafes(const PKCS12 *p12)
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
return NULL;
}
+
+ if (p12->authsafes->d.data == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
p7s = ASN1_item_unpack(p12->authsafes->d.data,
ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_AUTHSAFES));
if (p7s != NULL) {
diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
index afdb8d68..67be81eb 100644
--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
+++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
@@ -98,6 +98,11 @@ static int pkcs12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
return 0;
}
+ if (p12->authsafes->d.data == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
salt = p12->mac->salt->data;
saltlen = p12->mac->salt->length;
if (p12->mac->iter == NULL)
diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c
index 62230bc6..1e5b5495 100644
--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c
+++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c
@@ -77,8 +77,9 @@ static int newpass_p12(PKCS12 *p12, const char *oldpass, const char *newpass)
bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7);
} else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, oldpass, -1);
- if (!alg_get(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
- &pbe_nid, &pbe_iter, &pbe_saltlen))
+ if (p7->d.encrypted == NULL
+ || !alg_get(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
+ &pbe_nid, &pbe_iter, &pbe_saltlen))
goto err;
} else {
continue;
diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c
index 49a0da5f..8228315e 100644
--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c
+++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c
@@ -33,10 +33,13 @@ int SMIME_write_PKCS7(BIO *bio, PKCS7 *p7, BIO *data, int flags)
int ctype_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
const PKCS7_CTX *ctx = ossl_pkcs7_get0_ctx(p7);
- if (ctype_nid == NID_pkcs7_signed)
+ if (ctype_nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) {
+ if (p7->d.sign == NULL)
+ return 0;
mdalgs = p7->d.sign->md_algs;
- else
+ } else {
mdalgs = NULL;
+ }
flags ^= SMIME_OLDMIME;
--
2.33.0

112
0011-poly1305-ppc.pl-Fix-vector-register-clobbering.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
From 1df7dcaa6684420a74e6f935e0b5290fb616d5a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rohan McLure <rmclure@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 10:25:50 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 9/9] poly1305-ppc.pl: Fix vector register clobbering
Fixes CVE-2023-6129
The POLY1305 MAC (message authentication code) implementation in OpenSSL for
PowerPC CPUs saves the the contents of vector registers in different order
than they are restored. Thus the contents of some of these vector registers
is corrupted when returning to the caller. The vulnerable code is used only
on newer PowerPC processors supporting the PowerISA 2.07 instructions.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
reference: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23200
Signed-off-by: yexiao <yexiao7@huawei.com>
---
.../crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl | 42 +++++++++----------
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl
index 9f86134d..2e601bb9 100755
--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl
+++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl
@@ -744,7 +744,7 @@ ___
my $LOCALS= 6*$SIZE_T;
my $VSXFRAME = $LOCALS + 6*$SIZE_T;
$VSXFRAME += 128; # local variables
- $VSXFRAME += 13*16; # v20-v31 offload
+ $VSXFRAME += 12*16; # v20-v31 offload
my $BIG_ENDIAN = ($flavour !~ /le/) ? 4 : 0;
@@ -919,12 +919,12 @@ __poly1305_blocks_vsx:
addi r11,r11,32
stvx v22,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
- stvx v23,r10,$sp
- addi r10,r10,32
- stvx v24,r11,$sp
+ stvx v23,r11,$sp
addi r11,r11,32
- stvx v25,r10,$sp
+ stvx v24,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
+ stvx v25,r11,$sp
+ addi r11,r11,32
stvx v26,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
stvx v27,r11,$sp
@@ -1153,12 +1153,12 @@ __poly1305_blocks_vsx:
addi r11,r11,32
stvx v22,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
- stvx v23,r10,$sp
- addi r10,r10,32
- stvx v24,r11,$sp
+ stvx v23,r11,$sp
addi r11,r11,32
- stvx v25,r10,$sp
+ stvx v24,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
+ stvx v25,r11,$sp
+ addi r11,r11,32
stvx v26,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
stvx v27,r11,$sp
@@ -1899,26 +1899,26 @@ Ldone_vsx:
mtspr 256,r12 # restore vrsave
lvx v20,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
- lvx v21,r10,$sp
- addi r10,r10,32
- lvx v22,r11,$sp
+ lvx v21,r11,$sp
addi r11,r11,32
- lvx v23,r10,$sp
+ lvx v22,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
- lvx v24,r11,$sp
+ lvx v23,r11,$sp
addi r11,r11,32
- lvx v25,r10,$sp
+ lvx v24,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
- lvx v26,r11,$sp
+ lvx v25,r11,$sp
addi r11,r11,32
- lvx v27,r10,$sp
+ lvx v26,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
- lvx v28,r11,$sp
+ lvx v27,r11,$sp
addi r11,r11,32
- lvx v29,r10,$sp
+ lvx v28,r10,$sp
addi r10,r10,32
- lvx v30,r11,$sp
- lvx v31,r10,$sp
+ lvx v29,r11,$sp
+ addi r11,r11,32
+ lvx v30,r10,$sp
+ lvx v31,r11,$sp
$POP r27,`$VSXFRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp)
$POP r28,`$VSXFRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp)
$POP r29,`$VSXFRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp)
--
2.33.0

14
edk2.spec
View File

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
Name: edk2
Version: %{stable_date}
Release: 2
Release: 3
Summary: EFI Development Kit II
License: BSD-2-Clause-Patent and OpenSSL and MIT
URL: https://github.com/tianocore/edk2
@ -20,6 +20,15 @@ Source5: edk2-ovmf-x64-nosb.json
patch0: 0001-OvmfPkg-VirtioNetDxe-Extend-the-RxBufferSize-to-avoi.patch
patch1: 0002-add-Wno-maybe-uninitialized-to-fix-build-error.patch
patch2: 0003-Add-testcases-for-empty-associated-data-entries-with.patch
patch3: 0004-Do-not-ignore-empty-associated-data-with-AES-SIV-mod.patch
patch4: 0005-Add-a-test-for-CVE-2023-3446.patch
patch5: 0006-Fix-DH_check-excessive-time-with-over-sized-modulus.patch
patch6: 0007-Make-DH_check-set-some-error-bits-in-recently-added-.patch
patch7: 0008-DH_check-Do-not-try-checking-q-properties-if-it-is-o.patch
patch8: 0009-dhtest.c-Add-test-of-DH_check-with-q-p-1.patch
patch9: 0010-Add-NULL-checks-where-ContentInfo-data-can-be-NULL.patch
patch10: 0011-poly1305-ppc.pl-Fix-vector-register-clobbering.patch
BuildRequires: acpica-tools gcc gcc-c++ libuuid-devel python3 bc nasm python3-unversioned-command isl
@ -257,6 +266,9 @@ chmod +x %{buildroot}%{_bindir}/Rsa2048Sha256GenerateKeys
%endif
%changelog
* Sat Feb 24 2024 yexiao <yexiao7@huawei.com> - 202308-3
- Fix CVE-2023-3446、CVE-2023-3817、CVE-2024-0727、CVE-2023-2975、CVE-2023-6129
* Thu Jan 25 2024 duyiwei <duyiwei@kylinos.cn> - 202308-2
- Added firmware scanning directory mapping for libvirt XML